Robinson et al v. USA
Filing
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MEMORANDUM and ORDER signed by Judge Morrison C. England, Jr. on 11/18/2011 GRANTING, without leave to amend, 11 Motion to Dismiss. CASE CLOSED. (Michel, G)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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DENNIS ROBINSON, SPENCER
ROBINSON, Jr., RICKIE ROBINSON
CYNTHIA ROBINSON, VICKIE
ROBINSON,
No. 2:11-cv-01227-MCE-CMK
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Plaintiffs,
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v.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, as
Trustee for the Indians of the
Mooretown Rancheria, aka MAIDU
INDIANS OF CALIFORNIA,
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Defendant.
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----oo0oo---This matter comes before the Court on the motion of
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Defendant, United States of America’s (“United States”), to
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dismiss Plaintffs, Dennis, Spencer, Rickie, Cynithia and Vickie
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Robinson’s (collectively, “Robinsons” or “Plaintiffs”) Complaint
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in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).1
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Plaintiffs oppose the motion.
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Because oral argument will not be of material assistance,
the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.
Local Rule 78-230(h).
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For the reasons set forth below, the United States’ motion is
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granted without leave to amend.
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BACKGROUND
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This lawsuit involves land held in trust by the United
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States for the benefit of the Indians of the Mooretown Rancheria,
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also known as the Maidu Indians of California (“Tribe”).
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Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that the Tribe’s construction of a
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casino and other facilities on the land has encroached upon, and
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interfered with, Plaintiffs’ rights to a sixty foot,
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non-exclusive road and utility easement Plaintiffs allege they
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own.
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Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that, “[b]ased on the United
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States’ awareness and knowledge of the [Tribe’s] planned
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construction activities, it knew or should have known that these
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activities would adversely affect the easement . . . and that, as
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a result, these activities would violate the Robinsons’ legal
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rights.”
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(Pl.’s Compl., filed May 06, 2011, [ECF No. 1], ¶¶ 1, 17.)
(Id. ¶¶ 17, 29.)
The Robinsons’ first claim for relief seeks damages for loss
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of lateral support; their second claim seeks damages for loss of
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subjacent support; the third claim seeks damages under a strict
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liability theory for property damage; the Robinsons’ fourth claim
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seeks damages under a negligence theory for loss of lateral
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support; the fifth claim also seeks damages under a negligence
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theory for property damages caused to the subject easement; the
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sixth claim alleges a continuing nuisance;
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///
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the seventh claim also rests on a nuisance theory for the alleged
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encroachment upon Plaintiffs’ property; the Robinsons’ eighth and
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final claim is a also a nuisance claim for obstruction of the
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road to their property.
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that the United States “took no steps to warn or give notice to
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the [Tribe] that the planned activities would” interfere with
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Plaintiffs’ use of the easement, refused to take steps to rectify
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the alleged damage, and violated its duty to maintain the subject
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easement.
The gravamen of Plaintiffs’ complaint is
(Id. ¶ 17.)
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In 2004, the Robinsons filed an almost identical action
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arising out of the same basic nucleus of fact — namely, the
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alleged encroachment upon the Robinsons’ easement caused by the
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Tribe’s construction.
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00734, filed April 01, 2004.2
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2004 complaint were identical to counts one through seven of this
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action.
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an eighth count for continuing nuisance based on obstruction of
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the road to the Robinsons’ property.
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four additional paragraphs to the complaint containing factual
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allegations regarding new hotel construction that Plaintiffs
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allege also encroached upon their easement.
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See Robinson v. United States, Civ. No 04Counts one through seven of the
The Robinsons, in filing this complaint, however, added
The Robinsons also included
Given the factual similarities between the two actions, on
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August 25, 2011, District Judge Morrison C. England, Jr., signed
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a related case order.
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2011, [ECF No. 18].)
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(See Related Case Order, filed Aug. 25,
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Hereinafter, the Court will refer to this action as the
“2004 action.”
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Judge England held that “[e]xamination of the . . . civil actions
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reveals that these actions are related within the meaning of
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Local Rule 123(a)” because they “are based on the same or similar
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claims, the same property transaction or event, similar questions
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of fact and the same questions of law.”
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the 2004 action was reassigned to Judge England.
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16.)
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(Id. at 2:1-6.)
Thus,
(Id. at 2:11-
On March 03, 2011, the United States filed a motion to
dismiss the 2004 action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
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Procedure 12(b)(1).
The Court granted the United States’ motion,
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holding that the United States’ sovereign immunity precluded the
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Court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over the
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Robinsons’ claims.
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STANDARD
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Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be asserted by
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either party or the court, sua sponte, at any time during the
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course of an action.
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the burden of establishing a federal court’s jurisdiction rests
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on the party asserting the jurisdiction.
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v. Portage La Prairie Mut. Ins. Co., 907 F.2d 911, 912 (9th Cir.
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1990).
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until it is proved otherwise.
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Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Stock West, Inc. v.
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Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989).
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
Once challenged,
See Farmers Ins. Exch.
The court presumes a lack of subject matter jurisdiction
See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.
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“It is a long-settled principle that standing cannot be inferred
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argumentatively from averments in the pleadings, but rather must
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affirmatively appear in the record.”
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Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990) (internal citations and
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quotations omitted).
FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of
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ANALYSIS
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The United States contends that Plaintiffs’ complaint should
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be dismissed because it is duplicative of the complaint
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Plaintiffs filed in the 2004 action.
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States maintains that the only difference between the two
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complaints are the addition of one new claim, a nuisance claim
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the Court previously dismissed with prejudice in the 2004 action,
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and four new paragraphs containing factual allegations that
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imitate those in the 2004 action.
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asserts that the Court should grant its motion to dismiss for the
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same reason the Court dismissed the 2004 action: the Court does
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not have subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims
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because the United States has not waived sovereign immunity in
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this context.
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Specifically, the United
Moreover, the United States
Plaintiffs’ opposition to the United States’ motion to
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dismiss points to four paragraphs they allege differ from the
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complaint in the 2004 action.
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paragraphs 27 and 43-45 which contain allegations that the hotel
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the Tribe constructed encroached upon their easement.
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Specifically, Plaintiffs point to
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Moreover, Plaintiffs contend that the additional eighth claim for
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nuisance is permitted under California law which allows for
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successive actions for continuing nuisance claims.
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Plaintiffs put forth the same arguments in opposition to the
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United States’ sovereign immunity position that they did in the
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now dismissed 2004 action.
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Finally,
District courts retain “broad discretion to control their
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dockets,” and may impose “sanctions including, where appropriate,
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default or dismissal.”
Adams v. Cal. Dep’t of Health Serv.,
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487 F.3d 684, 688 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted).
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As such, a district court may “dismiss a duplicative later-filed
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action.”
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two separate actions involving the same subject matter at the
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same time in the same court and against the same.”
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citations omitted).
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than the issuance of a stay or the enjoinment of proceedings,
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promotes judicial economy and the comprehensive disposition of
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litigation.”
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duplicative, the test for claim preclusion applies.
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688.
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Id.
Plaintiffs generally “have no right to maintain
Id. (internal
Dismissal of a duplicative lawsuit, “more so
Id. at 692.
To determine whether a suit is
See id. at
Claim preclusion, or res judicata, is applicable when there
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is “(1) an identity of claims, (2) a final judgment on the
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merits, and (3) privity between parties.”
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Liquidators of Eur. Fed. Credit Bank, 630 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th
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Cir. 2011).
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pleading identical causes of action, but by demonstrating the
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suits are part of the “same transaction or series” of events and
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“whether they could conveniently be tried together.”
United States v.
The first prong of the test is satisfied, not by
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Adams, 487 F.3d at 689.
However, the analysis is fluid, and to
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determine the identity of claims, the Ninth Circuit employs a
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four-part test: (1) whether “rights or interests established in
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the prior judgment would be destroyed or impaired” by the second
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action moving forward; (2) whether “substantially the same
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evidence” is presented in both actions; (3) whether the suits
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“involve infringement of the same right;” and (4) whether the
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suits arise from the same set of facts.
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Liquidators, 630 F.3d at 1150.
Id.; See also
The “most significant factor is
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that the causes of action arise from a common transactional
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nucleus of facts.”
Adams, 487 F.3d at 691.
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Regarding the second requirement that there be a final
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judgment on the merits, a dismissal for failure to state a claim,
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or failure to prosecute, constitutes final judgment for purposes
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of res judicata analysis.
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,
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514 U.S. 211, 228 (1995).
Third, identical parties obviously
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establishes privity between them.
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Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1081 (9th
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Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted).
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Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council,
In the instant case, it is clear the later-filed complaint
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is duplicative of the first, largely because the causes of action
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arise from a common transactional nucleus of facts.
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Specifically, the “two separate actions involv[e] the same
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subject matter at the same time in the same court and against the
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same defendant.”
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each complaint are nearly identical, and the claims in both suits
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stem from the Tribe’s construction activities on the land the
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United States holds in trust.
Adams, 487 F.3d at 688.
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The facts alleged in
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Plaintiffs fully described in both complaints the extent to which
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the Tribe’s construction allegedly encroached on Plaintiffs’
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easement.
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assert a violation of the same right — the right to quiet
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enjoyment and use of their easement.
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In other words, Plaintiffs’ claims in both complaints
In this action, Plaintiffs assert one claim distinct from
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the 2004 action: Plaintiffs’ eighth claim for continuing
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nuisance. However, Plaintiffs proffer the same evidence in
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support of this claim and rely on the same operative facts to
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prove the nuisance as they did in the 2004 action.
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Tribe’s construction activities that allegedly encroached upon
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Plaintiffs’ easement and the United States’ approval thereof.
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While Plaintiffs contend that paragraphs 23 and 43-45 contain new
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allegations regarding the Tribe’s construction activities, a
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brief review of both complaints shows that paragraph 43e of
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Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint in the 2004 action contained
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substantially similar allegations centering around the
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construction of the Tribe’s hotel.3
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That is, the
The identity of claims prong satisfied, the Court turns to
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the other two elements of claim preclusion.
The Court dismissed
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the original complaint because Plaintiffs could not establish a
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waiver of sovereign immunity since they failed state a claim for
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relief under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
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The Court also notes that in its first Order granting
Defendant’s motion to dismiss with leave to amend in the first
action, the Court dismissed each of Plaintiffs’ nuisance claims
with prejudice.
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See Lewis v. Hunt, 492 F.3d 565, 571 (holding that Plaintiffs’
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complaint did “not invoke the statutory waiver of sovereign
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immunity granting consent to suit and thus, cannot state a claim
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upon which relief could be granted.”)
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adjudicated on the merits.
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(holding that dismissal for failure to state a claim constitutes
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final judgment for purposes of res judicata analysis.)
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privity is easily established by the fact that the parties to
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this action are identical to the parties in the 2004 action.
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Plaintiffs’ claim that this complaint should not be
Thus, the case was
See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 228 (1995)
Lastly,
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dismissed as duplicative because California law permits
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successive filings of claims for continuing nuisance misses the
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mark.
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permanent nuisance, it does not follow that Plaintiffs have the
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right to file multiple concurrent actions based upon the same
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subject matter, as Plaintiffs did here.
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relevant standard for dismissing an action as duplicative is not
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whether the law permits successive actions, but rather whether
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the subsequent action arises out of the same transaction and
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occurrence.
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demonstrate that the subsequent action does not arise out of the
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same transaction and occurrence as the 2004 action.
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Specifically, both complaints arise out of Plaintiffs’
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fundamental allegation that the United States is liable to the
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Robinsons for its approval of the Tribe’s construction plans.
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Even if California law permits successive actions for
As set forth above, the
The short of it is that Plaintiffs have failed to
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To permit Plaintiffs to maintain this action would promote the
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possibility of inconsistent rulings, undue expense to the
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parties, and imprudent allocation of judicial resources.
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this action should be dismissed with prejudice as duplicative of
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the 2004 action.4
Thus,
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CONCLUSION
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Based on the foregoing, the United State’s motion to dismiss
is GRANTED without leave to amend.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 18, 2011
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_____________________________
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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Even if, as Plaintiffs maintain, this case is not
duplicative of the 2004 action, Plaintiffs’ complaint would be
dismissed for the same reasons the Court dismissed Plaintiffs’
first amended complaint in the 2004 action. Specifically,
Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the United States has
waived its sovereign immunity where it holds land in trust and
the beneficiaries of that trust cause property damage to a third
party. Since the United States has not waived its sovereign
immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act, this Court does not
have jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs’ claims.
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