Sosa v. The Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, N.A., No. 3:2012cv00144 - Document 41 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING 34 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Certain Claims Alleged in Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. See order for details and time-sensitive instructions. Signed by Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler on 7/2/2012.(lblc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/2/2012)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Sosa v. The Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, N.A. Doc. 41 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 Northern District of California 10 San Francisco Division MARIA G. SOSA, 12 For the Northern District of California UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 No. C 12-00144 LB Plaintiff, v. 13 BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON TRUST, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS CERTAIN CLAIMS ALLEGED IN PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 14 15 Defendant. _____________________________________/ 16 [ECF No. 34] I. INTRODUCTION 17 Plaintiff Maria Sosa filed this action against defendant Bank of New York Mellon Trust 18 (“BNYM”) in which she alleges that BNYM is responsible for the allegedly improper institution of 19 foreclosure proceedings against her property. See Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), ECF No. 20 33.1 Ms. Sosa filed a Second Amended Complaint on April 9, 2012, and BNYM now moves to 21 dismiss part of her third, and the entirety of her fourth, causes of action. Motion, ECF No. 34; see 22 SAC, ECF No. 33. Upon consideration of the papers submitted, the court GRANTS Defendant’s 23 motion.2 24 /// 25 26 27 28 1 Citations are to the Electronic Case File (“ECF”) with pin cites to the electronic page number at the top of the document, not the pages at the bottom. 2 Pursuant to this district’s Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the court finds this matter to be suitable for determination without oral argument and vacates the July 5, 2012 hearing. C 12-00144 LB ORDER Dockets.Justia.com 1 2 II. BACKGROUND FACTS Ms. Sosa alleges that she is an unsophisticated borrower who obtained a $544,000 mortgage loan 3 secured by her principal residence, which is located at 475 Bell Street, East Palo Alto, California. 4 SAC, ECF No. 33 at 2, ¶ 2; id. at 5, ¶ 20. The loan was secured by a trust deed. Id. at 5, ¶ 20. 5 BNYM allegedly was assigned the rights and interests to the promissory note on or about October 5, 6 2010 and again on or about September 9, 2011. Id. at 6, ¶¶ 25, 28. Ms. Sosa alleges that the 7 September 9, 2011 assignment is “misleading, invalid, and void” because the assignor—Wells Fargo 8 Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”)—“lacked the requisite authority to re-assign” interest under the trust 9 deed because it had already done so on October 5, 2010. Id. at 7, ¶ 29. American Title Insurance Company (“FATIC”), acting as agents for the beneficiary under the trust 12 For the Northern District of California Ms. Sosa alleges that First American Trustee Servicing Solutions, LLC (“FATSS”) and First 11 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 deed, issued a notice of default on September 16, 2010. Id. at 5, ¶ 21. She contends that this notice 13 of defective because the declaration accompanying it “ambiguously declared” that “one of the” 14 requirements relating to the assessment of her financial situation and the exploration of alternatives 15 to foreclosure was made by “Beneficiary.” Id. at 5, 7, ¶¶ 21, 32. She contends that she was never 16 contacted by anyone for any such assessment and so this declaration is “fraudulent.” Id. at 7-8, ¶¶ 17 35, 40. 18 A foreclosure sale had been scheduled for February 3, 2012. Application, ECF No. 13 at 1. On 19 February 2, 2012, after a hearing attending by both parties, the court entered a temporary restraining 20 order that enjoins BNYM (as well as its officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and other 21 persons who are in active concert or participation with them) from conducting a deed of trust sale of 22 or foreclosing upon Ms. Sosa residence. 2/2/2012 Order, ECF No. 17. The court also entered a 23 preliminary injunction with the same conditions. 3/27/2012 Order, ECF No. 29. 24 Ms. Sosa filed a Second Amended Complaint on April 9, 2012, and BNYM now moves to 25 dismiss part of her third, and the entirety of her fourth, causes of action. Motion, ECF No. 34; see 26 SAC, ECF No. 33. Ms. Sosa opposes BNYM’s motion. Opposition, ECF No. 35. 27 III. LEGAL STANDARD 28 A court may dismiss a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) when it does C 12-00144 LB ORDER 2 not contain enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. See Bell Atlantic Corp. 2 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 3 factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for 4 the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). “The plausibility standard 5 is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a 6 defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.) “While a complaint 7 attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s 8 obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and 9 conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual 10 allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 11 U.S. at 555 (internal citations and parentheticals omitted). 12 For the Northern District of California UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 In considering a motion to dismiss, a court must accept all of the plaintiff's allegations as true 13 and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See id. at 550; Erickson v. Pardus, 551 14 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007); Vasquez v. Los Angeles County, 487 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2007). 15 If the court dismisses the complaint, it should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend 16 is made “unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other 17 facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. 18 v. Northern California Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990)). But when a party 19 repeatedly fails to cure deficiencies, the court may order dismissal without leave to amend. See 20 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming dismissal with prejudice where 21 district court had instructed pro se plaintiff regarding deficiencies in prior order dismissing claim 22 with leave to amend). 23 24 IV. DISCUSSION A. The Court’s 3/28/2012 Order 25 In its 3/28/2012 granting in part and denying in part BNYM’s motion to dismiss Ms. Sosa’s First 26 Amended Complaint, the court ruled that Ms. Sosa’s first and second causes of action—in which she 27 alleges claims for violation of California Civil Code §§ 2923.5 and 2924, respectively—were 28 sufficiently pled. The court also ruled that Ms. Sosa had standing to bring her third cause of action, C 12-00144 LB ORDER 3 1 in which she alleges a claim for violation of all three prongs of California’s Unfair Competition Law 2 (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200-17210.3 The court also ruled that Ms. Sosa sufficiently 3 alleged a claim under the “unlawful” prong of the UCL (by virtue of the survival of her first and 4 second causes of action), but that she did not sufficiently allege claims under the UCL’s “unfair” or 5 “fraudulent” prongs. Finally, the court ruled that Ms. Sosa did not sufficiently allege a claim for 6 negligent misrepresentation. 7 Ms. Sosa filed a Second Amended Complaint that includes some new allegations. See SAC, 8 ECF No. 33 at 5-7, ¶¶ 22-24, 26-27, 29; id. at 19-20, ¶¶ 118-20, 122-23. BNYM does not believe 9 that these new allegations save her “unfair” and “fraudulent” UCL claims or her negligent misrepresentation claim. Each claim is addressed in turn below. 11 B. Whether Ms. Sosa States a Claim under the UCL’s “Unfair” Prong 12 For the Northern District of California UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 The Ninth Circuit has explained that the definition of “unfair” acts or practices in consumer 13 actions is unsettled. Lozano v. AT & T Wireless Services, Inc., 504 F.3d 718, 736 (9th Cir. 2007). 14 One line of cases defines “unfair” conduct as immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or 15 substantially injurious to consumers and requiring the court to weigh the utility of the defendant’s 16 conduct against the gravity of the harm to the alleged victim. Id. The other line of cases requires 17 that the allegedly “unfair” conduct be tethered to specific constitutional, statutory, or regulatory 18 provisions. Id. The Ninth Circuit declined to specify which test should be used and, instead, 19 observed that the two tests are not mutually exclusive. Id. 20 21 In light of these tests, the court, in its 3/28/2012 Order, summarized BNYM’s argument for why dismissal was appropriate and then explained why Ms. Sosa’s allegations were not sufficient: 22 23 3 24 25 26 27 28 Section 17200 prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent” business practices. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Because the statute is written in the disjunctive, it prohibits three separate types of unfair competition: (1) unlawful acts or practices, (2) unfair acts or practices, and (3) fraudulent acts or practices. Cel–Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal.4th 163, 180 (Cal. 1999). The court notes that BNYM argues in its motion that Ms. Sosa does not have standing to bring a UCL claim. See Motion, ECF No. 34 at 5-6. The argument is moot because the court already decided that Ms. Sosa had such standing. 3/28/2012 Order, ECF No. 30 at 6. C 12-00144 LB ORDER 4 1 2 3 4 [BNYM] argues that [Ms.] Sosa fails to state a claim under the UCL’s “unfair” prong because she did not allege that its conduct threatened an “incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws.” Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 19 at 8. In support of its position, [BNYM] cites an unpublished case from another district in which the court held that allegations relating to loan origination and wrongful foreclosure do not threaten antitrust violations and could not serve as a basis for a claim under the unfair prong. Id. (citing Heald v. National City Mortg., No. 11CV904 JLS (NLS), 2011 WL 5513226 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2011). 5 6 7 8 9 [Ms.] Sosa quotes high-level statements regarding the balancing test but offers no analysis as to why it should or how it should apply to the facts in this case. Opposition, ECF No. 24 at 6-7. [Ms.] Sosa claims that her allegation that [BNYM’s] allegedly wrongful initiation of foreclosure proceedings in violation of section 2924 constitutes an unlawful act and then concludes that this means that she has properly alleged that [BNYM] is engaged in deceptive, unfair and fraudulent conduct under both the “unlawful” and “unfair” prongs of the UCL. Id. at 7. But [Ms.] Sosa’s statements merely make a conclusory assertion and are not persuasive. 3/28/2012 Order, ECF No. 30 at 7. “Given these factors,” the court “determine[d] that [Ms.] Sosa 11 failed to state a claim for a violation of the UCL under its ‘unfair’ prong.” Id. 12 For the Northern District of California UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 The court, then, provided Ms. Sosa with the reason why her claim was insufficient and provided 13 her with an opportunity to cure it. She did not. In fact, the UCL-related allegations in her Second 14 Amended Complaint are identical to the UCL-related allegations in the First Amended Complaint 15 that the court found to be insufficient. Compare FAC, ECF No. 8 at 16-20, ¶¶ 94-116 with SAC, 16 ECF No. 33 at 16-19, ¶¶ 94-115.2 Accordingly, Ms. Sosa’s “unfair” UCL claim is dismissed with 17 prejudice. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1261. 18 C. Whether Ms. Sosa States a Claim under the UCL’s “Fraudulent” Prong 19 To state a claim under the “fraudulent” prong of § 17200, a plaintiff must allege facts showing 20 that members of the public are likely to be deceived by the alleged fraudulent business practice. See 21 Morgan v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 177 Cal. App. 4th 1235, 1255 (2009). Federal Rule of Civil 22 Procedure 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirements applies to allegations of fraud in support of a § 23 17200 claim. See Long v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No C 06-2616 JW, 2007 WL4877691, at *3 (N.D. 24 Cal. Dec. 21, 2006). 25 In its 3/28/2012 Order, as it did for her “unfair” UCL claim, the court summarized BNYM’s 26 argument for why Ms. Sosa’s “fraudulent” UCL claim failed and then explained why her allegations 27 28 2 The court notes that the First Amended Complaint does contain one paragraph that was omitted from the Second Amended Complaint. See FAC, ECF No. 8 at 19, ¶ 113. C 12-00144 LB ORDER 5 1 2 3 4 5 were insufficient: [BNYM] argues that [Ms.] Sosa did not allege a fraud claim under the UCL with specific particularity. Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 19 at 9. [BNYM] explains that [Ms.] Sosa alleges that [BNYM] violated the fraudulent prong by engaging in “one or more” of eight identified acts. Id. (citing First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 8 at 17-18, ¶ 104(a)-(h)). [BNYM] contends that [Ms.] Sosa’s failure to even allege which of the eight listed acts [BNYM] may have engaged in, let alone allege each act with the required specificity under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), is fatal to her claim under the “fraud” prong of the UCL. Id. 6 7 Here again, [Ms.] Sosa merely quotes high-level statements regarding the elements of a claim under the UCL’s ‘fraud” prong but offers no analysis as to why it should or how it should apply to the facts in this case. Opposition, ECF No. 24 at 6. 8 9 10 3/28/2012 Order, ECF No. 30 at 8. “Given these factors,” the court “determine[d] that [Ms.] Sosa failed to state a claim for a violation of the UCL under its ‘fraud’ prong.” Id. As noted above, the UCL-related allegations in Ms. Sosa’s Second Amended Complaint are 12 For the Northern District of California UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 identical to the UCL-related allegations in the First Amended Complaint that the court found to be 13 insufficient. Compare FAC, ECF No. 8 at 16-20, ¶¶ 94-116 with SAC, ECF No. 33 at 16-19, ¶¶ 94- 14 115.3 In light of her failure to cure the deficiencies pointed out to her, Ms. Sosa’s “fraudulent” UCL 15 claim is dismissed with prejudice. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1261. 16 D. Whether Ms. Sosa States a Claim for Negligent Misrepresentation 17 The elements of a negligent misrepresentation claim are: “(1) a misrepresentation of a past or 18 existing material fact, (2) without reasonable ground for believing it to be true, (3) with the intent to 19 induce another’s reliance on the fact misrepresented, (4) justifiable reliance on the 20 misrepresentation, and (5) resulting damages.” Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Cambridge Integrated 21 Servs. Group, Inc., 171 Cal. App. 4th 35, 50 (2009). And “[a]s with any negligence claim, the tort 22 of negligent misrepresentation requires that [a] [p]laintiff allege a duty of care.” Plastino v. Wells 23 Fargo Bank, No. C 12–01037 CRB, 2012 WL 2061515, at *8 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2012) (citing Eddy 24 v. Sharp, 199 Cal. App. 3d 858, 864 (1988)). A negligent misrepresentation claim also must meet 25 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)’s particularity requirement. Neilson v. Union Bank of Cal., 26 N.A., 290 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1141 (C.D. Cal. 2003). 27 28 3 The court notes that the First Amended Complaint does contain one paragraph that was omitted from the Second Amended Complaint. See FAC, ECF No. 8 at 19, ¶ 113. C 12-00144 LB ORDER 6 1 In her First Amended Complaint, Ms. Sosa alleged that BNYM initiated the foreclosure of 2 subject property by recording a misleading declaration in violation of its obligation, pursuant to 3 California Civil Code § 2923.5, to contact the borrower prior to the initiation of non-judicial 4 foreclosure. See FAC, ECF No. 8 at 20-22, ¶¶ 120-21, 124-27. Ms. Sosa claimed that BNYM had a 5 common law duty avoid making partial, misleading representations that effectively concealed 6 material facts. Id. at 8, ¶¶ 39-40. In its motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint, BNYM 7 pointed out that it was assigned the trust deed a year after the allegedly fraudulent declaration was 8 filed and so it could not possibly owe Ms. Sosa a duty in such a situation. Motion to Dismiss FAC, 9 ECF No. 19 at 9-11. Defendant also argues that the timing meant that Ms. Sosa cannot allege a claim with the requisite specificity because she cannot claim that she relied on the representation to 11 her detriment because she was in default and could not have cured it. Id. at 10. 12 For the Northern District of California UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 The court dismissed Ms. Sosa’s negligent misrepresentation claim without prejudice. 3/28/2012 13 Order, ECF No. 30 at 9. It explained that Ms. Sosa “did not address whether [BNYM] may be held 14 liable for representations made by another party.” Id. And “[i]n the absence of analysis or authority 15 supporting such a conclusion, and given the uncontested documentary evidence that [BNYM] did 16 not execute the allegedly fraudulent declaration,” the court concluded that Ms. Sosa failed to state a 17 claim for negligent misrepresentation. 18 As mentioned above, Ms. Sosa’s Second Amended Complaint includes some new allegations. 19 See SAC, ECF No. 33 at 5-7, ¶¶ 22-24, 26-27, 29; id. at 19-20, ¶¶ 118-20, 122-23. Those 20 allegations appear to address the court’s inquiry about whether BNYM may be held liable for the 21 allegedly false representations made in the declaration that accompanied the notice of default. 22 Specifically, Ms. Sosa alleged the following: 23 118. Defendant [BNYM] is acting as the assignee for the Deed of Trust and the Note and voluntarily accepted the benefit of foreclosure on the subject property. 24 25 26 119. [Ms. Sosa] alleges that the foreclosure proceedings were known to Defendant [BNYM] at the time of the [October 5, 2010 assignment] because [BNYM] was named as the beneficiary in the [notice of default] and the single point of contact for payment to stop the foreclosure one month before it was allegedly assigned all beneficial interest under the Deed of Trust and Note. 27 28 120. By enforcing the terms of the contract, instituting and continuing foreclosure proceedings, [BNYM] is also liable for enforcement of the contract and the representations made in the [notice of default] and Foreclosure Declaration. C 12-00144 LB ORDER 7 1 121. [BNYM] was allegedly assigned the rights and interests to the promissory not by [Wells Fargo] with an Assignment of Deed of Trust]. 2 3 4 122. The assignment transfers the interest of the assignor to the assignee. Manson, Iver & York v. Black, 176 Cal. App. 4th 36, 49 [(2009)]. Thereafter, “[t]he assignee ‘stands in the shoes’ of the assignor, taking his rights and remedies, subject to any defenses which the obligor has against the assignor prior to notice of the assignment.” Johnson v. County of Fresno[,] 111 Cal. App. 4th 1087, 1096 [(2003)]. 5 6 7 123. [Ms. Sosa] alleges that [BNYM], as holder of [] all rights and interests under the Note, must also accept all obligations and liabilities that flow from the alleged agreement between the parties and representations made during the foreclosure proceedings. 8 SAC, ECF No. 19-20, ¶¶ 118-23. 9 In its motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, BNYM argues that “[t]he allegations in 10 [Ms. Sosa’s] SAC are nearly identical to those in her FAC and, more importantly, they do not 11 For the Northern District of California UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT address the deficiencies noted by the Court.” Motion, ECF No. 34 at 7-8. The court begs to differ. 12 Ms. Sosa clearly added new allegations addressing the court’s inquiry. 13 Whether these new allegations carry the day is a separate issue, though. Ms. Sosa’s premise is 14 that, because an “assignee ‘stands in the shoes’ of the assignor,” and takes the assignor’s “rights and 15 remedies, subject to any defenses which the obligor has against the assignor prior to notice of the 16 assignment,” Johnson, 111 Cal. App. 4th at 1096, BNYM (the assignee, in this scenario) took all of 17 the Wells Fargo’s (the assignor) “rights and remedies,” subject to any “defenses” Ms. Sosa (the 18 obligor) had against Wells Fargo. The problem is that none of the authority cited by Ms. Sosa 19 stands for the proposition that an assignee is vicariously liable for the acts of the assignor that were 20 made prior to the assignment. The cases Ms. Sosa cites deal with the determination of whether a 21 particular party is a real party in interest and can enforce the rights assigned to the party; they do not 22 address vicarious liability for torts allegedly committed by the assignor. See Manson, 176 Cal. App. 23 4th at 49-50; Johnson, 111 Cal. App. 4th at 1096; see also F.D.I.C. v. Varrasso, No. CIV. 2:11–2628 24 WBS CKD, 2012 WL 219046, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2012 (“As the purchaser of the Weisbly 25 Loans, IndyMac stepped into the shoes of Kay–Co and is entitled to assert any claims arising out of 26 the initial real estate transaction.”) (citing Johnson). Thus, although Ms. Sosa addressed the court’s 27 concern, she failed to do so in a way that convinces the court to allow her negligent 28 misrepresentation claim to go forward. For this reason, and because she has had opportunity to cure C 12-00144 LB ORDER 8 1 its deficiencies, Ms. Sosa’s negligent misrepresentation claim is dismissed with prejudice. See 2 Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1261.4 3 4 V. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS BNYM’s motion to dismiss certain claims 5 alleged in Ms. Sosa’s Second Amended Complaint. Specifically, Ms. Sosa “unfair” and 6 “fraudulent” UCL claims (alleged within her third cause of action) and her negligent 7 misrepresentation claim (her fourth cause of action) are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 8 Remaining are her claims for violation of California Civil Code §§ 2923.5 and 2924 (her first and 9 second causes of action) and her “unlawful” UCL claim (alleged within her third cause of action). This disposes of ECF No. 34. 11 The court previously ordered the parties to participate in a settlement conference before Chief 12 For the Northern District of California UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 Magistrate Judge Maria-Elena James. Referral Order, ECF No. 31. The settlement conference 13 originally was scheduled for June 19, 2012, and then it was continued to June 27, 2012. Order 14 Scheduling Settlement Conference, ECF No. 32; Clerk’s Notice Rescheduling Settlement 15 Conference, ECF No. 39. On June 27, 2012, neither Ms. Sosa nor her counsel appeared at the 16 settlement conference. 7/2/2012 Minute Order, ECF No. 40. Ms. Sosa’s counsel is ORDERED to 17 file, no later than July 6, 2012, a declaration explaining why he and Ms. Sosa failed to appear at 18 the settlement conference. In addition, the parties are FURTHER ORDERED to contact Judge 19 James’s courtroom deputy immediately to schedule a new settlement conference, and Ms. Sosa’s 20 counsel SHALL advise the court of that date in his declaration. Failure to participate in the 21 settlement conference violates the currently-operative settlement conference order, Order 22 Scheduling Settlement Conference, ECF No. 32, and may subject Ms. Sosa and/or her counsel to 23 sanctions if it happens again. 24 25 26 27 28 4 In her opposition to BNYM’s motion to dismiss, Ms. Sosa argues that her claim survives because BNYM was a member of a joint venture or a civil conspiracy. See Opposition, ECF No. 35 at 8-9. This is the first time that Ms. Sosa has ever made such a claim; it did not appear in her original or First Amended Complaint, and it does not appear in the operative Second Amended Complaint. Moreover, even if it did, she fails to allege any facts to support either of these theories. In such a situation, the court need not address them. C 12-00144 LB ORDER 9 1 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 2, 2012 _______________________________ LAUREL BEELER United States Magistrate Judge 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 12 For the Northern District of California UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 C 12-00144 LB ORDER 10
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
