Dagdagan v. City of Vallejo et al, No. 2:2008cv00922 - Document 57 (E.D. Cal. 2010)
Court Description: ORDER granting in part and denying in part 37 Motion for Summary Judgment signed by Judge Garland E. Burrell, Jr on 1/6/10: Defendants' motions are DENIED. (Kaminski, H)
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Dagdagan v. City of Vallejo et al Doc. 57 1 2 3 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 6 MACARIO BELEN DAGDAGAN, 7 Plaintiff, 8 9 10 v. CITY OF VALLEJO, VALLEJO OFFICER J. WENTZ, VALLEJO OFFICER JOHN BOYD, VALLEJO OFFICER SGT. J. MILLER and Does 1-30, inclusive, 11 Defendants. 12 13 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 2:08-CV-00922-GEB-GGH ORDER GRANTING AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS On September 2, 2009, Plaintiff Macario Dagdagan filed a motion 14 for partial summary judgment on certain of his Fourth Amendment claims 15 alleged under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and his state claims alleged 16 under California Civil Code section 52.1. 17 seeks partial summary judgment on his claims that Vallejo Police 18 Officers Wentz and Boyd (collectively, “Defendants”) violated his 19 Fourth Amendment rights by “entering [his] home without a warrant” and 20 “arresting [him] without probable cause.” 21 Summ. J. 1.) 22 Amendment gives rise to liability under California Civil Code section 23 52.1. (Id.) 24 the undisputed facts demonstrate Defendants violated his Fourth 25 Amendment rights when, without a warrant, they entered his apartment, 26 questioned him, and then arrested him.1 Specifically, Plaintiff (Not. of Mot. for Partial Plaintiff contends that liability under the Fourth Plaintiff argues summary judgment is warranted because Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s 27 28 1 Plaintiff’s briefs indicate that the portion of his motion (continued...) 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 motion, and seek to continue or dismiss it under Federal Rule of Civil 2 Procedure 56(f). 3 summary judgment, arguing the defense of qualified immunity precludes 4 liability for Plaintiff’s claims under the Fourth Amendment. 5 motions were heard on October 13, 2009. 6 Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment is GRANTED and DENIED 7 in part and Defendants’ motions are DENIED. 8 Further, each Defendant filed a cross motion for I. The For the reasons stated below, LEGAL STANDARDS 9 Under Rule Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), the party 10 moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating 11 the absence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. 12 Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S., 317, 323 (1986). 13 satisfies this burden, “the non-moving party must set forth, by 14 affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, specific facts showing 15 that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 16 Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 17 1987)(quotations and citation omitted)(emphasis omitted). 18 deciding a summary judgment motion, all reasonable inferences that can 19 be drawn from the evidence “must be drawn in favor of the non-moving 20 party.” 21 (9th Cir. 2009). 22 23 Celotex If the moving party T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. When Bryan v. McPherson, --- F.3d ----, 2009 WL 5064477, at *2 Further, the defense of qualified immunity requires a two-step analysis: 24 First, the court determines whether the facts show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right. If the alleged conduct did not violate a constitutional right, then the defendants are 25 26 27 28 1 (...continued) challenging Defendants’ questioning of him after their entry need only be decided if Defendants’ warrantless entry is found to be justified. 2 1 entitled to immunity and the claim must be dismissed. However, if the alleged conduct did violate such a right, then the court must determine whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged unlawful action. A right is clearly established if a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. If the right is not clearly established, then the officer is entitled to qualified immunity. While the order in which these questions are addressed is left to the court's sound discretion, it is often beneficial to perform the analysis in the sequence outlined above. Of course, where a claim of qualified immunity is to be denied, both questions must be answered. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 762 (9th Cir. 2009)(quotations and citation omitted). II. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56(f) 12 Defendants seek a continuance or dismissal of Plaintiff’s motion 13 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f)(“Rule 56(f)”) premised on 14 their inability to depose two individuals, Gina Kearney and Paul 15 Turner. 16 Kearney for a deposition; and they subpoenaed Turner but he failed to 17 appear. 18 Defendants expect Kearney to testify about her 911 emergency telephone 19 call in which she reported that Plaintiff assaulted her, the injuries 20 she suffered as a result of this reported assault, and the nature of 21 her relationship with Plaintiff. 22 they responded to her 911 call, after which Defendants attempted to 23 speak with Plaintiff, and ultimately entered Plaintiff’s apartment 24 without a warrant. 25 what Defendants observed before they entered Plaintiff’s apartment. 26 (Whitefleet Decl. ¶¶ 10, 11.) 27 Defendants have not demonstrated the testimony of either Kearney or (Opp’n. 7:4-17.) Defendants have not successfully served (Lairamore Decl. ¶¶ 2-4; Whitefleet Decl. ¶¶ 8-9.) Defendants spoke with Kearney when Defendants expect Turner to provide evidence of Plaintiff opposes the motion, arguing 28 3 1 2 Turner is material to the issues in Plaintiff’s motion. (Reply 19:10-15.) To prevail on their Rule 56(f) motion, Defendants must show: “(1) 3 that they have set forth in affidavit form the specific facts that 4 they hope to elicit from further discovery, (2) that the facts sought 5 exist, and (3) that these sought-after facts are ‘essential’ to resist 6 the summary judgment motion.” 7 Dept. Of Toxic Substances Control v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 779 (9th 8 Cir. 1986). 9 additional discovery they seek is “essential to resist” Plaintiff’s State of Cal. on Behalf of California Defendants, however, have not demonstrated that the 10 motion. 11 authorized under law to enter his apartment without a warrant. 12 summary judgment evidentiary record indicates that the testimony 13 Defendants seek is either cumulative of evidence already in the record 14 or irrelevant to the motion. 15 is denied. See id. 16 17 Plaintiff’s motion addresses whether Defendants were III. The Therefore, Defendants’ Rule 56(f) motion STATEMENT OF FACTS The parties dispute the facts concerning Defendants’ entry into 18 Plaintiff’s apartment and what transpired therein. 19 adopts Defendants’ version of the facts for the purposes of his motion 20 for partial summary judgment, only disputing Defendants’ 21 characterization of the weapon Plaintiff allegedly used in the 22 reported assault as well as several inferences Defendants seek to have 23 drawn from that evidence. 24 declarations and exhibits attached to Plaintiff’s motion stricken from 25 the record. 26 moot because Plaintiff agrees that Defendants’ version of the facts in 27 the summary judgment record are to be used when deciding Plaintiff’s 28 motion. However, Plaintiff Defendants move to have certain However, this portion of Defendants’ motion is denied as 4 1 The summary judgment evidentiary record reveals that on June 2, 2 2007, at approximately 10:51 p.m., Gina Kearney placed a 911 emergency 3 telephone call to the police, reporting that twenty-five minutes 4 earlier, Plaintiff threatened to kill her with a knife at Plaintiff’s 5 apartment. 6 Material Facts (“SAUF”) ¶ 3; Defs.’ Opp’n. to Pl.’s Separate Statement 7 of Undisputed Material Facts (“SUF”) ¶ 1; Powell Decl. ¶ 4.) 8 response to Kearney’s 911 call, Defendants were dispatched to 9 Kearney’s residence at 1020 Santa Clara Street in Vallejo, California (Pl.’s Opp’n. to Defs.’ Statement of Additional Undisputed 10 at approximately 11:19 p.m. 11 Decl. ¶ 5.) 12 In (Pl.’s Opp’n. to Defs.’ SAUF ¶ 3; Powell When Defendants arrived at Kearney’s residence, Kearney told 13 Defendant Boyd that Plaintiff assaulted her earlier in the day when 14 she went to his apartment to retrieve a car she had loaned him. 15 (Defs.’ Opp’n. to Pl.’s SUF ¶¶ 2-4.) 16 had been drinking. 17 the assault to Defendants, Kearney appeared upset, tearful, her hands 18 were shaking, and she complained that the back of her head hurt. 19 ¶ 8; Defs.’ Opp’n. to Pl.’s SUF ¶ 10.) Defendants, however, did not 20 observe any signs of physical injury. (Defs.’ Opp’n. to Pl.’s SUF ¶ 21 10.) 22 Kearney also stated Plaintiff (Pl.’s Opp’n. to Defs.’ SAUF ¶ 4.) When reporting (Id. Kearney further reported that when she was at Plaintiff’s 23 apartment, she and Plaintiff had an argument, in the course of which, 24 Plaintiff “grabbed the back of her head and threatened to kill her 25 while he held a butcher knife.”2 (Defs.’ Opp’n. to Pl.’s SUF ¶¶ 3-4.) 26 27 28 2 Defendants argue Plaintiff assaulted Kearney with a meat cleaver instead of a butcher knife. (Defs.’ Opp’n. to Pl.’s SUF ¶ 4.) However, evidence has not been presented supporting this argument. 5 1 Kearney said she then kneed Plaintiff in the groin, got a hold of the 2 knife and called the name of the manager of the apartment building, 3 Beverly Good. 4 and the knife was removed from Plaintiff’s apartment. 5 to Pl.’s SUF ¶ 9; Pl.’s Opp’n. to Defs.’ SAUF ¶ 7; Boyd Depo. 37:9-14, 6 38:24-25.) 7 (Defs.’ Opp’n. to Pl.’s SUF ¶¶ 5-6.) Good intervened, (Defs.’ Opp’n. After speaking with Kearney, Defendants left her home and went to 8 Plaintiff’s residence at 421 Louisiana Street in Vallejo, California, 9 to speak with Plaintiff and hear his version of what had transpired. 10 (Defs.’ Opp’n. to Pl.’s SUF ¶¶ 11-12.) 11 Plaintiff’s apartment, they observed that the door to the apartment 12 was open. 13 apartment, and rice was scattered on the kitchen floor. 14 Specifically, Boyd testified he could see from the doorway of 15 Plaintiff’s apartment “rice all over the linoleum [kitchen] floor.” 16 (Boyd Depo. 64:9-10.) 17 could see only the corner of the stove but could hear “gas or some 18 type of noise.” 19 at the hearing on the motions, that from the landing outside of 20 Plaintiff’s apartment, the Defendants could not tell if there was 21 anything cooking on top of the stove. 22 (Id. ¶ 19.) When Defendants arrived at Defendants also saw that a light was on in the (Id. ¶ 20.) Boyd also testified, that from the doorway, he (Boyd Depo. 63:7-64:4.) Defendants’ counsel stated While outside Plaintiff’s apartment, Defendants announced their 23 presence by calling out “Vallejo Police.” 24 SAUF ¶ 24.) 25 Defendants entered Plaintiff’s apartment. 26 Plaintiff’s apartment opens into a small kitchen. 27 Boyd turned the stove burner off. 28 Boyd Depo. 70:12.) There was no response. (Pl.’s Opp’n. to Defs.’ (Id. ¶ 25.) (Id.) After a few seconds, The doorway to After their entry, (Pl.’s Opp’n. to Defs.’ SAUF ¶ 11; Defendants moved from the kitchen into a bedroom, 6 1 where they found Plaintiff lying in bed under blankets, and apparently 2 asleep. 3 empty beer bottles on the night stand next to Plaintiff’s bed. 4 52.) 5 respond. 6 it. 7 effect of “leave me alone” or “let me go to sleep.” 8 9 (Defs.’ Opp’n. to Pl.’s SUF ¶¶ 43-44, 47.) Defendants saw (Id. ¶ Defendants again announced their presence but Plaintiff did not (Id. ¶ 45.) (Id. ¶ 46.) Boyd then grabbed Plaintiff’s leg and tugged on Plaintiff responded by saying something to the (Id. ¶ 47.) Boyd asked Plaintiff to identify himself, and Plaintiff provided his name. (Id. ¶ 48.) Boyd then told Plaintiff that Kearney had 10 reported that he had assaulted her with a butcher knife. 11 Boyd Depo. 92:3-4.) 12 the fuck out of his house” and rolled over as if to go back to sleep. 13 (Defs.’ Opp’n. to Pl.’s SUF ¶ 50.; Pl.’s Opp’n. to Defs.’ SAUF ¶ 17.) 14 Defendants then grabbed and lifted the blanket off Plaintiff “for 15 officer safety.” 16 to ask Plaintiff to discuss the reported assault and provide “his side 17 of the story.” 18 those questions. 19 “verbally aggressive and agitated.” 20 Wentz Depo. 58:13-18.) 21 (Id. ¶ 49; Plaintiff responded by telling Defendants “to get (Defs.’ Opp’n. to Pl.’s SUF ¶ 51.) (Id. ¶ 53.) Boyd continued Plaintiff refused to cooperate or answer (Pl.’s Opp’n. to Defs.’ SAUF ¶ 18.) Plaintiff was (Id. ¶ 12; Boyd Depo. 96:6-22; After several minutes of questioning, Plaintiff sat up in bed, 22 with his hands clenched in a fist position by his waist. 23 Opp’n. to Pl.’s SUF ¶¶ 57-58.) 24 swung at either Defendant. 25 and warned Plaintiff multiple times that he would be tased if he did 26 not cooperate. 27 refused to comply with Defendants’ requests, and Boyd told Plaintiff 28 he was under arrest for “delaying or obstructing [his] investigation.” (Defs.’ However, Plaintiff never struck at or (Id. ¶ 58.) Wentz then showed his taser (Pl.’s Opp’n. to Defs.’ SAUF ¶ 20.) 7 Plaintiff still 1 (Defs.’ Opp’n. to Pl.’s SUF ¶ 60; Boyd Depo. 98:5-11.) 2 Boyd testified, “we were trying to get a statement from him, and after 3 he was, you know, telling me and telling Officer Wentz several times 4 to fuck off and this and that, at that point I told him he was under 5 arrest for delaying or obstructing my investigation.” 6 98:5-11.) 7 Specifically, (Boyd Depo. Then, one of the Defendants told Plaintiff to lay on his stomach 8 and put his hands behind him or he would be tased. 9 Defs.’ SAUF ¶ 21; Defs.’ Opp’n. to Pl.’s SUF ¶ 62.) (Pl.’s Opp’n. to Plaintiff 10 refused, and again told Defendants to “fuck off.” 11 Defs.’ SAUF ¶ 21.) 12 two probes towards Plaintiff. 13 Once tased, Plaintiff sat straight up as if the taser had no effect; 14 and, he continued to refuse to place his hands behind his back. 15 (Pl.’s Opp’n. to Defs.’ SAUF ¶ 22.) Plaintiff also resumed swearing. 16 (Defs.’ Opp’n. to Pl.’s SUF ¶ 69.) Wentz then tased Plaintiff again. 17 (Id. ¶ 71.) 18 the mattress and handcuff him. 19 who transported Plaintiff to the hospital where he received medical 20 care. 21 22 (Pl.’s Opp’n. to Defendant Wentz then fired his taser which sent (Defs.’ Opp’n. to Pl.’s SUF ¶ 65.) Thereafter, Boyd was able to lie Plaintiff’s body flat on (Id.) Subsequently, medics arrived (Id. ¶¶ 83-85.) All criminal charges against Plaintiff were voluntarily dropped by the District Attorney. (Id. ¶ 86.) 23 24 25 26 27 28 IV. A. DISCUSSION Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment Claims Plaintiff argues he is entitled to partial summary judgment on his Fourth Amendment claims since Defendants impermissibly entered his 8 1 apartment without a warrant, questioned him regarding a reported 2 assault, and subsequently arrested him. 3 actions were justified under the Fourth Amendment, and alternatively, 4 they are entitled to qualified immunity. 5 1. 6 Defendants’ argue their The Warrantless Entry Plaintiff argues Defendants’ warrantless entry into his 7 apartment violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment. 8 by the Ninth Circuit: 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 As stated The Fourth Amendment provides: ‘The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.’ Searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. The presumption, however, is not irrebuttable. There are two general exceptions to the warrant requirement for home searches: exigency and emergency. These exceptions are narrow and their boundaries are rigorously guarded to prevent any expansion that would unduly interfere with the sanctity of the home. In general, the difference between the two exceptions is this: The “emergency” exception stems from the police officers' community caretaking function and allows them to respond to emergency situations that threaten life or limb; this exception does not derive from police officers' function as criminal investigators. By contrast, the “exigency” exception does derive from the police officers' investigatory function; it allows them to enter a home without a warrant if they have both probable cause to believe that a crime has been or is being committed and a reasonable belief that their entry is necessary to prevent the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts. 23 24 Hopkins, 573 F.3d at 763 (quotations, brackets and citations omitted). 25 Since it is undisputed that Defendants entered Plaintiff’s 26 apartment without a warrant, unless either the emergency or exigency 27 exception applies, Defendants’ warrantless entry violated Plaintiff’s 28 9 1 rights under the Fourth Amendment. 2 justified under both exceptions. Defendants argue their entry was 3 a. 4 Defendants contend they were authorized to enter Plaintiff’s 5 apartment under the emergency exception since the following facts gave 6 them “probable cause to believe a burglary had occurred:” the door was 7 open late at night, rice was on the kitchen floor, a light and the 8 stove were on, and there was no response to their announcement of 9 police presence. The Emergency Exception (Opp’n. to Mot. for Summ. J. 10:18-19.) Defendants 10 alternatively argue their observations gave them reason to believe 11 that “there could be injured parties” inside Plaintiff’s apartment. 12 (Id. 10:25.) 13 However, the exigency exception, not the emergency exception, is 14 applicable when law enforcement officers conduct a warrantless search 15 of a home to investigate a burglary. 16 529, 533 (9th Cir. 1993)(stating that a burglary investigation could 17 not justify warrantless entry into home under the emergency exception; 18 however, exigent circumstances could justify a warrantless entry into 19 a residence if facts known to the officers suggested that a burglary 20 was in progress and supported probable cause to enter to learn what 21 was happening). 22 See U.S. v. Erickson, 991 F.2d Under the emergency exception, “law enforcement officers may 23 enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an 24 injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.” 25 Bringham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). 26 aid exception’ does not depend on the officers’ subjective intent or 27 the seriousness of any crime they are investigating when the emergency 28 arises. The “‘emergency It requires only an objectively reasonable basis for 10 1 believing that a person within the house is in need of immediate aid.” 2 Michigan v. Fisher, 130 S. Ct. 546, 548 (2009)(quotations and 3 citations omitted). 4 the police officers must have had “an objectively reasonable basis for 5 believing that medical assistance was needed, or persons were in 6 danger.” 7 v. Snipe, 515 F.3d 947, 952 (9th Cir. 2008)(articulating Ninth 8 Circuit’s two-pronged test for application of emergency exception; the 9 first prong asking whether, “considering the totality of the That is, at the time of their warrantless entry, Id. at 549 (quotations and citation omitted); see also U.S. 10 circumstances, law enforcement had an objectively reasonable basis for 11 concluding that there was an immediate need to protect others or 12 themselves from serious harm.”). 13 Defendants have not shown their entry was justified under the 14 emergency exception since the record is devoid of facts indicating 15 anyone was injured in the Plaintiff’s apartment. 16 statement that she had kneed Plaintiff in the groin, Defendants had no 17 reason to believe Plaintiff was injured. 18 exception requires more than mere speculation of injury. 19 573 F.3d at 764 (holding that warrantless entry to check for injuries 20 when responding to report of minor hit and run car accident was not 21 justified under emergency exception as there was no indication that 22 the accident had caused any injuries). 23 totality of circumstances, it was not objectively reasonable for 24 Defendants to believe “that medical assistance was needed or persons 25 were in danger.” 26 does not justify Defendants’ warrantless entry into Plaintiff’s 27 apartment. 28 // Application of this See Hopkins, Therefore, in light of the Fisher, 130 S. Ct. at 547. 11 Other than Kearney’s The emergency exception 1 b. 2 For the exigency exception to apply, the Defendants “must satisfy The Exigency Exception 3 two requirements: first, [they] . . . must prove that [they] had 4 probable cause to search [Plaintiff’s apartment]; and second, . . . 5 [they] must [also demonstrate] that exigent circumstances justified 6 the warrantless intrusion.” 7 for a search requires that there be “known facts and circumstances 8 9 Hopkins, 573 F.3d at 768. Probable cause . . . sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.” 10 Hopkins, 573 F.3d at 767 (quotations and citation omitted). 11 circumstances exist when “there is a compelling reason for not 12 obtaining a warrant - for example, [when there is] a need to protect 13 an officer or the public from danger, a need to avoid the imminent 14 destruction of evidence, when entry in hot pursuit is necessary to 15 prevent a criminal suspect’s escape or [there is] a need to respond to 16 fire or other emergencies.” 17 960 (9th Cir. 2007)(quotations and citation omitted). 18 law enforcement officials rely on the exigency exception, they must 19 demonstrate that they “attempt[ed], in good faith, to secure a warrant 20 or to present evidence explaining why a telephone warrant was 21 unavailable or impractical.” 22 Exigent Fisher v. City of San Jose, 509 F.3d 952, Therefore, when Id. at 961. Defendants make two arguments in support of their contention that 23 the exigency exception justified their warrantless entry. 24 Defendants argue their entry was justified because they believed a 25 burglarly had either occurred or was in progress at Plaintiff’s 26 apartment. 27 the following observations made upon their arrival at Plaintiff’s 28 apartment gave them probable cause to believe Plaintiff’s apartment (Opp’n. to Mot. for Summ. J. 13-14.) 12 First, Defendants contend 1 had been burglarized or that a burglarly was in progress: the door was 2 open late at night, a light was on, the stove was on, rice was on the 3 kitchen floor, and there was no response to the announcement of police 4 presence. 5 probable cause to enter [Plaintiff’s apartment], we examine the 6 totality of the circumstances known to the officers at the time they 7 entered. 8 substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing that 9 such activity occurred.” (Opp’n. 12:17-24.) “To determine if the officers had Probable cause requires only a fair probability or Murdock v. Stout, 54 F.3d 1437, 1441 (9th 10 Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by, LaLonde v. County of 11 Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2000). 12 Defendants argue the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Murdock v. Stout 13 supports their position that they were authorized to enter Plaintiff’s 14 apartment without a warrant to investigate a potential burglary. 15 F.3d at 1442. 16 the police were dispatched to the plaintiff’s house to investigate a 17 report of suspicious activity suggesting a potential burglary. 18 1441. 19 rear of the house. 20 Circuit concluded there was not probable cause to support the 21 officers’ entry. 22 several indications that a resident was or should have been at the 23 residence. 24 officers [then] attempted to make contact with the resident . . . but 25 received no answer . . . .” 26 “[t]hese additional pieces of information, indicating that a resident 27 should have been home, but was not responding, combined with the 28 earlier report of suspicious activity and the presence of an open door 54 Murdock, however, is distinguishable since in that case Id. at Upon their arrival, the officers discovered an open door at the Id. Id. Based upon these facts alone, the Ninth However, the officers in Murdock also “observed The lights were on and a television was on . . . . Id. at 1442. 13 The The Ninth Circuit held that 1 tip[ped] the scales to supply the officers with probable cause to 2 believe that some criminal activity had occurred or was occurring 3 . . . .” Id. at 1442. Further, the Ninth Circuit explicitly noted 4 in Murdock “there was no indication . . . that the officers were using 5 their burglary investigation as a pretext for conducting a search for 6 evidence in Murdock’s home.” 7 Id. at 1442-43. Here, the situation is different. Defendants were not 8 responding to a reported burglary; they went to Plaintiff’s apartment 9 to speak with Plaintiff about a reported assault. Defendants’ 10 observations that Plaintiff’s door was open at night, that a light and 11 the stove were on, that rice was on the floor, and that there was no 12 response to their announcement of their presence, did not give them 13 probable cause to believe a burglarly had occurred or was in progress. 14 Further, upon entry into Plaintiff’s apartment, Defendants did not 15 look for additional evidence of a burglary; rather, they found 16 Plaintiff in bed and attempted to speak with him regarding the assault 17 Kearney had reported. 18 Defendants’ after-the-fact argument that a potential burglary 19 justified their entry appears to be a pre-textual basis for entering 20 Plaintiff’s apartment to investigate Kearney’s assault allegations. 21 (Pl.’s Opp’n. to Defs.’ SAUF ¶ 15.) Moreover, even “[i]f a burglary had occurred in the recent past, 22 there was no need for the police to enter [Plaintiff’s apartment]. 23 The only possible basis for finding exigent circumstances is if the 24 facts support a finding that the police had a legitimate reason to 25 believe that a burglary was in progress.” 26 No. 89-000136A, 1990 WL 320756, at *4 (D. Guam Feb. 16, 1990). 27 Defendants “bear[] the burden of showing the existence of exigent 28 circumstances by particularized evidence, and this burden is not 14 Guam v. Manibusan, Crim. 1 satisfied by mere speculation” that a burglary was in progress. 2 Baily v. Newland, 263 F.3d 1022, 1033 (9th Cir. 2001)(citations and 3 quotations omitted). 4 Defendants alternatively argue, given Kearney’s report and the 5 condition of Plaintiff’s apartment upon their arrival, there was 6 probable cause to believe that the crime of either assault or battery 7 had been committed there earlier and “exigency existed to immediately 8 investigate . . . .” 9 demonstrated that their entry and search was supported by any exigency 10 making it reasonable for them to enter Plaintiff’s apartment without a 11 warrant. 12 that there is insufficient time to obtain a warrant; therefore, the 13 [Defendants] must show that a warrant could not have been obtained in 14 time.” 15 Defendants simply posit that “exigency existed to avoid the improper 16 frustration of legitimate law enforcement efforts.” 17 for Summ. J. 13:27-28.) 18 warrant, and have not explained why a telephone warrant was 19 unavailable or impractical. 20 burden of showing an exigency excused the warrant requirement, the 21 exigency exception does not justify their entry into Plaintiff’s 22 apartment to investigate the reported assault. 23 exigency exception does not sanction Defendants’ actions. 24 2. 25 (Opp’n. 14:2.) Defendants, however, have not “[T]he presence of exigent circumstances necessarily implies Baily, 263 F.3d at 1033 (citations and quotations omitted). (Opp’n. to Mot. Defendants made no attempt to obtain a Since Defendants have not sustained their Therefore, the The Warrantless Arrest Plaintiff also argues Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment 26 rights by arresting him in his home without a warrant. 27 counter the arrest was justified on two grounds. 28 they had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for the assault Kearney 15 Defendants First, they contend 1 reported. 2 intoxication, the open door, the violent nature of the crime of an 3 assault with a [butcher knife], and the clear potential of Plaintiff 4 presenting a danger to the community at large, but more specifically 5 of potential further assault of Kearney . . . .” 6 Defendants also assert they had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff 7 under California Penal Code Section 148 for delaying or obstructing a 8 police officer.3 9 “Plaintiff with close[d] fists” provided exigent circumstances to 10 11 Defendants argue “exigency is established by Plaintiff’s (Opp’n. 20:16-19.) Defendants contend that their observations of effectuate the arrest. (Opp’n. 21:1.) “[T]he warrantless arrest of a person is a species of seizure” 12 that under the Fourth Amendment, must be reasonable to be 13 constitutional. 14 Amendment protects against warrantless arrest inside a person’s home 15 in the same fashion that it protects against warrantless searches of 16 the home, which is to say that police officers may not execute a 17 warrantless arrest in a home unless they have both probable cause and 18 exigent circumstances.” 19 arrested Plaintiff in his home without a warrant, the arrest is 20 constitutional only if Defendants can demonstrate both probable cause 21 and exigent circumstances. 22 Payton v New York, 445 U.S. 573, (1980). Hopkins, 573 F.3d at 773. “The Fourth Since Defendants Defendants’ first argument - that they properly arrested 23 Plaintiff for the reported assault - fails to satisfy the requirements 24 of the Fourth Amendment. Defendants’ arrest of Plaintiff on this 25 3 26 27 28 California Penal Code Section 148(a)(1) provides that “[e]very person who willfully resists, delays or obstructs any public officer . . . . in the discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of his or her office or employment . . . shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, or by both that fine and imprisonment.” 16 1 ground was unreasonable for the same reasons that Defendants’ entry 2 was impermissible. 3 illegal, the arrest was as well.” 4 Washington, 287 Fed. Appx. 568, 574 (9th Cir. 2008). 5 See Hopkins, 573 F.3d at 773. “[I]f the entry was Gallagher v. City of Winlock Defendants’ second argument - that Plaintiff was permissibly 6 arrested for a violation of California Penal Code Section 148 7 (“Section 148”) - is also unpersuasive. 8 of Section 148(a)(1) are: “(1) the [individual] willfully resisted, 9 delayed, or obstructed a peace officer, (2) when the officer was The elements of a violation 10 engaged in the performance of his or her duties, and (3) the 11 [individual] knew or reasonably should have known that the other 12 person was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or her 13 duties.” 14 However, “[i]n California, the lawfulness of the officer’s conduct is 15 an essential element of the offense of resisting, delaying, or 16 obstructing a peace officer.” 17 entered Plaintiff’s apartment, Plaintiff’s refusal to answer questions 18 relating to the assault or to cooperate with the police officer’s 19 investigation cannot be the basis of a constitutional arrest under 20 Section 148. 21 148 violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable 22 seizure. 23 24 Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 695 (9th Cir. 2005). Id. Since Defendants unlawfully Therefore, Defendants’ arrest of Plaintiff under Section B. Defendants’ Motion for Qualified Immunity Each Defendant argues even if his actions violated Plaintiff’s 25 Fourth Amendment rights, the defense of qualified immunity shields him 26 from liability.4 The qualified immunity analysis hinges upon whether 27 28 4 Plaintiff has not agreed to treat Defendants’ version of events (continued...) 17 1 Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights were clearly established in 2007 2 when Defendants engaged in the unconstitutional conduct. 3 573 F.3d at 770-71. 4 [constitutional] right must be sufficiently clear [so] that a 5 reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates 6 [the constitutional right at issue]. 7 whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was 8 unlawful in the situation he confronted. 9 to what the law requires is reasonable, the officer is entitled to the See Hopkins, “To be clearly established, the contours of the The dispositive inquiry is If the officer’s mistake as 10 [qualified] immunity defense.” 11 F.3d 1012, 1020 (9th Cir. 2009)(quotations and citations omitted). 12 1. 13 Ramierz v. City of Buena Park, 560 Application of Qualified Immunity to Defendants’ Warrantless Entry The standard articulated in United States v. Cervantes 14 in 2000, clearly established that “[t]he police must have reasonable 15 grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate 16 need for their assistance” to be justified in making a warrantless 17 entry into a residence. 18 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled by, U.S. v. Snipe, 515 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 19 2008)(articulating applicable standard for emergency exception); see 20 also Hopkins, 573 F.3d at 771. 21 [however,]. . . presents a somewhat different question than whether 22 there were reasonable grounds to believe that there was an emergency 23 at hand; [instead,] in determining whether the officers’ conduct 24 violated clearly established law, [the court] must ask whether in United States v. Cervantes, 219 F.3d 882, 888 The “qualified immunity analysis 25 4 26 27 28 (...continued) as true for the purpose of decision on each Defendant’s qualified immunity motion. However, since it is determined that each Defendant fails to prevail on his qualified immunity defense using Defendants’ version of the facts, it is unnecessary to discuss the parties’ factual disputes. 18 1 200[7,] a ‘reasonable officer’ would have known that he lacked 2 reasonable grounds to believe that there was an emergency at hand.” 3 Hopkins, 573 F.3d at 771 (quotations and citation omitted)(emphasis in 4 original). 5 “[A] reasonable officer would indeed have known that the 6 emergency exception to the Fourth Amendment would not encompass a 7 warrantless entry” on the facts of this case. 8 771. 9 apartment upon Defendants arrival, a reasonable officer would have Hopkins, 573 F.3d at Based upon Kearney’s report and the condition of Plaintiff’s 10 concluded that he lacked reasonable grounds for believing there was an 11 emergency necessitating an immediate need of assistance. 12 evidence the officers have provided does not contain adequate 13 justification for their entry, it can be concluded that “it would have 14 been clear to a reasonable officer that such [an entry] was unlawful.” 15 Id. at 771 (quotations and citation omitted). 16 qualified immunity motion under the emergency exception is denied. 17 When the Therefore, Defendants The contours of the exigency exception were also well-defined in 18 2007. 19 exception required the presence of both probable cause and exigent 20 circumstances. 21 2005); U.S. v. Lai, 944 F.2d 1434, 1441 (9th Cir. 1991)(abrogated on 22 other grounds). 23 and search does not eliminate the need for a search warrant absent 24 exigent circumstances.” 25 Cir. 2001). 26 At that time, it was clearly established that the exigency See U.S. v. Martinez, 406 F.3d 1160, 1164 (9th Cir. Further, “the existence of probable cause to arrest Bailey v. Newland, 263 F.3d 1022, 1033 (9th Since a reasonable officer should have known that “exigent 27 circumstances necessarily imply insufficient time to obtain a 28 warrant,” and that mere investigation of a crime does not itself 19 1 create an exigency justifying a warrantless entry into a residence, 2 Defendants qualified immunity argument under this exception is 3 unavailing. 4 also Groh v. Ramierz, 540 U.S. 551, 558 (2004)(noting that “a 5 warrantless entry to search for weapons or contraband even when a 6 felony has been committed and there is probable cause to believe that 7 incriminating evidence will be found within” is unlawful absent 8 exigent circumstances). 9 known that the condition of Plaintiff’s apartment upon Defendants’ U.S. v. Lindsey, 877 F.2d 777, 781 (9th Cir. 1989); see Further, a reasonable officer would have 10 arrival, did not “[give] rise to exigent circumstances justifying [a] 11 warrantless entry . . . .” 12 denied on this ground. 13 2. Id. Therefore, Defendants’ motion is also Application of Qualified Immunity to Defendants’ Warrantless Arrest 14 In 2007, it was well-established that an arrest constitutes a 15 seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. See Hopkins, 573 F.3d 16 at 774. “There can be no doubt that the law in this respect was 17 clearly established prior to 200[7] and thus should have been known by 18 a reasonable officer.” Id. Moreover, a reasonable officer would have 19 known that a warrantless arrest within Plaintiff’s home required the 20 presence of both probable cause and exigent circumstances. See Kirk 21 v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638 (2002)(holding that both exigent 22 circumstances and probable cause are required to justify a warrantless 23 arrest inside the home). 24 In light of Defendants’ unlawful entry, no reasonable officer 25 would have believed that Plaintiff could have been arrested for 26 violating California Penal Code Section 148(a). Further, no 27 reasonable officer would have believed exigent circumstances existed 28 20 1 to arrest Plaintiff for the reported assault. 2 motion is also denied on this ground. 3 4 C. Therefore, Defendants’ Plaintiff’s Claims Under California Civil Code Section 52.1 Plaintiff also seeks partial summary judgment on his claims under 5 California Civil Code section 52.1, in which he alleges Defendants’ 6 “actions constituted interference with [P]laintiff’s rights under the 7 Fourth Amendment.” 8 52.1(b) provides that “[a]ny individual whose exercise or enjoyment of 9 rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . (Not. of Mot. for Partial Summ. J. 1.) Section 10 has been interfered with . . . may institute and prosecute . . . a 11 civil action for damages . . . and other appropriate equitable relief 12 . . . .” 13 address his claims under section 52.1 in his motion and provides no 14 authority supporting his conclusory argument under Section 52.1. 15 Therefore, this portion of Plaintiff’s motion is denied. Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(b). 16 17 V. Plaintiff, however, fails to CONCLUSION For the stated reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary 18 judgment on his Fourth Amendment claims based on Defendants’ 19 warrantless entry into his apartment and his subsequent arrest is 20 GRANTED and Plaintiff’s motion under California Civil Code section 21 52.1 is DENIED. 22 Dated: Defendants’ motions are DENIED. January 6, 2010 23 24 25 GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR. United States District Judge 26 27 28 21
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