(PC) Dent v. Silbaugh et al, No. 2:2008cv00736 - Document 66 (E.D. Cal. 2011)
Court Description: FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge John F. Moulds on 02/17/11 recommending that defendant's 07/02/10 motion for summary judgment be granted. MOTION for SUMMARY JUDGMENT 55 referred to Judge Morrison C. England Jr. Objections due within 14 days. (Plummer, M)
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(PC) Dent v. Silbaugh et al Doc. 66 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 BRIAN KEITH DENT, 11 Plaintiff, 12 13 No. 2:08-cv-0736-MCE-JFM (PC) vs. D. SILBAUGH, et al., 14 Defendants. 15 FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS / 16 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding before the court with a civil rights action 17 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is proceeding on the first claim in plaintiff’s third 18 amended complaint filed May 1, 2009.1 Therein, plaintiff claims that defendant Murthy filed a 19 false rules violation report against plaintiff in retaliation for plaintiff’s acts of filings a grievance 20 and another complaint against defendant Murthy. This matter is before the court on defendant 21 Murthy’s motion for summary judgment. 22 ///// 23 ///// 24 25 26 1 The remaining claims raised in the third amended complaint have been dismissed without prejudice due to plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to suit. See Order filed January 6, 2010. 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 2 SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS UNDER RULE 56 Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists “no 3 genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 4 matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 5 Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 6 8 always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. 9 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “[W]here the 7 10 nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary 11 judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers 12 to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, 13 after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing 14 sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that 15 party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof 16 concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts 17 immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as 18 whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary 19 judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323. 20 If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the 21 opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See 22 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to 23 establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the 24 allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the 25 form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the 26 dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party 2 1 must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome 2 of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 3 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 4 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could 5 return a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 6 1436 (9th Cir. 1987). 7 In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party 8 need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the 9 claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing 10 versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary 11 judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a 12 genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory 13 committee’s note on 1963 amendments). 14 In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, 15 depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 16 any. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson, 17 477 U.S. at 255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the 18 court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 19 Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to 20 produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen 21 Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 22 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply 23 show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken 24 as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 25 ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted). 26 ///// 3 1 On July 30, 2008, the court advised plaintiff of the requirements for opposing a 2 motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154 3 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999), and Klingele v. 4 Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988). 5 6 ANALYSIS Defendant Murthy advances three grounds in support of his motion for summary 7 judgment. First, he contends that there is no evidence that his action in issuing the rules violation 8 report did not advance a legitimate penological interest and that the evidence shows that his 9 action did advance legitimate penological interests. Second, he contends that there is no 10 11 12 evidence of retaliatory intent. Finally, he contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity. A. Undisputed Facts At all times relevant to this action plaintiff was an inmate at California Medical 13 Facility (CMF) in Vacaville, California, and defendant Murthy was a licensed psychologist 14 working at CMF. In 2006, defendant Murthy was plaintiff’s treating psychologist in the 15 enhanced outpatient (EOP) program at CMF. Defendant Murthy recommended to an 16 interdisciplinary treatment team (IDTT) that plaintiff be transferred to a Correctional Clinical 17 Case Management System (CCCMS) level of care. In January 2007, the IDTT informed plaintiff 18 that he would be transferred to CCCMS at an IDTT hearing in April 2007. In the same month, 19 plaintiff assisted another inmate in filing a grievance against defendant Murthy for providing 20 substandard mental health care. In February 2007, plaintiff filed a CDC Form 1824 Reasonable 21 Accommodation Request requesting to remain at the EOP level of care and to be assigned to Dr. 22 Bruce, another psychologist. 23 The IDTT meeting to transfer plaintiff to CCCMS was held on April 6, 2007. 24 Both plaintiff and defendant Murthy were present at the meeting. At the meeting, plaintiff told 25 the IDTT that defendant Murthy was making plaintiff “sick in the stomach”, making plaintiff’s 26 psychological problems worse, and that plaintiff was experiencing suicidal and homicidal 4 1 thoughts. Declaration of Brian Keith Dent in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary 2 Judgment, filed July 21, 2010, at ¶ 172; Declaration of H. Murthy in Support of Motion for 3 Summary Judgment, filed July 2, 2010 (Murthy Declaration), at ¶ 11. Thereafter, defendant 4 Murthy filed a rules violation report charging plaintiff with threatening staff. After the IDTT 5 hearing, plaintiff was rehoused in a Department of Mental Health (DMH) facility. Ex. A to 6 Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts, Administrative Segregation Unit Placement Notice, 7 filed July 2, 2010. On May 21, 2007, plaintiff was released from DMH. Id. Two days later he 8 was placed in administrative segregation based on the events of April 6, 2007. Id. 9 A disciplinary hearing was held on May 17, 2007. Ex. A, Rules Violation Report 10 – Part C. At the disciplinary hearing, plaintiff pleaded not guilty and stated “I can not like 11 someone if I want to. But I did not threaten him.” Id. Plaintiff was found guilty of threatening 12 staff. Id The findings were based on defendant Murthy’s statement that plaintiff pointed at him 13 in a threatening and intimidating manner, and statements of two officers, contained in the 14 investigative employee’s supplemental report, who saw plaintiff point at defendant Murthy. Id. 15 One employee reported that plaintiff didn’t point at defendant Murthy when plaintiff said he had 16 homicidal thoughts; he pointed at defendant Murthy and said “I don’t like you.” Ex. A, Serious 17 Rules Violation Report. The hearing officer reduced the Serious Rules Violation Report to an 18 Administrative CDC 115, and plaintiff was warned and counseled. Ex. A, Rules Violation 19 Report – Part C. 20 ///// 21 ///// 22 23 24 25 26 2 In his opposition, which is not signed under penalty of perjury, plaintiff states that he told the IDTT he was experiencing suicidal and homicidal thoughts. In his declaration, which is signed under penalty of perjury, plaintiff aver, inter alia, that he told the IDTT that he was “experiencing suicide thoughts” but makes no reference to homicidal thoughts. Plaintiff’s opposition, however, demonstrates that he does not contest the evidence tendered by defendant Murthy, in the form of Murthy’s declaration, that plaintiff stated during the IDTT that he felt homicidal. 5 1 B. Legal Standards 2 Prison inmates have a right to be free from the filing of false disciplinary charges 3 in retaliation for the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.3 See Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 4 265 (1997). Retaliation against prisoners for activity protected by the First Amendment “is itself 5 a constitutional violation, and prohibited as a matter of ‘clearly established law.’ See Rhodes [v. 6 Robinson], 408 F.3d [559] at 566 [(9th Cir. 2005)]; Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 & n. 4 7 (9th Cir.1995).” Brodheim v. Cry, 583 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009). In Rhodes, the United 8 States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 9 set forth the five basic elements of a “viable claim of First Amendment retaliation” FN3 in the prison context: 10 FN3. Although Rhodes concerned a district court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the elements of the claim are the same on a motion for summary judgment. On summary judgment, however, the plaintiff must demonstrate there is a triable issue of material fact on each element of his claim, as opposed to merely alleging facts sufficient to state a claim. 11 12 13 14 15 (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. 408 F.3d at 567-68. See also Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir.1994) (per curiam). We also noted that a plaintiff who fails to allege a chilling effect may still state a claim if he alleges he suffered some other harm. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568 n. 11. 16 17 18 19 20 Brodheim, id. Plaintiff “bears the burden of pleading and proving the absence of legitimate 21 correctional goals for the conduct of which he complains” and, in assessing whether a 22 defendant’s action reasonably advanced a legitimate correctional goal, courts “should ‘afford 23 appropriate deference and flexibility’ to prison officials in the evaluation of proffered legitimate 24 penological reasons for conduct alleged to be retaliatory.” Pratt, 65 F.3d at 806-7. 25 26 3 This right is generally described as a substantive due process right. 6 1 The right to petition the government for a redress of grievances is a right protected 2 by the First Amendment. The right has been broadly construed to include “a person’s right to 3 seek redress from all branches of government.” Franco v. Kelly, 854 F.2d 584, 585-86 (2d Cir. 4 1988). Prison inmates are entitled to access to both administrative and judicial forums to seek 5 redress of grievances against state officials. Hines v. Gomez, 853 F.Supp. 329, 331 (N.D.Cal. 6 1994) (quoting Franco at 585-86). 7 C. Application 8 Defendant Murthy seeks summary judgment on the grounds that there is no 9 evidence either that his filing of the rules violation report did not reasonably advance a legitimate 10 correctional goal or that it was retaliatory. Defendant Murthy also contends that he is entitled to 11 qualified immunity. 12 Prison officials have a “valid interest in the peaceable operation of the prison 13 through the insistence on respect, rather than through violent confrontation.” Bradley v. Hall, 64 14 F.3d 1276, 1281 (9th Cir. 1995), abrogated in part on other grounds by Shaw v. Murphy, 532 15 U.S. 223 (2001). Disciplining an inmate for threatening staff is consistent with this legitimate 16 correctional goal. The undisputed evidence shows that during the IDTT hearing on April 6, 17 2007, plaintiff stated that he felt suicidal and homicidal and that he pointed at defendant Murthy 18 and stated that he didn’t like Murthy. In response to this incident, defendant Murthy filed a 19 CDC-115 Rules Violation Report charging plaintiff with threatening staff. Defendant Murthy 20 wrote: 21 22 23 24 25 On 4/6/2007, at approximately 0940 hours, treatment team met with Inmate DENT, B. . . . and informed him that the team had decided that he no longer required EOP level of care and was appropriate for CCCMS. Inmate Dent became hostile and angry, stating, I’m having homicidal thoughts. I can’t be around this man.” He pointed at me in a threatening and intimidating manner. This is clearly a verbal threat to kill me and I believe that Inmate Dent is capable of acting on this stated threat. It also appears that this is an attempt to manipulate staff through intimidation as he is demanding to remain EOP. 26 7 1 Ex. A to Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts. Plaintiff does not dispute that he made the 2 statements attributed to him, nor does he dispute that he pointed at defendant Murthy. Defendant 3 Murthy interpreted plaintiff’s behavior as a threat against him and issued the rules violation 4 report. 5 Defendant Murthy avers that he issued the rules violation report “in order to: (1) 6 put Mr. Dent on notice that his behavior was inappropriate, and to deter Mr. Dent from engaging 7 in future dangerous and threatening behavior; and (2) to place other correctional and medical 8 staff on notice of Mr. Dent’s dangerous and threatening behavior so that they could take 9 appropriate steps to prevent him from engaging in any similar future behavior; and (2) to protect 10 my own safety and security and the safety and security of the institution” and that his “sole 11 motivation was to attempt to deter any future misbehavior by [plaintiff] so as to ensure the safety 12 and security of the institution.” Murthy Declaration at ¶¶ 13-14. Given the specific facts that are 13 undisputed, and the deference that must be afforded to prison officials in assessing whether the 14 challenged action reasonably advanced a legitimate correctional goal, this court finds that 15 plaintiff cannot meet his burden of proving an absence of legitimate correctional goals for 16 defendant Murthy’s action in issuing the rules violation report. For that reason, defendant 17 Murthy is entitled to summary judgment. 18 19 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendant’s July 2, 2010 motion for summary judgment be granted. 20 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 21 Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen 22 days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 23 objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 24 “Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 25 shall be served and filed within ten (10) days after service of the objections. The parties are 26 ///// 8 1 advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the 2 District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 3 DATED: February 17, 2011. 4 5 6 7 8 12 dent0736.m sj 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 9
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