Enriquez et al v. Interstate Group, LLC et al
Filing
58
ORDER by Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers denying 12 Defendant Shawn Luteyn's Motion to Dismiss Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (fs, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/31/2012)
1
2
3
4
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6
7
8
9
10
JOSE ENRIQUEZ and QUINN COLMENERO,
individually and on behalf of themselves
and those similarly situated,
Northern District of California
United States District Court
11
12
13
14
15
Plaintiffs,
Case No.: 11-CV-05155 YGR
ORDER DENYING MOTION OF DEFENDANT
SHAWN LUTEYN TO DISMISS COMPLAINT FOR
LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
vs.
INTERSTATE GROUP, LLC; SHAWN LUTEYN;
and DOES 1 to 50,
Defendants.
16
17
Plaintiffs Jose Enriquez (“Enriquez”) and Quinn Colmenero (“Colmenero”) bring this
18
putative class action, on behalf of themselves and similarly situated current and former employees of
19
Defendant Interstate Group, LLC (“Interstate”) for violation of state and federal labor laws.
20
Plaintiffs also bring two claims in their individual capacities against Interstate and its Chief
21
Operating Officer, Shawn Luteyn (“Luteyn”), for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act
22
(“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.: (1) failure to pay overtime (Count One); and (2) wrongful
23
termination (Count Eleven). (Dkt. No. 23, “First Amended Complaint” (“FAC”) ¶¶ 34-41, 101-06.)
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Luteyn, who works and resides in Idaho, has filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that
25
the Court lacks personal jurisdiction. The Court held oral argument on July 10, 2012 and ordered
26
supplemental briefing.
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Having carefully considered the papers submitted, the pleadings, and the oral argument of
counsel, for the reasons set forth below, the Court hereby DENIES Luteyn’s to Dismiss.
1
I.
BACKG
GROUND1
Interstate manufactu and sells auto, cargo constructio recreatio and spor utility, an
ures
s
o,
on,
onal
rt,
nd
2
3
wor trailers. (F
rk
FAC ¶ 9.) In
nterstate own and opera approxim
ns
ates
mately 37 re
etail dealersh
hips
4
thro
oughout the United States, including eight stores in Californi that speci
U
ia,
ialize in the sale of its
5
trail
lers. (Id.) Luteyn is the Chief Opera
L
ating Officer of Interstat and he resides and ma
r
te,
aintains his
6
offic in Idaho. (Id. ¶ 13.)
ce
aintiffs work at Interst
ked
tate’s dealers
ship in Santa Rosa, Calif
a
fornia, Trail
lersPlus.
Both Pla
7
8
Colm
menero work as a Sale Associate2 from Septe
ked
es
e
ember 2009 to May 2010 and from A
August 2011
1
9
to September 20
011. (Id. ¶ 8.) Between May 2010 a August 2
8
and
2011, Colme
enero worked as a store
10
man
nager. (Id.) Enriquez ha worked as a Sales Ass
as
s
sociate at TrailersPlus in Santa Rosa California,
n
a,
,
11
sinc December 2009. (Id. ¶ 7.)
ce
r
Northern District of California
United States District Court
12
A.
OVERTIME CLAIM
C
13
Plaintiff first claim is for failur to pay ove
fs’
m
re
ertime. (Id. ¶ 36.) The F
FLSA requir employers
res
14
pay non-exempt employees overtime rat for each hour worked in excess o
t
tes
d
over forty ho in a
ours
15
wor
rkweek. 29 U.S.C. § 207 Plaintiffs allege that I
U
7.
Interstate mi
isclassifies S
Sales Managers as exemp
pt
16
emp
ployees so th it does no have to pa Sales Man
hat
ot
ay
nagers overti for any work in excess of forty
ime
17
hour in a week. (FAC ¶ 16 Plaintiffs also allege that Intersta has a poli of prohib
rs
6.)
s
ate
icy
biting its Sal
les
18
Asso
ociates from logging mo than 39.5 hours, rega
m
ore
5
ardless of act hours w
tual
worked. (Id. ¶ 17.) If a
19
Sale Associate logs more th 39.5 hou on a time
es
han
urs
ecard, the Sa Associa is required to change
ales
ate
d
20
the timecard or the timecard will be cha
t
t
d
anged for the Sales Associate. (Id.) Plaintiffs claim that
e
21
Lute “was the primary de
eyn
e
ecision make with respe to the vio
er
ect
olations of th FLSA.” (I ¶ 13.)
he
Id.
22
B.
23
Colmene also brin a claim for wrongful termination against both Interstate a Luteyn.
ero
ngs
fo
n
h
and
24
COLMENERO’S WRONGF TERMIN
O
FUL
NATION CLA
AIM
On July 22, 2011, Colmener filed a for
J
ro
rmal written complaint w the Cali
with
ifornia Depa
artment of
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26
1
27
2
28
Because the pen
nding Motion addresses on certain cla
nly
aims and issue this section is not intended to provid
es,
de
an ex
xhaustive sum
mmary of the factual or pro
ocedural back
kground in thi action.
is
In the parties’ briefs, Plaintif refer to this position as “Sales Assoc
t
ffs
ciate,” while D
Defendant ref to the sam
fers
me
posit
tion as “Sales Consultant.” For consistency purpose only, the Court will use the term “Sal Associate”
s
”
es
les
”
throu
ughout.
2
1
Labor Standards Enforceme (“DLSE” claiming t
s
ent
”),
that Interstat failed to p overtime when
te
pay
e
2
emp
ployees work in excess of 8 hours in a day. (Id ¶ 96.) Co
ked
s
Id.
olmenero alle
eges that pri to the
ior
3
hear
ring on the DLSE compl
D
laint, he was summoned into his man
s
d
nager’s offic to particip in a
ce
pate
4
conf
ference call with Luteyn to discuss the basis for the DLSE c
n
t
claim. (Dkt. No. 17, Ex. A,
5
Dec
claration of Quinn Colme
Q
enero (“Colm
menero Dec. ¶ 5.) Co
.”),
olmenero alle
eges that Lu
uteyn
6
prim
marily repres
sented Interstate at the August 31, 20 DLSE h
A
011
hearing, whic resulted in a settlemen
ch
n
nt
7
and the issuance of back pay to Interstat employee s. (Id. ¶ 7; s also, Sup
e
y
te
see
pplemental D
Declaration of
o
8
Shaw Luteyn (“Luteyn Sup Dec.”), Dkt. No. 19- ¶ 11 ( “Co
wn
(
pp.
D
-1,
olmenero ov
verstates my role in the
9
Cali
ifornia DLSE settlement conference” Depositio of Shawn Luteyn (“L
E
t
”);
on
n
Luteyn Dep.” Dkt. No.
”),
10
46-1 at 189:1-3
1,
3.)
Colmene was term
ero
minated on September 10 2011, alleg
0,
gedly in reta
aliation for fi
filing the
11
Northern District of California
United States District Court
12
DLS complain (FAC ¶ 98.) Luteyn fired Colme
SE
nt.
9
enero via tele
ephone after another Inte
r
erstate
13
emp
ployee report feeling harassed whe Colmener inquired a
ted
h
en
ro
about the pho number for a former
one
r
14
store manager. (Colmenero Dec. ¶ 8; se also, Lute Dep. at 1
o
ee
eyn
183:14-16 (“ was broug into it,
“I
ght
15
yes” The FAC alleges tha Luteyn wa the decisi maker in Colmenero’s firing. (F
”).)
C
at
as
ion
n
FAC ¶ 98.)
16
II.
DISCUS
SSION
17
A.
LEGAL STAN
NDARD UNDE RULE 12(
ER
(b)(2)
18
A motion under Federal Rule of Civil Proced
n
f
dure 12(b)(2 challenges the Court’s exercise of
2)
s
s
f
19
sonal jurisdic
ction over a defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). Where no federal statu governs
.
ute
pers
20
pers
sonal jurisdic
ction, the Co applies the law of th state in wh it sits, h
ourt
t
he
hich
here, Califor
rnia.
21
Schw
warzenegger v. Fred Ma
r
artin Motor Co., 374 F.3 797, 800 (
C
3d
(9th Cir. 200
04). Californ law allow
nia
ws
22
for the exercise of “jurisdict
t
tion on any basis not inc
b
consistent wi the Const
ith
titution of th state or of
he
f
23
the United State
U
es.” Cal. Civ Proc. Code § 410.10.
v.
24
Due proc requires that the non-resident d
cess
s
defendant hav either a “substantial, continuous,
ve
25
and systematic” presence in the forum state or suffic
”
n
s
cient “minim
mum contact with [the f
ts
forum state]
26
h
aintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of f play and substantial
d
l
fair
d
such that the ma
27
justi
ice.” Int’l Sh Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 31 0, 316 (1945 Where th non-resid
hoe
W
5).
he
dent
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defe
endant’s foru
um-related activities are not “substan
a
ntial, continu
uous, and sy
ystematic,” th Court mu
he
ust
3
1
evaluate whether the specific activity giving rise to the Plaintiffs’ causes of action is sufficiently
2
related to the forum state. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446 (1952);
3
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-53 (1958).
4
5
6
The Ninth Circuit applies a three-part test to determine whether a non-resident defendant’s
activities are sufficiently related to the forum state to establish personal jurisdiction:
(1)
7
8
(2)
9
(3)
10
The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or
consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform
some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting
activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws;
the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forumrelated activities; and
the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice,
i.e. it must be reasonable.
Northern District of California
Schwarzenegger, supra, 374 F.3d at 802 (citing Lake v. Lake, 817 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1987)).
12
United States District Court
11
The plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating the first two parts. Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.2d
13
1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2008). If the plaintiffs fail to satisfy either of these parts, then personal
14
jurisdiction is not established in the forum state. Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1555
15
(9th Cir. 2006). If the plaintiffs carry this burden, then “the defendant must come forward with a
16
‘compelling case’ that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” Id. (citing
17
Schwarzenegger, supra, 374 F.3d at 802).
18
Where, as here, the motion to dismiss is based on written materials–pleadings, declarations,
19
and Luteyn’s deposition–rather than an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiffs need only make a prima
20
facie showing of jurisdiction. Schwarzenneger, supra, 374 F.3d at 800. The plaintiffs must make
21
this showing with respect to each claim. Fiore v. Walden, 657 F.3d 838, 858 (9th Cir. 2011). A
22
plaintiff makes a “prima facie” showing by producing admissible evidence which, if believed, would
23
be sufficient to establish the existence of personal jurisdiction. Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495,
24
1498 (9th Cir. 1995). In deciding whether such a showing has been made, a district court must
25
accept as true the uncontroverted allegations in the complaint; where allegations are contested, they
26
“are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[s] and all doubts are resolved in [their]
27
favor.” AT&T v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1996).
28
4
1
A.
2
Analyzin Luteyn’s acts under th minimum contacts te demonstra that Lut
ng
he
m
est
ates
teyn has
3
MINIMUM CONTACTS ANALYSIS
suff
ficient minim
mum contacts for the Cou to exercis specific ju
urt
se
urisdiction a to each cla
as
aim.
Part One: Purpo
O
oseful Direct
tion
4
1.
1
5
The first part of the minimum contac test is sub
T
t
cts
bdivided into purposeful direction,
o
l
6
whic generally applies to to claims, and purposef availmen which gen
ch
y
ort
a
ful
nt,
nerally applies to contrac
ct
7
claim Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antise
ms.
e
emitisme, 433 F.3d 1199 1206 (9th
9,
8
Cir. 2006). Alth
hough claim of unlawfu employme practices presuppose an employm contrac
ms
ul
ent
s
e
ment
ct,
9
SA
enerally are analyzed as torts under p
a
purposeful d
direction. Se Holliday v Lifestyle Lift,
ee
v.
L
FLS claims ge
10
Inc., No. C-09-4
4995 RS, 2010 WL 3910
0143 (N.D. C Oct. 5, 2
Cal.
2010).
Northern District of California
The first part of the minimum co
t
m
ontacts test i s satisfied w
where a defen
ndant purpos
sefully direc
cts
12
United States District Court
11
a
t
rzenegger, su
upra, 374 F. at 802-03 Courts fo
.3d
3.
ocus on wher
re
his activities at the forum state. Schwar
13
the defendant’s actions were felt, not wh
d
e
hether the ac occurred within this f
cts
forum. Yaho supra,
oo!,
14
433 F.3d at 1205. Thus, cou analyze this issue us
urts
sing the “eff
fects test.” S
Schwarzeneg
gger, supra,
15
374 F.3d at 802 (citing Cald v. Jones, 465 U.S. 78 789-90 (1984)). Und the “effe test,” the
der
83,
der
ects
e
16
defe
endant allege
edly must ha (a) comm
ave
mitted an inte
entional act; (b) express aimed at t forum
;
sly
the
17
state (c) which caused harm that the defendant knew was likely to be suffer in the fo
e;
m
w
y
red
orum state. Id.
I
Intentiona Act3
al
18
a)
19
ntent’ in the context of th ‘intention act’ test [
he
nal
[refers] to an intent to
n
“‘[I]n
20
3
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Luteyn contends that the fidu
s
uciary shield doctrine precl
d
ludes his acts from countin towards th minimum
s
ng
he
cont
tacts test beca
ause they were conducted in his role as a corporate officer. (Mot. at 9-10.) In the Motion, he
e
i
h
raise the doctrine only in resp to genera jurisdiction . However, h also referen
es
e
pect
al
he
nces the doctr in his
rine
spec
cific jurisdiction analysis.
Luteyn’s acts are not protected by the fiduciary s
p
t
shield doctrin because he is alleged to have been a
ne
e
“prim
mary participant” in the all
leged wrongd
doing. Allstar Mktg. Group LLC v. You Store Onlin LLC, 666 F.
r
up,
ur
ne,
Supp 2d 1109, 1120 (C.D. Ca 2009) (citin Transgo, I v. Ajac Tr
p.
al.
ng
Inc.
ransmission P
Parts Corp., 7 F.2d 1001,
768
1021 (9th Cir. 1985). Under the fiduciary shield doctrin “the acts o corporate o
1
t
ne,
of
officers & dire
ectors in their
r
offic capacities are the acts of the corpora
cial
s
ation exclusiv
vely and are t
thus not mater for purpo of
rial
oses
estab
blishing minim
mum contacts as to the ind
dividual.” Co Studio v. B
olt
Badpuppy Ent
ter., 75 F. Sup 2d 1103,
pp.
1111 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (citing Shearer v. Su
1
1
S
uperior Court 70 Cal. App 3d 424, 430 (1977)). On exception to
t,
p.
0
ne
t
the fiduciary shie doctrine is if the defend is a prima participan in alleged w
f
eld
s
dant
ary
nt
wrongdoing. Allstar Mktg
g.
Grou supra, 666 F. Supp. 2d at 1120. Pla
up,
d
aintiffs have a
alleged that L
Luteyn was a “
“primary part
ticipant” in th
he
alleg wrongdoi
ged
ing: Luteyn was the decisio maker with respect to th overtime p
w
on
h
he
policies, and L
Luteyn
personally fired Colmenero. (FAC ¶¶ 13, 98.)
C
9
5
1
perform an actual, physical act in the real world, rather than an intent to accomplish a result or
2
consequence of that act.” Id. at 806.
Here, the policy decision to deny overtime compensation satisfies the intentional act prong.
3
4
Plaintiffs claim that Luteyn “was the primary decision maker with respect to the violations of the
5
FLSA.” (FAC ¶ 13.) In other words, Luteyn is alleged to have promulgated both the policy decision
6
to misclassify Store Managers as exempt, and the policy decision to deny overtime compensation to
7
Sales Associates. (Id.) Luteyn does not argue to the contrary, but instead claims that he manages
8
operations at only a high level and he is not involved with individual store employee issues. Since
9
Plaintiffs allege that the FLSA violations occur in all eight California stores, if not all 37 Interstate
corporate policies. Accordingly, the uncontroverted allegation that Luteyn made the policy decision
12
Northern District of California
stores, the alleged overtime violations are not based on individual store level employee decisions but
11
United States District Court
10
to deny overtime compensation in violation of the FLSA operates as the “intentional act” under the
13
“effects test.” See Holliday, 2010 WL 3910143 (policy decision to deny overtime compensation to
14
all non-exempt employees in violation of FLSA “operates as the ‘intentional act’”).
Colmenero’s termination likewise satisfies the intentional act prong. Luteyn contends that his
15
16
role in Colmenero’s termination was limited to ratifying the decision of a store manager. However,
17
Luteyn does not deny, refute, or attempt to contradict the allegation that he was the individual who
18
fired Colmenero. Taking as true, the uncontroverted allegation that Luteyn uttered words to the
19
effect of “you’re fired,” Luteyn’s role in Colmenero’s termination went beyond mere ratification, he
20
personally participated in the allegedly wrongful termination. Moreover, Plaintiffs have proffered
21
the declaration4 of an individual present when Luteyn fired Colmenero that states it was Luteyn who
22
made the decision to fire Colmenero. (Dkt. No. 47.) “Conflicts between parties over statements
23
contained in affidavits must be resolved in plaintiff’s favor.” Schwarzenegger, supra, 374 F.3d at
24
800.
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court concludes that Luteyn’s allegedly unlawful
25
26
conduct satisfies the intentional act prong of the effects test.
27
4
28
Larry Tait, the Regional Manager who worked out of the Santa Rosa, California store at the time, provided a
sworn declaration that Luteyn made the decision to terminate Colmenero, and that Luteyn personally fired
Colmenero. (Dkt. No. 47.)
6
1
b)
Express Aiming
A
2
The express aimin requirem is satisfi if a defen
e
ng
ment
ied
ndant knows the plaintif
s
ff
3
is a resident of the forum sta at the tim his wrong conduct occurs. Do Food, Inc v. Watts, 303
t
ate
me
gful
ole
c.
4
F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 20
d
2
002).
The alleg
gedly unlaw overtime policy satis
wful
e
sfies the “ex
xpress aiming requireme of the
g”
ent
5
6
effects test. By operating ei
ight retail sto in Calif
ores
fornia and ap
pplying alleg
gedly unlawf overtime
ful
7
nia,
t
ifornia. The retaliatory t
e
termination also satisfies
policies to stores in Californ Luteyn targeted Cali
8
the “express aim
“
ming” require
ement of the effects test . At the tim Luteyn fired Colmene he was
e
me
ero
9
awa that Colm
are
menero work in the San Clara, California sto and that C
ked
nta
ore
Colmenero lived in
10
Cali
ifornia.5 (Co
olmenero De ¶¶ 3-7.)
ec.
Based on the foregoi analysis, the Court c
n
ing
,
concludes tha Luteyn’s allegedly un
at
nlawful
11
Northern District of California
United States District Court
12
cond was exp
duct
pressly aime at Plaintif in Califor
ed
ffs
rnia.
13
c)
14
The third element of the effec test–caus
t
cts
sing harm that the defend knows is
dant
i
15
Foreseeab Harm
ble
likel to be suff
ly
fered in the forum state–i similarly s
f
is
satisfied.
By apply
ying the allegedly unlaw overtime policies he in Califor
wful
e
ere
rnia, Luteyn would
n
16
17
reas
sonably have known that California employees w
e
t
e
would be har
rmed by such policies. W respect
h
With
t
18
to th retaliatory termination claim, Luteyn knew th Colmener lived and worked in C
he
y
n
hat
ro
California an
nd
19
ther
refore, it was foreseeable that the har from firin Colmener would occur in Califo
s
e
rm
ng
ro
ornia.
20
Based on the foregoi analysis, the Court c
n
ing
,
concludes tha Plaintiffs have presen sufficien
at
nted
nt
21
alleg
gations and facts to dem
f
monstrate that Luteyn pur
t
rposefully di
irected his ac
ctions at Cal
lifornia so as
s
22
to sa
atisfy the first part of the minimum contacts test
e
c
t.
23
2.
2
Part Two: Forum
m-related ac
ctivities
24
The requirem that the claims “aris out of” or “relate to” t defendan forumT
ment
se
r
the
nt’s
25
relat activities is met if “b for” the contacts betw
ted
s
but
c
ween the def
fendant and the forum st
tate, the caus
se
26
of action would not have ari
isen. See Om
meluk v. Lan
ngsten Slip & Bathygger A/S, 52 F.3 267, 271
ri
3d
27
5
28
For purposes of this motion, it has not bee disputed th Luteyn had a phone con
r
f
en
hat
d
nversation wi Colmenero
ith
o
conc
cerning his Ca
alifornia over
rtime wage claim, Luteyn r
represented In
nterstate at th hearing bef
he
fore the
California admini
istrative agen and Lutey terminated Colmenero’s employmen
ncy,
yn
d
nt.
7
1
(9th Cir. 1995); see also, Myers v. Benn Law Offi
h
My
nett
fices, 238 F.3 1068, 107 (9th Cir. 2
3d
75
2000).
2
Lute argues th Plaintiffs cannot sati this part of the test b
eyn
hat
s
isfy
t
because they fail to alleg a single ac
y
ge
ct
3
that ties Luteyn to California.6 Luteyn either misrea the FAC or simply ig
e
ads
C
gnores the fa alleged.
acts
4
In light of the allega
o
ations that Lu
uteyn person
nally promul
lgated unlaw overtime
wful
e
5
mpensation policies, and that Luteyn decided to t
terminate Co
olmenero and personally executed
d
y
com
6
that decision, th arising out of prong is easily satisf
he
t
fied. Here, “
“but for” Lu
uteyn’s allege
ed
7
mulgation of unlawful ov
f
vertime policies that app
plied to Inter
rstate’s Calif
fornia stores Colmenero
s,
o
prom
8
and Enriquez wo
ould not hav an overtim claim. Li
ve
me
ikewise, “bu for” Lutey act of te
ut
yn’s
erminating
9
menero’s em
mployment at the Santa Rosa, Califor
a
R
rnia store, an allegedly in retaliatio for filing a
nd
y
on
Colm
10
com
mplaint with the California DLSE, Co
t
olmenero wo
ould not hav a claim fo retaliatory termination
ve
or
n.
Therefor the Court concludes that Plaintiff overtime claim and C
re,
t
t
fs’
Colmenero’s retaliation
11
Northern District of California
United States District Court
12
claim arise out of or relate to Luteyn’s forum-relate d activities.
m
o
o
f
13
3.
3
Part Three: Reas
sonableness
14
“Once it has been decide that a defe
“
ed
endant purpo
osefully esta
ablished min
nimum contacts
15
with a forum, he must prese a compell
h
e
ent
ling case tha the presen of some o
at
nce
other consid
derations
16
wou render ju
uld
urisdiction un
nreasonable in order to d
defeat person jurisdicti
nal
ion.” Harris Rutsky & Co.
s
C
17
Ins. Servs v. Bel & Clement Ltd., 328 F.3d 1122, 1
ll
ts
F
1132 (9th Ci 2003) (cit
ir.
ting Burger K
King v.
18
Rud
dzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 47 (1985) (in
77
nternal quota
ations omitted). To dete
ermine whet
ther a
19
part
ticular exerci of person jurisdiction is reason
ise
nal
nable, the Co must ana
ourt
alyze seven factors: (a)
20
the extent of the defendant’s purposeful interjection into the for
e
e
s
l
n
rum; (b) the b
burden on th defendant
he
t
21
in li
itigating in th forum; (c the extent of conflict w the sove
he
c)
with
ereignty of th defendan state; (d)
he
nt’s
22
the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute (e) the most efficient judicial resol
f
g
e;
lution of the
23
cont
troversy; (f) the importance of the fo
orum to the p
plaintiff’s in
nterest in con
nvenient and effective
d
24
25
26
27
28
6
Luteyn argues th he cannot be held perso
hat
t
onally liable u
under the FLS because h did not act as Plaintiff’s
SA
he
“emp
ployer” withi the meanin of the FLSA Luteyn ar
in
ng
A.
rgues that bec
cause he does not hold a “s
significant
own
nership interes in Interstat or exercise “operational control . . . o
st”
te
e
l
over day to da functions,” he cannot be
ay
”
e
held liable under a derivative liability theor This again ignores that Plaintiffs are not attempti to impute
d
l
ry.
n
t
e
ing
liabi
ility or jurisdi
iction over Lu
uteyn based on acts of the corporation b virtue of hi position as a corporate
o
by
is
offic
cer. Rather, Plaintiffs argu that Luteyn own acts a sufficient to establish m
P
ue
n’s
are
minimum con
ntacts.
.
8
1
relief; and (g) the existence of an alternative forum. Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus. AB, 11 F.3d
2
1482, 1487-88 (9th Cir. 1993). An analysis of these factors demonstrates that an exercise of
3
jurisdiction is reasonable.
4
a)
Purposeful interjection into the forum.
5
The first factor, regarding the extent of the defendant’s purposeful interjection
6
into the forum state’s affairs, “parallels the question of minimum contacts” in determining the
7
reasonableness of an exercise of specific jurisdiction. Amoco Egypt Oil Co. v. Leonis Nav. Co., Inc.,
8
1 F.3d 848, 852 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 623 (9th Cir. 1991)
9
(“In light of the first prong of purposeful availment, analysis of this first factor in the third prong
himself into California’s affairs. Since Plaintiffs satisfied the first prong of purposeful availment by
12
Northern District of California
would be redundant”). Luteyn argues that there is no evidence that he purposefully interjected
11
United States District Court
10
showing that Luteyn purposefully directed his activities at California, this factor weighs in favor of
13
finding that the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable.
14
b)
Burden on defendant of litigating in a foreign forum.
15
The second factor focuses on the burden that defending in a particular forum.
16
Core-Vent, supra, 11 F.3d at 1487. For the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction to be unreasonable, the
17
burden of defending in California must be “so gravely difficult and inconvenient” that it violates due
18
process. See Burger King, supra, 471 U.S. at 485 (litigating in forum must be “so gravely difficult
19
and inconvenient that a party unfairly is at a severe disadvantage in comparison to his opponent.”)
20
(internal quotations omitted). This factor also must be considered in relation to the corresponding
21
burden on the plaintiff. Sinatra v. National Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir. 1988).
22
Luteyn argues that “[t]he burden on Luteyn, who lives and works in Idaho, is substantial.” (Mot. 13.)
23
Luteyn is the COO of a company with eight stores in California, and he has visited California for the
24
opening of at least some of those stores. (FAC ¶ 9; Luteyn Supp. Dec. ¶ 14; Luteyn Dep. at 30:6-
25
32:3, 234:13-235:12.) His declaration indicates that he has performed his regular work while in
26
California on previous occasions. (Luteyn Supp. Dec. ¶ 14.) Additionally, Luteyn’s deposition
27
testimony indicates that he travels to California for leisure approximately once per year. (Luteyn
28
Dep. at 235:4-13) By contrast, Colmenero is now unemployed (see Colmenero Dec. ¶ 14), nothing
9
1
indicates that Enriquez or Colmenero have ever traveled to Idaho, and many of their likely witnesses
2
reside in California. This factor thus supports a finding of reasonableness.
3
c)
Conflict with Idaho’s sovereignty.
4
With respect to the third factor, Luteyn does not argue that exercise of
5
jurisdiction over him would conflict with Idaho’s sovereignty, but instead argues that Idaho has an
6
interest in resolving a lawsuit against one of its residents. See Core-Vent, supra, 11 F.3d at 1487.
7
Although this case involves a resident of Idaho, there is no indication that the exercise of jurisdiction
8
over Luteyn would interfere with Idaho’s sovereignty. This factor thus supports a finding of
9
reasonableness.
10
d)
Forum state’s interest.
11
The fourth factor concerns the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the
Northern District of California
United States District Court
12
dispute. Id. California has a strong interest in adjudicating this matter because the injuries alleged
13
occurred here in California and Plaintiffs are residents of California. Thus, the fourth factor indicates
14
the exercise of jurisdiction over Luteyn would be reasonable.
15
e)
Most efficient forum for judicial resolution.
16
The fifth factor considers which forum will provide the most efficient judicial
17
resolution. Id. Resolving the claims here will be more efficient. First, the claims asserted against
18
Luteyn are also asserted against Interstate, and thus, the claims will be resolved in this forum even if
19
Luteyn is dismissed from this lawsuit. Accordingly, it is more efficient to resolve these claims in
20
one, rather than two forums. Second, the overtime claim is related to the California state law claims,
21
and some degree of overlap in witnesses and evidence is likely. Luteyn has not indicated there are
22
any witnesses or evidence in Idaho. For these reasons, this factor supports a finding of
23
reasonableness.
24
f)
Plaintiff’s interest in convenient and effective relief.
25
The sixth factor, the importance of this forum to Plaintiffs for convenient and
26
effective relief also supports exercising jurisdiction over Luteyn. Id. at 1487-88. Colmenero is
27
presently unemployed and has expressed fears of financial distress (Colmenero Dec. ¶ 14). A local
28
forum without travel requirements is more cost-effective for Plaintiff. There is no indication that
10
1
either of the Plaintiffs has ever traveled to Idaho, and many of their likely witnesses reside in
2
California. This factor thus supports a finding of reasonableness.
3
g)
Existence of an alternative forum.
4
The single factor weighing in favor of dismissal is the last factor, the presence
5
of an alternative forum in Idaho. Although an alternative forum exists in Idaho, Luteyn has not
6
“come forward with a ‘compelling case’ that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable.”
7
Pebble Beach, supra, 453 F.3d at 1555 (citing Schwarzenegger, supra, 374 F.3d at 802).
Overall, the reasonableness factors indicate that an exercise of personal jurisdiction over
8
9
10
Luteyn would be reasonable in this case.
III.
CONCLUSION
Northern District of California
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court concludes that the specific activity giving rise to
12
United States District Court
11
the Plaintiffs’ causes of action is sufficiently related to California to establish personal jurisdiction
13
over Shawn Luteyn. Accepting as true the uncontroverted allegations in the FAC and resolving all
14
conflicts in the evidence in Plaintiffs’ favor, Luteyn “could reasonably expect to be haled into court”
15
in California. See Int’l Shoe, supra, 326 U.S. at 316. Thus, “the maintenance of the suit does not
16
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id.
17
18
The Motion of Defendant Shawn Luteyn to Dismiss the Complaint for Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction is DENIED.
19
This Order terminates Dkt. No. 12.
20
IT IS SO ORDERED.
21
22
23
Dated: August 31, 2012
______________________________________
YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
24
25
26
27
28
11
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