-EFB (PS) Douglas v. Sacramento County et al, No. 2:2009cv01038 - Document 61 (E.D. Cal. 2011)
Court Description: FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS, recommending that defendants' 40 be granted; plaintiff's 44 47 Motions to disregard evidence and defendants' documents be denied; defendants' 50 51 Motion to Strike evidence and documents su bmitted by plaintiff be denied; and Clerk be directed to enter Judgment for defendants and close this case, signed by Magistrate Judge Edmund F. Brennan on 2/9/2011. Within 14 days after being served with F/Rs, any party may file written Objections with Court and serve a copy on all parties. (Marciel, M)
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-EFB (PS) Douglas v. Sacramento County et al Doc. 61 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 IRWIN DOUGLAS, Plaintiff, 11 No. CIV 09-1038 KJM EFB PS vs. 12 13 SACRAMENTO COUNTY, et al., 14 Defendants. ___________________________/ FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 15 This case is before the undersigned pursuant to Eastern District of California Local Rule 16 17 302(c)(21). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Presently pending for decision is defendants’ motion for 18 summary judgment. Dckt. Nos. 40, 42. For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned will 19 recommend that the motion be granted. 20 I. 21 BACKGROUND Plaintiff initiated this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on April 17, 2009 22 against Sacramento County, Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department, Sacramento County 23 Sheriff’s Deputy Robert Falk, and Sacramento County Sheriff’s Deputy Robert Williams. 24 Compl., Dckt. No. 1. His complaint states that on April 28, 2008, the defendants violated his 25 civil rights because “[he] was arrested (kidnapped) by Deputies Falk and Williams [w]ithout a 26 warrant, and no evidence of any crime.” Id. at 1. Plaintiff contends that “[t]here was no warrant 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 ever issued for [his] arrest.” Id. The complaint further alleges: “What was the point of my 2 arrest? Malice, amusement, to embarrass me, discrimination, (national origin, race), defame my 3 character (an arrest record makes it very hard to survive and take care of my family). Those 4 actions violated my civil rights, and the Defend[a]nts should be held responsible.” Id. at 2. 5 Defendants filed an answer on July 10, 2009, Dckt. No. 10, and now seek summary 6 judgment on all of plaintiff’s claims. Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“Defs.’ MSJ”), Dckt. No. 42, at 7 2. Plaintiff opposes the motion, Dckt. Nos. 43-46, and moves the court to disregard certain 8 documents and evidence submitted by defendants in support of their summary judgment motion, 9 Dckt. Nos. 44 and 47. Defendants also object and move to strike certain evidence submitted by 10 plaintiff in opposition to their summary judgment motion. Dckt. No. 50-1. 11 II. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 12 Defendants assert that the gravamen of plaintiff’s complaint “is that he was arrested 13 without a warrant, ostensibly asserting a claim for relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. [§] 1983 for 14 violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Defs.’ MSJ at 2. However, defendants contend that the 15 undisputed evidence shows that plaintiff was taken into custody pursuant to a valid arrest 16 warrant and that defendants were entitled to rely on the warrant in effecting the arrest. Id. Thus, 17 defendants contend that plaintiff cannot establish any claims for relief as a matter of law.1 Id. Plaintiff opposes the motion for summary judgment, arguing that “[t]here was no warrant, 18 19 outstanding or other, for [his] arrest on the day [he] was kidnapped by Deputies Falk and 20 //// 21 22 23 24 25 26 1 Defendants also contend that (1) the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department is not a separate legal entity and is redundant to the County of Sacramento, and therefore should be dismissed; (2) Deputy Williams did not arrest plaintiff and therefore cannot be liable on plaintiff’s Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment claim; (3) Deputies Falk and Williams are entitled to qualified immunity; and (4) plaintiff cannot establish liability against the County of Sacramento because plaintiff has not alleged any unconstitutional policy, custom, or practice by the County, as required by Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). However, as explained below, because defendants are entitled to summary judgment on alternative grounds, these arguments need not be addressed. 2 1 Williams.” Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Resp.”), Dckt. No. 43, at 2.2 Plaintiff 2 contends that the “warrant” defendants submitted as evidence in support of their summary 3 judgment motion is a “fabricated copy” and that defendants “cannot produce an/the original.” 4 Id. at 7.3 Plaintiff argues that “a copy of any ‘warrant’ is not a valid/legal document” because 5 “[c]opies can be produced at any time” and a copy is “not valid without the carbon-date tested 6 original.” Id. 7 A. 8 Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists “no genuine 9 10 Summary Judgment Standard issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. 11 12 13 14 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). 15 Summary judgment avoids unnecessary trials in cases with no genuinely disputed 16 material facts. See N.W. Motorcycle Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 17 1994). At issue is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require 18 submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” 19 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). Thus, Rule 56 serves to screen 20 21 2 22 23 24 25 26 Defendants object to and move to strike this portion of plaintiff’s response to their summary judgment motion on the ground that “it is conclusory and lacks foundation.” Dckt. No. 50-1 at 2. That objection is overruled. Defendants also object to various other evidence and documents submitted by plaintiff in opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment. See Dckt. No. 50-1 at 2-9. To the extent that those objections and/or motions to strike are not specifically addressed herein, the objections and motions to strike are denied as unnecessary. 3 Defendants object to and move to strike this portion of plaintiff’s response on the grounds that “it is an improper objection to evidence submitted by Defendants.” Dckt. No. 50-1 at 3. That objection is overruled. 3 1 the latter cases from those which actually require resolution of genuine disputes over material 2 facts; e.g., issues that can only be determined through presentation of testimony at trial such as 3 the credibility of conflicting testimony over facts that make a difference in the outcome. 4 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 5 If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the opposing party must establish that 6 a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 7 Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). To overcome summary judgment, the opposing 8 party must demonstrate a factual dispute that is both material, i.e. it affects the outcome of the 9 claim under the governing law, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. 10 Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and genuine, i.e., the evidence is 11 such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Wool v. Tandem 12 Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987). In attempting to establish the existence 13 of a factual dispute that is genuine, the opposing party may not rely upon the allegations or 14 denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of 15 affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute 16 exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. 17 In resolving a summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions, 18 answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Fed. R. 19 Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 20 255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be 21 drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Nevertheless, inferences 22 are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual 23 predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. 24 Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to 25 demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is 26 some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken as a whole could 4 1 not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for 2 trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted). Facts4 3 B. 4 Based on the pleadings and evidence on file in this action, the court finds the following 5 facts to be undisputed: 6 7 1. The Warrant In March 1996, a Payless Drug Store in Sacramento County was burglarized. Pl.’s Resp., 8 Ex. 1 at 7; see also Defs.’ Stmt. of Undisp. Facts (“SUF”), Dckt. No. 42-1, ¶ 1.5 In its 9 investigation of the burglary, the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department recovered several 10 fingerprints from the door and broken windows of the drug store. Pl.’s Resp., Ex. 1 at 10. A 11 Sacramento County Crime Scene Investigator determined that one of the recovered fingerprints 12 was made by plaintiff’s left thumb. Id. at 9. 13 Based on the presence and location of the plaintiff’s fingerprint, the Sacramento County 14 Sheriff’s Department requested a warrant for plaintiff’s arrest for second-degree burglary. Id. at 15 5, 16. In October 1996, an arrest warrant was obtained and activated for “Erwin Douglas.” SUF 16 ¶ 1; Defs.’ MSJ, Exs. F, I. The arrest warrant included various identifying information regarding 17 Mr. Douglas, including a date of birth, sex, race, height, weight, hair color, eye color, social 18 security number, and driver’s license number. SUF ¶ 2. The warrant remained active when 19 plaintiff was arrested on April 28, 2008. SUF ¶¶ 3, 4. 5.6 Plaintiff was aware as early as 20 4 21 22 23 Plaintiff neither admitted or denied the facts set forth by defendants as undisputed as required by Local Rule 260(b). Because plaintiff neither submitted his own statement of disputed facts nor addressed defendants’ statement of undisputed facts, the court accepts defendants’ version of the facts except where contradicted by plaintiff’s complaint or by the documents and evidence plaintiff submitted in opposition to the summary judgment motion. 5 24 25 26 Unless otherwise stated, all citations to the Statement of Undisputed Facts herein incorporate by reference the evidence cited in the SUF in support of each undisputed fact. 6 Plaintiff objects to the declaration of Michael Ziegler, which is cited in support of this SUF, on the grounds that Mr. Ziegler’s testimony is “unsubstantiated and unsupported, fabricated, hearsay, nonsense.” See Dckt. No. 47 at 1. Plaintiff also objects to the “arrest report 5 1 September 2004 that he was “wanted for burglary” in California. Pl.’s Resp. at 5.7 2 2. Plaintiff’s Arrest 3 On April 28, 2008, Deputy Falk was on duty at the William R. Ridgeway Family 4 Relations Courthouse in Sacramento County. SUF ¶ 6. Prior to the start of court, Deputy Falk 5 searched the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department’s Wants and Warrants computer system 6 for the names of those individuals scheduled to appear before the court. SUF ¶ 7. It is the 7 custom and practice of the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department for deputy sheriffs assigned 8 to courtrooms to do so. SUF ¶ 17. 9 Plaintiff was scheduled to attend a hearing in the court on that day. Compl. at 1. When 10 Deputy Falk searched for plaintiff’s name, the computer system indicated that there was an 11 active warrant for plaintiff’s arrest. SUF ¶ 8. It is the custom and practice of the Sacramento 12 County Sheriff’s Department to arrest an individual when the Wants and Warrants computer 13 system indicates there is an active warrant for that person’s arrest. SUF ¶ 18. 14 When plaintiff appeared in court, Deputy Falk compared the name, date of birth, and 15 social security number that plaintiff provided with the identifying information listed in the 16 warrant. SUF ¶¶ 9, 10. He also observed that plaintiff’s height, weight, and race matched those 17 listed in the warrant. SUF ¶ 10. Upon determining that plaintiff was the person described in the 18 warrant, Deputy Falk arrested him. SUF ¶¶ 11, 12. Plaintiff’s date of birth, social security 19 number, race, and gender are the same as on the warrant, and plaintiff admits he formerly 20 resided at the address reflected on the warrant. SUF ¶¶ 15, 16. 21 22 23 24 25 26 and declaration of probable cause by John Anderson” and the declarations of Falk and Williams. Id.; see also Dckt. No. 44 at 5. The objections are without merit and are overruled. 7 In September of 2004, Plaintiff was informed by the Miami Beach Police Department that he was wanted for burglary in California. Pl.’s Resp. at 5. Also, in 2007, plaintiff attempted to purchase a firearm but was denied because a background check revealed that he was wanted in California for burglary. Id. Defendants object to and move to strike this portion of plaintiff’s response on the grounds that “it is irrelevant and immaterial” and “lacks foundation.” Dckt. No. 50-1 at 3. Those objections are overruled. 6 1 As is the practice and custom of the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department, Deputy 2 Williams then transported plaintiff to booking. SUF ¶¶ 13, 19. After booking, plaintiff received 3 an “Inmate Booking Information Receipt.” Pl.’s Resp., Ex. 1 at 1. Although this booking 4 receipt indicated that plaintiff did not have any outstanding warrants as of that time, see id., after 5 a person is arrested pursuant to a warrant, the warrant is cleared, meaning the warrant no longer 6 appears as active. Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Decl. of Michael Ziegler in Supp. Thereof, Dckt. 42 7 at 68, ¶ 7. 8 Plaintiff posted bail that same day and was released. Compl. at 2. 9 C. Analysis 1. 10 11 Unlawful Arrest To prevail on a § 1983 claim for unlawful arrest, a plaintiff must demonstrate that there 12 was no probable cause for his arrest. Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 139 F.3d 374, 380 13 (1998). To determine whether an officer had probable cause at the time of the arrest, a court 14 considers whether at the moment of the arrest, the facts and circumstances within the officer’s 15 knowledge were sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the individual arrested 16 had committed an offense. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). An officer may rely on a 17 judge’s probable cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant so long as 18 the officer’s reliance is objectively reasonable. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-819 19 (1982). 20 Plaintiff’s primary allegation appears to be that he was falsely arrested as “there was no 21 warrant ever issued for [his] arrest.” Compl. at 1. Defendants disagree, arguing that a valid 22 warrant existed for plaintiff’s arrest. Defendants have provided the Court with a certified copy 23 of the warrant for plaintiff’s arrest. Defs.’ Ex. I. Although plaintiff contends that the warrant is 24 inadmissible since it is a copy and not the original, the certified copy of the warrant that 25 defendants have submitted, which is accompanied by a signed letter from a Deputy Clerk of the 26 Sacramento County Superior Court certifying that the annexed warrant “is a correct copy of the 7 1 original on file,” is both self-authenticating and admissible in accordance with Federal Rules of 2 Evidence 901 and 902. Fed. R. Evid. 901(b) (“[T]he following are examples of authentication or 3 identification conforming with the requirements of this rule: . . . (7) Public records or reports. 4 Evidence that a writing authorized by law to be recorded or filed and in fact recorded or filed in 5 a public office, or a purported public record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, 6 is from the public office where items of this nature are kept.”); Fed. R. Evid. 902(b) (“Extrinsic 7 evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility is not required with respect to 8 the following: (1) Domestic public documents under seal. A document bearing a seal purporting 9 to be that of the United States, or of any State, . . . or of a political subdivision, department, 10 officer, or agency thereof, and a signature purporting to be an attestation or execution. . . . (4) 11 Certified copies of public records. A copy of an official record or report or entry therein, or of a 12 document authorized by law to be recorded or filed and actually recorded or filed in a public 13 office, . . . certified as correct by the custodian or other person authorized to make the 14 certification . . . .”). The undisputed facts also establish that the warrant was in existence at the 15 time that plaintiff appeared in court on April 28, 2008. SUF ¶ 5. 16 Although plaintiff contends that the warrant is “fabricated,” he has presented no 17 evidence in support of that position. He only offers argument and speculation that the warrant 18 must be a fabrication or somehow invalid. Plaintiff’s sole piece of evidence is an “Inmate 19 Booking Information Receipt” that he received after he was booked into the Sacramento County 20 Jail on April 28, 2008, which stated, “OUTSTANDING WARRANTS: NONE.” Pl.’s Resp., Ex. 21 1 at 1. Plaintiff argues that this proves that there was never a warrant issued for his arrest. 22 However, the undisputed evidence shows that there was an active warrant for plaintiff’s arrest on 23 the date that plaintiff was arrested but that the warrant was cleared, or deemed inactive, after 24 plaintiff was arrested pursuant to that warrant, thereby explaining why the Inmate Booking 25 Information Receipt noted that plaintiff had no outstanding warrants. 26 //// 8 1 In light of the facially valid warrant that was in existence when plaintiff appeared in 2 court on April 28, 2008, as well as Deputy Falk’s verification that the descriptors and identifiers 3 therein matched plaintiff,8 defendants have sufficiently demonstrated that there is no genuine 4 issue of material fact regarding whether Deputy Falk’s arrest of plaintiff was both reasonable and 5 supported by probable cause.9 Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on 6 plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for unlawful arrest. 7 8 9 10 11 2. Due Process Violation Additionally, although the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint are unclear, to the extent plaintiff claims his detention was a violation of his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, defendants are entitled to summary judgment. “Liberty is protected from unlawful state deprivation by the due process clause of the 12 Fourteenth Amendment.” Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir.1985). The loss of 13 liberty caused by an individual’s mistaken incarceration “after the lapse of a certain amount of 14 time” gives rise to a claim under the due process clause. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 15 (1979). However, not every deprivation of liberty gives rise to a constitutional claim. An arrest 16 and subsequent detention, pursuant to a facially valid arrest warrant, does not violate due process 17 where the detention is not unduly long. Baker, 443 U.S. at 144-145 (where arrest was made 18 19 20 21 8 Although plaintiff’s name was misspelled on the warrant, defendants have sufficiently demonstrated that the spelling listed on the warrant is a known alias for plaintiff and that a sufficient number of other descriptors and identifiers in the warrant matched plaintiff. See Defs.’ MSJ, Ex. C. 9 22 23 24 25 26 Further, although plaintiff appears to contend in his opposition to the summary judgment motion that the warrant was invalid because it was not supported by probable cause at the time it was issued, Dckt. No. 43 at 6-8, those allegations are not included in plaintiff’s complaint. Moreover, plaintiff has not provided any evidence demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact regarding that claim, nor has he shown that he could overcome the presumption of validity associated with warrants issued by neutral magistrates. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). Additionally, plaintiff has not alleged that the individual defendants named herein had any connection to the issuance of the warrant or that the County of Sacramento had any unconstitutional policy, custom, or practice regarding the issuance of warrants, as required by Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). 9 1 pursuant to a facially valid warrant, a three day detention does not amount to a due process 2 violation); Erdman v. Cochise County, 926 F.2d 877, 882 (9th Cir. 1991)(twelve day detention 3 did not violate due process where arrest was made pursuant to facially valid warrant). 4 Neither party disputes that plaintiff was detained after his arrest. Pl.’s Resp., Ex. 1 at 1-3. 5 However, as noted above, plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence demonstrating that the 6 warrant for his arrest was facially invalid. Plaintiff also does not provide any evidence 7 demonstrating that his detention, which lasted less than a day, was unduly long or that he could 8 or should have been released sooner. Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary judgment 9 on plaintiff’s due process claim. 10 3. Equal Protection Clause 11 Finally, to the extent that plaintiff’s allegation that “the point of [his] arrest” was 12 “discrimination, (national origin, race)” purports to establish a claim under § 1983 for violation 13 of plaintiff’s rights under the equal protection clause, defendants are entitled to summary 14 judgment on that claim. Compl. at 2; see also Pl.’s Resp. at 7 (contending that defendants’ 15 actions were “based solely on malice, bigotry, racism”). The equal protection clause commands that no state shall “deny any person within its 16 17 jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. It is not enough to 18 show mere differential treatment; a party must allege and prove the presence of an unlawful 19 intent to discriminate against him for an invalid reason. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 20 (1944). Here, plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence demonstrating that he was arrested 21 because of his race or national origin, or for any other invalid reason, or that any of the named 22 defendants acted with any racial animus or discriminatory intent toward plaintiff. Therefore, 23 defendants are entitled summary judgment on plaintiff’s equal protection clause claim. 24 //// 25 //// 26 //// 10 1 III. CONCLUSION 2 In accordance with the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 3 1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Dckt. No. 40, be granted; 4 2. Plaintiff’s motion to disregard various evidence and documents submitted by 5 6 7 defendants, Dckt. Nos. 44 and 47, be denied; 3. Defendants’ motion to strike various evidence and documents submitted by plaintiff, Dckt. No. 50-1, be denied; and 8 4. The Clerk be directed to enter judgment for defendants and close this case. 9 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 10 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 11 after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 12 objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 13 “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections 14 within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. 15 Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 16 DATED: February 9, 2011. 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 11
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