Dias v. City of San Leandro et al, No. 3:2011cv01966 - Document 21 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING AS MOOT MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT by Hon. William Alsup granting 13 Motion to Dismiss.(whalc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/15/2011)
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Dias v. City of San Leandro et al Doc. 21 1 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 JAMES DIAS, 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 No. C 11-01966 WHA Plaintiff, v. CITY OF SAN LEANDRO, the SAN LEANDRO POLICE DEPARTMENT, and OFFICER DENNIS MALLY, individually and in his official capacity as police officer for SAN LEANDRO, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING AS MOOT MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT Defendants. / INTRODUCTION In this Section 1983 action, defendants City of San Leandro and the San Leandro Police 20 Department move to dismiss plaintiff James Dias’s complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or 21 alternatively for a more definite statement pursuant to Rule 12(e). Defendants also request that 22 the Court strike plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages. For the following reasons, defendants’ 23 motion to dismiss is GRANTED, defendants’ motion for a more definite statement is DENIED AS 24 MOOT, and defendants’ request to strike plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages is GRANTED. 25 26 STATEMENT The following facts are taken from the complaint: On May 22, 2010, defendant Officer 27 Dennis Mally of the San Leandro Police Department responded to a complaint of loud music 28 coming from the home of plaintiff James Dias. Hearing no music, Officer Mally asked plaintiff and a guest to keep any music and their voices at a low volume. Plaintiff asked Officer Mally Dockets.Justia.com 1 to leave his property, whereupon Officer Mally called for back-up. When plaintiff attempted to 2 re-enter his home, Officer Mally then allegedly grabbed plaintiff’s wrist, threw him to the 3 ground, and placed him under arrest. After two of plaintiff’s guests told Officer Mally to 4 release plaintiff, Officer Mally allegedly “began applying extreme force” to plaintiff. One or 5 more other, unidentified officers were apparently present and physically engaged plaintiff. 6 Plaintiff alleges that multiple officers used “great physical violence” against him and that he 7 was tased by the officers. Plaintiff allegedly suffered “severe injuries to his face and body in 8 the struggles with the officers” (First Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 8–18). Plaintiff filed his complaint in 9 April 2011. Plaintiff alleges that defendants, the City of San Leandro and the San Leandro Police 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 Department, were negligent in their particular conduct with plaintiff, and that defendants 12 negligently failed to adequately train, supervise, and discipline SLPD officers, leading to 13 plaintiff’s injuries. Plaintiff also alleges that there existed an “informal custom, policy, or 14 practice” of allowing SLPD officers to perpetrate the type of conduct plaintiff alleges 15 (id. ¶¶ 18–21). 16 Plaintiff asserts five claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and four state-law claims. Plaintiff 17 alleges four constitutional claims under Section 1983 for violation of plaintiff’s Fourth and 18 Fourteenth Amendment rights against: (1) unreasonable searches and seizures, (2) unlawful 19 seizure (detention), (3) unlawful seizure (arrest), and (4) use of excessive force. Plaintiff’s fifth 20 Section 1983 claim is specifically asserted pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services 21 of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), stating a violation of his rights under the Fourth, 22 Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff finally asserts state-law claims of 23 intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, negligence, and false 24 imprisonment. Plaintiff seeks general damages “exceeding $25,000,” special damages, punitive 25 damages, attorney’s fees under Section 1988, and costs. 26 Defendants City and the SLPD move to dismiss. The motion states that defendant 27 Officer Mally was never served with the complaint. There is no proof of service of summons 28 on the docket, and Officer Mally does not join the motion. 2 1 ANALYSIS 2 To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 3 accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. FRCP 12(b)(6); Ashcroft 4 v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). A claim is facially plausible when there are sufficient 5 factual allegations to draw a reasonable inference that the defendants are liable for the 6 misconduct alleged. While a court “must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as 7 true,” it is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id. 8 at 1949–50 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “[C]onclusory 9 allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1996) 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 (citation omitted). 12 A. 13 “[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its 14 employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether 15 made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official 16 policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Monell, 17 436 U.S. at 694. “[I]n order to establish an official policy or custom sufficient for Monell 18 liability, a plaintiff must show a constitutional right violation resulting from (1) an employee 19 acting pursuant to an expressly adopted official policy; (2) an employee acting pursuant to a 20 longstanding practice or custom; or (3) an employee acting as a “final policymaker.” Delia v. 21 City of Rialto, 621 F.3d 1069, 1081–82 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). 22 SECTION 1983 CLAIMS A Section 1983 claim against a local government entity based on inaction must establish 23 that (1) the plaintiff “possessed a constitutional right of which he was deprived,” (2) “the 24 municipality had a policy,” (3) “this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s 25 constitutional right,” and (4) “the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional 26 violation.” Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing City of Canton v. 27 Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389–91 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A failure to train or 28 supervise can amount to a ‘policy or custom’ sufficient to impose liability on the County.” 3 1 Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 2 389–90). 3 As reviewed above, plaintiff’s first through fourth claims for relief are brought against 4 all defendants under Section 1983 for alleged violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth 5 Amendment rights. These claims are based on factual allegations of the actions of an employee 6 of the City and the SLPD. As a matter of law, the City and the SLPD cannot be held liable 7 under Section 1983 for any alleged unconstitutional actions of an employee, but rather only for 8 constitutional violations caused by their own policy, custom, or practice. 9 On the other hand, plaintiff’s fifth claim for relief specifically invokes Monell. The total of the complaint’s allegations as to the policy or practice involved here include that “high- 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 ranking members” of the City and the SLPD allegedly “approved, ratified, condone [sic], 12 encouraged, and sought to cover up and or tacitly authorize the continuing pattern and practice 13 of misconduct and/or civil rights violations of its officers” (First Amd. Compl. ¶ 33), and that 14 defendants failed to “train, supervise, and discipline” officers and that “[t]his lack of adequate 15 supervisorial training demonstrates the existence of an informal custom, policy or practice of 16 promoting, tolerating, and/or ratifying with deliberate indifference” continued violations of 17 detainees’ constitutional rights (id. ¶ 21). Plaintiff alleges that his Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and 18 Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated on this basis. 19 Again, in addition to alleging a deprivation of constitutional rights, plaintiff must also 20 allege that a policy, custom, or practice of defendants caused that deprivation. Plaintiff fails 21 this threshold pleading requirement. Plaintiff’s allegations of a custom, policy, or practice are 22 impermissibly vague and unspecific. Plaintiff does not refer to any specific custom, policy, or 23 practice that caused his alleged deprivation of rights. Plaintiff avers, in a conclusory fashion, 24 that his rights were violated and that such violation demonstrates the existence of a custom, 25 policy, or practice. Likewise, plaintiff makes no mention of how any failures in training 26 defendants’ employees caused the asserted constitutional violations. These allegations are 27 insufficient under Rule 12(b)(6) to state a Section 1983 claim against the City or the SLPD. 28 4 1 Therefore, the motion to dismiss claims one through five for violations of Section 1983, as 2 brought against the City and the SLPD, is GRANTED. STATE-LAW CLAIMS 3 B. 4 Public entities in California are not liable for state-law tort claims for any injuries GOV’T CODE 815.2; see also Guzman v. County of Monterey, 46 Cal. 4th 887, 897 (2009). 7 Plaintiff brings his sixth through ninth claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, 8 assault and battery, negligence, and false imprisonment, respectively. Plaintiff pleads neither 9 any particular statute that would abrogate the City’s or the SLPD’s statutory immunity from 10 common-law torts, nor does the complaint state factual allegations in support of these claims 11 For the Northern District of California caused by their conduct except where such liability is expressly authorized by statute. CAL. 6 United States District Court 5 against the City and the SLPD. Plaintiff agrees with defendants that the sixth through ninth 12 claims against the City and the SLPD should be dismissed, but reserves them against defendant 13 Officer Mally. Therefore, the motion to dismiss plaintiff’s sixth through ninth claims for relief 14 against the City and the SLPD is GRANTED. 15 16 * * * In their motion, the City and the SLPD request that the complaint’s prayer for punitive 17 damages be stricken as against them, because, as public entities, punitive damages are 18 unavailable against them. See CAL. GOV’T CODE 818 (public entities are not liable for damages 19 “imposed primarily for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant”); 20 McAllister v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 183 Cal. App. 3d 653 (1986); City of Newport v. 21 Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981) (no punitive damages for Section 1983 claims). 22 Plaintiff agrees that punitive damages are unavailable against the City and the SLPD, but 23 reserves its request with respect to defendant Officer Mally. The complaint’s prayer for 24 punitive damages as to the City and the SLPD is therefore STRICKEN. 25 Defendants’ motion for a more definite statement is DENIED AS MOOT. 26 27 28 5 1 2 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss the complaint is GRANTED as to the 3 City and the SLPD. As Officer Mally is not a movant, all claims remain against him (though he 4 has not appeared and may not have been served). 5 Plaintiff may seek leave to amend the complaint and will have FOURTEEN CALENDAR 6 DAYS from the date of this order to file a motion, noticed on the normal 35-day track, for leave 7 to file an amended complaint. A proposed amended complaint must be appended to the motion. 8 The motion should clearly explain how the amendments to the complaint cure the deficiencies 9 identified herein. 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 13 Dated: July 15, 2011. WILLIAM ALSUP UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6
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