Allstate Insurance Company v. Tucknott Electric Co., Incorporated et al, No. 3:2014cv01804 - Document 30 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
Court Description: CORRECTED ORDER granting 18 Motion for Abstention from Hearing Declaratory Relief Action. Case is dismissed without prejudice. Signed by Judge Samuel Conti on October 23, 2014. (sclc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 10/24/2014)
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Allstate Insurance Company v. Tucknott Electric Co., Incorporated et al Doc. 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 ) ) ) Plaintiff, ) v. ) ) TUCKNOTT ELECTRIC CO., INC.; ) ROBERT ALLEN TUCKNOTT, JOSE SAMUEL ) MOLINA, and ELIDIA DIAZ MOLINA ) ) Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO. 10 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 9 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Case No. 14-CV-01804 SC ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ABSTENTION FROM HEARING DECLARATORY RELIEF ACTION 19 20 I. 21 INTRODUCTION Now before the Court is Defendants Samuel Molina and Elidia 22 Diaz Molina's motion seeking abstention from hearing this 23 declaratory relief action filed by Plaintiff Allstate Insurance 24 Company ("Allstate"). 25 Tucknott joins in the motion. 26 is opposed, fully briefed,1 and appropriate for resolution without 27 oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). 28 1 ECF No. 18 ("Mot."). Defendant Robert ECF No. 21 ("Joinder"). The motion For the reasons ECF Nos. 20 ("Opp'n"); 22 ("Reply"). Dockets.Justia.com 1 set forth below the motion is GRANTED and the complaint is 2 DISMISSED without prejudice. 3 4 5 II. BACKGROUND This is an insurance coverage dispute arising from an 6 automobile-bicycle accident. Tucknott was driving his automobile 7 when his vehicle struck the Molinas. 8 Molinas filed suit in state court ("the Underlying Action") against 9 Tucknott and several of his companies, including Tucknott Electric, Following the accident, the United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 which was the named insured in an Allstate Business Auto Policy 11 ("the Policy"). 12 Tucknott tendered the suit to Allstate. 13 Tucknott and Tucknott Electric, while nevertheless reserving the 14 right to argue that no coverage exists. 15 After the suit was filed, Tucknott Electric and Allstate agreed to defend Allstate then brought this declaratory judgment action seeking 16 a court order resolving its coverage obligations. In this motion, 17 Defendants argue that the Court should decline to hear Allstate's 18 declaratory judgment action, and instead dismiss the case in favor 19 of having the issue heard in state court. 20 21 III. LEGAL STANDARDS 22 A. Declaratory Judgment 23 The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 2201(a) 24 provides that "[i]n a case of actual controversy within its 25 jurisdiction . . . any court of the United States . . . may declare 26 the rights and other legal relations of any interested party 27 seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could 28 be sought." The purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act is to 2 1 "bring[] to the present a litigable controversy, which otherwise 2 might only be tried in the future." 3 Aluminium v. Hunter Eng'g Co., Inc., 655 F.2d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 4 1981). Societe du Conditionnement en 5 B. Abstention under the Declaratory Judgment Act 6 "By the Declaratory Judgment Act, Congress sought to place a 7 remedial arrow in the district court's quiver; it created an 8 opportunity, rather than a duty, to grant a new form of relief to 9 qualifying litigants." Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 288 (1995). Two cases, Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co. of 11 America, 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942) and Wilton, explain the 12 circumstances in which district courts ought not string that arrow. 13 Under Brillhart/Wilton, courts consider three factors in 14 determining whether abstention is appropriate ("the Brillhart 15 factors"): "avoiding 'needless determination of state law issues'; 16 discouraging 'forum shopping'; and avoiding 'duplicative 17 litigation.'" 18 F.3d 966, 975 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. v. 19 Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1224 (9th Cir. 1998)). 20 Brillhart factors "remain the philosophic touchstone for the 21 district court," Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1225, they "are not necessarily 22 exhaustive." 23 800, 803 (9th Cir. 2002). 24 considered include: 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// R.R. Street & Co., Inc. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 656 Although the Huth v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 298 F.3d Other factors that courts have 3 [W]hether the declaratory action will settle all aspects of the controversy; whether the declaratory action will serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations at issue; whether the declaratory action is being sought merely for the purposes of procedural fencing or to obtain a "res judicata" advantage; or whether the use of a declaratory action will result in entanglement between the federal and state court systems. In addition, the district court might also consider the convenience of the parties, and the availability and relative convenience of other remedies. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1225 n.5. None of these factors is dispositive, 9 and district courts have broad discretion in declining to hear United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 declaratory judgment actions "as long as it furthers the 11 Declaratory Judgment Act's purpose of enhancing judicial economy 12 and cooperative federalism." 13 Huth, 298 F.3d at 802-03. Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1224; see also 14 15 16 IV. DISCUSSION Defendants make four arguments in favor of abstention. First, 17 they argue that the Underlying Action involves "overlapping factual 18 questions," and accordingly should be considered a parallel action 19 for the purposes of Brillhart and Wilton. 20 Specifically, they argue that the questions of the ownership and 21 operation of the automobile and the liability of Mr. Tucknott's 22 businesses will be at issue in both the Underlying Action and this 23 action. 24 favor of abstention because Allstate's declaratory judgment action 25 was filed in response to the already-filed Underlying Action in 26 state court. 27 F.3d at 1225-26). 28 to prejudicial discovery costs by being forced to litigate in both Mot. at 2. Second, they argue the forum-shopping factor weighs in Id. at 3 (citing Wilton, 515 U.S. at 283; Dizol, 133 Third, Defendants contend they will be subjected 4 1 state and federal court. Id. at 2-3. Finally, in addition to the 2 above factors, Defendants argue the Court can and should consider 3 that if the Court were to dismiss the declaratory judgment action 4 no other grounds for federal jurisdiction would remain. 5 (citing Md. Cas. Co. v. Knight, 96 F.3d 1284, 1289 (9th Cir. 6 1995)). Mot. at 2 7 Allstate disagrees with each of Defendants' arguments, instead 8 arguing that there is a presumption in favor of declaratory relief, 9 and, in any event, Defendants cannot satisfy the Brillhart factors. United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 First, Allstate points to numerous cases recognizing authority 11 under the Declaratory Judgment Act to "determine [an insurer's] 12 obligations to defend and indemnify its insured against a third- 13 party claim." 14 contends abstention is inappropriate in the absence of a 'parallel' 15 state court action. 16 Action raises distinct factual and legal issues and involves 17 different parties, abstention is per se inappropriate. 18 Allstate argues there is no forum-shopping concern here because it 19 is not (and in its view could not be) a party to the Underlying 20 Action. 21 F. Supp. 2d --, 2014 WL 1671806, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2014)). 22 Finally, Allstate states that it, not Defendants, will be 23 prejudiced if the Court declines to hear this case. 24 Opp'n at 4 (collecting cases). Second, Allstate Because, in Allstate's view, the Underlying Third, Id. at 8 (citing Imperium Ins. Co. v. Unigard Ins. Co., -- As a preliminary matter, the Court can find no support for 25 Allstate's contention that it is presumptively entitled to 26 declaratory relief. 27 hear a declaratory judgment action is clearly discretionary. 28 Wilton, 515 U.S. at 288. To the contrary, the decision of whether to To be sure, federal courts can and often 5 1 do elect to hear declaratory judgment actions to determine an 2 insurer's obligations to defend or indemnify an insured against a 3 third party claim, and "there is no presumption in favor of 4 abstention in declaratory actions generally, nor in insurance 5 coverage cases specifically." 6 absence of a presumption in favor of abstention does not render 7 declaratory relief "presumptively available." 8 is also mistaken in its apparent belief that Defendants must show a 9 "compelling reason" for the Court to decline to hear a declaratory But the Relatedly, Allstate United States District Court 10 For the Northern District of California Opp'n at 3. Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1225. relief action. Such a rule would effectively 11 transform the discretionary Brillhart/Wilton standard into the 12 abstention inquiry under Colorado River Water Conservation District 13 v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976), which requires a 14 showing of "exceptional circumstances" in favor of abstention. 15 Wilton expressly rejected that argument, and reaffirmed Brillhart's 16 discretionary approach to declaratory judgment jurisdiction. 17 U.S. at 286. 18 favor of hearing this declaratory relief action, and will instead 19 assess whether to hear the case under the Brillhart factors. 515 Accordingly, the Court will apply no presumption in 20 A. Avoiding Needless Determination of State Law Issues 21 The first factor under Brillhart focuses on whether exercising 22 jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment action will result in 23 the needless determination of issues of state law. 24 undisputed that this case raises exclusively questions of state 25 insurance law. 26 expressly left to the states through the McCarran-Ferguson Act,'" a 27 consideration other courts have found compelling in declining 28 jurisdiction. It is Insurance law is "'an area that Congress has Advent, Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of 6 1 Pittsburgh, No. 13-CV-00561-LHK, 2013 WL 3483742, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2 July 8, 2013) (quoting Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Robsac Indus., 947 F.2d 3 1367, 1371 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled in part on other grounds, 4 Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1227) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1011-12 (1988)). 5 Similarly, because jurisdiction here is solely premised on 6 diversity of citizenship, "the federal interest is at its nadir." 7 Cont'l Cas., 947 F.2d at 1371. 8 Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of abstention. 9 B. United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 Discouraging Forum-Shopping The second factor under Brillhart focuses on discouraging 11 forum-shopping. 12 discouraging an insurer from forum shopping." 13 Reading v. Krieger, 181 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 1999). 14 circumstance generally understood to indicate forum-shopping is a 15 "reactive" declaratory judgment action filed in federal court 16 seeking a ruling as to an insurer's obligations under a policy at 17 issue in a state court action that is, usually because of an 18 absence of diversity jurisdiction, not removable to federal court. 19 See Cont'l Cas., 947 F.2d at 1371; see also Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1225 20 (reaffirming that "federal courts should generally decline to 21 entertain reactive declaratory actions"). 22 Action was the first filed action and does not appear to be 23 removable to federal court. 24 parties to the Underlying Action are residents of California). 25 Nonetheless, Allstate offers two reasons why, in its view, this 26 should not weigh in favor of abstention. 27 28 This factor is "usually . . . understood to favor Am. Cas. Co. of One Here the Underlying Compl. ¶¶ 2-6 (stating that all the Allstate's first argument can be dispensed with quickly. Allstate argues that it "is not (and could not be) a party to the 7 1 state court action." Opp'n at 8. Allstate apparently bases this 2 conclusion on California Evidence Code Section 1155's bars against 3 the introduction of evidence of insurance coverage "to prove 4 negligence or other wrongdoing." 5 similar declaratory remedy to that provided by the Declaratory 6 Judgment Act. 7 1060 (conferring a right of action in Superior Court to obtain a 8 declaration of one's "rights or duties with respect to another" 9 under an agreement). But California law affords a Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2201, with Cal. Civ. P. Code § As a result, other courts, including the United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 Ninth Circuit, have dismissed similar arguments, finding instead 11 that the insurer could simply have filed a state court action for 12 declaratory relief and sought to relate the two matters. 13 Polido, 110 F.3d at 1423 (holding that an insurer could have 14 brought a declaratory relief action "in a separate action to the 15 same court that will decide the underlying tort action"); Advent, 16 2013 WL 3483742, at *4 ("[S]tate courts are well equipped to issue 17 a declaratory judgment on a matter that turns solely on questions 18 of state contract and insurance law."); Great Am. Assur. v. 19 McCormick, No. C 05-02175 CRB, 2005 WL 3095972, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 20 Nov. 15, 2005) (Breyer, J.) ("Great American's argument that it is 21 not forum-shopping because it needs a determination of its coverage 22 responsibilities is unavailing. 23 relief action in state court in Monterey County where such action 24 could have been related to and coordinated with the pending state 25 court actions.")(citing Polido). 26 See It could have filed a declaratory Allstate's second argument merits more attention. Relying on 27 a case from the Eastern District of California, Allstate contends 28 that there is no forum-shopping concern where "[t]he parties to 8 1 this litigation are not parties to the underlying action and are 2 not seeking to subvert the state court judgment." 3 WL 1671806, at *3. 4 Court disagrees. 5 shopping is a concern is where a state court loser seeks to 6 undermine finality by seeking relief in federal court. 7 Krieger, 181 F.3d at 1119 (affirming a denial of declaratory relief 8 to bar "the [d]efendants, who [did] not fare[] well in three 9 summary judgments in this action, from wiping the slate clean and Imperium, 2014 With all due respect to the Imperium court, the To be sure, one clear circumstance where forum- Cf. United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 starting this litigation anew . . . "). 11 only type of forum-shopping that was a concern in Brillhart, 12 Wilton, and the other declaratory judgment abstention cases. 13 Instead, under circumstances such as this one, where the legal 14 question presented is one of state law, there is a prior, pending 15 proceeding in state court involving overlapping facts, and there is 16 an adequate state court procedure for Allstate to obtain a 17 declaration of its coverage obligations, it should be clear why 18 Allstate filed in federal rather than state court -- Allstate seeks 19 what it perceives as a friendly forum. 20 However that is not the Because this is a reactive declaratory judgment action and 21 Allstate filed in this court in an effort at forum-shopping, this 22 factor weighs in favor of abstention. 23 C. Avoiding Duplicative Litigation 24 "If there are parallel state proceedings involving the same 25 issues and parties pending at the time [a] federal declaratory 26 action is filed, there is a presumption that the entire suit should 27 be heard in state court." 28 Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1225. Much of Allstate's opposition focuses on the alleged absence 9 1 of a parallel action. In Allstate's view, "for the abstention 2 doctrine to apply, a parallel state court action must be pending at 3 the same time as [a] federal declaratory judgment action." Opp'n 4 at 5 (collecting cases) (internal quotation marks omitted). In 5 support of this position, Allstate cites several out-of- 6 jurisdiction cases as well as Polido v. State Farm Mutual 7 Automobile Insurance Co., 110 F.3d 1418, 1423 (9th Cir. 1997), 8 overruled in part on other grounds, Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1227, and 9 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Knight, 96 F.3d 1284, 1288 (9th Cir. United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 1996).2 11 Allstate's proposition. 12 stated that "in determining whether to exercise its discretionary 13 jurisdiction to reach the merits in an action for declaratory 14 relief, the dispositive question is not whether the pending state 15 proceeding is 'parallel,' but rather whether there was a procedural 16 vehicle available to the insurance company in state court to 17 resolve the issues raised in the action filed in federal court." 18 110 F.3d at 1423. 19 cases involving parallel proceedings as "the primary instance" in 20 which a court should abstain from hearing a declaratory judgment 21 action, that case nowhere suggests a parallel proceeding is a 22 necessary precondition for abstention. 23 the Ninth Circuit has clearly stated that "the absence of a 24 parallel state proceeding is not necessarily dispositive; the 25 potential for such a proceeding may suffice." 26 2 27 28 Yet none of the controlling authorities cited support For instance, in Polido, the Ninth Circuit Similarly, while Maryland Casualty refers to 96 F.3d at 1288. Instead, Golden Eagle Ins. Allstate also cites Security Farms v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 124 F.3d 999, 1009 (9th Cir. 1997), however that case does not reference, analyze, or discuss Wilton or Brillhart at all, and instead involves an entirely different branch of abstention doctrine. 10 1 Co. v. Travelers Cos., 103 F.3d 750, 754 (9th Cir. 1996), overruled 2 in part on other grounds, Dizol 133 F.3d at 1227; see also Wilton, 3 515 U.S. at 290 (declining to "delineate the outer boundaries" of 4 district court discretion to deny declaratory relief, including 5 under circumstances "in which there are no parallel state 6 proceedings"). Even setting aside the question of whether abstention is ever 7 8 appropriate where there is no pending parallel state court 9 proceeding, Allstate interprets 'parallel' too narrowly. Allstate United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 suggests, relying on language from Wilton, that "because this 11 action and the Underlying Action do not involve the 'same issues' 12 or the 'same parties,' they are manifestly not 'parallel.'" 13 at 5 (quoting Wilton, 515 U.S. at 282). 14 Wilton on which Allstate relies does not impose such a rigid 15 parallelism requirement. 16 merely explains the holding in Brillhart that "at least where 17 another suit involving the same parties and presenting an 18 opportunity for ventilation of the same state law issues is pending 19 in state court," the district court should consider abstention. 20 See 515 U.S. at 282. 21 view, "[t]he Ninth Circuit construes 'parallel actions' liberally. 22 Underlying state actions need not involve the same parties nor the 23 same issues to be considered parallel."3 24 3 25 26 27 28 Opp'n However the portion of Instead, the quoted language from Wilton Furthermore, also contrary to Allstate's Keown v. Tudor Ins. Co., Other courts appear to impose a stricter parallelism standard than the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Detco Indus. Inc., 426 F.3d 994, 997 (8th Cir. 2005) (considering parallel proceedings a "threshold issue" and finding parallelism only if "substantially the same parties litigate substantially the same issues in different forums") (quoting New Beckley Mining Corp. v. Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am., 946 F.2d 1072, 1073 (4th Cir. 1991)); Clay Reg'l Water v. City of Spirit Lake, 193 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1137 (N.D. Iowa 2002) (stating that "a parallel 11 1 621 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1037 (D. Haw. 2008) (citations omitted). 2 Instead, "[i]t is enough that the state proceedings arise from the 3 same factual circumstances" as the declaratory judgment action. 4 Golden Eagle, 103 F.3d at 755 (citing Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. 5 Hungerford, 53 F.3d 1012, 1017 (9th Cir. 1995), overruled in part 6 on other ground, Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1227). 7 that an insurer is not a party to the underlying state court 8 proceeding is immaterial. 9 Corp., No. 07-1966 SC, 2007 WL 1880291, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 29, Furthermore, the fact See Clarendon Am. Ins. Co. v. Sorg United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 2007) (Conti, J.) ("[T]he Ninth Circuit has found that state court 11 actions not involving the insurance carrier were sufficiently 12 parallel to the declaratory relief action to merit consideration 13 and dismissal under Brillhart.") (citing Golden Eagle; Emp'rs 14 Reins. Corp. v. Karussos, 65 F.3d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 1995), 15 overruled in part on other grounds, Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1227). 16 Here, both this case and the Underlying Action arise from the 17 same factual circumstances. 18 several factual issues appear relevant to both this suit and the 19 Underlying Action. 20 Tucknott, Robert A. Tucknott & Associates, Inc., and Tucknott 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Reviewing the language of the Policy, The Underlying Action involves claims against state court proceeding is a necessary prerequisite to the use of either the Colorado River-Moses H. Cone or Brillhart standards of abstention"). Nevertheless it is unclear how imposing a strict parallelism requirement would further the twin goals of the Brillhart line of cases: judicial economy and cooperative federalism. Such a strict parallelism requirement would certainly result in abstention in cases involving pure forum-shopping or reactive declaratory judgment actions, but it might nevertheless result in abstention being denied in other desirable cases, for instance those involving highly significant issues of state law or factually overlapping cases which nonetheless involve distinct legal issues and theories. See, e.g., Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Simpson Manuf. Co., 829 F. Supp. 2d 914, 922 (D. Haw. 2011) (considering the unsettled nature of a particular question of Hawaiian law in staying a declaratory judgment action). 12 1 Electric Company, "either individually or under a theory of 2 respondeat superior." 3 appears the vehicle Tucknott was driving was registered to "Robert 4 A Tucknott/Assoc Inc[.]" 5 ("Vehicle Regis."). 6 among other things, "'autos' you lease[d], hire[d], rent[ed] or 7 borrow[ed]," and, specifically for Mr. Tucknott, even for autos he 8 did not "own, hire or borrow" so long as the vehicle was not owned 9 by him individually "or by any member of his or her household." Mot. at 2. At the time of the accident, it ECF No. 22 ("Brown Decl.") Ex. C The Policy at issue provides coverage for, United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 ECF No. 1 ("Compl.") ¶¶ 14, 17. 11 Tucknott, his businesses, the vehicle, and his activities on the 12 day of the accident are likely to be relevant both to vicarious 13 liability and policy interpretation. 14 both disputes arise from the same factual circumstances. 15 The relationships between Accordingly, the Court finds Moreover, Allstate's argument that "the state and federal 16 actions involve completely different issues: the state court 17 proceeding is a personal injury action . . . while this suit 18 involves the interpretation of Allstate's insurance policy" is 19 unavailing. 20 state and federal court proceedings are not dispositive because the 21 insurer 'could have presented the issues that it brought to federal 22 court in a separate action to the same court that will decide the 23 underlying tort action.'" 24 Karussos, 65 F.3d at 800). 25 there is an available procedural vehicle for Allstate to raise 26 these issues in state court. 27 28 "[D]ifferences in factual and legal issues between the Polido, 110 F.3d at 1423 (quoting As the Court previously explained, See Cal. Civ. P. Code § 1060. Here, the Court finds that the state court in the Underlying Action is better equipped to resolve this declaratory judgment 13 1 action. First, as explained above, there is the potential for 2 several overlapping factual issues. 3 more familiar with the parties and the state law issues likely to 4 arise in interpreting the Policy. 5 weighs in favor of abstention. Second, the state court is Accordingly, this factor also 6 D. Remaining Factors 7 Finally, both sides argue they will be prejudiced if the Court 8 does not adopt their position. Defendants argue the Court should 9 abstain from hearing this action because exercising jurisdiction United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 over the declaratory judgment action will result in litigation, and 11 hence discovery, on two fronts. 12 Defendants overstate the likelihood of duplicative discovery, and 13 in any event, because the coverage issues would only be resolved in 14 state court after the merits of the Underlying Action, Allstate 15 would suffer the bulk of any prejudice by being forced to continue 16 paying Tucknott's defense costs during the full pendency of the 17 tort action. 18 Mot. at 2-3. Allstate argues that Opp'n at 8-10. Allstate's argument is well-taken, but ultimately not enough 19 to sway the Court from its view that this dispute is better 20 resolved in state court. 21 Allstate, Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. App. 22 4th 902, 910 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), belies this position. 23 case, the Court of Appeal noted that "[i]n a case where there is no 24 potential conflict between the coverage issues and the issues in 25 the third party action, the carrier may obtain an early trial date 26 in the coverage action," thereby possibly ending its duty to 27 defend. 28 no potential factual overlap between coverage issues and issues in Nevertheless, one of the cases cited by In that While Allstate failed to persuade the Court that there is 14 1 the Underlying Action, if Allstate continues to believe that to be 2 the case, it can seek an accelerated resolution of the coverage 3 issues in state court. As a result, the Court is not persuaded that prejudice weighs 4 5 more than weakly against abstention. 6 7 8 9 V. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that the Brillhart factors weigh against the exercise of jurisdiction in United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 this case and in favor of the resolution of these issues in state 11 court. 12 prejudice. Accordingly, Allstate's complaint is DISMISSED without 13 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 16 17 Dated: October 23, 2014 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 15
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