Walnut Hill Estate Enterprises, LLC et al v. County of Butte et al, No. 2:2009cv00500 - Document 40 (E.D. Cal. 2010)
Court Description: ORDER granting 17 Motion for Summary Judgment signed by Judge Garland E. Burrell, Jr on 7/21/10: The Clerk of Court shall close this case. (Kaminski, H)
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Walnut Hill Estate Enterprises, LLC et al v. County of Butte et al Doc. 40 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 WALNUT HILL ESTATE ENTERPRISES, ) LLC; JONOTHAN BENEFIELD; and JULIE ) BENEFIELD, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) ) CITY OF OROVILLE; DAVID GOYER; ) BECKY FRASER; RAY SANDOVAL; and ) CHRIS GAIL, ) ) Defendants. ) ) 2:09-cv-00500-GEB-GGH ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DECLINING TO EXERCISE SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION OVER PLAINTIFFS’ REMAINING STATE LAW CLAIM* 17 18 Defendants City of Oroville, David Goyer, Becky Fraser, Ray 19 Sandoval, and Chris Gail (“Defendants”) move for summary judgment on 20 all of Plaintiffs’ claims in their First Amended Complaint (“FAC”).1 21 Plaintiffs allege in their FAC that Defendants violated their 22 constitutional rights when they conducted health and safety code 23 inspection searches of Plaintiffs’ business and subsequently issued 24 Plaintiffs a “Notice to Repair or Demolish the Substandard Building.” 25 * 26 27 28 argument. This matter is deemed suitable for decision without oral E.D. Cal. R. 230(g). 1 The individual Defendants also argue they are entitled to qualified immunity. However, since these Defendants prevail on their summary judgment motion, the qualified immunity issues are not reached. 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 2 I. Background Plaintiffs Jonothan Benefield and Julie Benefield 3 (collectively, “the Owners”) are the managing members of Plaintiff 4 Walnut Hill Estate Enterprises, LLC (“Walnut Hill”). 5 Undisputed Facts (“SUF”) ¶ 1.) 6 which is located in downtown Oroville, California. 7 (Statement of Walnut Hill owns the Oroville Inn, (Id.) Oroville City Interim Fire Marshall Chris Gail (“Gail”) and 8 Code Enforcement Officer David Goyer (“Goyer”) went to the Oroville 9 Inn on December 16, 2008 after Interim Fire Chief Les Bowers 10 (“Bowers”) informed Gail that the Inn was in “very poor condition and 11 should be inspected for safety reasons.” 12 Gail after Bowers and his crews had responded to a fire alarm at the 13 Inn on the morning of December 16, 2008, at which time Bowers observed 14 the poor conditions and that the residents of the Inn did not evacuate 15 the building despite “an audible alarm sounding when his crews arrived 16 at the building . . . .” 17 Oroville Inn maintenance man and observed “several code violations” 18 before they were asked to leave the premises. 19 “issued a Notice of Violation for the violations they observed and set 20 January 2, 2009 as the date for re-inspection.” 21 (Id. ¶ 2.) (Id. ¶ 3.) Bowers spoke to Gail and Goyer met with the (Id. ¶ 3.) Goyer (Id.) The Owners refused to allow Gail and Goyer into the Oroville 22 Inn on January 2, 2009. 23 Warrant” in the Butte County Superior Court on January 7, 2009. 24 ¶ 4; Ex. 1 of Defendants’ Unopposed Request for Judicial Notice 25 (“RJN”), which is granted.) 26 Court Judge William Lamb issued “an Inspection Warrant authorizing 27 City staff to enter upon and inspect the interior and exterior of the 28 Oroville Inn.” Goyer then filed an “Affidavit for Inspection (SUF ¶ 5.) (SUF On January 7, 2009, Butte County Superior Plaintiffs “filed an ex parte application 2 1 to quash and/or limit the scope of the Inspection Warrant” on January 2 8, 2009, which City Attorney, Dwight L. Moore opposed on January 9, 3 2009. 4 at which Plaintiffs’ application to quash the warrant was denied. 5 (Id. ¶ 8.) (Id. ¶¶ 6, 7.) 6 Judge Lamb held a hearing on January 9, 2009, Goyer submitted his “Return on Inspection Warrant” to the 7 Butte County Superior Court on January 30, 2009, which included a 8 twenty-four page list of hundreds of health and safety code violations 9 Goyer discovered while inspecting the Oroville Inn. (Moore Decl. Ex. 10 3, Ex. E.) 11 three apartments which “were not inspected after being provided a 24- 12 hour notice, because the occupants did not make their apartments 13 available for inspection.” 14 inspection warrant on February 4, 2009, authorizing forcible entry 15 into these apartments. 16 the Owners and tenants advance written notice of each inspection. 17 (SUF ¶ 10.) 18 Repair or Demolish the Substandard Building”, and were advised that 19 their failure to comply may result in a civil enforcement action. 20 (Id. ¶ 11.) 21 The “Return on Inspection Warrant” also listed twenty- (Id.) Judge Lamb issued an additional (SUF ¶ 9; Gail Decl. Ex. 5.) City staff gave On April 22, 2009, the Owners were given a “Notice to Plaintiffs challenge in their FAC, filed on May 13, 2009, 22 the inspections “[c]ommencing on January 9, 2009,” and the April 22, 23 2009 “Notice to Repair or Demolish the Substandard Building.” 24 8.) 25 rights and were conducted in retaliation for Plaintiffs asserting 26 their First Amendment right in an an earlier filed lawsuit. 27 12(a), (b).) 28 violated their procedural and substantive due process rights and their (FAC ¶ Plaintiffs allege the inspections violated their Fourth Amendment (Id. ¶ Plaintiffs also allege the inspections and Notice 3 1 “rights to be secured from a taking.” 2 further allege the City of Oroville has policies, practices, and 3 customs which foster, promote, condone the constitutional violations 4 to which they were subjected. 5 writ of mandate under California Code of Civil Procedure section 6 1094.5. (Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiffs Plaintiffs also seek a (Id. ¶ 21.) 7 II. 8 9 (Id. ¶ 12(c), (d).) Legal Standard The movant for summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact for 10 trial. 11 movant satisfies this burden, “the non-moving party must set forth, by 12 affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56 [of the Federal Rules of 13 Civil Procedure], specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 14 for trial.” 15 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) (quotations, citation, and emphasis 16 omitted). 17 non-moving party.” 18 2009). Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, “All reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the Bryan v. McPherson, 590 F.3d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 19 20 21 III. A. If the Analysis Fourth Amendment Claims Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Fourth 22 Amendment claims, arguing the inspection searches “were pursuant to 23 valid inspection warrants.” 24 arguing the warrants were “not supported by probable cause,” were 25 “unparticularized,” and that Defendants exceeded the scope of the 26 inspection warrants when they executed the inspections. 27 5:1-3, 6:19.) (Mot. 5:12-15.) 28 4 Plaintiffs rejoin, (Opp’n 3:28, 1 “[T]he Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable 2 searches applies to administrative inspections of private commercial 3 property.” 4 “[p]robable cause in the criminal law sense is not required. 5 purposes of an administrative search . . ., probable cause justifying 6 the issuance of a warrant may be based . . . on specific evidence of 7 an existing violation . . . .” 8 320 (1978). 9 the facts that would justify an inference of ‘probable cause’ to make Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598 (1981). However, For Marshall v. Barlow’s, 436 U.S. 307, “Where considerations of health and safety are involved, 10 an inspection are clearly different from those that would justify such 11 an inference where a criminal investigation has been undertaken.” 12 Camara v. Mun. Court of City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 13 538 (1967). 14 be ‘met by a showing of specific evidence sufficient to support a 15 reasonable suspicion of violation.’” 16 St., 741 F.2d 172, 174-75 (8th Cir. 1984) (quoting W. Point-Pepperell, 17 Inc. v. Donovan, 689 F.2d 950, 958 (11th Cir. 1982)). 18 “This lower standard of administrative probable cause may In re Inspection of 526 Catalan Here, Goyer described in his affidavit supporting his 19 request for a state court issued inspection warrant the health and 20 safety code violations he personally observed at the Oroville Inn on 21 December 16, 2008, including the following: an electrical conduit 22 pulled away from the wall, cracked and chipped weather proofing, dry 23 rot around exterior doors, broken windows, defective emergency exit 24 signs, a missing sewer cleanout cap, a disassembled electrical grill 25 in the hallway, external fire systems connections lacking maintenance, 26 ceiling leaks, large piles of household debris, a pile of carpet 27 soaked with water leaking from the ceiling, and problems with the 28 elevator. (RJN Ex. 1.) Goyer concluded, “Based on my observations of 5 1 the Property, I believe that an inspection of the Property is 2 necessary to enforce the City Code and protect the health and safety 3 of the Property’s occupants and guests.” 4 (Id.) Plaintiffs have not controverted this evidence, and have 5 therefore failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that the 6 inspection warrants issued on January 7 and February 4, 2009 were 7 unsupported by “specific evidence of [] existing [code] violation[s]” 8 and thus lacked “probable cause justifying the issuance of [the] 9 warrant[s].” 10 Marshall, 436 U.S. at 320. Plaintiffs also argue the inspection warrants are “so open 11 ended” that they can “only be described as [] general warrant[s].” 12 (Opp’n 4:105.) 13 “determined by considering the information presented to the [court] in 14 the warrant application.” 15 (9th Cir. 1981). 16 inspection warrant may “properly draw reasonable inferences from [the] 17 information” presented. 18 that the deleterious conditions may be present throughout the 19 facility, a warrant authorizing a full plant-wide inspection is 20 justified.” 21 Bd., 214 Cal. App. 3d 625, 634 (1989) (citing Donovan v. Fall River 22 Foundry Co, Inc., 712 F.2d 1103, 1108 (7th Cir. 1983)). 23 affidavit described multiple health and safety code violations he 24 personally observed. 25 Interim Fire Chief Bowers’ statement that the property needed to be 26 inspected due to its “blighted conditions” and the maintenance man’s 27 statement to Goyer that “he knew of many other maintenance problems 28 with the Property.” Whether an inspection warrant has “proper scope” is In re J.R. Simplot Co., 640 F.2d 1134, 1138 The court considering the application for an Id. “If evidence is presented to the court Salwasser Mfg. Co. v. Occupational Saf. & Health Appeals Goyer’s Additionally, Goyer included in his affidavit Goyer requested in his affidavit a warrant to 6 1 inspect “[t]he entire property . . ., including interior and exterior 2 inspections of all the residential and commercial units, offices, 3 common areas, roof, basement and mechanical room, in order to inspect 4 for violations of the City of Oroville Building, Fire, Zoning, Housing 5 and Health Ordinances . . . .” 6 inspect the areas Goyer sought to inspect based on the observations 7 contained in Goyer’s affidavit and Goyer’s subsequent “Declaration in 8 Support of Return on Inspection Warrant.” 9 controverted Defendants’ evidence with evidence creating a genuine The state court authorized warrants to Plaintiffs have not 10 issue of material fact that the scope of the inspection authorized by 11 the warrants was “unreasonable.” 12 People v. Wheeler, 30 Cal. App. 3d 282, 297-99 (1973) (upholding 13 rejection of similar particularity challenge to an inspection warrant 14 obtained under California Code of Civil Procedure sections 1822.50 et 15 seq. for the inspection of a 315-acre ranch with over 100 structures, 16 77 of which were occupied, for possible health and safety code 17 violations; the warrant described the place to be searched as “19100 18 Coleman Valley Road used as the residence of William and Sarah Wheeler 19 and other structures” and was supported by an affidavit showing 20 potential health and safety code violations). 21 Simplot, 640 F.2d at 1138; see Plaintiffs further argue that the inspections were 22 “manifestly excessive in scope.” 23 the declaration of Jonothan Benefield in support of this argument, in 24 which Benefield avers “the police threatened [him] with physical 25 arrest by means of force . . . if [he] interfere[d] with the search.” 26 (Benefield Decl. ¶ 18.) 27 factual context and is controverted by the DVD Defendants submitted 28 which contains a video recording of a portion of the January 9, 2009 (Opp’n 6:19.) Plaintiffs present However, this conclusory averment lacks 7 1 search. 2 officials accompanied by a uniformed deputy sheriff officer served the 3 inspection warrant on Benefield in the presence of Benefield’s 4 attorney, Frear Stephen Schmid; and, depicts Schmid shouting a tirade 5 of profanities at City officials involved with executing the 6 inspection warrant. 7 informed Benefield that any person interfering with the inspection 8 would be subject to arrest. 9 warned Benefield that he could be arrested if he interfered with the (Moore Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 1.) The video recording shows City The video also shows that a City official Even if the deputy sheriff officer later 10 search, this mere warning has not been shown unlawful in light of 11 California Code of Civil Procedure section 1822.57, which prescribes 12 that “[a]ny person who willfully refuses to permit an inspection 13 lawfully authorized by warrant issued pursuant to this title is guilty 14 of a misdemeanor.” 15 permit an inspection is itself a crime”). 16 see also Camara, 387 U.S. at 531 (“refusal to Plaintiffs also challenge Defendants’ entry into private 17 apartments. 18 authorized “the inspection of the interior of the residences.” 19 uncontroverted evidence shows that Defendants entered private 20 apartments under the January 7, 2009 warrant only after they obtained 21 consent from the tenants. 22 “were not inspected because the tenants did not provide access”); Id. 23 Ex. E.) 24 Inspection Warrant” revealed a multitude of health and safety code 25 violations in the apartments searched, including exposed wiring, lack 26 of hot and cold running water, lack of heating, water intrusion 27 through exterior walls and ceiling, emergency escape window problems, 28 pest infestation, and general dilapidation, Defendants obtained a However, the January 7, 2009 warrant specifically The (Moore Decl. Ex. 3 (stating that apartments Defendants’ evidence also shows that after the “Return on 8 1 warrant on February 4, 2009, authorizing forcible entry to inspect the 2 remaining apartments. 3 obtained under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1822.56, 4 which prescribes that “the judge may expressly authorize a forcible 5 entry.” 6 evidence sufficient to permit drawing a reasonable inference that 7 Defendants’ execution of the two inspection warrants was “excessive,” 8 Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Fourth 9 Amendment claims is granted. 10 11 B. (Moore Decl. Ex. 3, Ex. E.) This warrant was Since Plaintiffs have not countered Defendants’ evidence with Retaliation Claim Defendants also seek summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ 12 retaliation claim, arguing Plaintiffs have failed to “establish a link 13 between the alleged retaliatory conduct of [Defendants] and the 14 alleged protected conduct of Plaintiff[s].” 15 Plaintiffs counter the searches were conducted in retaliation for 16 Plaintiffs filing an earlier lawsuit. 17 “the inspections were in retaliation for [Plaintiffs’] exercise of 18 [their] First Amendment rights [when they filed] a civil lawsuit 19 against the City and defendant Goyer for their unjustified and 20 warrantless forced evacuations of the entire building on or about June 21 29, 2006 [in] Walnut Hill Estate Enterprises, LLC [] v. City of 22 Oroville [], action no. 2:08-CV-1142-FCD-GGH [“the 2008 Action”].” 23 (Opp’n 6:12-15.) 24 25 26 27 (Defs.’ Mot. 4:8-9.) Specifically, Plaintiffs argue [A] plaintiff alleging retaliation for the exercise of [a] constitutionally protected right[] must initially show that the protected conduct was a ‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor in the defendant’s decision . . . . At that point, the burden shifts to the defendant to establish that it would have reached the same decision even in the absence of the protected conduct. 28 9 1 Soranno’s Gasco v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing 2 Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 3 (1977)). 4 Plaintiffs argue “within a few months of [Plaintiffs] filing 5 [the 2008 Action], the City initiated ‘searches’ in December 2008.” 6 (Opp’n 6:21-22.) 7 nearly seven months before December 16, 2008, the date which Gail, 8 Goyers, and Bowers discovered the health and safety code violations 9 which provided the basis for the January 7, 2009 inspection warrant. Plaintiffs filed the 2008 Action on May 23, 2008, 10 The 2008 Action concerned the City’s evacuation of the Oroville Inn in 11 June 2006 following the discovery of health and safety code 12 violations. 13 of Jonothan Benefield in support of their retaliation claim, in which 14 Benefield avers that although he “had numerous meetings and/or 15 discussions with David Goyer and the City and ha[s] allowed various 16 specific inspections at the property” between the June 2006 evacuation 17 and December 2008, “this was the first attempt by Mr. Goyer to inspect 18 the property after the filing of [the 2008 Action].” 19 averments in Benefield’s declaration do not support Plaintiffs’ 20 argument that the filing of the 2008 Action was “a ‘substantial’ or 21 ‘motivating’ factor in the defendant[s’] decision” to inspect the 22 Oroville Inn in December 2008. 23 Plaintiffs also present the declaration of James Carpenter in support 24 of their retaliation claim. 25 permit from the City of Oroville after he reached an agreement to 26 lease “the premises” in the Oroville Inn, concerning which the City 27 “scheduled an inspection of the proposed lease premises at the 28 Oroville Inn for August 26, 2009.” (Benefield Decl. ¶ 8.) Plaintiffs offer the declaration (Id. ¶ 15.) The Soranno’s, 874 F.2d at 1314. Carpenter declares he sought an occupancy (Carpenter Decl. ¶¶ 1,2.) 10 1 Carpenter also declares that Michael Cully informed Carpenter he would 2 not perform any inspection “of the proposed leased premises” “due to 3 an ongoing investigation regarding the Oroville Inn and due to 4 litigation by the owners of Oroville Inn against the City of 5 Oroville.” 6 [him] with the form attached hereto, and left the premises.” 7 However, there is no form attached to Carpenter’s declaration. 8 Finally, Carpenter avers Paula Atteberry encouraged him to rent 9 somewhere other than the Oroville Inn. (Id. ¶ 4.) Carpenter further declares “[Cully] presented (Id. ¶ 6.) (Id.) The individuals 10 mentioned in Carpenter’s declaration, Cully and Atteberry, are not 11 mentioned in Plaintiffs’ Opposition brief or in Benefield’s 12 declaration, and it is unclear how they relate to this lawsuit. 13 inspection searches had been conducted when Carpenter sought an 14 occupancy permit from the City, and Carpenter’s declaration does not 15 reference the 2008 Action or otherwise support Plaintiffs’ retaliation 16 claim. 17 Plaintiffs’ retaliation claims is granted. 18 C. 19 The Therefore, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Procedural Due Process Claim Defendants also seek summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ 20 procedural due process claim, arguing “Plaintiffs[] received all of 21 the process they were due.” 22 arguing their “Due Process rights were violated when the City issued 23 the ‘Notice to Repair or Demolish’ without [providing Plaintiffs with] 24 notice and an opportunity to be heard” before the Notice was issued. 25 (Opp’n 10:19-21.) 26 (Defs.’ Mot. 5:16.) Plaintiffs rejoin, “A procedural due process claim hinges on proof of two 27 elements: (1) a protectible liberty or property interest . . .; and 28 (2) a denial of adequate procedural protections. 11 Property interests 1 are not created by the Constitution but by existing rules or 2 understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law 3 . . . .” 4 Cir. 2005) (citations and quotes omitted). 5 pointed to any California law requiring a hearing prior to the 6 issuance of a “Notice of Repair or Demolish.” 7 was issued under California Health and Safety Code section 17980, 8 which requires only that “[w]henever the enforcement agency has . . . 9 determined that [a] building is [] substandard . . . [t]he owner shall Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Plaintiffs have not The Notice in this case 10 have the choice of repairing or demolishing.” 11 Code § 17980(b). 12 Repair or Demolish Substandard Building” on April 22, 2010, which 13 stated, “[t]he building official has determined that the buildings 14 must either be repaired or demolished, the option is yours.” 15 Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. 2; SUF ¶ 11.) 16 Cal. Health and Safety The Owners and tenants were each given a “Notice to (Moore Plaintiffs have not provided the procedural protections to 17 which they contend they were entitled before the City issued the 18 Notice. 19 a hearing before the Oroville City Council in October 2009 after 20 Plaintiffs failed to comply with the “Notice to Repair or Demolish.” 21 During this October 2009 hearing Benefield and his attorney presented 22 evidence and arguments before the City Council. 23 Benefield Decl. Ex. 1 (City Council Resolution No. 7458 showing that 24 Plaintiffs were notified of the hearing during which the City Council 25 “would consider adopting a resolution declaring the substandard 26 housing conditions at the Property to be a public nuisance, and 27 ordering abatement of the nuisance”).) 28 failed to discuss this hearing in the arguments contained in their Both parties submitted evidence that Plaintiffs were provided 12 (Moore Decl. Ex. 3; However, Plaintiffs have 1 Opposition brief, and have not shown any basis for their contention 2 that they were entitled to more process than what they have been 3 given. 4 process claim on the searches, they have failed to raise a genuine 5 issue of material fact concerning the validity of any search. 6 stated reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ 7 procedural due process claim is granted. 8 D. 9 Further, to the extent Plaintiffs premise their procedural due For the Substantive Due Process Claim Defendants also seek summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ 10 substantive due process claim, arguing that “enforcing [the Health and 11 Safety] codes advances a legitimate government purpose.” 12 3.) 13 abusive code enforcement activities . . . which . . . shock the 14 conscience of any believer in the rule of law.” 15 (Mot. 7:2- Plaintiffs rejoin, arguing Defendants engaged in “capricious and (Opp’n 14:4-6.) “[T]he irreducible minimum of a substantive due process 16 claim challenging land use action is failure to advance any legitimate 17 governmental purpose.” 18 Cir. 2008). 19 plaintiff must show that the “governmental deprivation of [the] 20 [protected] interest . . . rises to the level of the constitutionally 21 arbitrary.” 22 conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense.” 23 (quotations omitted). 24 Defendants’ enforcement of the California Health and Safety Code is 25 rationally related to the City’s legitimate governmental interest in 26 preserving the public health and safety. 27 F.3d 1311, 1328 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The City has an obvious interest in 28 preventing safety and sanitation hazards by enforcing the housing Shanks v. Dressel, 540 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th When challenging a municipality’s land use action, a Id. (emphasis omitted). “[O]nly egregious official Id. Here, the uncontroverted evidence shows that 13 See Armendariz v. Penman, 75 1 code.”), overruled on other grounds by Crown Point Dev., Inc. v. City 2 of Sun Valley, 506 F.3d 851, 856-57 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Camara, 3 387 U.S. at 535 (discussing the “reasonable goals of code enforcement” 4 including “[t]he primary governmental interest . . . to prevent even 5 the unintentional development of conditions which are hazardous to the 6 public health and safety”). 7 judgment on Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim is granted. 8 E. Therefore, Defendants’ motion for summary Takings Claim 9 Defendants also seek dismissal of Plaintiffs’ takings claim, 10 stating in their motion: “Counsel for the parties have stipulated that 11 Plaintiffs are not pursuing a takings claim. 12 not be addressed here and should be dismissed.” 13 Plaintiffs do not oppose dismissal of this claim in their Opposition 14 brief. 15 before the Oroville City Council in October 2009 on the “Notice to 16 Repair or Demolish.” 17 Repair or Demolish” was not a final administrative action. 18 step analysis [is involved in] determin[ing] whether a regulatory 19 takings claim is ripe: (1) the underlying ‘administrative action must 20 be final before it is judicially reviewable’[;] and (2) the claimant 21 must have ‘unsuccessfully attempted to obtain just compensation 22 through the procedures provided by the State.’” 23 Props., Inc. v. Cnty. of San Luis Obispo, 548 F.3d 1184, 1190 (9th 24 Cir. 2008) (quoting Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton 25 Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 192, 195 (1985)). 26 Plaintiffs have not shown that their takings claim is ripe for review, 27 their takings claim is dismissed. As such, that claim will (Mot. 7:21-23.) Further, both parties present evidence that a hearing was held This hearing indicates that the “Notice to 28 14 “[A] two- Equity Lifestyle Since 1 F. Monell Liability 2 Defendants also seek summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims 3 against the City of Oroville, arguing under Monell v. Department of 4 Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), Plaintiffs have failed to 5 identify “an unconstitutional policy, practice, or custom.” 6 8:2-3.) 7 Housing,” the inspection searches, and the “Notice of Repair or 8 Demolish” constitute “official polic[ies] . . . ratified by the City.” 9 (Opp’n 9:19-28.) (Mot. Plaintiffs respond, arguing the “Notice of Substandard However, Plaintiffs have not shown that a City 10 official violated their constitutional rights. 11 violation occurred, the municipality cannot be held liable and whether 12 ‘the [City’s official policies] . . . might have authorized the 13 [challenged actions] is quite beside the point.’” 14 Cnty. of Honolulu, 511 F.3d 901, 907 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, -- 15 U.S. ---, 129 S. Ct. 62 (2008) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 16 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986)). 17 judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims against the City of Oroville is 18 granted. 19 G. “If no constitutional Long v. City and Therefore, Defendants’ motion for summary Dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Writ claim under 28 U.S.C §.1367(c) 20 Plaintiffs seek in their only remaining claim a writ of 21 mandate under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, in 22 which Plaintiffs request various relief. 23 “claim for a writ of mandate is a state law claim.” 24 Co. v. City of Walnut Creek, 428 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1055 n.6 (N.D. Cal. 25 2006). 26 bases for issuance of [the] writ are the City's alleged violations of 27 both federal and state law . . . .” 28 summary judgment motion has been granted on all of Plaintiffs’ federal Plaintiffs section 1094.5 Pac. Bell Tel. The claim remains a state law claim even though “the asserted 15 Id. However, since Defendants’ 1 claims, the Court may sua sponte decide whether to continue exercising 2 supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ remaining state claim. 3 Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997) 4 (en banc) (suggesting that a district court may, but need not, sua 5 sponte decide whether to continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction 6 under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) after all federal law claims have been 7 dismissed). 8 9 See Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a [state law] claim” when 10 “all claims over which it has original jurisdiction” have been 11 dismissed. 12 jurisdiction over state law claims is triggered by the presence of one 13 of the conditions in § 1367(c), it is informed by the . . . values of 14 economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” 15 (quotations omitted). 16 claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of [the] factors to be 17 considered . . . point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over 18 the remaining state-law claims.” 19 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). 20 developing and applying state law rests with the state courts.” 21 Curiel v. Barclays Capital Real Estate Inc., No. S-09-3074 FCD/KJM, 22 2010 WL 729499, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2010). 23 Gibbs factors weigh against dismissal, Plaintiffs’ remaining state 24 claim will be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 25 26 “While discretion to decline to exercise supplemental Acri, 114 F.3d at 1001 “In the usual case in which all federal-law United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, “Further, primary responsibility for IV. Since none of the Conclusion For the stated reasons, Defendants’ summary judgment motion 27 is granted on Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment, procedural due process, 28 substantive due process, and Monell claims. 16 Judgment shall be entered 1 in favor of Defendants on these claims. 2 claim is dismissed. 3 mandate under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 is 4 dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 5 close this case. 6 Dated: Further, Plaintiffs’ takings Lastly, Plaintiffs’ state claim for a writ of The Clerk of Court shall July 21, 2010 7 8 9 GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR. United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 17
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