Booker v JP Morgan Chase, et al.,
Filing
20
MEMORANDUM and ORDER signed by Judge Frank C. Damrell, Jr. on 3/29/2010. Plaintiff's 1 Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice and this action is TERMINATED. (Marciel, M)
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MELVIN BOOKER and SARA MIKO BOOKER, Plaintiffs, v. JPMORGAN CHASE; WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK; QUALITY LOAN SERVICE CORPORATION; MIDAMERICAN AXCESS CORPORATION; RAYMOND ARTHUR NICHOLS; and GEORGE W. TRAPP, Defendants. ____________________________/ ----oo0oo---This matter is before the court on the motion of defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., to dismiss plaintiffs Melvin R. Booker and Sara Miko Booker's ("plaintiffs") complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") 12(b)(6). On March 23, Civ. No. S-09-3541 FCD/KJN MEMORANDUM AND ORDER UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA ----oo0oo----
2010, plaintiffs filed a statement of non-opposition, requesting that their claims for violations of the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA") and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA") 1
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be dismissed without prejudice against all defendants. 19.)
(Docket #
Accordingly, plaintiffs' TILA and RESPA claims are See, e.g. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 41(a); Swedberg v.
dismissed.
Marotzke, 339 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2003) (defendant's filing of a motion to dismiss, pursuant to FRCP 12(b), does not prevent the plaintiff from later filing a voluntary dismissal). Dismissal of the TILA and RESPA claims leaves the complaint devoid of any federal claims. The remaining claims are state law
claims for negligence, violation of the California Rosenthal Act, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, violation of California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq., breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and wrongful foreclosure. (Pls.' Compl. ("Compl.").)
Subject to the conditions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. See Acri v. Varian Associates, Inc., 114 The court's decision
F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997)(en banc).
whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction should be informed by values of "economy, convenience, fairness, and comity." at 1001 (citations omitted). Id.
Further, primary responsibility for
developing and applying state law rests with the state courts. Therefore, when federal claims are eliminated before trial, district courts should usually decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343,
350 (1988); Gini v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept., 40 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[I]n the usual case in which federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise 2
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jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.")(quoting Schneider v. TRW Inc., 938 F.2d 986, 993 (9th Cir. 1991)). accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' remaining state law claims. Accordingly, plaintiffs' complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: March 29, 2010 In
FRANK C. DAMRELL, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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