(PS) Garber v. Mericle et al, No. 2:2009cv03168 - Document 15 (E.D. Cal. 2010)
Court Description: FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge Craig M. Kellison on 6/22/10 RECOMMENDING that this case proceed against defendant Dickinson only on Plaintiffs claim of deliberate indifference to his medical condition; and all other defendants and claims be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Referred to Judge Morrison C. England, Jr.; Objections to F&R due within 14 days.(Dillon, M)
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(PS) Garber v. Mericle et al Doc. 15 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BART A. GARBER, 12 13 No. CIV S-09-3168-MCE-CMK Plaintiff, vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 DALE T MERICLE, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 19 / Plaintiff, a former state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1). The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). The court is also required to screen complaints brought by litigants who have been 22 granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The court must dismiss 23 a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon 24 which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 25 such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 require that complaints contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply, 2 concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to 3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice 4 of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 5 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity 6 overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail 7 to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the court to conduct the screening 8 required by law when the allegations are vague and conclusory.1 9 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 10 Plaintiff alleges general systemic defects in the medical treatment he received 11 while incarcerated. While he names numerous defendants, he fails to allege specific facts 12 relating to most of the named defendants. What is clear from his complaint is that after 13 numerous delays, apparently due to several transfers between different facilities, Plaintiff had 14 surgery on his leg. Following the surgery, defendant Dickenson failed to follow physician 15 instructions regarding changing the dressing causing damage to Plaintiff’s new skin graft. He 16 also makes several general and vague allegations about being denied medical treatment and pain 17 medication. 18 II. DISCUSSION 19 As stated above, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires a complaint contain a 20 short and plain statement of Plaintiff’s claim. Here, Plaintiff’s complaint refers to attached 21 documents which purportedly support the allegations against the defendants. This pleading 22 method does not, however, satisfy the requirement of Rule 8(a) that claims must be stated 23 simply, concisely, and directly. To the contrary, Plaintiff’s complaint would require the court to 24 1 25 26 The undersigned originally issued a screening order on May 7, 2010. Plaintiff was provided an opportunity to file an amended complaint to cure the defects identified herein. As Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint within the time provided, the undersigned now issues these findings and recommendations which are essentially the same as the prior screening order. 2 1 comb through his exhibits to find factual support for his vague allegations. The court is 2 unwilling to do this in part due to limited judicial resources but also because it is for Plaintiff – 3 not the court – to formulate his claims 4 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual 5 connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. 6 See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 7 (1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the 8 meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or 9 omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which 10 complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and 11 conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations 12 are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the 13 plaintiff must set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged 14 constitutional deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). 15 The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the 16 prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel 17 and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 18 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts 19 of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 20 (1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v. 21 Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with 22 “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 23 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only 24 when two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious 25 such that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2) 26 subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of 3 1 inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison 2 official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id. 3 Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury, or risks of serious 4 injury or illness, gives rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 5 105; see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as dental and mental 6 health needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). An injury or illness is 7 sufficiently serious if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant 8 injury or the “. . . unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 9 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994). 10 Factors indicating seriousness are: (1) whether a reasonable doctor would think that the condition 11 is worthy of comment; (2) whether the condition significantly impacts the prisoner’s daily 12 activities; and (3) whether the condition is chronic and accompanied by substantial pain. See 13 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 14 The requirement of deliberate indifference is less stringent in medical needs cases 15 than in other Eighth Amendment contexts because the responsibility to provide inmates with 16 medical care does not generally conflict with competing penological concerns. See McGuckin, 17 974 F.2d at 1060. Thus, deference need not be given to the judgment of prison officials as to 18 decisions concerning medical needs. See Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir. 19 1989). The complete denial of medical attention may constitute deliberate indifference. See 20 Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986). Delay in providing medical 21 treatment, or interference with medical treatment, may also constitute deliberate indifference. 22 See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. Where delay is alleged, however, the prisoner must also 23 demonstrate that the delay led to further injury. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. 24 Negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not, however, give 25 rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Moreover, a 26 difference of opinion between the prisoner and medical providers concerning the appropriate 4 1 course of treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. See Jackson v. McIntosh, 2 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996). 3 Here, at best, Plaintiff’s states a claim against defendant Dickenson for deliberate 4 indifference to his medical condition. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Dickenson failed to comply 5 with physician orders in changing the dressing on his wound, which caused further injury to his 6 skin graft.2 Plaintiff also refers to several appointments he had with numerous medical providers 7 over the years, some of whom apparently provided adequate treatment and others who failed to 8 do what Plaintiff was requesting. Either way, Plaintiff’s vague allegations are insufficient to 9 state a claim. Differing opinions are not enough to violate a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment 10 rights. 11 Plaintiff also names numerous individuals as defendants, but fails to make any 12 allegations against them. As stated above, Plaintiff must set forth specific factual allegations as 13 to how each named defendant violated his constitutional rights. He fails to do so. In addition, he 14 names several supervisory defendants, including wardens and the Chief Medical Officers of 15 several prisons. However, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the 16 actions of their employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that 17 there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only liable for the 18 constitutional violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the 19 violations. See id. The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a supervisory defendant can 20 be liable based on knowledge and acquiescence in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct 21 because government officials, regardless of their title, can only be held liable under § 1983 for 22 his or her own conduct and not the conduct of others. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 23 1949 (2009). When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such 24 defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. 25 26 2 Service has been authorized on defendant Dickenson by separate order. 5 1 Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 2 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel 3 in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th 4 Cir. 1982). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the 5 official’s own individual actions, has violated the constitution.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948. 6 Accordingly, simply naming the supervisors as defendants, without more, is insufficient. 7 8 9 III. CONCLUSION Based on the above, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff’s complaint is sufficient to state a claim against defendant Dickenson only. Plaintiff was previously informed 10 of the defects in his complaint as set forth above. He was provided an opportunity to file an 11 amended complaint to cure the defects, but he has not availed himself of that opportunity. 12 Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that: 13 1. 14 This case proceed against defendant Dickinson only on Plaintiff’s claim of deliberate indifference to his medical condition; and 15 2. All other defendants and claims be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 16 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 17 Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days 18 after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 19 objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of 20 objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. 21 See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 22 23 24 25 DATED: June 22, 2010 ______________________________________ CRAIG M. KELLISON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 26 6
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