J & J Sports Productions, Inc. v. Torres, No. 2:2011cv02439 - Document 14 (E.D. Cal. 2012)
Court Description: FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge Allison Claire on 12/12/12 recommending that 9 Motion for Default Judgment filed by J & J Sports Productions, Inc. be granted; The Court enter judgment against defendant on plaintiff' ;s claims; The court award statutory damages in an amount of $5,000.00 to plaintiff; and this case be closed. These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case. Objections to F&R due within 14 days. (Matson, R)
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J & J Sports Productions, Inc. v. Torres Doc. 14 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 11 J & J SPORTS PRODUCTIONS, INC., 12 Plaintiff, 13 14 No. 2:11-cv-2439 JAM AC vs. DULCE TORRES, dba EL MALECON BAR & GRILL, 15 Defendant. 16 17 FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS / Pending before the court is plaintiff’s motion for default judgment against 18 defendant Dulce Torres, doing business as El Malecon Bar & Grill, located at 2518 East Fremont 19 Street, Stockton, California 95205. Upon review of the motion and the supporting documents, 20 and good cause appearing, THE COURT FINDS AS FOLLOWS: 21 22 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On September 15, 2011, plaintiff, an international distributor of sports and 23 entertainment programming, filed a complaint against defendant alleging that the latter 24 unlawfully intercepted and exhibited a live broadcast of a prizefight program entitled “200: 25 Celebrate and Dominate: Shane Mosley v. Sergio Mora” (“the Program”) in the establishment 26 for commercial advantage without obtaining a sublicense from plaintiff for its use, in violation of 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 605, the Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 2 553, and state law. The complaint alleges defendant exhibited the Program on September 18, 3 2010.1 4 Plaintiff brings the following claims: (1) a violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605 5 (Unauthorized Publication or Use of Communications) alleging that defendant knowingly 6 intercepted, received, and exhibited the Program for purposes of direct or indirect commercial 7 advantage or private financial gain; (2) a violation of 47 U.S.C. § 553 (Unauthorized Reception 8 of Cable Services) based upon the same allegations; (3) a claim for conversion alleging that 9 defendant tortiously obtained possession of the Program and wrongfully converted it for his own 10 benefit; and (4) a violation of the California Business & Professions Code § 17200, et. seq. In the complaint, plaintiff seeks $110,000 in statutory damages as well as 11 12 attorneys’ fees and costs for Count I; $60,000 in statutory damages, as well as attorneys’ fees 13 and costs for Count II; compensatory, exemplary, and punitive damages, as well as attorneys’ 14 fees and costs for Count III; and restitution, declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorneys’ 15 fees for Count IV. 16 The summons and complaint were served on defendant by substituted service on 17 January 8, 2012 (an “Amelio Doe” accepted service at defendant’s place of business). See Doc. 18 No. 5; Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2); Pacific Atlantic Trading Co. v. M/V Main Express, 758 F.2d 19 1325, 1331 (9th Cir. 1985) (default judgment void without personal jurisdiction). Defendant has 20 1 21 22 23 24 25 26 Further details are provided in the affidavit of plaintiff’s corporate president, submitted in support of the motion, and its attached exhibits. See Doc. No. 11. Plaintiff owned the commercial exhibition licensing rights to the Program pursuant to contract with Golden Boy Promotions, Inc. Under the contract Golden Boy retained exclusive rights to license live cable and satellite television exhibition of the Program on a residential pay-per-view basis, and sold to plaintiff the exclusive right to exhibit or sublicense exhibition of the telecast at commercial closed-circuit exhibition outlets. Plaintiff then marketed the commercial exhibition rights to its commercial customers (i.e., casinos, racetracks, bars, restaurants and nightclubs). Electronic transmission of the live telecast was encrypted to ensure distribution only to licensed exhibitors, who paid fees to plaintiff under sublicensing agreements. Id. Plaintiff also submitted the affidavit of an investigator who observed the Program being televised at the defendant establishment on the date of the live telecast. See Doc. No. 9-3. 2 1 failed to file an answer or otherwise appear in this action. The clerk entered default against 2 defendant on February 13, 2012. Request for entry of default and the instant motion for default judgment and 3 4 supporting papers were served by mail on defendant at defendant’s last known address. Doc. 5 Nos. 7, 9. Defendant did not file an opposition to the motion for entry of default judgment. 6 Plaintiff seeks an entry of default judgment in the amount of $111,600 ($10,000 for statutory 7 damages pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II); $100,000 for enhanced damages pursuant 8 to 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(ii); and $1,600 for conversion).2 9 LEGAL STANDARD Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55, default may be entered against a 10 11 party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought who fails to plead or otherwise 12 defend against the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). However, “[a] defendant’s default does not 13 automatically entitle the plaintiff to a court-ordered judgment.” PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 14 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924-25 15 (9th Cir. 1986)); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b) (governing the entry of default judgments). Instead, 16 the decision to grant or deny an application for default judgment lies within the district court’s 17 sound discretion. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). In making this 18 determination, the court may consider the following factors: 19 20 21 (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. 22 Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). Default judgments are ordinarily 23 disfavored. Id. at 1472. 24 25 26 2 Plaintiff does not seek default judgment on its claims brought pursuant to 47 U.S.C. Section 553 and the California Business & Professions Code § 17200, et. seq. See Riley Decl. ¶¶ 6-7. 3 1 As a general rule, once default is entered, well-pleaded factual allegations in the 2 operative complaint are taken as true, except for those allegations relating to damages. 3 TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (citing 4 Geddes v. United Fin. Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)); see also Fair 5 Housing of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002). Although well-pleaded 6 allegations in the complaint are admitted by a defendant’s failure to respond, “necessary facts 7 not contained in the pleadings, and claims which are legally insufficient, are not established by 8 default.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Danning 9 v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978)); accord DIRECTV, Inc. v. Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 10 854 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[A] defendant is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to 11 admit conclusions of law” (citation and quotation marks omitted).); Abney v. Alameida, 334 F. 12 Supp. 2d 1221, 1235 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (“[A] default judgment may not be entered on a legally 13 insufficient claim.”). A party’s default conclusively establishes that party’s liability, although it 14 does not establish the amount of damages. Geddes, 559 F.2d at 560; cf. Adriana Int’l Corp. v. 15 Thoeren, 913 F.2d 1406, 1414 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating in the context of a default entered 16 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 that the default conclusively established the 17 liability of the defaulting party). DISCUSSION 18 19 20 21 A. The Eitel Factors 1. Factor One: Possibility of Prejudice to Plaintiff The first Eitel factor considers whether the plaintiff would suffer prejudice if 22 default judgment is not entered, and such potential prejudice to the plaintiff militates in favor of 23 granting a default judgment. See PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. Here, plaintiff would 24 potentially face prejudice if the court did not enter a default judgment. Absent entry of a default 25 judgment, plaintiff would be without another recourse for recovery. Accordingly, the first Eitel 26 factor favors the entry of default judgment. 4 1 2. Factors Two and Three: The Merits of Plaintiff’s Substantive Claims and the Sufficiency of the Complaint 2 The undersigned considers the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claims and the 3 4 sufficiency of the complaint together because of the relatedness of the two inquiries. The 5 undersigned must consider whether the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to state a claim 6 that supports the relief sought. See Danning, 572 F.2d at 1388; PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 7 1175. Plaintiff seeks entry of default judgment on its claim brought pursuant to 47 8 9 U.S.C. § 605(a).3 Plaintiff’s inability to allege the precise nature of the intercepted transmission 10 in this case, which is largely due to defendant’s failure to appear or defend itself in the action, 11 raises a question regarding the scope of 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) and the sufficiency of plaintiff’s 12 claim under that provision. The Federal Communications Act prohibits, among other things, 13 commercial establishments from intercepting and broadcasting radio communications to its 14 patrons. See 47 U.S.C. § 605(a). In relevant part, 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) states: 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 No person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any radio communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person. No person not being entitled thereto shall receive or assist in receiving any interstate or foreign communication by radio and use such communication (or any information therein contained) for his own benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto. No person having received any intercepted radio communication or having become acquainted with the contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such communication (or any part thereof) knowing that such communication was intercepted, shall divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such communication (or any part thereof) or use such communication (or any information therein contained) for his own benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that satellite television signals are covered 23 24 25 26 3 The undersigned does not address the merits of, or sufficiency of the allegations in support of, plaintiff’s state law claim for conversion. As discussed more fully below, the undersigned need not reach plaintiff’s conversion claim because the recommended statutory damages will sufficiently compensate plaintiff such that an award for conversion damages would be duplicative. 5 1 communications under 47 U.S.C. § 605(a). DIRECTV, Inc. v. Webb, 545 F.3d 837, 844 (9th 2 Cir. 2008). The scope of section 605(a) is less clear with respect to transmissions intercepted 3 4 from a cable system, which are expressly covered under 47 U.S.C. § 553(a). Section 553(a) 5 states, in relevant part: “No person shall intercept or receive or assist in intercepting or receiving 6 any communications service offered over a cable system, unless specifically authorized to do so 7 by a cable operator or as may otherwise be specifically authorized by law.” 47 U.S.C. 8 § 553(a)(1).4 Here, plaintiff has not alleged whether the transmission that defendant intercepted 9 10 was from a cable system or a satellite television signal. A split of authority has developed 11 regarding the scope of section 605(a) in that numerous courts have concluded that section 605(a) 12 applies exclusively to broadcasts obtained by way of a satellite television signal, as opposed to 13 transmissions over a cable system, and that section 553 applies exclusively to transmission over 14 a cable system. Compare United States v. Norris, 88 F.3d 462, 466-69 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding 15 that sections 553(a) and 605(a) are not “overlapping statutes” and are thus mutually exclusive), 16 with Int’l Cablevision, Inc. v. Sykes, 75 F.3d 123, 132-33 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that section 17 605 and section 553 are not completely overlapping); see also TKR Cable Co. v. Cable City 18 Corp., 267 F.3d 196, 204-07 (3d Cir. 2001) (recognizing the disagreement between the holdings 19 in Norris and Sykes, and holding “that § 605 encompasses the interception of satellite 20 transmissions to the extent reception or interception occurs prior to or not in connection with, 21 distribution of the service over a cable system, and no more” (internal quotation marks 22 23 24 25 26 4 Section 553 carries lower minimum statutory damages and lower enhanced damages than section 605. Compare 47 U.S.C. §§ 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II) and 605(e)(3)(C)(ii) (providing for the award of statutory damages of not less than $1,000 and no more than $10,000, and under certain circumstances enhanced damages of up to $100,000 per violation), with 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(A)(ii) (providing for the award of statutory damages of not less than $250 and not more than $10,000, and under certain circumstances enhanced damages of up to $50,000 per violation). 6 1 omitted).). 2 At a minimum, plaintiff’s complaint and evidence support a conclusion that 3 defendant intercepted, without authorization, a transmission of the Program and broadcast it to 4 its patrons. Plaintiff essentially concedes that its complaint and the record contain no allegations 5 or evidence substantiating the nature of the transmission that was intercepted by defendant. 6 Plaintiff argues, however, that although it was unable to allege the precise means of transmission 7 in this case (i.e., transmission over a cable system or satellite broadcast), it “should not be 8 prejudiced” given defendant’s failure to appear or defend itself in this action. Pl.’s Memo. of P. 9 & A. in Supp. of Motion for Default J. at 8. The undersigned agrees with plaintiff that under the 10 circumstances of this case, where plaintiff was deprived of the opportunity to conduct discovery 11 regarding the transmission at issue because of defendant’s failure to appear or defend itself in 12 this action, plaintiff should not suffer the resulting prejudice. In any event, the split of authority 13 presented above has little practical impact in this case because the undersigned will recommend 14 the entry of a judgment in the total amount of $5,000, which is the middle range of the non- 15 enhanced statutory damages available under both 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(A)(ii) and 47 U.S.C. 16 § 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II). Thus, insofar as the merits of plaintiff’s statutory claims and the 17 sufficiency of its pleadings under the Eitel factors are concerned, the complaint and record 18 before the undersigned favor entry of default judgment. 19 3. Factor Four: The Sum of Money at Stake in the Action 20 Under the fourth factor cited in Eitel, “the court must consider the amount of 21 money at stake in relation to the seriousness of Defendant’s conduct.” PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. 22 Supp. 2d at 1177; see also Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld Prods., Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 23 500 (C.D. Cal. 2003). Here, plaintiff seeks statutory damages of $110,000 for the willful 24 violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605. This amount represents the maximum amount plaintiff would be 25 permitted to recover under the statute, including enhanced damages. In addition, plaintiff seeks 26 compensatory and punitive damages for defendant’s tortuous conversion of plaintiff’s property. 7 1 Plaintiff notes defendant would have been required to pay only $1,600 to broadcast the Program 2 at the bar and grill, but plaintiff asserts nominal damages have proven insufficient to combat 3 piracy and that defendant therefore should be required to pay the statutory maximum. Thus, 4 plaintiff seems to concede that amount of damages requested is not proportional to defendant’s 5 conduct. Given the substantial amount of money at stake, this factor could weigh against 6 7 the entry of default judgment. See, e.g., Joe Hand Promotions v. Streshly, 655 F. Supp. 2d 1136 8 (S.D. Cal. 2009) (proposed award amount of $100,975 was “manifestly excessive under existing 9 law”); J & J Sports Productions. v. Cardoze, 2010 WL 2757106, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 9, 2010) 10 (“a large sum of money at stake would disfavor default damages,” such as damages totaling 11 $114,200); see also Board of Trustees of the Sheet Metal Workers v. Vigil, 2007 WL 3239281, 12 at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2007) (“default judgment is disfavored if there were a large sum of 13 money involved”); but see J & J Sports Productions v. Hernandez, 2010 WL 1980186, at *4 14 (“the statutes involved contemplate such an award under certain circumstances,” and the factor 15 did not weigh against default judgment). As discussed below, however, the court declines to 16 enter judgment in the amount requested. Consequently, the factor does not weigh against 17 plaintiff. 18 4. Factor Five: The Possibility of a Dispute Concerning Material Facts 19 The facts of this case are relatively straightforward, and plaintiff has provided the 20 court with well-pleaded allegations supporting its statutory claims and affidavits in support of its 21 allegations. Here, the court may assume the truth of well-pleaded facts in the complaint (except 22 as to damages) following the clerk’s entry of default and, thus, there is no likelihood that any 23 genuine issue of material fact exists.5 See, e.g., Elektra Entm’t Group Inc. v. Crawford, 226 24 25 26 5 Defendant’s failure to file an answer in this case or a response to the instant default application further supports the conclusion that the possibility of a dispute as to material facts is minimal. 8 1 F.R.D. 388, 393 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“Because all allegations in a well-pleaded complaint are taken 2 as true after the court clerk enters default judgment, there is no likelihood that any genuine issue 3 of material fact exists.”); accord Philip Morris USA, Inc., 219 F.R.D. at 500; PepsiCo, Inc., 238 4 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. 5 5. Factor Six: Whether the Default Was Due to Excusable Neglect Upon review of the record before the court, the undersigned finds that the default 6 7 was not the result of excusable neglect. See PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. Plaintiff 8 served the defendant with the summons and complaint. Moreover, plaintiff served defendant by 9 mail with notice of its application for default judgment. Despite ample notice of this lawsuit and 10 plaintiff’s intention to seek a default judgment, defendant has not appeared in this action to date. 11 Thus, the record suggests that defendant has chosen not to defend this action, and not that the 12 default resulted from any excusable neglect. Accordingly, this Eitel factor favors the entry of a 13 default judgment. 14 6. Factor Seven: The Strong Policy Underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Favoring Decisions on the Merits 15 16 “Cases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably possible.” Eitel, 17 782 F.2d at 1472. However, district courts have concluded with regularity that this policy, 18 standing alone, is not dispositive, especially where a defendant fails to appear or defend itself in 19 an action. PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177; see also Craigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc., 20 694 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1061 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2010); ACS Recovery Servs., Inc. v. Kaplan, 21 2010 WL 144816, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2010) (unpublished); Hartung v. J.D. Byrider, Inc., 22 2009 WL 1876690, at *5 (E.D. Cal. June 26, 2009) (unpublished). Accordingly, although the 23 undersigned is cognizant of the policy in favor of decisions on the merits—and consistent with 24 existing policy would prefer that this case be resolved on the merits—that policy does not, by 25 itself, preclude the entry of default judgment. 26 Upon consideration of the Eitel factors, the undersigned concludes that plaintiff is 9 1 entitled to the entry of default judgment against defendant and will make a recommendation to 2 that effect. What remains is the determination of the amount of damages to which plaintiff is 3 entitled. 4 B. Terms of Judgment After determining that a party is entitled to entry of default judgment, the court 5 6 must determine the terms of the judgment to be entered. Considering plaintiff’s briefing and the 7 record in this case, including the affidavits and declarations submitted by plaintiff, the 8 undersigned concludes that plaintiff is entitled to an award of statutory damages in the amount of 9 $5,000 as a result of defendant’s unlawful interception and broadcast of the Program, and will 10 recommend the same. 11 Pursuant to section 605, a court may award statutory damages of “not less than 12 $1,000 or more than $10,000” for violation of the Federal Communications Act, and may also 13 award enhanced damages of up to $100,000 if the “violation was committed willfully and for 14 purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage or private financial gain.” 47 U.S.C. 15 § 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II), (e)(3)(C)(ii). Here, plaintiff seeks a judgment in the amount of $111,600. Plaintiff’s 16 17 application for default judgment and proposed order indicate that this sum consists of $110,000 18 for a violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(B)(iii) and (e)(3)(C)(ii), and $1,600 as compensatory 19 damages arising from defendant’s act of conversion. In this case, plaintiff’s investigator provided evidence that the establishment, 20 21 which has a capacity of 100 patrons, had about between 62 and 68 patrons inside on the day in 22 question and that defendant was unlawfully broadcasting the Program on an unspecified number 23 of televisions.6 Affiant Decl., Doc. No. 9-3; Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Motion for 24 6 25 26 While plaintiff asserts in its motion that the Program was broadcast on four televisions inside defendant’s establishment, see Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Motion for Default J. at 11, the Affiant Declaration provides only that there were four televisions; it does not specify how many of those televisions were broadcasting the Program. See Affiant Decl., Doc. No. 9-3. 10 1 Default J. at 16. Defendant’s establishment is not large, and there is no evidence of a repeat 2 violation or additional egregious circumstances. The investigator reported that there was no 3 cover charge for entry on the night in question. There is no evidence before the court of any 4 promotion by defendant that the fight would be shown at the establishment. There is also no 5 evidence before the court that a special premium on food and drink was being charged at the 6 establishment on the night of the fight or that the establishment was doing any greater level of 7 business on the night the fight was shown than at any other time. Finally, plaintiff has presented 8 no evidence to the court suggesting that the defendant was a repeat broadcast piracy offender. 9 Balancing these facts with the widespread problem of piracy and the need for an award sufficient 10 to deter future piracy, the undersigned will recommend an award of statutory damages in the 11 amount of $5,000. On the record before the court, the undersigned does not find that this case 12 merits an award of enhanced damages. 13 Plaintiff also seeks actual damages for defendant’s alleged tortious act of 14 conversion in the amount of $1,600, which consists of the fee that defendant would have had to 15 pay to plaintiff in order to lawfully broadcast the Program through a contractual sublicense.7 16 The undersigned will not recommend an award of damages with respect to plaintiff’s conversion 17 claim. The statutory damages provisions at issue serve not only a deterrent function, see J & J 18 Sports Prods. v. Orellana, 2010 WL 1576447, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2010) (unpublished), but 19 also a compensatory function, which is evidenced by provisions that permit the award of 20 statutory damages or actual damages in a civil action. See 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(I); 47 21 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(A)(i). Here, the recommended award of statutory damages in the amount of 22 $5,000 sufficiently compensates plaintiff, and this case does not present a set of circumstances 23 where an additional award might be warranted. Accordingly, the undersigned will recommend 24 7 25 26 Damages for conversion are measured, in relevant part, by the value of the property at the time of the conversion. Cal. Civ. Code § 3336; see also Stan Lee Trading, Inc. v. Holtz, 649 F. Supp. 577, 581 (C.D. Cal. 1986); Spates v. Dameron Hosp. Ass’n, 114 Cal. App. 4th 208, 221, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 597, 608 (Ct. App. 2003). 11 1 that plaintiff be awarded no damages on its conversion claim. 2 Finally, although the prayer for relief in the complaint and the application for 3 default judgment indicate that plaintiff seeks the award of costs and attorneys’ fees, the 4 application for default judgment contains no argument or evidence in support of such a request. 5 Accordingly, the undersigned will not recommend the award of costs or attorneys’ fees. 6 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 7 1. Plaintiff’s application for default judgment be granted; 8 2. The court enter judgment against defendant on plaintiff’s claims brought 9 pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 605(a); 10 3. The court award statutory damages in an amount of $5,000.00 to plaintiff; 12 4. This case be closed. 13 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 11 and 14 Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen 15 days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 16 objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 17 “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections 18 within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. 19 Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 20 1991). 21 DATED: December 12, 2012. 22 ` ALLISON CLAIRE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 23 24 25 /mb;j&j2439.mdj 26 12
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