Enriquez et al v. Interstate Group, LLC et al

Filing 58

ORDER by Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers denying 12 Defendant Shawn Luteyn's Motion to Dismiss Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (fs, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/31/2012)

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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 8 9 10 JOSE ENRIQUEZ and QUINN COLMENERO, individually and on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated, Northern District of California United States District Court 11 12 13 14 15 Plaintiffs, Case No.: 11-CV-05155 YGR ORDER DENYING MOTION OF DEFENDANT SHAWN LUTEYN TO DISMISS COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION vs. INTERSTATE GROUP, LLC; SHAWN LUTEYN; and DOES 1 to 50, Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiffs Jose Enriquez (“Enriquez”) and Quinn Colmenero (“Colmenero”) bring this 18 putative class action, on behalf of themselves and similarly situated current and former employees of 19 Defendant Interstate Group, LLC (“Interstate”) for violation of state and federal labor laws. 20 Plaintiffs also bring two claims in their individual capacities against Interstate and its Chief 21 Operating Officer, Shawn Luteyn (“Luteyn”), for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act 22 (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.: (1) failure to pay overtime (Count One); and (2) wrongful 23 termination (Count Eleven). (Dkt. No. 23, “First Amended Complaint” (“FAC”) ¶¶ 34-41, 101-06.) 24 Luteyn, who works and resides in Idaho, has filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that 25 the Court lacks personal jurisdiction. The Court held oral argument on July 10, 2012 and ordered 26 supplemental briefing. 27 28 Having carefully considered the papers submitted, the pleadings, and the oral argument of counsel, for the reasons set forth below, the Court hereby DENIES Luteyn’s to Dismiss. 1 I. BACKG GROUND1 Interstate manufactu and sells auto, cargo constructio recreatio and spor utility, an ures s o, on, onal rt, nd 2 3 wor trailers. (F rk FAC ¶ 9.) In nterstate own and opera approxim ns ates mately 37 re etail dealersh hips 4 thro oughout the United States, including eight stores in Californi that speci U ia, ialize in the sale of its 5 trail lers. (Id.) Luteyn is the Chief Opera L ating Officer of Interstat and he resides and ma r te, aintains his 6 offic in Idaho. (Id. ¶ 13.) ce aintiffs work at Interst ked tate’s dealers ship in Santa Rosa, Calif a fornia, Trail lersPlus. Both Pla 7 8 Colm menero work as a Sale Associate2 from Septe ked es e ember 2009 to May 2010 and from A August 2011 1 9 to September 20 011. (Id. ¶ 8.) Between May 2010 a August 2 8 and 2011, Colme enero worked as a store 10 man nager. (Id.) Enriquez ha worked as a Sales Ass as s sociate at TrailersPlus in Santa Rosa California, n a, , 11 sinc December 2009. (Id. ¶ 7.) ce r Northern District of California United States District Court 12 A. OVERTIME CLAIM C 13 Plaintiff first claim is for failur to pay ove fs’ m re ertime. (Id. ¶ 36.) The F FLSA requir employers res 14 pay non-exempt employees overtime rat for each hour worked in excess o t tes d over forty ho in a ours 15 wor rkweek. 29 U.S.C. § 207 Plaintiffs allege that I U 7. Interstate mi isclassifies S Sales Managers as exemp pt 16 emp ployees so th it does no have to pa Sales Man hat ot ay nagers overti for any work in excess of forty ime 17 hour in a week. (FAC ¶ 16 Plaintiffs also allege that Intersta has a poli of prohib rs 6.) s ate icy biting its Sal les 18 Asso ociates from logging mo than 39.5 hours, rega m ore 5 ardless of act hours w tual worked. (Id. ¶ 17.) If a 19 Sale Associate logs more th 39.5 hou on a time es han urs ecard, the Sa Associa is required to change ales ate d 20 the timecard or the timecard will be cha t t d anged for the Sales Associate. (Id.) Plaintiffs claim that e 21 Lute “was the primary de eyn e ecision make with respe to the vio er ect olations of th FLSA.” (I ¶ 13.) he Id. 22 B. 23 Colmene also brin a claim for wrongful termination against both Interstate a Luteyn. ero ngs fo n h and 24 COLMENERO’S WRONGF TERMIN O FUL NATION CLA AIM On July 22, 2011, Colmener filed a for J ro rmal written complaint w the Cali with ifornia Depa artment of 25 26 1 27 2 28 Because the pen nding Motion addresses on certain cla nly aims and issue this section is not intended to provid es, de an ex xhaustive sum mmary of the factual or pro ocedural back kground in thi action. is In the parties’ briefs, Plaintif refer to this position as “Sales Assoc t ffs ciate,” while D Defendant ref to the sam fers me posit tion as “Sales Consultant.” For consistency purpose only, the Court will use the term “Sal Associate” s ” es les ” throu ughout. 2 1 Labor Standards Enforceme (“DLSE” claiming t s ent ”), that Interstat failed to p overtime when te pay e 2 emp ployees work in excess of 8 hours in a day. (Id ¶ 96.) Co ked s Id. olmenero alle eges that pri to the ior 3 hear ring on the DLSE compl D laint, he was summoned into his man s d nager’s offic to particip in a ce pate 4 conf ference call with Luteyn to discuss the basis for the DLSE c n t claim. (Dkt. No. 17, Ex. A, 5 Dec claration of Quinn Colme Q enero (“Colm menero Dec. ¶ 5.) Co .”), olmenero alle eges that Lu uteyn 6 prim marily repres sented Interstate at the August 31, 20 DLSE h A 011 hearing, whic resulted in a settlemen ch n nt 7 and the issuance of back pay to Interstat employee s. (Id. ¶ 7; s also, Sup e y te see pplemental D Declaration of o 8 Shaw Luteyn (“Luteyn Sup Dec.”), Dkt. No. 19- ¶ 11 ( “Co wn ( pp. D -1, olmenero ov verstates my role in the 9 Cali ifornia DLSE settlement conference” Depositio of Shawn Luteyn (“L E t ”); on n Luteyn Dep.” Dkt. No. ”), 10 46-1 at 189:1-3 1, 3.) Colmene was term ero minated on September 10 2011, alleg 0, gedly in reta aliation for fi filing the 11 Northern District of California United States District Court 12 DLS complain (FAC ¶ 98.) Luteyn fired Colme SE nt. 9 enero via tele ephone after another Inte r erstate 13 emp ployee report feeling harassed whe Colmener inquired a ted h en ro about the pho number for a former one r 14 store manager. (Colmenero Dec. ¶ 8; se also, Lute Dep. at 1 o ee eyn 183:14-16 (“ was broug into it, “I ght 15 yes” The FAC alleges tha Luteyn wa the decisi maker in Colmenero’s firing. (F ”).) C at as ion n FAC ¶ 98.) 16 II. DISCUS SSION 17 A. LEGAL STAN NDARD UNDE RULE 12( ER (b)(2) 18 A motion under Federal Rule of Civil Proced n f dure 12(b)(2 challenges the Court’s exercise of 2) s s f 19 sonal jurisdic ction over a defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). Where no federal statu governs . ute pers 20 pers sonal jurisdic ction, the Co applies the law of th state in wh it sits, h ourt t he hich here, Califor rnia. 21 Schw warzenegger v. Fred Ma r artin Motor Co., 374 F.3 797, 800 ( C 3d (9th Cir. 200 04). Californ law allow nia ws 22 for the exercise of “jurisdict t tion on any basis not inc b consistent wi the Const ith titution of th state or of he f 23 the United State U es.” Cal. Civ Proc. Code § 410.10. v. 24 Due proc requires that the non-resident d cess s defendant hav either a “substantial, continuous, ve 25 and systematic” presence in the forum state or suffic ” n s cient “minim mum contact with [the f ts forum state] 26 h aintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of f play and substantial d l fair d such that the ma 27 justi ice.” Int’l Sh Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 31 0, 316 (1945 Where th non-resid hoe W 5). he dent 28 defe endant’s foru um-related activities are not “substan a ntial, continu uous, and sy ystematic,” th Court mu he ust 3 1 evaluate whether the specific activity giving rise to the Plaintiffs’ causes of action is sufficiently 2 related to the forum state. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446 (1952); 3 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-53 (1958). 4 5 6 The Ninth Circuit applies a three-part test to determine whether a non-resident defendant’s activities are sufficiently related to the forum state to establish personal jurisdiction: (1) 7 8 (2) 9 (3) 10 The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forumrelated activities; and the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable. Northern District of California Schwarzenegger, supra, 374 F.3d at 802 (citing Lake v. Lake, 817 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1987)). 12 United States District Court 11 The plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating the first two parts. Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.2d 13 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2008). If the plaintiffs fail to satisfy either of these parts, then personal 14 jurisdiction is not established in the forum state. Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1555 15 (9th Cir. 2006). If the plaintiffs carry this burden, then “the defendant must come forward with a 16 ‘compelling case’ that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” Id. (citing 17 Schwarzenegger, supra, 374 F.3d at 802). 18 Where, as here, the motion to dismiss is based on written materials–pleadings, declarations, 19 and Luteyn’s deposition–rather than an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiffs need only make a prima 20 facie showing of jurisdiction. Schwarzenneger, supra, 374 F.3d at 800. The plaintiffs must make 21 this showing with respect to each claim. Fiore v. Walden, 657 F.3d 838, 858 (9th Cir. 2011). A 22 plaintiff makes a “prima facie” showing by producing admissible evidence which, if believed, would 23 be sufficient to establish the existence of personal jurisdiction. Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 24 1498 (9th Cir. 1995). In deciding whether such a showing has been made, a district court must 25 accept as true the uncontroverted allegations in the complaint; where allegations are contested, they 26 “are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[s] and all doubts are resolved in [their] 27 favor.” AT&T v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1996). 28 4 1 A. 2 Analyzin Luteyn’s acts under th minimum contacts te demonstra that Lut ng he m est ates teyn has 3 MINIMUM CONTACTS ANALYSIS suff ficient minim mum contacts for the Cou to exercis specific ju urt se urisdiction a to each cla as aim. Part One: Purpo O oseful Direct tion 4 1. 1 5 The first part of the minimum contac test is sub T t cts bdivided into purposeful direction, o l 6 whic generally applies to to claims, and purposef availmen which gen ch y ort a ful nt, nerally applies to contrac ct 7 claim Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antise ms. e emitisme, 433 F.3d 1199 1206 (9th 9, 8 Cir. 2006). Alth hough claim of unlawfu employme practices presuppose an employm contrac ms ul ent s e ment ct, 9 SA enerally are analyzed as torts under p a purposeful d direction. Se Holliday v Lifestyle Lift, ee v. L FLS claims ge 10 Inc., No. C-09-4 4995 RS, 2010 WL 3910 0143 (N.D. C Oct. 5, 2 Cal. 2010). Northern District of California The first part of the minimum co t m ontacts test i s satisfied w where a defen ndant purpos sefully direc cts 12 United States District Court 11 a t rzenegger, su upra, 374 F. at 802-03 Courts fo .3d 3. ocus on wher re his activities at the forum state. Schwar 13 the defendant’s actions were felt, not wh d e hether the ac occurred within this f cts forum. Yaho supra, oo!, 14 433 F.3d at 1205. Thus, cou analyze this issue us urts sing the “eff fects test.” S Schwarzeneg gger, supra, 15 374 F.3d at 802 (citing Cald v. Jones, 465 U.S. 78 789-90 (1984)). Und the “effe test,” the der 83, der ects e 16 defe endant allege edly must ha (a) comm ave mitted an inte entional act; (b) express aimed at t forum ; sly the 17 state (c) which caused harm that the defendant knew was likely to be suffer in the fo e; m w y red orum state. Id. I Intentiona Act3 al 18 a) 19 ntent’ in the context of th ‘intention act’ test [ he nal [refers] to an intent to n “‘[I]n 20 3 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Luteyn contends that the fidu s uciary shield doctrine precl d ludes his acts from countin towards th minimum s ng he cont tacts test beca ause they were conducted in his role as a corporate officer. (Mot. at 9-10.) In the Motion, he e i h raise the doctrine only in resp to genera jurisdiction . However, h also referen es e pect al he nces the doctr in his rine spec cific jurisdiction analysis. Luteyn’s acts are not protected by the fiduciary s p t shield doctrin because he is alleged to have been a ne e “prim mary participant” in the all leged wrongd doing. Allstar Mktg. Group LLC v. You Store Onlin LLC, 666 F. r up, ur ne, Supp 2d 1109, 1120 (C.D. Ca 2009) (citin Transgo, I v. Ajac Tr p. al. ng Inc. ransmission P Parts Corp., 7 F.2d 1001, 768 1021 (9th Cir. 1985). Under the fiduciary shield doctrin “the acts o corporate o 1 t ne, of officers & dire ectors in their r offic capacities are the acts of the corpora cial s ation exclusiv vely and are t thus not mater for purpo of rial oses estab blishing minim mum contacts as to the ind dividual.” Co Studio v. B olt Badpuppy Ent ter., 75 F. Sup 2d 1103, pp. 1111 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (citing Shearer v. Su 1 1 S uperior Court 70 Cal. App 3d 424, 430 (1977)). On exception to t, p. 0 ne t the fiduciary shie doctrine is if the defend is a prima participan in alleged w f eld s dant ary nt wrongdoing. Allstar Mktg g. Grou supra, 666 F. Supp. 2d at 1120. Pla up, d aintiffs have a alleged that L Luteyn was a “ “primary part ticipant” in th he alleg wrongdoi ged ing: Luteyn was the decisio maker with respect to th overtime p w on h he policies, and L Luteyn personally fired Colmenero. (FAC ¶¶ 13, 98.) C 9 5 1 perform an actual, physical act in the real world, rather than an intent to accomplish a result or 2 consequence of that act.” Id. at 806. Here, the policy decision to deny overtime compensation satisfies the intentional act prong. 3 4 Plaintiffs claim that Luteyn “was the primary decision maker with respect to the violations of the 5 FLSA.” (FAC ¶ 13.) In other words, Luteyn is alleged to have promulgated both the policy decision 6 to misclassify Store Managers as exempt, and the policy decision to deny overtime compensation to 7 Sales Associates. (Id.) Luteyn does not argue to the contrary, but instead claims that he manages 8 operations at only a high level and he is not involved with individual store employee issues. Since 9 Plaintiffs allege that the FLSA violations occur in all eight California stores, if not all 37 Interstate corporate policies. Accordingly, the uncontroverted allegation that Luteyn made the policy decision 12 Northern District of California stores, the alleged overtime violations are not based on individual store level employee decisions but 11 United States District Court 10 to deny overtime compensation in violation of the FLSA operates as the “intentional act” under the 13 “effects test.” See Holliday, 2010 WL 3910143 (policy decision to deny overtime compensation to 14 all non-exempt employees in violation of FLSA “operates as the ‘intentional act’”). Colmenero’s termination likewise satisfies the intentional act prong. Luteyn contends that his 15 16 role in Colmenero’s termination was limited to ratifying the decision of a store manager. However, 17 Luteyn does not deny, refute, or attempt to contradict the allegation that he was the individual who 18 fired Colmenero. Taking as true, the uncontroverted allegation that Luteyn uttered words to the 19 effect of “you’re fired,” Luteyn’s role in Colmenero’s termination went beyond mere ratification, he 20 personally participated in the allegedly wrongful termination. Moreover, Plaintiffs have proffered 21 the declaration4 of an individual present when Luteyn fired Colmenero that states it was Luteyn who 22 made the decision to fire Colmenero. (Dkt. No. 47.) “Conflicts between parties over statements 23 contained in affidavits must be resolved in plaintiff’s favor.” Schwarzenegger, supra, 374 F.3d at 24 800. Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court concludes that Luteyn’s allegedly unlawful 25 26 conduct satisfies the intentional act prong of the effects test. 27 4 28 Larry Tait, the Regional Manager who worked out of the Santa Rosa, California store at the time, provided a sworn declaration that Luteyn made the decision to terminate Colmenero, and that Luteyn personally fired Colmenero. (Dkt. No. 47.) 6 1 b) Express Aiming A 2 The express aimin requirem is satisfi if a defen e ng ment ied ndant knows the plaintif s ff 3 is a resident of the forum sta at the tim his wrong conduct occurs. Do Food, Inc v. Watts, 303 t ate me gful ole c. 4 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 20 d 2 002). The alleg gedly unlaw overtime policy satis wful e sfies the “ex xpress aiming requireme of the g” ent 5 6 effects test. By operating ei ight retail sto in Calif ores fornia and ap pplying alleg gedly unlawf overtime ful 7 nia, t ifornia. The retaliatory t e termination also satisfies policies to stores in Californ Luteyn targeted Cali 8 the “express aim “ ming” require ement of the effects test . At the tim Luteyn fired Colmene he was e me ero 9 awa that Colm are menero work in the San Clara, California sto and that C ked nta ore Colmenero lived in 10 Cali ifornia.5 (Co olmenero De ¶¶ 3-7.) ec. Based on the foregoi analysis, the Court c n ing , concludes tha Luteyn’s allegedly un at nlawful 11 Northern District of California United States District Court 12 cond was exp duct pressly aime at Plaintif in Califor ed ffs rnia. 13 c) 14 The third element of the effec test–caus t cts sing harm that the defend knows is dant i 15 Foreseeab Harm ble likel to be suff ly fered in the forum state–i similarly s f is satisfied. By apply ying the allegedly unlaw overtime policies he in Califor wful e ere rnia, Luteyn would n 16 17 reas sonably have known that California employees w e t e would be har rmed by such policies. W respect h With t 18 to th retaliatory termination claim, Luteyn knew th Colmener lived and worked in C he y n hat ro California an nd 19 ther refore, it was foreseeable that the har from firin Colmener would occur in Califo s e rm ng ro ornia. 20 Based on the foregoi analysis, the Court c n ing , concludes tha Plaintiffs have presen sufficien at nted nt 21 alleg gations and facts to dem f monstrate that Luteyn pur t rposefully di irected his ac ctions at Cal lifornia so as s 22 to sa atisfy the first part of the minimum contacts test e c t. 23 2. 2 Part Two: Forum m-related ac ctivities 24 The requirem that the claims “aris out of” or “relate to” t defendan forumT ment se r the nt’s 25 relat activities is met if “b for” the contacts betw ted s but c ween the def fendant and the forum st tate, the caus se 26 of action would not have ari isen. See Om meluk v. Lan ngsten Slip & Bathygger A/S, 52 F.3 267, 271 ri 3d 27 5 28 For purposes of this motion, it has not bee disputed th Luteyn had a phone con r f en hat d nversation wi Colmenero ith o conc cerning his Ca alifornia over rtime wage claim, Luteyn r represented In nterstate at th hearing bef he fore the California admini istrative agen and Lutey terminated Colmenero’s employmen ncy, yn d nt. 7 1 (9th Cir. 1995); see also, Myers v. Benn Law Offi h My nett fices, 238 F.3 1068, 107 (9th Cir. 2 3d 75 2000). 2 Lute argues th Plaintiffs cannot sati this part of the test b eyn hat s isfy t because they fail to alleg a single ac y ge ct 3 that ties Luteyn to California.6 Luteyn either misrea the FAC or simply ig e ads C gnores the fa alleged. acts 4 In light of the allega o ations that Lu uteyn person nally promul lgated unlaw overtime wful e 5 mpensation policies, and that Luteyn decided to t terminate Co olmenero and personally executed d y com 6 that decision, th arising out of prong is easily satisf he t fied. Here, “ “but for” Lu uteyn’s allege ed 7 mulgation of unlawful ov f vertime policies that app plied to Inter rstate’s Calif fornia stores Colmenero s, o prom 8 and Enriquez wo ould not hav an overtim claim. Li ve me ikewise, “bu for” Lutey act of te ut yn’s erminating 9 menero’s em mployment at the Santa Rosa, Califor a R rnia store, an allegedly in retaliatio for filing a nd y on Colm 10 com mplaint with the California DLSE, Co t olmenero wo ould not hav a claim fo retaliatory termination ve or n. Therefor the Court concludes that Plaintiff overtime claim and C re, t t fs’ Colmenero’s retaliation 11 Northern District of California United States District Court 12 claim arise out of or relate to Luteyn’s forum-relate d activities. m o o f 13 3. 3 Part Three: Reas sonableness 14 “Once it has been decide that a defe “ ed endant purpo osefully esta ablished min nimum contacts 15 with a forum, he must prese a compell h e ent ling case tha the presen of some o at nce other consid derations 16 wou render ju uld urisdiction un nreasonable in order to d defeat person jurisdicti nal ion.” Harris Rutsky & Co. s C 17 Ins. Servs v. Bel & Clement Ltd., 328 F.3d 1122, 1 ll ts F 1132 (9th Ci 2003) (cit ir. ting Burger K King v. 18 Rud dzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 47 (1985) (in 77 nternal quota ations omitted). To dete ermine whet ther a 19 part ticular exerci of person jurisdiction is reason ise nal nable, the Co must ana ourt alyze seven factors: (a) 20 the extent of the defendant’s purposeful interjection into the for e e s l n rum; (b) the b burden on th defendant he t 21 in li itigating in th forum; (c the extent of conflict w the sove he c) with ereignty of th defendan state; (d) he nt’s 22 the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute (e) the most efficient judicial resol f g e; lution of the 23 cont troversy; (f) the importance of the fo orum to the p plaintiff’s in nterest in con nvenient and effective d 24 25 26 27 28 6 Luteyn argues th he cannot be held perso hat t onally liable u under the FLS because h did not act as Plaintiff’s SA he “emp ployer” withi the meanin of the FLSA Luteyn ar in ng A. rgues that bec cause he does not hold a “s significant own nership interes in Interstat or exercise “operational control . . . o st” te e l over day to da functions,” he cannot be ay ” e held liable under a derivative liability theor This again ignores that Plaintiffs are not attempti to impute d l ry. n t e ing liabi ility or jurisdi iction over Lu uteyn based on acts of the corporation b virtue of hi position as a corporate o by is offic cer. Rather, Plaintiffs argu that Luteyn own acts a sufficient to establish m P ue n’s are minimum con ntacts. . 8 1 relief; and (g) the existence of an alternative forum. Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus. AB, 11 F.3d 2 1482, 1487-88 (9th Cir. 1993). An analysis of these factors demonstrates that an exercise of 3 jurisdiction is reasonable. 4 a) Purposeful interjection into the forum. 5 The first factor, regarding the extent of the defendant’s purposeful interjection 6 into the forum state’s affairs, “parallels the question of minimum contacts” in determining the 7 reasonableness of an exercise of specific jurisdiction. Amoco Egypt Oil Co. v. Leonis Nav. Co., Inc., 8 1 F.3d 848, 852 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 623 (9th Cir. 1991) 9 (“In light of the first prong of purposeful availment, analysis of this first factor in the third prong himself into California’s affairs. Since Plaintiffs satisfied the first prong of purposeful availment by 12 Northern District of California would be redundant”). Luteyn argues that there is no evidence that he purposefully interjected 11 United States District Court 10 showing that Luteyn purposefully directed his activities at California, this factor weighs in favor of 13 finding that the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. 14 b) Burden on defendant of litigating in a foreign forum. 15 The second factor focuses on the burden that defending in a particular forum. 16 Core-Vent, supra, 11 F.3d at 1487. For the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction to be unreasonable, the 17 burden of defending in California must be “so gravely difficult and inconvenient” that it violates due 18 process. See Burger King, supra, 471 U.S. at 485 (litigating in forum must be “so gravely difficult 19 and inconvenient that a party unfairly is at a severe disadvantage in comparison to his opponent.”) 20 (internal quotations omitted). This factor also must be considered in relation to the corresponding 21 burden on the plaintiff. Sinatra v. National Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir. 1988). 22 Luteyn argues that “[t]he burden on Luteyn, who lives and works in Idaho, is substantial.” (Mot. 13.) 23 Luteyn is the COO of a company with eight stores in California, and he has visited California for the 24 opening of at least some of those stores. (FAC ¶ 9; Luteyn Supp. Dec. ¶ 14; Luteyn Dep. at 30:6- 25 32:3, 234:13-235:12.) His declaration indicates that he has performed his regular work while in 26 California on previous occasions. (Luteyn Supp. Dec. ¶ 14.) Additionally, Luteyn’s deposition 27 testimony indicates that he travels to California for leisure approximately once per year. (Luteyn 28 Dep. at 235:4-13) By contrast, Colmenero is now unemployed (see Colmenero Dec. ¶ 14), nothing 9 1 indicates that Enriquez or Colmenero have ever traveled to Idaho, and many of their likely witnesses 2 reside in California. This factor thus supports a finding of reasonableness. 3 c) Conflict with Idaho’s sovereignty. 4 With respect to the third factor, Luteyn does not argue that exercise of 5 jurisdiction over him would conflict with Idaho’s sovereignty, but instead argues that Idaho has an 6 interest in resolving a lawsuit against one of its residents. See Core-Vent, supra, 11 F.3d at 1487. 7 Although this case involves a resident of Idaho, there is no indication that the exercise of jurisdiction 8 over Luteyn would interfere with Idaho’s sovereignty. This factor thus supports a finding of 9 reasonableness. 10 d) Forum state’s interest. 11 The fourth factor concerns the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the Northern District of California United States District Court 12 dispute. Id. California has a strong interest in adjudicating this matter because the injuries alleged 13 occurred here in California and Plaintiffs are residents of California. Thus, the fourth factor indicates 14 the exercise of jurisdiction over Luteyn would be reasonable. 15 e) Most efficient forum for judicial resolution. 16 The fifth factor considers which forum will provide the most efficient judicial 17 resolution. Id. Resolving the claims here will be more efficient. First, the claims asserted against 18 Luteyn are also asserted against Interstate, and thus, the claims will be resolved in this forum even if 19 Luteyn is dismissed from this lawsuit. Accordingly, it is more efficient to resolve these claims in 20 one, rather than two forums. Second, the overtime claim is related to the California state law claims, 21 and some degree of overlap in witnesses and evidence is likely. Luteyn has not indicated there are 22 any witnesses or evidence in Idaho. For these reasons, this factor supports a finding of 23 reasonableness. 24 f) Plaintiff’s interest in convenient and effective relief. 25 The sixth factor, the importance of this forum to Plaintiffs for convenient and 26 effective relief also supports exercising jurisdiction over Luteyn. Id. at 1487-88. Colmenero is 27 presently unemployed and has expressed fears of financial distress (Colmenero Dec. ¶ 14). A local 28 forum without travel requirements is more cost-effective for Plaintiff. There is no indication that 10 1 either of the Plaintiffs has ever traveled to Idaho, and many of their likely witnesses reside in 2 California. This factor thus supports a finding of reasonableness. 3 g) Existence of an alternative forum. 4 The single factor weighing in favor of dismissal is the last factor, the presence 5 of an alternative forum in Idaho. Although an alternative forum exists in Idaho, Luteyn has not 6 “come forward with a ‘compelling case’ that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” 7 Pebble Beach, supra, 453 F.3d at 1555 (citing Schwarzenegger, supra, 374 F.3d at 802). Overall, the reasonableness factors indicate that an exercise of personal jurisdiction over 8 9 10 Luteyn would be reasonable in this case. III. CONCLUSION Northern District of California Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court concludes that the specific activity giving rise to 12 United States District Court 11 the Plaintiffs’ causes of action is sufficiently related to California to establish personal jurisdiction 13 over Shawn Luteyn. Accepting as true the uncontroverted allegations in the FAC and resolving all 14 conflicts in the evidence in Plaintiffs’ favor, Luteyn “could reasonably expect to be haled into court” 15 in California. See Int’l Shoe, supra, 326 U.S. at 316. Thus, “the maintenance of the suit does not 16 offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. 17 18 The Motion of Defendant Shawn Luteyn to Dismiss the Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction is DENIED. 19 This Order terminates Dkt. No. 12. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 22 23 Dated: August 31, 2012 ______________________________________ YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 24 25 26 27 28 11

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