Laguna v. Foster Poultry Farms
Filing
34
ORDER signed by Judge Garland E. Burrell, Jr on 11/10/11 ORDERING summary judgment is granted in Defendant's favor on Plaintiff's wrongful termination in violation of public policy (age, race, and national origin) claim, and on Plaintiff� 39;s CBA claim. Therefore, judgment shall be entered in favor of defendant on these claims. Further, Plaintiff's remaining wrongful termination for whistle-blowing state claim is remanded to the Superior Court ofCalifornia in the County of San Joaquin. REMANDING CASE to San Joaquin Superior Court, 39-02010-00248776. Copy of remand order sent to other court. CASE CLOSED. (Becknal, R)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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ABEL LAGUNA,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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FOSTER POULTRY FARMS,
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Defendant.
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2:10-cv-03137-GEB-CKD
ORDER
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Defendant seeks summary judgment on the five claims which
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comprise Plaintiff’s Complaint. Plaintiff only opposes the portion of
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the motion challenging his wrongful termination for whistle-blowing
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claim. Plaintiff states in his Opposition that he does not oppose
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dismissal of his claim for wrongful termination in violation of public
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policy which is alleged based on age, race, and national origin;
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therefore, this claim is dismissed.
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The undisputed facts determined under Local Rule 260(b) reveal
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the following facts. Plaintiff was terminated from employment with
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Defendant
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Undisputed Facts (“Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s SUF”) ¶ 59.) Plaintiff’s
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employment was governed by a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”)
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between Defendant and the union to which Plaintiff belonged. (Id. ¶¶ 7-
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8.) The CBA authorized Defendant to create rules that did not conflict
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with the CBA. (Id. ¶ 15.)
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concerned when employees had to be at their appointed work stations.
on
July
10,
2009.
(Pl.’s
Resp.
to
Def.’s
Statement
of
One of the rules of conduct Defendant created
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(Id. ¶ 15.)
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grounds to terminate Plaintiff includes determining whether Plaintiff
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breached this rule.
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to his employment to utilize a grievance procedure in section 6 of the
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CBA. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 60-63.) Following his termination, Plaintiff did not
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complete this grievance procedure. (Id. ¶¶ 63-64.)
The parties argument concerning whether Defendant had
The CBA requires an employee with a dispute related
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Rather, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Superior Court for
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San Joaquin County, California, which was removed to this federal court
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based
on
federal
question
jurisdiction
under
§
301
of
the
Labor
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Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (“§ 301”). Defendant argues in
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its motion that § 301 preempts Plaintiff’s following state claims
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because they arise from employment issues governed by the CBA: breach of
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employment contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
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fair dealing, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”).
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Plaintiff states in his Opposition that he “does not dispute Defendant’s
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motion as it relates to [these claims].” (Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. for Summ.
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J. (“Opp’n”) 9:24-26.)
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DISCUSSION
A. Breach of Contract, Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith
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and Fair Dealing, and IIED Claims
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“Section 301 preempts state law claims which are founded on
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rights created by a [CBA], or which are ‘substantially dependent on
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analysis of a collective bargaining agreement.’” Cramer v. Consol.
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Freightways,
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Plaintiff’s
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covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and IIED claims arise from the
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CBA, since the undisputed facts and Plaintiff’s complaint show that
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Plaintiff’s final discharge is alleged to result from Plaintiff’s
Inc.,
breach
209
of
F.3d
1122,
employment
1129
(9th
contract,
2
Cir.
breach
of
2000).
the
Here,
implied
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misconduct involving how he recorded the time he worked. Since it is
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undisputed that “[r]esolution of [Plaintiff’s] claims . . . necessarily
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entails examination and interpretation of the [CBA] . . .”, these claims
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are preempted and governed by the CBA. Stallcop v. Kaiser Found. Hosps.,
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820 F.2d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1987).
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However, as the Ninth Circuit has explained, Plaintiff’s
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preempted state claims are supplanted with a “federal claim” under §
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301. See Bloom v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 1553, 1561
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(9th Cir. 1990) (recharacterizing plaintiff’s preempted state law claims
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as a single claim under § 301), aff’d, 933 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1991).
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Defendant argues it should be granted summary judgment on this § 301
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claim, since Plaintiff failed to exhaust the applicable grievance
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procedure
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established that “[a]n employee seeking a remedy for an alleged breach
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of [a CBA] . . . must attempt to exhaust any exclusive grievance and
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arbitration procedures before he may maintain a suit against his . . .
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employer.” O’Sullivan v. Longview Fibre Co., 993 F. Supp. 743, 747 (N.D.
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Cal. 1997) (quoting Clayton v. Int’l Union, United Auto, Aerospace &
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Agric. Implement Workers of Am., 451 U.S. 679, 681 (1981)).
in
the
CBA.
(Mot.
17:9-25,
19:16-20:24.)
It
is
well-
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Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff failed to exhaust
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applicable remedies under the CBA before bringing this suit. (Pl.’s
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Resp. to Def.’s SUF ¶¶ 63-64.) Therefore, summary judgment is entered in
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favor of Defendant on Plaintiff’s § 301 claim.
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B.
Wrongful Termination for Whistle-Blowing Claim and 28 U.S.C.
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§ 1367(c) Dismissal
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Defendant also argues it is entitled to summary judgment on
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Plaintiff’s remaining wrongful termination for whistle-blowing claim.
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However, the merits of this portion of the motion will not be decided,
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since the Court will not continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction
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over this state claim. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court
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“may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a [state] claim”
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if “all claims over which it has original jurisdiction” have been
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dismissed. The “discretion [whether] to decline to exercise supplemental
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jurisdiction over state law claims is triggered by the presence of one
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of the conditions in § 1367(c), [and] is informed by the . . . values of
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economy, convenience, fairness and comity” as delineated by the Supreme
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Court in United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726
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(1966). Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1997)
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(en banc).
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Judicial
economy
does
not
favor
continuing
to
exercise
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supplemental jurisdiction since time has not been invested analyzing
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Plaintiff’s remaining state claim. See Otto v. Heckler, 802 F.2d 337,
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338
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discretion to determine whether its investment of judicial energy
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justifies retention of jurisdiction or if it should more properly
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dismiss the claims without prejudice.”) (citation omitted). Nor do the
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comity and fairness factors weigh in favor of exercising supplemental
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jurisdiction since “[n]eedless decisions of state law should be avoided
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both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties,
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by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.” Gibbs,
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383
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remanded to the Superior Court of California in the County of San
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Joaquin, from which this case was removed.
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IV. CONCLUSION
(9th
U.S.
Cir.
at
1986)
726.
(“[T]he
Therefore,
district
court,
Plaintiff’s
of
remaining
course,
state
has
claim
the
is
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For the reasons stated above, summary judgment is granted in
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Defendant’s favor on Plaintiff’s wrongful termination in violation of
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public policy (age, race, and national origin) claim, and on Plaintiff’s
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CBA claim. Therefore, judgment shall be entered in favor of defendant on
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these claims. Further, Plaintiff’s remaining wrongful termination for
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whistle-blowing
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California in the County of San Joaquin.
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Dated:
state
claim
is
remanded
to
the
Superior
November 10, 2011
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GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.
United States District Judge
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Court
of
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