(PS) Le et al v. McGreevy et al, No. 2:2016cv01447 - Document 14 (E.D. Cal. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER AND FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge Allison Claire on 9/9/16 ORDERING that Plaintiffs' 6 request to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED; RECOMMENDING that Plaintiffs' remaining "Requests" and &quo t;Motions" (ECF Nos. 7 , 8 , 9 , 11 , 12 ), should be DENIED, as moot. Matter referred to District Judge John A. Mendez. Within 21 days after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections with the court. (Kastilahn, A)
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(PS) Le et al v. McGreevy et al Doc. 14 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 HELEN LE, et al., 12 13 14 15 16 No. 2:16-cv-1447 JAM AC (PS) Plaintiffs, v. ORDER AND FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS KENNETH EDWARD AZNOE, RICHARD EDWARD McGREEVY, et al., Defendants. 17 Plaintiffs are proceeding in this action pro se. This matter was accordingly referred to the 18 undersigned by E.D. Cal. R. (“Local Rule”) 302(c)(21). On July 13, 2016, the court denied 19 plaintiffs’ request to proceed in forma pauperis because their application did not contain sufficient 20 information. ECF No. 4. The request was further denied because the complaint did not comply 21 with the “short and plain statement” requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Rule”) 8, and because the 22 portions of the complaint that could be understood either did not state a claim upon which relief 23 could be granted, or asserted claims against defendants who were immune from suit. Id. 24 Plaintiffs have renewed their request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and have 25 submitted an affidavit that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915. ECF No. 6. The 26 court will therefore screen the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 27 28 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 2 I. SCREENING Where “plaintiff’s claim appears to be frivolous on the face of the complaint,” the district 3 court may “deny[] plaintiff leave to file in forma pauperis.” O’Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 4 617 (9th Cir. 1990). As the court has already advised plaintiffs, they must assist the court in 5 making this determination by drafting their complaint so that it complies with the Federal Rules 6 of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”). 7 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the complaint must contain (1) a “short and 8 plain statement” of the basis for federal jurisdiction (that is, the reason the case is filed in this 9 court, rather than in a state court), (2) a short and plain statement showing that plaintiffs are 10 entitled to relief (that is, who harmed the plaintiffs, and in what way), and (3) a demand for the 11 relief sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Plaintiffs’ claims must be set forth simply, concisely and 12 directly. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). 13 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 14 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the 15 court will (1) accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint, unless they 16 are clearly baseless or fanciful, (2) construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the 17 plaintiff, and (3) resolve all doubts in the plaintiffs’ favor. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; 18 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at 19 Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 340 (9th Cir. 2010). 20 However, the court need not accept as true, legal conclusions cast in the form of factual 21 allegations, or allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice. See Western 22 Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981); Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 23 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.), as amended, 275 F.3d 1187 (2001). 24 Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. 25 Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Pro se complaints are construed liberally and may 26 only be dismissed if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support 27 of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 28 2014). A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an 2 1 opportunity to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See 2 Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). 3 A. The Complaint 4 The amended complaint is extremely difficult to read. See Complaint for Civil Case 5 Declaratory (“Complaint”) ECF No. 5. The allegations contain many partial or indecipherable 6 sentences. The court has, once again, nevertheless extracted as much information as it can from 7 the Complaint, and sets forth the alleged facts as best it can. The allegations are presumed to be 8 true only for purposes of this screening. 9 As best the court can tell, an insurance company failed to pay a claim without a reasonable 10 basis for denial. Complaint at 5 ¶ III(A). Two insurance company employees are named as 11 defendants, namely, Richard E. McGreevy, alleged to be an attorney at “Anchor General 12 Insurance,” and Jaime Tamayo, alleged to be the President and CEO of “Mapre Insurance 13 Commerce West.” Complaint at 2 ¶ I(B). The remaining defendants appear to be state court 14 judges and justices who ruled against plaintiffs, and other state court personnel. Complaint at 2-3 15 ¶ I(B). 16 It appears that plaintiffs took their case against the insurance company or companies to 17 state court, where they lost at the Superior Court, then at the Court of Appeal for the Third 18 District, then at the California Supreme Court. See Complaint at 6-8. Plaintiffs have now 19 brought their case to this court. As best the court can tell, plaintiffs are complaining about the 20 treatment they received in the state court proceedings, and the losses they suffered there. 21 B. Analysis 22 This Complaint should be dismissed for lack of federal court jurisdiction. 23 1. No diversity jurisdiction 24 Plaintiffs allege “diversity” jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). However, the 25 allegations of the complaint show that plaintiffs are domiciled in, and therefore presumed to be 26 citizens of, California, having lived here for at least the past nine (9) years. See Complaint at 4 27 ¶ II(B); Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 828 (1989) (“[i]n order to be a 28 citizen of a State within the meaning of the diversity statute, a natural person must both be a 3 1 citizen of the United States and be domiciled within the State) (emphasis added); Anderson v. 2 Watts, 138 U.S. 694, 706 (1891) (“[t]he place where a person lives is taken to be his domicile 3 until facts adduced establish the contrary”). The Complaint lists California addresses for almost 4 all the defendants, and there is no allegation in the Complaint from which the court could infer 5 that those defendants are not California citizens. Therefore, plaintiffs have not met their burden 6 to show that diversity jurisdiction exists. Carden v. Arkoma Associates, 494 U.S. 185, 187 7 (1990) (“[s]ince its enactment, we have interpreted the diversity statute to require ‘complete 8 diversity’ of citizenship”). 9 2. No federal question jurisdiction Plaintiffs also allege “federal question” jurisdiction, citing “ADA law.”1 See 28 U.S.C. 10 11 § 1331. However, the Complaint contains no allegations that plaintiffs were discriminated 12 against because of a disability, nor how they were discriminated against, nor any other allegation 13 relating to the ADA. The claim is sufficiently insubstantial that it fails to confer federal question 14 jurisdiction. Leeson v. Transamerica Disability Income Plan, 671 F.3d 969, 975 (9th Cir. 2012) 15 (“a federal court may dismiss a federal question claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction” 16 where the claim is “‘wholly insubstantial and frivolous’”) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 17 682-83 (1946)). 18 3. Rooker-Feldman doctrine bar & immunity 19 Plaintiffs also cite 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that plaintiffs’ Due Process rights were 20 violated. However, the only apparent basis for this claim is that plaintiffs did not receive enough 21 opportunities to make their case, and lost in state court. Specifically, they were thrown out of 22 court, and were not given live hearings on their claims. However, this district court has no 23 authority to review such proceedings of the state courts. Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 24 F.3d 855, 858–59 (9th Cir. 2008) (federal district courts have no authority to directly or indirectly 25 review state court decisions) (citing the “Rooker-Feldman” doctrine);2 Cooper v. Ramos, 704 26 27 28 1 See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923). 4 2 1 F.3d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[t]he doctrine bars a district court from exercising jurisdiction not 2 only over an action explicitly styled as a direct appeal, but also over the ‘de facto equivalent’ of 3 such an appeal”). Plaintiffs’ remedy, having lost their case at the state court level, was to seek 4 review by the United States Supreme Court. Mothershed v. Justices of Supreme Court, 410 F.3d 5 602, 606 (9th Cir. 2005) (“state court litigants may therefore only obtain federal review by filing 6 a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States”). In addition, it 7 appears that plaintiffs are suing, among others, state judges and justices for their judicial actions. 8 Such claims are barred by absolute judicial immunity. See In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 947 (9th 9 Cir. 2002) (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978)). 10 II. CONCLUSION 11 Plaintiffs, to their credit, have somewhat clarified the jurisdictional and substantive 12 allegations in the amendment to their original complaint. However, the clarifications make it 13 even clearer that there is no diversity jurisdiction here, and that any federal claim is 14 jurisdictionally barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Accordingly, another attempt at 15 amending the complaint in this court would be futile. Moreover, plaintiffs’ additional motions 16 and requests are therefore moot, and should be denied. 17 18 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs’ request to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 6) is GRANTED. 19 Further, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 20 1. This action should be DISMISSED, without prejudice, for lack of federal jurisdiction; 21 22 23 24 and 2. Plaintiffs’ remaining “Requests” and “Motions” (ECF Nos. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12), should be DENIED, as moot. These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 25 assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty-one (21) 26 days after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written 27 objections with the court. Such document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 28 Findings and Recommendations.” Local Rule 304(d). Plaintiff is advised that failure to file 5 1 ob bjections wit thin the spec cified time may waive th right to appeal the District Court’s order. m he p s s 2 Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). M d C 3 DA ATED: Sep ptember 9, 20 016. 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6
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