Mc Erlain v. Park Plaza Towers Owners Association et al, No. 3:2013cv03232 - Document 73 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS; VACATING HEARING. To the extent the motion seeks judgment on the pleadings in favor of the HOA, the motion is granted. In all other respects, the motion is denied. Signed by Judge Maxine M. Chesney on August 12, 2014. (mmclc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/12/2014)
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Mc Erlain v. Park Plaza Towers Owners Association et al Doc. 73 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 11 PATRICK JOHN MCERLAIN, No. C-13-3232 MMC Plaintiff, 12 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS; VACATING HEARING v. 13 14 15 PARK PLAZA TOWERS OWNERS ASSOCIATION, et al., Defendants. / 16 17 Before the Court is defendants’ “Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Pursuant to 18 FRCP 12(c),” filed July 8, 2014. Plaintiff Patrick McErlain (“McErlain”) has filed opposition, 19 to which defendants have replied. Having read and considered the papers filed in support 20 of and in opposition to the motion, the Court deems the matter appropriate for 21 determination on the parties’ respective written submissions, VACATES the hearing 22 scheduled for August 15, 2014, and rules as follows. 23 BACKGROUND 24 In the operative complaint, the Amended Complaint filed July 16, 2013 (“AC”), 25 McErlain alleges he “resides and owns property at the Park Plaza Towers condominium” in 26 Burlingame, California, and is “mentally disabled by reason of a diagnosed bipolar 27 disorder.” (See AC ¶ 1.) McErlain’s claims arise from his allegation that the thirteen 28 defendants named in the AC have “engaged in a coordinated effort to deprive him of his Dockets.Justia.com 1 civil rights and his right to enjoy and live in his home” (see id.), and, in particular, that said 2 defendants have engaged in a “conspiracy and actions designed to oust [McErlain] from his 3 residence because of his disability” (see AC ¶ 2). Three of the defendants, specifically, the 4 Park Plaza Towers Owners Association, Behling Property Management Corp., and David 5 Behling, are alleged to “own, operate, maintain and/or control the common areas” of the 6 Park Plaza Towers (see AC ¶ 11); the remaining ten defendants, specifically, Joseph 7 Schreurs, Ladonna Horwitz, Nyla Starr, Sherry Berenstein, Julie Robles, Cynthia Schreurs, 8 Tracy Fallon, Norma Berliner-Saltz, Tim Ho, and Dennis Gale, are alleged to be “board 9 members” or “those in a position to influence board members” (see AC ¶ 12). 10 In his First, Second, and Third Causes of Action, McErlain alleges defendants’ 11 conduct constitutes disability discrimination in violation of, respectively, (1) the Fair Housing 12 Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604, (2) the Fair Employment and Housing Act, California Government 13 Code §§ 12900-12996, and (3) the Unruh Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code § 51. In his 14 Fifth Cause of Action, McErlain alleges such conduct constitutes negligent and intentional 15 infliction of emotional distress, and, in his Fourth Cause of Action, titled “Defamation,” 16 McErlain alleges said defendants have made false statements about him concerning his 17 conduct at the Park Plaza Towers. 18 On July 25, 2012, prior to the filing of the instant action, one of the defendants 19 named herein, the Park Plaza Towers Owners Association (hereinafter, “the HOA”), filed in 20 state court a complaint against McErlain and his mother, Nancy McErlain, alleging causes 21 of action for “nuisance,” “breach of contract,” and “declaratory relief” (see Defs.’ Req. for 22 Judicial Notice, filed July 8, 2014, Ex. A at 1:12-13),1 and, on February 13, 2013, said 23 defendant filed an Amended Complaint consisting of the same three causes of action (see 24 id. Ex. B at 1:13-14). The HOA’s claims arise from its allegations that McErlain, who owns 25 26 27 28 1 Defendants’ unopposed request that the Court take judicial notice of the pleadings filed in the state court action is hereby GRANTED. See Rosales-Martinez v. Palmer, 753 F.3d 890, 894 (9th Cir. 2014) (“It is well established that [a court] may take judicial notice of judicial proceedings in other courts.”). 2 1 one unit in the Park Plaza Towers and resides in another unit owned by his mother, has 2 “continuously and systematically engaged in noxious and offensive conduct within the 3 common areas at Park Plaza Towers which has substantially and unreasonably interfered 4 and/or obstructed with the free use and enjoyment of the common areas.” (See id. Ex. B 5 ¶ 13.) On March 21, 2013, McErlain filed an answer to the HOA’s operative state court 6 complaint (see id. Ex. C); he has not filed a cross-complaint against the HOA.2 The state 7 court matter remains pending and trial is set to begin November 11, 2014. (See Heaton 8 Decl., filed July 8, 2014, ¶ 5.) LEGAL STANDARD 9 10 Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows: “After the 11 pleadings are closed — but early enough not to delay trial — a party may move for 12 judgment on the pleadings.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). “The principal difference between 13 motions filed pursuant to Rule 12(b) and Rule 12(c) is the time of filing;” a Rule 12(c) 14 motion is subject to the same analysis as a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6). 15 See Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir.1989). 16 In analyzing a motion to dismiss, a district court must accept as true all material 17 allegations in the complaint, and construe them in the light most favorable to the 18 nonmoving party. See NL Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir.1986). 19 Although, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court generally may not consider material 20 beyond the complaint, see Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 21 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990), a court may consider matters that are subject to judicial notice, 22 see Mack v. South Bay Beer Distribs., Inc., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986). DISCUSSION 23 24 Defendants argue that the causes of action alleged by McErlain in the instant case 25 are based on the same “nucleus of operative facts” as the causes of action set forth in the 26 2 27 28 The Court takes judicial notice of the docket of the Superior Court, which docket can be found at http://www.sanmateocourt.org. The docket reflects that, on July 14, 2014, McErlain filed a motion for leave to file a cross-complaint to assert causes of action that, in all material respects, are identical to the causes of action alleged in the instant case. 3 1 HOA’s state court action (see Mot. at 2:15-17), and, consequently, can only be brought in a 2 cross-complaint filed in the state court action. In support thereof, defendants rely on 3 § 426.30(a) of the California Code of Civil Procedure, which provides as follows: 4 5 6 7 8 9 Except as otherwise provided by statute, if a party against whom a complaint has been filed and served fails to allege in a cross-complaint any related cause of action which (at the time of serving his answer to the complaint) he has against the plaintiff, such party may not thereafter in any other action assert against the plaintiff the related cause of action not pleaded. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 426.30(a). For purposes of § 426.30, a “related cause of action” is “a cause of action which arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as 10 the cause of action which the plaintiff alleges in his complaint.” See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 11 § 426.10(c). “Because of the liberal construction given to the statute to accomplish its 12 purpose of avoiding a multiplicity of actions, ‘transaction’ is construed broadly; it . . . may 13 embrace a series of acts or occurrences logically interrelated.” See Align Tech. v. Tran, 14 179 Cal. App. 4th 949, 960 (2009) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 15 Section 426.30 is applicable in federal court proceedings, and, consequently, bars 16 causes of action filed in federal court where those causes of action are “related” to causes 17 of action alleged against the federal plaintiff in a prior state court action filed by the federal 18 defendant. See, e.g., Cheiker v. Prudential Ins. Co., 820 F.2d 334, 336-37 (9th Cir. 1987) 19 (holding insureds “contract and tort causes of action” against insurer were barred by 20 § 426.30, where causes of action “arose out of the same transaction” as, and thus were 21 “related” to, interpleader cause of action previously filed by insurer against insureds in state 22 court); Brenner v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 494 F.2d 881, 881-82 and n.2 (9th 23 Cir. 1974) (holding customer’s federal securities causes of action against broker were 24 barred by predecessor to § 426.30, where broker’s prior state court action against 25 customer “arose out of the same transactions as those complained of by the [customer]”). 26 Here, the Court notes at the outset that, although the instant motion is brought on 27 behalf of all thirteen named defendants, the HOA is the sole plaintiff in the state court 28 action on which the instant motion is based. As the Ninth Circuit has explained, “[u]nder 4 1 the plain language of § 426.30,” only “the plaintiff” in the earlier-filed action may seek relief 2 under § 426.30. See Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 951-52 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding 3 billboard owner’s claims against director of state agency not barred by § 426.30, where 4 director was not “the plaintiff” in prior action filed by state agency against billboard owner, 5 even though owner’s claims were “related” to those asserted by agency in prior action). 6 Consequently, no defendant herein other than the HOA is entitled to seek relief under 7 § 426.30. The Court next considers the motion as it pertains to McErlain’s causes of action 8 against the HOA. 9 Defendants argue McErlain’s causes of action here are related to the HOA’s causes 10 of action in state court. McErlain does not argue to the contrary, and the Court agrees that 11 the causes of action in the two cases are related within the meaning of § 426.10(c), as both 12 actions arise from the same transaction or series of transactions. Specifically, the HOA, in 13 the state court action, alleges that McErlain has engaged in particular conduct the HOA 14 characterizes as “noxious and/or offensive,” such as “intentionally” leaving “dog feces” in 15 common areas and “physically threaten[ing]” another resident’s “care giver” (see Defs.’ 16 Req. for Judicial Notice Ex. B ¶ 13), which conduct the HOA alleges is a breach of the 17 “governing documents” of the HOA (see id. Ex. B ¶ 23), thus entitling the HOA to an order 18 enjoining McErlain from owning or living in any unit in the Park Plaza Towers (see id. Ex. B 19 at 19:7-10). In the instant federal action, McErlain denies engaging in the acts attributed to 20 him in the state action (see, e.g., AC ¶ 30 (denying leaving dog feces in common areas, 21 and instead accusing other residents of doing so)) or describes those events as occurring 22 in a different manner (see, e.g., id. (alleging contact with “the care giver” consisted of 23 “demand[ing]” she “not use a key in violation of the HOA rules”)), and characterizes 24 defendants’ conduct as “creat[ing] a hostile environment” in an attempt to “force” McErlain 25 to “leave Park Plaza [Towers] by any means available” (see AC ¶ 1, 25). 26 Although McErlain does not dispute the two cases are related, he asserts that 27 § 426.30 is inapplicable to the instant federal action, because, he argues, said statute, like 28 “res judicata and collateral estoppel,” does not apply where the first case has not been 5 1 “brought to judgment.” (See Opp’n at 2:5-6, 8-10.)3 Section 426.30, however, contains no 2 language limiting its scope in such manner, and, indeed, uses the word “pending” in 3 reference to the earlier-filed action. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 426.30(b)(1); see also Cal. 4 Code Civ. Proc. § 426.40(b) (providing exception to § 426.30 where court “in which the 5 action is pending” lacks jurisdiction to hear claim pleaded in later action). Significantly, 6 McErlain cites no authority holding § 426.30 is inapplicable where the first action remains 7 pending. Rather, those courts that have considered the issue have found § 426.30 does 8 bar causes of action that are related to an earlier-filed, pending state court action. See, 9 e.g., Carroll v. Import Motors, Inc., 33 Cal. App. 4th 1429, 1435-36 (1995) (dismissing, 10 pursuant to § 426.30, customer’s complaint against auto dealership, where customer’s 11 claims were related to those alleged by dealership in earlier-filed pending action; explaining 12 customer’s remedy was “to ask leave of the trial court [in the pending action filed by 13 dealership] to file his cross-complaint”); Sierra Environmental Techs. v. Gale, No. 09-3201, 14 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 22720, at *2, *4-7 (E.D. Cal. March 11, 2010) (dismissing, pursuant to 15 § 426.30, employer’s claims against former employees, where employer’s claims were 16 related to those alleged by former employees’ in earlier-filed complaint pending in state 17 court). 18 Moreover, as the “legislative purpose” of the statute is to “provide for the settlement, 19 in a single action, of all conflicting claims between the parties arising out of the same 20 transaction,” see Align Tech., 179 Cal. App. 4th at 959 (internal quotation and citation 21 omitted), such purpose would be wholly undermined if a party against whom a complaint is 22 filed could commence, and simultaneously pursue, against the complainant a second 23 lawsuit alleging claims arising from that same transaction. 24 25 Accordingly, to the extent defendants seek judgment on the pleadings with respect to the causes of action alleged here against the HOA, the motion will be granted. 26 3 27 28 McErlain also contends defendants have failed to show the Court should abstain from deciding his claims pursuant to the “Younger doctrine.” (See Pl.’s Opp. at 5:24-25); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Defendants, however, do not rely on the doctrine set forth in Younger and, consequently, the Court does not further consider this argument. 6 CONCLUSION 1 2 For the reasons stated above: 3 1. To the extent the motion seeks judgment on the pleadings in favor of the HOA, 4 the motion is hereby GRANTED. 5 2. In all other respects, the motion is hereby DENIED. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 8 Dated: August 12, 2014 MAXINE M. CHESNEY United States District Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 7
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