(PC) Patterson v. California Correctional Health Services, No. 2:2016cv01538 - Document 6 (E.D. Cal. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER, FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge Kendall J. Newman on 12/1/2016 GRANTING plaintiff's 2 request to proceed IFP. IT IS RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed without prejudice. Referred to Judge Troy L. Nunley; Objections to F&R due within 14 days.(Yin, K)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOE PATTERSON, 12 13 14 15 No. 2:16-cv-1538 TLN KJN P Plaintiff, v. ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE SERVICES, et al., Defendants. 16 17 18 Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 19 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 20 § 1915. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 21 § 636(b)(1). 22 I. Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis 23 Plaintiff submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. 24 § 1915(a). However, the court will not assess a filing fee at this time. Instead, the undersigned 25 recommends summary dismissal of the complaint. 26 II. Screening 27 28 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 1 1 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 2 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 3 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 4 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 5 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 6 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an 7 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 8 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 9 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 10 Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 11 2000) (“[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably 12 meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 13 1227. Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 14 15 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 16 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic 17 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 18 In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a 19 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations 20 sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555. However, “[s]pecific 21 facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what 22 the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 23 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, citations and internal quotations marks omitted). 24 In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the 25 complaint in question, Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93, and construe the pleading in the light most 26 favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other 27 grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984). 28 //// 2 1 III. Complaint Plaintiff alleges that the California Correctional Health Care Services (“CCHCS”) and the 2 3 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) breached the confidentiality 4 of his personal information and medical records when an unencrypted laptop was stolen from the 5 vehicle of a CCHCS employee. Plaintiff alleges he is now exposed to potential identity theft as a 6 result of defendants’ negligence. Attached to the complaint is a letter from CCHCS notifying 7 plaintiff of this “potential breach.” (ECF No. 1 at 8.) The letter states that it is unknown if “any 8 sensitive information was contained in the laptop” and that the laptop was password protected. 9 Plaintiff asserts violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, California Health and Safety 10 Code Section 1280.15, and the California Medical Information Act (“CMIA”). He seeks money 11 damages. Plaintiff also appends information concerning the Health Insurance Portability and 12 Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), and California Civil Codes sections. (ECF No. 1 at 9- 13 22.) 14 IV. Named Defendants 15 Plaintiff failed to name a proper defendant. State agencies, such as CDCR and CCHCS, 16 are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State 17 Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989); Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per 18 curiam) (holding that prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claims against CDCR for damages and 19 injunctive relief were barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. 20 v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to state 21 agencies); see also Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30 (1991) (clarifying that Eleventh Amendment 22 does not bar suits against state officials sued in their individual capacities, nor does it bar suits for 23 prospective injunctive relief against state officials sued in their official capacities). 24 However, assuming that plaintiff could substitute appropriate individuals as defendants, 25 the speculative allegations of the complaint still fail to establish that plaintiff has standing 26 because he cannot show an injury-in-fact. 27 //// 28 //// 3 1 V. Standing 2 Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to actual “Cases” and 3 “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Plaintiff is required to establish standing for each claim 4 he asserts. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006). If a plaintiff has no 5 standing, the court has no subject matter jurisdiction. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Adams, 629 F.2d 6 587, 593 n.11 (9th Cir. 1980) (“[B]efore reaching a decision on the merits, we [are required to] 7 address the standing issue to determine if we have jurisdiction.”). 8 9 “‘One element of the case-or-controversy requirement’ is that plaintiff [ ] ‘must establish that [he has] standing to sue.’” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013) 10 (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818(1997)). To satisfy Article III standing, plaintiff must 11 have suffered an injury in fact -- an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete 12 and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there 13 must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of -- the injury has to 14 be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent 15 action of some third party not before the court. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 16 560 (1992) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks, brackets and ellipses omitted). 17 “HIPAA itself does not provide for a private right of action.” Webb v. Smart Document 18 Solutions, LLC, 499 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Standards for Privacy of Individually 19 Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82462-01, 82601 (Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 20 45 C.F.R. pt. 160 and 164) (“Under HIPAA, individuals do not have a right to court action.”)). 21 While potential future harm can in some instances confer standing, plaintiff must face “a 22 credible threat of harm” that is “both real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical.” 23 Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations and internal quotation 24 marks omitted) (holding that threat of potential identity theft created by theft of a laptop known to 25 contain plaintiffs’ unencrypted names, addresses, and social security numbers was sufficient to 26 confer standing, but that “more conjectural or hypothetical” allegations would make threat “far 27 less credible”); Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147 (“[A]n injury must be concrete, particularized, and 28 actual or imminent.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff’s allegations are 4 1 based upon a notification which states that it is unknown whether any sensitive information is 2 contained in the laptop and that even if there is sensitive information in the laptop, the scope of 3 the information, including whether any of plaintiff’s information is contained therein, is 4 unknown. In other words, whether plaintiff’s sensitive information has been compromised is 5 unknown. Plaintiff cannot state a claim for relief based upon the speculative breach of his 6 sensitive information. Thus, his claim for violation of his constitutional right to informational 7 privacy should be dismissed without prejudice for lack of standing. See Fleck & Assoc., Inc. v. 8 City of Phoenix, 471 F.3d 1100, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 2006) (dismissal for lack of standing is without 9 prejudice). 10 VI. State Law Claims The complaint also alleges violations of California’s CMIA and California Health and 11 12 Safety Code § 1280.15. The CMIA authorizes a suit for money damages by “an individual . . . 13 against a person or entity who has negligently released confidential information or records 14 concerning him or her . . . .” Cal. Civ. Code § 56.36(b). California Health and Safety Code 15 § 1280.15, on the other hand, does not appear to authorize a private action, but requires 16 notification of any unlawful or unauthorized access of a patient’s medical information and 17 authorizes the State Department of Health Services to issue administrative penalties for failing to 18 prevent such access. However, the CMIA and § 1280.15 are state laws and do not provide a basis 19 for federal jurisdiction. Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 662 (9th Cir. 2007) 20 (“Section 1983 requires [plaintiff] to demonstrate a violation of federal law, not state law.”). 21 Because plaintiff lacks standing to pursue his federal claims for relief, this court should decline to 22 exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s putative state law claims.1 Carnegie-Mellon 23 Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988) (when federal claims are eliminated before trial, district 24 courts should usually decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction). 25 //// 26 //// 27 28 1 The court takes no position on whether plaintiff would be able to successfully pursue his claims in state court. 5 1 2 VII. No Leave to Amend If the court finds that a complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, the court 3 has discretion to dismiss with or without leave to amend. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126- 4 30 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Leave to amend should be granted if it appears possible that the 5 defects in the complaint could be corrected, especially if a plaintiff is pro se. Id. at 1130-31; see 6 also Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A pro se litigant must be given 7 leave to amend his or her complaint, and some notice of its deficiencies, unless it is absolutely 8 clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.”) (citing Noll v. 9 Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987)). However, if, after careful consideration, it is clear 10 that a complaint cannot be cured by amendment, the Court may dismiss without leave to amend. 11 Cato, 70 F.3d at 1005-06. 12 The undersigned finds that, as set forth above, plaintiff lacks standing and that amendment 13 would be futile because the notification on which plaintiff’s allegations are based establishes only 14 speculative injury that is not real or immediate. Because plaintiff lacks standing to pursue his 15 federal claims, the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state 16 law claims and dismiss the complaint in its entirety. 17 VIII. Conclusion 18 The undersigned recommends that the complaint be dismissed without prejudice because 19 the facts show, at most, that plaintiff’s sensitive information might have been stolen. Thus, 20 plaintiff’s injury is too speculative to support a claim. Because the undersigned recommends that 21 plaintiff’s federal claims be dismissed, the court should also decline to exercise supplemental 22 jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims. 23 24 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted; and 25 IT IS RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed without prejudice. 26 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 27 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 28 after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections 6 1 with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 2 “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that 3 failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District 4 Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 5 Dated: December 1, 2016 6 7 /patt1538.56 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 7
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