Murray v. County of Contra Costa et al, No. 3:2008cv01539 - Document 98 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
Court Description: ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL by Judge Thelton Henderson denying 93 Motion for New Trial (tehlc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/3/2012)
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Murray v. County of Contra Costa et al Doc. 98 1 2 3 4 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 8 9 GREGORY MURRAY, 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 12 13 Plaintiff, v. CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, et al, NO. C 08-1539 TEH ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL Defendants. 14 15 This matter came before the Court on July 2, 2012, on Plaintiff Gregory Murray’s 16 motion for new trial. Having carefully considered the parties’ written and oral arguments, 17 Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED for the reasons set forth below. 18 19 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 20 This lawsuit arises from Contra Costa County’s placement of Baby J, the daughter of 21 Plaintiff Gregory Murray (“Murray” or “Plaintiff”), in foster care in 2006. Murray alleged 22 that Defendant Sandra Andrade (“Defendant” or “Andrade”), a Contra Costa County social 23 worker handling Baby J’s case, violated his due process rights. Plaintiff ultimately took two 24 causes of action to trial against Defendant, alleging that Andrade violated his first and 25 fourteenth amendment rights and was therefore liable under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. The 26 violation of Plaintiff’s first amendment rights was based on allegations that Andrade delayed 27 or prevented Murray from appearing in court to contest Baby J’s adoption and seek custody 28 Dockets.Justia.com 1 of Baby J. The violation of Plaintiff’s fourteenth amendment rights was based on allegations 2 that Andrade delayed or prevented Murray from forming a relationship with Baby J. 3 Baby J was born in February of 2006, in Contra Costa County, California. Due to 4 Baby J’s mother testing positive for various drugs upon Baby J’s delivery, the County’s 5 Children and Family Services bureau (“CFS”) initiated involvement to ensure the safety of 6 Baby J. Initially, Baby J remained in her mother’s care, through the County’s Voluntary 7 Family Maintenance program (“VFM”). During VFM, Mr. Murray contacted CFS and spoke 8 with social worker Lori Castillo, checking on the baby’s safety. He purported to be the 9 husband of the mother and possibly the father to the baby. After a period of VFM, the mother had still not successfully tested drug-free on a 11 consistent basis, and CFS initiated court proceedings in an attempt to promote compliance on For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 12 the part of Baby J’s mother. In July of 2006, proceedings were initiated, and the handling of 13 the case moved from Lori Castillo to Defendant Andrade. Ms. Andrade prepared a juvenile 14 dependency petition and filed it in July of 2006. The mother’s condition deteriorated prior to 15 the detention hearing in August of that year, and the child was ultimately ordered placed 16 outside the mother’s home. Baby J was placed in foster care. 17 Mr. Murray, meanwhile, had initiated divorce proceedings in August 2005, before 18 Baby J’s birth. He had moved to Florida, and in the Sarasota County Florida dissolution 19 judgment, the court adjudged there to be no children of the marriage. Mr. Murray did not 20 participate in the 2006 dependency court proceedings, but did make arrangements for 21 paternity testing, which revealed, in May 2007, that he was the father of Baby J. Thereafter, 22 he had visits with Baby J, enrolled in parenting classes in Florida, and was ultimately found 23 to be suitable to take sole custody of his daughter. In August 2007, Baby J was placed with 24 Murray and the dependency case was dismissed. 25 At trial in March of 2012, Murray argued that he was given no notice of the 26 dependency proceedings, in spite of his having provided CFS with his contact information. 27 Andrade responded that he never provided an address, though he did leave a phone number 28 with her office. She contended that no written notice of the proceedings was sent because 2 1 she did not have an address, but that attempts were made to notify Murray by phone. Murray 2 maintained that he provided both phone and address information, and received no notice of 3 the proceedings in any form. A secondary area of dispute arose around the issue of paternity 4 testing–Murray alleged he was never offered paternity testing nor representation, while 5 Andrade differs, claiming he was offered both testing and a referral for legal representation 6 prior to the dependency proceedings. 7 The case was tried by jury on March 20, 2012, and on March 27, 2012, the jury 8 returned a verdict for the Defendant. Judgment was entered on April 10, 2012, and Plaintiff 9 filed his motion for new trial on May 21, 2012, timely under an extension of time to file 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 granted May 8, 2012. 12 LEGAL STANDARD 13 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a), “[a] court may, on motion, grant a new 14 trial to all or some of the issues—and to any party—... (A) after a jury trial, for any reason 15 for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.” 16 Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a)(1)(A). “Rule 59 does not specify the grounds on which a motion for a 17 new trial may be granted.” Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1035 (9th Cir. 18 2003). Rather, the Court is “bound by those grounds that have been historically recognized.” 19 Id. 20 “Historically recognized grounds include, but are not limited to, claims ‘that the 21 verdict is against the weight of the evidence, that the damages are excessive, or that, for other 22 reasons, the trial was not fair to the party moving.’” Molski v. M.J. Cable's, Inc., 481 F.3d 23 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251, 24 61 S.Ct. 189, 85 L.Ed. 147 (1940)). Further historically recognized grounds include fraud 25 underlying the verdict: the Court may grant a new trial if “the verdict is contrary to the clear 26 weight of the evidence, or is based upon evidence which is false, or to prevent, in the sound 27 discretion of the court, a miscarriage of justice.” Silver Sage Partners, Ltd. v. City of Desert 28 Hot Springs, 251 F.3d 814, 818–819 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). 3 1 “A motion for new trial may invoke the court's discretion insofar as it is based on 2 claims that ‘the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, that the damages are excessive, 3 or that, for other reasons, the trial was not fair to [the] party moving; and may raise questions 4 of law arising out of alleged substantial errors in admission or rejection of evidence or 5 instructions to the jury.’ ” Murphy v. City of Long Beach, 914 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1990), 6 quoting Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251, 61 S.Ct. 189, 85 L.Ed. 7 147 (1940). 8 The Ninth Circuit has held that a new trial may be granted “‘only if the verdict is 9 contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, is based upon false or perjurious evidence, or to 11 2007) (quoting Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., 212 F.3d 493, 510 n. 15 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 prevent a miscarriage of justice.’” Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 12 (9th Cir. 2000)). In determining whether a verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the 13 evidence, the Court “has ‘the duty ... to weigh the evidence as [the Court] saw it’” and may 14 set aside the verdict even if it is supported by substantial evidence. Id. (quoting Murphy, 15 914 F.2d at 187). However, a “jury’s verdict must be upheld if it is supported by substantial 16 evidence, which is evidence adequate to support the jury’s conclusion, even if it is possible to 17 draw a contrary conclusion.” Pavao v. Pagay, 307 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 2007). 18 In making this determination, the court “must view all evidence in the light most 19 favorable to the nonmoving party, draw all reasonable inferences in the favor of the 20 non-mover, and disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not 21 required to believe.” Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1020, 1021 (9th Cir. 2008) 22 (citation omitted). “The test applied is whether the evidence permits only one reasonable 23 conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary to the jury’s verdict.” Josephs v. Pac. 24 Bell, 443 F.3d 1050, 1062 (9th Cir. 2006). 25 26 DISCUSSION 27 Murray, in his motion, contends that the clear weight of the evidence supports the 28 conclusion that Murray did not receive notice of hearings at which important decisions were 4 1 made concerning Baby J, nor did he receive court reports to which he was entitled, thus 2 violating his constitutional rights. However, in spite of Murray’s provision of testimony in 3 support of each of his points, there remains testimony to the contrary on each of those points. 4 The result is a credibility contest–in order to find for Murray on his motion for a new trial, 5 the Court would have to discount the testimony offered to the contrary, and the Court has not 6 been given any sufficient basis to discount this testimony. As two reasonable conclusions 7 exist on each of the Plaintiff’s points, the motion for a new trial must be denied. 8 9 A. The Weakness of Andrade’s Testimony Regarding Murray’s Notice Murray argues that Andrade’s testimony regarding any notice she gave Murray of 11 upcoming hearings was inherently weak, citing the fact that she testified at trial that she gave For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 12 Murray oral notice of several hearings, but failed to document that notice. Ex. 2 at 48, 55-56, 13 60-64. His contention is that the lack of documentation requires the conclusion that she did 14 not, in fact, give oral notice as she claimed. However, as the testimony contained in the same 15 passages of the transcript demonstrates, Ms. Andrade also testified that she did not always 16 document those instances where she had given phone notice, and further testified that on the 17 one occasion where she does not believe she gave notice, is was due to lack of contact 18 information for Mr. Murray. Ex. 2 at 48, 55-56, 61 (see also Ex. 4, 148-49 for Murray’s own 19 testimony that he spoke with Andrade a “half dozen” times). While Murray certainly points 20 out grounds which might make a it reasonable for a juror to doubt Andrade’s testimony, he 21 has failed to present evidence sufficient to render Andrade’s testimony beyond the bounds of 22 reasonable belief. Simply stated, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 23 party, the evidence permits two reasonable conclusions, and therefore cannot constitute the 24 basis for a new trial. 25 26 B. The Lack of Document Production At Trial 27 The second argument brought by Murray in his motion for a new trial is that Andrade 28 failed to present documentary evidence of the mailing of notice or notices to Murray. 5 1 Andrade, in her response, points out that notice by mail is not required–that telephone notice 2 is sufficient, according to the testimony of Rachel Foster, a program analyst for CFS and 3 CFS’s “person most knowledgeable” regarding County practices in the area of CFS. Ex. 3. 4 Murray did not file a reply brief, nor did he address this point at oral argument. The relevant 5 inquiry not being sensitive to the question of what form the notice took, but requiring only 6 that notice have been given, the failure to present documentation of notice by mail is not 7 sufficient grounds on which to base a new trial. 8 9 C. Motive On The Part of Andrade Finally, Murray argues that Andrade’s testimony revealed a bias against Murray, 11 which arose from the impression of Murray given to Andrade by Baby J’s mother, and which For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 12 caused Andrade to avoid allowing Murray the access to the proceedings to which he was 13 constitutionally entitled. Murray argues that Andrade failed to investigate Murray and 14 therefore was never disabused of her mistaken impression of Murray, and remained willfully 15 blind to both Murray’s efforts to come into contact with his child and the rights conferred on 16 him by his status as a presumed father. Even if the Court were to agree with Murray, 17 however, regarding Andrade’s reservations about Murray, the introduction of a potential 18 motive for failure to notify Murray is not sufficient to invalidate Andrade’s testimony that 19 she did, in fact, give notice (as discussed above in section A). 20 Whatever impressions might be formed and assumptions made regarding Andrade’s 21 opinion of Murray, the fact remains that evidence was introduced supporting the contention 22 that Andrade provided notice to Murray by phone regarding the Baby J proceedings. At oral 23 argument, counsel for Murray even acknowledged that a finding of motive in the vein 24 presented by Plaintiff does not foreclose the possibility that Andrade nevertheless gave 25 notice. This makes reasonable the conclusion that Murray’s constitutional rights were not 26 violated, and that he was not deprived of notice of the proceedings involving his daughter, 27 nor hindered in forming a relationship with his child. In light of the burden imposed on the 28 6 1 moving party by Rule 59, and the possibility of differing, yet reasonable, views on this 2 question, the Court cannot grant Murray’s motion on this basis. 3 4 CONCLUSION 5 For the reasons set forth above, the motion for new trial is DENIED. 6 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 9 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 Dated: 7/3/12 THELTON E. HENDERSON, JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 7
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