-KJN (HC) Bousamra v. Swarthout, No. 2:2010cv01718 - Document 16 (E.D. Cal. 2011)
Court Description: FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge Kendall J. Newman on 2/14/11 RECOMMENDING that 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied. Referred to Judge Kimberly J. Mueller; Objections to F&R due within 21 days. (Dillon, M)
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-KJN (HC) Bousamra v. Swarthout Doc. 16 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 GARY RUSSELL BOUSAMRA, 11 Petitioner, 12 13 vs. GARY SWARTHOUT, Warden, 14 Respondent. 15 16 No. 2:10-cv-1718 KJM KJN P FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS / I. Introduction 17 Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel with an application for a 18 writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner claims that the California Board 19 of Parole Hearings (hereafter the Board) applied Marsy’s Law in violation of the Ex Post Facto 20 Clause. In his next two claims, petitioner alleges that his federal constitutional right to due 21 process was violated by a 2009 decision of the Board to deny him a parole date. After review of 22 the record, this court finds the petition should be denied. 23 II. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 24 Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in 25 state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: 26 //// 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 2 3 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 4 5 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 6 Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly 7 established United States Supreme Court precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the 8 governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially 9 indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a different 10 result. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 11 (2000)). 12 Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal 13 habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle 14 from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the 15 prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ 16 simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court 17 decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that 18 application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 19 (2003) (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent review of the legal 20 question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”) (internal citations 21 omitted). 22 The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state 23 court judgment. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). Where the state 24 court reaches a decision on the merits, but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a 25 federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief 26 is available under section 2254(d). Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); 2 1 Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Independent review of the record is not 2 de novo review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can 3 determine whether a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable.”); accord Pirtle v. 4 Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). When it is clear that a state court has not reached 5 the merits of a petitioner’s claim, or has denied the claim on procedural grounds, the AEDPA’s 6 deferential standard does not apply and a federal habeas court must review the claim de novo. 7 Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003); Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167. 8 III. Petitioner’s Claims 9 A. Marsy’s Law 10 Petitioner contends that the Board’s application of “Marsy’s Law” (adopted by 11 the voters pursuant to Proposition 9, the “Victims’ Bill of Rights Act of 2008: Marsy’s Law”) to 12 delay for three years his next parole hearing, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United 13 States Constitution. Under the statute as it existed prior to the enactment of “Marsy’s Law,” 14 indeterminately-sentenced inmates, like petitioner,1 were denied parole for one year unless the 15 Board found, with stated reasons, that it was unreasonable to expect that parole could be granted 16 the following year, in which case the subsequent hearing could be extended up to five years. Cal. 17 Penal Code § 3041.5(b)(2) (2008). However, at his 2009 parole hearing, petitioner was subject 18 to the terms of the amended statute, which authorizes denial of a subsequent parole hearing for a 19 period up to fifteen years. Cal. Pen. Code, § 3041.5(b)(3) (2010). The shortest interval that the 20 Board may set is three years, applied to petitioner herein (Dkt. No. 1 at 10), based on a finding 21 that the prisoner “does not require a more lengthy period of incarceration . . . than seven 22 additional years,” Cal. Pen. Code, § 3041.5(b)(3)(C). 23 24 Petitioner asserts that application of the extended deferral period violates the Ex Post Facto Clause because it increases the risk that petitioner will suffer longer punishment than 25 1 26 Petitioner is serving an indeterminate sentence of 15-years-to-life with the possibility of parole, based on a 1986 conviction for second degree murder. 3 1 he would have received under the prior statute, because it changed the presumption that a person 2 sentenced to an indeterminate sentence would be considered for parole annually. (Dkt. No. 1 at 3 25.) 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 On February 23, 2010, the Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District of California, issued the last reasoned opinion addressing this claim: Bousamra is serving a life sentence. There is no evidence that he necessarily would have been released earlier had he been afforded a hearing in one or two years, rather than three. It is conceivable that the Board could conclude after three years that Bousamra still is not suitable for parole. Nevertheless, if Bousamra feels that he has developed sufficient insight and appropriate parole and relapse prevention plans before the expiration of the three-year period leading up to his next parole hearing, the newly amended Penal Code section 3041.5, subdivision (b)(4) affords the Board discretion to entertain an earlier hearing. 11 12 13 (Dkt. No. 1 at 43.) The Constitution provides that “No State shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto 14 Law.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 10. A law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause if it: (1) punishes as 15 criminal an act that was not criminal when it was committed; (2) makes a crime’s punishment 16 greater than when the crime was committed; or (3) deprives a person of a defense available at the 17 time the crime was committed. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 52 (1990). The Ex Post 18 Facto Clause is also violated if: (1) state regulations have been applied retroactively to a 19 defendant; and (2) the new regulations have created a “sufficient risk” of increasing the 20 punishment attached to the defendant's crimes. Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 854 (9th Cir. 21 2003). Not every law that disadvantages a defendant is a prohibited ex post facto law. In order 22 to violate the Clause, the law must essentially alter “the definition of criminal conduct” or 23 increase the “punishment for the crime.” Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441-42 (1997); Souch 24 v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 620 (9th Cir. 2002). 25 26 California Penal Code section 3041.5 has been amended several times since the date of petitioner’s conviction to allow for longer periods of time between parole suitability 4 1 hearings. Ex post facto challenges to those amendments have all been rejected. See e.g. 2 California Dep’t of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 509 (1995) (1981 amendment to 3 Section 3041.5, which increased maximum deferral period of parole suitability hearings to five 4 years did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because it simply altered the method of setting a 5 parole release date and did not create a meaningful “risk of increasing the measure of punishment 6 attached to the covered crimes”); Watson v. Estelle, 886 F.2d 1093, 1097-98 (9th Cir. 1989) (not 7 a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause to apply Section 3041.5(b)(2)(A) to prisoners sentenced 8 to life imprisonment prior to the 1977 implementation of California’s Determinate Sentence 9 Law); Clifton v. Attorney General Of the State of California, 997 F.2d 660, 662 n.1 (9th Cir. 10 1993) (same); see also Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 249 (2000) (upholding Georgia’s change 11 in the frequency of parole hearings for prisoners serving life sentences, from three to eight years). 12 Recently the Ninth Circuit overturned a district court decision granting 13 preliminary injunctive relief to plaintiffs in a class action seeking to prevent the Board from 14 enforcing the amended deferral periods established by Marsy’s Law. Gilman v. Schwarzenegger, 15 ___F.3d___, 2011 WL 198435 (9th Cir., Jan. 24, 2011). The court found it unlikely that 16 plaintiffs would succeed on the merits of their underlying challenge premised on the Ex Post 17 Facto Clause. The court initially compared and contrasted Marsy’s Law with existing Supreme 18 Court precedent: 19 Here, as in Morales and Garner, Proposition 9 did not increase the statutory punishment for any particular offense, did not change the date of inmates’ initial parole hearings, and did not change the standard by which the Board determined whether inmates were suitable for parole. However, the changes to the frequency of parole hearings here are more extensive than the change in either Morales or Garner. First, Proposition 9 increased the maximum deferral period from five years to fifteen years. This change is similar to the change in Morales (i.e., tripled from one year to three years) and the change in Garner (i.e., from three years to eight years). Second, Proposition 9 increased the minimum deferral period from one year to three years. Third, Proposition 9 changed the default deferral period from one year to fifteen years. Fourth, Proposition 9 altered the burden to impose a deferral period other than the default period. . . . Neither Morales nor Garner involved a change to the minimum deferral 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 //// 5 1 period, the default deferral period, or the burden to impose a deferral period other than the default period. 2 3 Gilman, 2011 WL 198435, at * 5. The Ninth Circuit found these distinctions insignificant due to 4 the availability of advance parole hearings at the Board’s discretion (sua sponte or upon the 5 request of a prisoner, the denial of which is subject to judicial review), reasoning that, “as in 6 Morales, an advance hearing by the Board ‘would remove any possibility of harm’ to prisoners 7 because they would not be required to wait a minimum of three years for a hearing.” Id. at *6, 8 quoting Morales, 514 U.S. at 513. The court concluded that plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate a 9 significant risk that their incarceration would be prolonged by application of Marsy’s Law, and 10 thus found that plaintiffs had not established a likelihood of success on the merits of their ex post 11 facto claim. 12 In addition to these preliminary conclusions by the Ninth Circuit that Marsy’s 13 Law does not appear to violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, at least one district court has dismissed 14 a petitioner’s challenge to the law on the ground that it improperly duplicates the class action 15 claim still pending on the merits in Gilman. See e.g. Bryant v. Haviland, 2011 WL 23064, *2- 16 5,15 (E.D. Cal., Jan. 4, 2011). That court noted that petitioner therein, as here, appears to be a 17 member of the Gilman class “of prisoners convicted of murder and serving a sentence of life with 18 the possibility of parole with at least one parole denial . . . challeng[ing] the state procedures 19 denying class members parole as well as their deferred parole suitability hearings following a 20 finding of parole unsuitability.” Id. at *5. Relying on established precedent precluding a 21 member of a class action from seeking, in an individual action, equitable relief that is also sought 22 by the class, see e.g. Crawford v. Bell, 599 F.2d 8990, 892-93 (9th Cir. 1979), the court 23 dismissed petitioner’s claim. 24 In light of these cases, the state court’s rejection of petitioner’s first claim for 25 relief was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, controlling principles of United 26 //// 6 1 States Supreme Court precedent. Therefore, petitioner is not entitled to relief in this action on 2 his ex post facto claim. 3 B. Due Process 4 In his next two claims, petitioner contends that the Board’s 2009 decision was not 5 supported by relevant, reliable evidence, or a rational nexus that he currently poses an 6 unreasonable risk of danger, and that the decision was arbitrary and capricious. All of these 7 arguments constitute a single claim that petitioner’s federal constitutional right to due process 8 was violated by a 2009 decision of the Board to deny him a parole date. 9 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state action that 10 deprives a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. A litigant alleging a 11 due process violation must first demonstrate that he was deprived of a liberty or property interest 12 protected by the Due Process Clause and then show that the procedures attendant upon the 13 deprivation were not constitutionally sufficient. Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 14 490 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1989). 15 A protected liberty interest may arise from either the Due Process Clause of the 16 United States Constitution “by reason of guarantees implicit in the word ‘liberty,’” or from “an 17 expectation or interest created by state laws or policies.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 18 221 (2005) (citations omitted). The United States Constitution does not, of its own force, create 19 a protected liberty interest in a parole date, even one that has been set. Jago v. Van Curen, 20 454 U.S. 14, 17-21 (1981); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) (There is 21 “no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the 22 expiration of a valid sentence.”). However, “a state’s statutory scheme, if it uses mandatory 23 language, ‘creates a presumption that parole release will be granted’ when or unless certain 24 designated findings are made, and thereby gives rise to a constitutional liberty interest.” 25 Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12; see also Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 376-78 (1987) (a 26 //// 7 1 state’s use of mandatory language (“shall”) creates a presumption that parole release will be 2 granted when the designated findings are made.). 3 California’s parole statutes give rise to a liberty interest in parole protected by the 4 federal due process clause. Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. ___ (2011), No. 10-333, 2011 WL 5 197627, at *2 (Jan. 24, 2011). In California, a prisoner is entitled to release on parole unless 6 there is “some evidence” of his or her current dangerousness. In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th 1181, 7 1205-06, 1210 (2008); In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal.4th 616, 651-53 (2002). However, in 8 Swarthout the United States Supreme Court held that “[n]o opinion of [theirs] supports 9 converting California’s ‘some evidence’ rule into a substantive federal requirement.” Swarthout, 10 2011 WL 197627, at *3. In other words, the Court specifically rejected the notion that there can 11 be a valid claim under the Fourteenth Amendment for insufficiency of evidence presented at a 12 parole proceeding. Id. at *3. Rather, the protection afforded by the federal due process clause to 13 California parole decisions consists solely of the “minimal” procedural requirements set forth in 14 Greenholtz, specifically “an opportunity to be heard and . . . a statement of the reasons why 15 parole was denied.” Swarthout, at *2-3. 16 Here, the record reflects that petitioner was present at the 2009 parole hearing, 17 that he participated in the hearing, and that he was provided with the reasons for the Board’s 18 decision to deny parole. (Dkt. No. 10-1 at 76-126.) According to the United States Supreme 19 Court, the federal due process clause requires no more. Accordingly, this claim should be 20 denied. 21 IV. Conclusion 22 23 For all of the above reasons, the undersigned recommends that petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied. 24 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner's application for a 25 writ of habeas corpus be denied. 26 //// 8 1 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 2 Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty- 3 one days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 4 objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 5 “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” If petitioner files 6 objections, he shall also address whether a certificate of appealability should issue and, if so, why 7 and as to which issues. A certificate of appealability may issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 “only if 8 the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. 9 § 2253(c)(3). Any response to the objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after 10 service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 11 specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 12 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 13 DATED: February 14, 2011 14 15 _____________________________________ KENDALL J. NEWMAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 16 17 bous1718.157 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 9
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