-CKD (HC)Goodridge v. Martel et al, No. 2:2011cv01937 - Document 12 (E.D. Cal. 2011)
Court Description: ORDER and FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge Carolyn K. Delaney on 10/11/11 ORDERING that petitioners 2 request to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED; and Petitioners 3 and 8 motions for appointment of counsel are DENIED. It is RECOMMENDED that 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be dismissedl and this case be closed. Referred to Judge Garland E. Burrell, Jr.; Objections to F&R due within 21 days.(Dillon, M)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
-CKD (HC)Goodridge v. Martel et al Doc. 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 PETER GOODRIDGE, 10 11 Petitioner, No. CIV S-11-1937 GEB CKD P vs. 12 MICHAEL MARTEL, et al., 13 Respondents. 14 ORDER; and / 15 FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for writ of habeas 16 corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He is serving a sentence of seven-years-to-life 17 imprisonment entered upon a 1971 Superior Court of Sacramento County conviction for first 18 degree murder. All of petitioner’s claims concern the fact that he was denied parole in 2010. 19 I. Request To Proceed In Forma Pauperis 20 Petitioner requests permission to proceed in forma pauperis. Examination of 21 petitioner’s in forma pauperis application reveals that petitioner is unable to afford the costs of 22 suit. Accordingly, the application to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. See 28 U.S.C. 23 § 1915(a). 24 II. Request For Appointment Of Counsel 25 26 Petitioner has requested appointment of counsel. There currently exists no absolute right to appointment of counsel in habeas proceedings. See Nevius v. Sumner, 105 F.3d Dockets.Justia.com 1 453, 460 (9th Cir. 1996). However, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A authorizes the appointment of counsel at 2 any stage of the case “if the interests of justice so require.” See Rule 8(c), Fed. R. Governing 3 § 2254 Cases. In the present case, the court does not find that the interests of justice would be 4 served by the appointment of counsel. Therefore, petitioner’s request will be denied. 5 III. Screening 6 Under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, the court must conduct a 7 preliminary review of § 2254 habeas petitions and dismiss any petition where it plainly appears 8 that petitioner is not entitled to relief in this court. As indicated below, it is clear petitioner is not 9 entitled to habeas relief. 10 An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a 11 judgment of a state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the 12 United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Also, federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any 13 claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state court’s adjudication of the 14 claim: 15 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 16 17 18 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 19 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (referenced herein in as “§ 2254(d).”1 It is the habeas petitioner’s burden to 20 show he is not precluded from obtaining relief by § 2254(d). See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 21 U.S. 19, 25 (2002). 22 23 The “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses of § 2254(d)(1) are different. As the Supreme Court has explained: 24 A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the “contrary to” clause if the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in our cases, or if it decides a case differently than we 25 26 1 Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) establishes a precondition to federal habeas relief, not grounds for entitlement to habeas relief. Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119 (2007). 1 have done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. The court may grant relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from our decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case. The focus of the latter inquiry is on whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable, and we stressed in Williams [v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000)] that an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one. 2 3 4 5 6 Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). A state court does not apply a rule different from the 7 law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or unreasonably apply such law, if the state court simply 8 fails to cite or fails to indicate an awareness of federal law. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 9 (2002). 10 The court will look to the last reasoned state court decision in determining 11 whether the law applied to a particular claim by the state courts was contrary to the law set forth 12 in the cases of the United States Supreme Court or whether an unreasonable application of such 13 law has occurred. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Where the state court fails 14 to give any reasoning whatsoever in support of the denial of a claim arising under Constitutional 15 or federal law, the Ninth Circuit has held that this court must perform an independent review of 16 the record to ascertain whether the state court decision was objectively unreasonable. Himes v. 17 Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). In other words, the court assumes the state court 18 applied the correct law, and analyzes whether the decision of the state court was based on an 19 objectively unreasonable application of that law. 20 It is appropriate to look to lower federal court decisions to determine what law has 21 been “clearly established” by the Supreme Court and the reasonableness of a particular 22 application of that law. “Clearly established” federal law is that determined by the Supreme 23 Court. Arredondo v. Ortiz, 365 F.3d 778, 782-83 (9th Cir. 2004). At the same time, it is 24 appropriate to look to lower federal court decisions as persuasive authority in determining what 25 law has been “clearly established” and the reasonableness of a particular application of that law. 26 Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 598 (9th Cir. 1999); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062 (9th 1 Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds, Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003); cf. Arredondo, 2 365 F.3d at 782-83 (noting that reliance on Ninth Circuit or other authority outside bounds of 3 Supreme Court precedent is misplaced). 4 First, petitioner asserts his being denied parole in 2010 was a result of a denial of 5 his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws. Generally speaking, the Equal 6 Protection Clause requires that similarly situated persons not be treated differently because of an 7 impermissible motive (like racism). U.S. v. Estrada-Plata, 57 F.3d 757, 760 (9th Cir. 1995). 8 Petitioner fails to point to evidence indicating a significant number of other persons who have 9 committed crimes similar to petitioner were paroled sooner than the time already served by 10 petitioner. Also, he fails to point to anything indicating he was denied parole based on any 11 impermissible motive. Accordingly, it is clear petitioner has no valid equal protection claim. 12 Next, petitioner asserts that the amount of time he has served in prison, about 40 13 years when his habeas petition was filed, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of 14 the Eighth Amendment. However, petitioner fails to point to anything suggesting he has a right 15 arising under the Eighth Amendment to be paroled at any point while serving a lawfully imposed 16 indeterminate sentence. The Eighth Amendment does require that a sentence not be grossly 17 disproportionate to the crime committed. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23-24 (2003). But, 18 that principle applies to the imposition of the sentence, not whether or when an inmate serving a 19 years-to-life sentence should be paroled. For these reasons, petitioner does not present a valid 20 Eighth Amendment claim. 21 Petitioner also asserts he was denied due process in violation of the Fourteenth 22 Amendment. He cites Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) which generally stands for the 23 proposition that prosecutors must turn over exculpatory evidence to defendants. Petitioner fails 24 to indicate how Brady is in anyway applicable to parole proceedings. 25 26 Petitioner points to other federal cases and legal terms like “ex post facto” and “suppression of evidence” but he fails to reasonably articulate any other federal claim. 1 For all of these reasons, it is clear petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief. 2 Therefore, the court will recommend that petitioner’s application for writ of habeas corpus be 3 dismissed. 4 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 5 1. Petitioner’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (#2) is granted; and 6 2. Petitioner’s motions for appointment of counsel (#3 & #8) are denied. 7 IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 8 1. Petitioner’s application for writ of habeas corpus be dismissed; and 9 2. This case be closed. 10 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 11 Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty- 12 one days after being served with these findings and recommendations, petitioner may file 13 objections. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings 14 and Recommendations.” In his objections petitioner may address whether a certificate of 15 appealability should issue in the event he files an appeal of the judgment in this case. See Rule 16 11, Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (the district court must issue or deny a 17 certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant). Petitioner is 18 advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the 19 District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 20 Dated: October 11, 2011 21 _____________________________________ CAROLYN K. DELANEY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 1/md good1937.110
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
