Titus v. City and County of San Francisco et al, No. 3:2013cv02401 - Document 57 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by Judge Jon S. Tigar granting 42 Motion for Summary Judgment. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/22/2014)
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Titus v. City and County of San Francisco et al Doc. 57 1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 LAVERNON TITUS, 7 Case No. 13-cv-02401-JST Plaintiff, 8 v. ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 9 CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, et al., 10 Defendants. 11 United States District Court Northern District of California Re: ECF No. 42 Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by the City and County of San 12 13 Francisco, San Francisco Police Department Officers Andrew Johnson, Eric Vintero, and Patrick 14 Brady. ECF No. 42. The Court will grant Defendants’ motion. I. 15 BACKGROUND A. 16 Factual History 17 For the purposes of summary judgment, the Court assumes the following facts pursuant to 18 Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 40 (“FAC”).1 Plaintiff was driving his work truck 19 to Veteran’s Administration Hospital when he was stopped by Officer Eric Vintero on May 7, 20 2012. ECF No. 40 at 4-5. Officer Vintero told Plaintiff that he was pulled over because he did not 21 stop at a stop sign. Id. at 5. Plaintiff informed Officer Vintero that he was on his way to the 22 hospital because he was a diabetic and was feeling very sick. Id. Plaintiff “was sweating, weak 23 and visibly shaking and was swaying when he stood.” Id. Officer Vintero only instructed Plaintiff to remain in the truck. Id. Officers Andrew 24 25 In their Reply to Plaintiff’s opposition, Defendants object to a number of facts and statements in Plaintiff’s Declaration, to the extent they conflict with his deposition testimony. ECF No. 52 at 89. Defendants also object to the Declaration and attached exhibits because they were untimely filed, as well as to certain exhibits because they contain unauthenticated materials. Id. Because the disputed facts are unnecessary to the Court’s decision, the Court does not reach these evidentiary objections. 1 26 27 28 Dockets.Justia.com 1 Johnson and Patrick Brady arrived at the scene, at which time Officer Vintero ordered Plaintiff out 2 of his vehicle.2 Id. Plaintiff was ordered to place his hands on the hood and spread his legs, and 3 then was told to stand on the sidewalk. Id. Officer Vintero allowed Plaintiff to sit when Plaintiff 4 reiterated that he felt sick. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the Officers were rude and yelled at him. Id. 5 at 6. Plaintiff was in custody for a total of about 40 minutes. Id. at 4. The officers subsequently had Plaintiff’s car towed, but allowed Plaintiff leave with a 6 7 citation. Id. Plaintiff asked for a ride to the hospital; the Officers refused because it was “only 8 two blocks away.” Id. at 6. Plaintiff walked to the hospital and was taken in for examination, but 9 alleges that “the risk of being detained could have caused Plaintiff to have a stroke given his high 10 level of sugar.” Id. B. United States District Court Northern District of California 11 Plaintiff filed his initial complaint in San Francisco Superior Court, and Defendants 12 13 14 15 16 17 Procedural History removed the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Plaintiff was granted leave to amend his initial complaint, and in August 2014 Plaintiff filed his FAC, alleging that Defendants were liable for intentional infliction of emotion distress and deliberate indifference to his medical needs under Section 1983, in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. ECF No. 40 at 6-9. Defendants filed this motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 42. C. 18 Jurisdiction This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because Plaintiff’s cause 19 of action arises under the United States Constitution. 20 II. 21 22 LEGAL STANDARD Summary judgment is proper when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). See Celotex Corp. v. 23 Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). A dispute is genuine only if there is sufficient evidence for 24 a reasonable fact finder to find for the non-moving party, and material only if the disputed fact 25 might affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 26 27 28 2 Defendants explain in their motion for summary judgment that Plaintiff was pulled over because his vehicle registration was expired, and the car had mismatched license plates. ECF No. 42 at 4. Plaintiff’s FAC does not include this information. 2 1 (1986). The court must draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non- 2 moving party. Johnson v. Rancho Santiago Cmt. Coll. Dist., 623 F.3d 1011, 1018 (9th Cir. 2010). 3 However, unsupported conjecture or conclusory statements do not create a genuine dispute as to 4 material fact and will not defeat summary judgment. Surrell v. Cal. Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 5 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008). 6 III. DISCUSSION 7 Plaintiff brings two causes of action: a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress 8 and a claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff 9 has not provided sufficient facts in his FAC to present a genuine issue of material fact in any of 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 these claims. A. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Defendants’ seek summary judgment against Plaintiff’s claim that they intentionally 13 inflicted emotional distress during the traffic stop. ECF No. 40 at 6. The Court concludes that, 14 even viewing all facts in favor of the Plaintiff, no reasonable jury could find that Defendants’ 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 actions rose to the level of outrageousness sufficient to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must show: “(1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant’s intention of causing or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.” George v. Sonoma County Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. C-08-02675 EDL, 2009 WL 656299, *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2009) (citing Trerice v. Blue Cross of Cal., 209 Cal.App.3d 878, 883 (1989); Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal.3d 197, 209 (1982)). 23 24 Plaintiff must also show that the outrageous conduct was “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized society.” Id. Rude or insensitive conduct is insufficient to 25 meet the requirements for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. 26 27 Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not demonstrated any conduct by the officers’ that would rise to the level of “outrageousness” required to make out a claim for intentional infliction 28 3 1 of emotional distress. Plaintiff does not offer argument in opposition to Defendants’ motion for 2 summary judgment as to his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Looking to his 3 complaint, Plaintiff alleges that during the course of a valid traffic stop, officers ordered Plaintiff 4 to hand over his license and registration, instructed him to get out of the car, and made him spread 5 his legs and place his hands on the hood. ECF No. 40 at 5. Plaintiff alleges that officers yelled at 6 him and were “rude and impolite the entire time.” Id. at 5-6. When Plaintiff asked for a ride to 7 the hospital because he was feeling ill, Defendants refused, because transporting a passenger who 8 was not handcuffed and had not been thoroughly searched was contrary to department policy. 9 ECF No. 42 at 5. 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Plaintiff alleges no conduct by Defendants that allow a reasonable jury to find that their actions were “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized society.” Id. Plaintiff does not contest the validity of the traffic stop or deny Defendants’ claims that, while driving a vehicle with a suspended license, he ran a stop sign. See ECF No. 29 at 2 (acknowledging that Plaintiff does not make claims of “false detention and false imprisonment”). Although Plaintiff claims he was visibly ill throughout the length of the stop, it was not outrageous for police officers to undertake a short traffic stop after witnessing him operate a vehicle illegally in a manner that posed a danger to others. Once that stop was completed, Defendants’ only additional action was to deny Plaintiff’s request to drive him to a hospital that was two blocks 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 away. Such a refusal is not “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized society.” George, 2009 WL 656299, *6. The Court therefore grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. B. Deliberate Indifference Defendants’ also seek summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s claims they acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs by stopping him and then refusing to provide him a ride two blocks to the hospital. Defendants contend that Plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue as to whether his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. Defendants argue in the alternative that, even if Defendants’ rights were violated, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as 28 4 1 Defendants’ conduct did not “violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which 2 a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) 3 (citations omitted). Because Defendants could not have known that their brief detention and 4 subsequent release of Plaintiff violated his constitutional rights, the Court will grant summary 5 judgment in their favor as to Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim. To determine whether to grant qualified immunity, a court must ask whether a plaintiff’s 6 7 rights were violated and if that right that was “clearly established.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 8 223, 236 (2009). Courts are “permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the 9 two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Id. “If an official could reasonably have believed 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 her actions were legal in light of clearly established law and the information she possessed at the 12 time, she is protected by qualified immunity.” Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 437 (9th Cir. 2002). It is clearly established in the law that the Fourteenth Amendment protects against police 13 14 officers’ acting with deliberate indifference toward the serious medical needs of an individual they 15 have detained. See Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002). 16 (collecting cases holding that deliberate indifference claims brought by arrestee arise “from the 17 due process clause rather than the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual 18 punishment”). But for the purposes of the qualified immunity analysis, “the right allegedly 19 violated must be defined at the appropriate level of specificity before a court can determine if it 20 was clearly established.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999). Therefore, the task of 21 “determining whether the law was clearly established ‘must be undertaken in light of the specific 22 context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.’” Estate of Ford v. Ramirez-Palmer, 301 23 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). The Ninth 24 Circuit has held that, in the context of claims for deliberate indifference, courts must grant officers 25 qualified immunity where the circumstances would not have informed a reasonable officer that 26 their conduct “posed such a substantial risk of serious harm that doing so would be 27 constitutionally impermissible.” Estate of Ford v. Ramirez-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1053 (9th Cir. 28 2002). 5 1 The parties dispute how much information Defendants had about Plaintiff’s medical 2 condition. Plaintiff alleges that he “was in dire need of emergency treatment when he was 3 detained, so much that it was obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity 4 for immediate medical attention.” ECF No. 40 at 8. Plaintiff also claims that he told officers he 5 was sick and had been en route to seeking emergency care at Veterans Hospital when he was 6 stopped. Id. Because the qualified immunity inquiry must be conducted viewing all facts in favor 7 of the plaintiff, the Court concludes that there is at least a genuine issue as to whether Plaintiff 8 made Defendants aware of a risk to his health such that Defendants were aware of Plaintiff’s 9 medical needs at the time they refused to transport him to the Hospital. 10 Nevertheless, the Court concludes that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, United States District Court Northern District of California 11 because then-existing law did not clearly inform Defendants that validly stopping Plaintiff for a 12 short period of time and then allowing him to walk unassisted two blocks to a hospital posed such 13 a substantial risk of harm as to be constitutionally impermissible. Estate of Ford, 301 F.3d at 14 1053. Plaintiff was lawfully stopped after he ran a stop sign. Plaintiff does not contest the legality 15 of his initial detention or claim that he was detained for longer than necessary to complete the 16 investigation into his traffic violation and suspended license. Although Plaintiff alleges he was 17 visibly ill during the stop, he cites not authority for the proposition that illness entitles an 18 individual to be released from a brief and otherwise lawful traffic stop. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Although Plaintiff contends Defendants’ acted unlawfully in detaining him while he was ill, Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim also rests on an allegation that officers acted unlawfully by not keeping him in their custody further and transporting him in a police vehicle to the Hospital. Even if the Court accepts that the Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs by towing his car and failing to provide him with a ride to the hospital when he appeared to be physically ill, Defendants could not have been expected to know that their decision to release Plaintiff had constitutional ramifications. Plaintiff has pointed to no case where any court has concluded that officers acted with deliberate indifference to an individual’s health by releasing him from their custody and allowing him to proceed to a nearby hospital unassisted. 28 6 1 Deliberate indifference claims commonly arise where a Plaintiff is incarcerated or detained 2 and therefore dependent on officers for medical care. Because a detained or incarcerated 3 individual “must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs[,] if the authorities fail to do 4 so, those needs will not be met.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). Plaintiff cites to 5 cases in which defendants were found to have acted with deliberate indifference where they 6 refused to provide a plaintiff with medical care while keeping that plaintiff in custody, rendering 7 the plaintiff unable to obtain any medical care. See ECF No. 49 at 8-9 (citing Nerren v. 8 Livingston Police Department, 86 F.3d 469 (5th Cir. 1986); Estate of Cole by Pardue v. Fromm, 9 94 F.3d 254, 258 (7th Cir. 1996)). But none of those cases would have given notice to Defendants 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 that their decision to release Plaintiff from their custody and allow him to proceed to a hospital only two blocks away constituted a Fourteenth Amendment violation. As Plaintiff was able to get to the hospital unassisted on foot after he was released, Defendants’ brief and lawful detention did not seriously compromise Plaintiff’s ability to treat his own medical needs. Defendants state that they deferred to their departmental policy to refuse to provide rides to individuals who were not arrested and had not been thoroughly searched. No clearly-established constitutional law conflicted with this policy. Therefore, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim. IV. 18 19 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in its entirety. 20 Defendants are ordered to provide a form of proposed judgment to the Court within 15 21 22 23 24 25 days of entry of this order. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: December 22, 2014 ______________________________________ JON S. TIGAR United States District Judge 26 27 28 7
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