Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians v. United States Department of the Interior et al, No. 1:2016cv00950 - Document 15 (E.D. Cal. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER Granting North Fork's 6 Motion to Intervene as a Matter of Right signed by District Judge Anthony W. Ishii on 10/21/2016. (Flores, E)
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Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians v. United States Department of the Interior et al Doc. 15 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 PICAYUNE RANCHERIA OF CHUKCHANSI INDIANS, 13 14 15 16 17 CASE NO. 1:16-CV-00950-AWI-EPG ORDER GRANTING NORTH FORK’S MOTION TO INTERVENE AS A MATTER OF RIGHT Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR; SALLY M. JEWELL, Secretary of the Interior; and LAWRENCE S. ROBERTS, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Indian Affairs, 18 Defendants. 19 20 21 I. Introduction The Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians (“Picayune”), a federally recognized 22 Indian tribe, owns and operates the Chukchansi Gold Resort and Casino, a class III gaming 23 facility in Coarsegold, California. Picayune has filed suit against the United States Department of 24 the Interior (“DOI”), the Secretary of the Interior (“the Secretary”) and the Assistant Secretary of 25 the DOI for Indian Affairs (“ASIA”), seeking a declaration of invalidity of several Secretarial 26 determinations surrounding class III gaming by the North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians 27 (“North Fork”) on a 305-acre parcel of land in Madera County (“the Madera Parcel”). North 28 Fork moves to intervene in this action permissively and as a matter of right. North Fork’s motion 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 is unopposed. It will be granted. II. Background1 2 3 In approximately 2004, North Fork purchased the Madera Parcel, just north of the city of 4 Madera and west of California State Highway 99. On March 1, 2005, North Fork submitted a 5 fee-to-trust application to the DOI, requesting that the DOI take the Madera Parcel into trust for 6 the benefit of the tribe pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”). The application was 7 supplemented on or about March 29, 2006, with a request for a two-part determination2 pursuant 8 to 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A). An Environmental Impact Study (“EIS”) was undertaken and the 9 results were published on August 6, 2010. “After reviewing the results of the EIS, the 10 submissions of state and local officials and surrounding Indian tribes, and the likely economic 11 impact on North Fork and the surrounding communities, the [ASIA] recommended approval of 12 (and requested the California Governor’s concurrence [in]) [North Fork’s] bid for acquisition … 13 [of the]Madera parcel[] [in trust by the United States] for the benefit of North Fork pursuant to 14 the [IRA] in anticipation of North Fork’s construction of a class III gaming facility as 15 contemplated by” the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”). North Fork v. California, Doc. 16 25 at 3. On August 30, 2012, Governor Brown issued a letter purporting to concur in the 17 Secretary’s two-part determination. On February 5, 2013, the United States took the Madera 18 parcel into trust for North Fork. In 2012, a Tribal-State gaming compact3 (“the 2012 compact”) was negotiated between 19 20 the State of California (“California”) and North Fork for gaming on the Madera Parcel. The 21 California Constitution provides that such a compact is not effective until it is “ratified in 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 The Court has previously set forth detailed histories of the conflict surrounding North Fork’s bid to conduct class III gaming on the Madera Parcel. See North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians of California v. State of California, No. 15-cv-419-AWI-SAB (“North Fork v. California”), Docs. 25, 46. Here, the Court only provides the facts necessary to resolve the instant motion to intervene. 2 The two-part determination of § 2719(b)(1)(A) provides an exception to the general prohibition on class III gaming on lands acquired after October 17, 1988, by asking if gaming on the newly acquired lands is in the best interest of the Indian tribe and its members, and if such gaming would be non-detrimental to the surrounding community. The two-part determination requires an affirmative finding on both questions by the Secretary of the Interior and concurrence by the Governor of the State in which the gaming activity is to be conducted. 3 IGRA requires an Indian tribe to conclude a Tribal-State compact, governing the ways in which gaming can be conducted, with the State in which the tribe seeks to conduct class III gaming before it is permitted to conduct class III gaming. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C). 2 1 accordance with State law….” Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19(f). On June 27, 2013, the California 2 legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 277 (“AB 277”), ratifying the 2012 compact. The Governor 3 signed AB 277 on July 3, 2013 and it was filed with the California Secretary of State. The then4 Secretary of State, Deborah Bowen, forwarded the compact to United States Secretary of the 5 Interior for review and approval pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8). On October 22, 2013, the 6 Assistant Secretary of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, issued notice that the compact 7 between the State and North Fork was approved (to the extent that it was consistent with IGRA). 8 Notice of Tribal-State Class III Gaming Compact taking effect, 78 FR 62649-01 (Oct. 22, 2013). 9 On July 19, 2013, a ballot summary and title were issued by the Attorney General of 10 California’s office for what would be commonly known as California Proposition 48 – 11 Referendum on Indian Gaming Compacts (2014). On October 1, 2013, proponents of the 12 referendum submitted 784,571 signatures from registered voters in support of placing 13 Proposition 48 on the ballot for the November 2014 election. The then-Secretary of State, Debra 14 Bowen, certified that the signatures submitted contained a sufficient number of valid signatures 15 to place the matter on the ballot. See Cal. Const., art. II, § 9(b). On November 4, 2014, California 16 voters voted on Proposition 48. Sixty-one percent of voters voted against the ratification of the 17 North Fork compact. 18 The Court omits discussion of the multiple litigations related to North Fork’s planned 19 class III gaming facility on the Madera Parcel. Instead, it is sufficient to note that the following 20 actions are related to this case: North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians v. State of California, No. 21 1:15-cv-00419-AWI-SAB (E.D. Cal.), Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior and 22 Picayune Rancheria v. United States, consolidated as Case No. 1:12-cv-02039-BAH (D.D.C.), 23 Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians v. Brown, Madera County Case No. MCV 072004 24 (California Superior Court, County of Madera), Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians v. 25 Brown, Case No. C074506 (California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District), and Stand Up 26 for California! v. State of California, Case No. F069302 (California Court of Appeal, Fifth 27 Appellate District). 28 /// 3 1 III. Discussion 2 A. Legal Standard 3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 provides for both intervention as a matter of right and 4 permissive intervention. A court must permit an applicant to intervene when: 5 6 7 8 9 10 (1) it has a significant protectable interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action; (2) the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect its interest; (3) the application is timely; and (4) the existing parties may not adequately represent the applicant's interest. [citation] [¶] Each of these four requirements must be satisfied to support a right to intervene. [citation] While Rule 24 traditionally receives liberal construction in favor of applicants for intervention. [citation], it is incumbent on the party seeking to intervene to show that all the requirements for intervention have been met. [citation]. 11 Chamness v. Bowen, 722 F.3d 1110, 1121 (9th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks and citations 12 omitted); accord Smith v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 830 F.3d 843, 853 (9th Cir. 2016); 13 see Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). Even where a party does not have a right to intervene, a district 14 court may permit intervention where the party “has a claim or defense that shares with the main 15 action a common question of law or fact” and such intervention will not “unduly delay or 16 prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). 17 B. Timeliness 18 The timeliness inquiry considers the totality of the circumstances, with a focus on three 19 factors: (1) the stage of the proceedings, (2) the prejudice to the other parties, and (3) the reason 20 for any delay. Timeliness is measured from the date that the putative intervenor “should have 21 been aware [that its] interests would [not] be protected adequately by the parties….” Chamness, 22 722 F.3d at 1121 (citation omitted). 23 At the time of filing of this motion, the Secretary had not filed an answer and the Court 24 had yet to hold an initial scheduling conference; essentially the only item before the Court was 25 Picayune’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). Temporally, North Fork’s motion was filed 26 fewer than thirty days after Picayune filed its FAC. North Fork filed its motion at an early stage 27 of the proceedings. See Citizens for Balanced Use v. Montana Wilderness Ass’n, 647 F.3d 893, 28 897 (9th Cir. 2011) (a putative intervenor’s motion was timely where it was filed “less than three 4 1 months after the complaint was filed and less than two weeks after the [defendant] filed its 2 answer….”) 3 Neither of the present parties identifies any prejudice that either would suffer if North 4 Fork were permitted to intervene. The Court does not anticipate any prejudice to the parties if 5 North Fork is permitted to intervene. 6 No explanation for delay in filing a motion to intervene is necessary here; North Fork’s 7 promptly filed its motion. North Fork’s motion to intervene is timely. 8 C. Protectable Interest 9 Whether a putative intervenor has a sufficiently protectable interest “is a practical, 10 threshold inquiry.” Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.2d 810, 818 (9th 11 Cir. 2001); accord California ex rel. Lockyer v. United States, 450 F.3d 436, 441 (9th Cir.2006). 12 To demonstrate such an interest, prospective intervenor must establish that “the interest 13 [asserted] is protectable under some law, and that there is a relationship between the legally 14 protected interest and the claims at issue.” Southwest Center for Biological Diversity, 268 F.2d at 15 818. Where injunctive or declaratory relief is sought, a putative intervenor has a significantly 16 protectable interest in an action when “the relief sought by plaintiffs will have direct, immediate, 17 and harmful effects” upon its interest. Southwest Center for Biological Diversity, 268 F.2d at 18 818. 19 Here, Picayune seeks relief that would prevent North Fork from conducting class III 20 gaming on the Madera Parcel and could result in the Madera Parcel no longer being Indian Land 21 at all. North Fork would be the entity primarily impacted if Picayune is granted the relief it 22 seeks. It is well established that an Indian tribe has a protectable interest in an action challenging 23 an agency’s determination when reversal of that determination would have an impact on the 24 tribal land. See, e.g., Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Bank of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 25 S.Ct. 2199, 2204 (2012); No Casino in Plymouth v. United States Department of Interior, 2013 26 WL 5159011, *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2013). This case is no exception; North Fork has a 27 significant protectable interest in this action. 28 /// 5 1 D. Practical Impairment of Protectable Interest 2 In order to satisfy the third prong of the intervention of right inquiry, North Fork’s 3 interests the case must be such that its resolution will have an actual effect on it. Arakaki v. 4 Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir. 2003). Disposition of this case could, as a practical 5 matter, have an impact on North Fork’s interest in maintaining the Indian lands status of and 6 conducting class III gaming on the Madera Parcel. Because the relief sought by Picayune would 7 directly impair North Fork’s interest, litigation of this action without North Fork would render 8 North Fork unable to protect its interest. 9 E. Adequacy of Present Representation. 10 The showing required is minimal to establish that the existing parties may not adequately 11 represent the putative intervenor. Arakaki, 324 F.3d at 1086. 12 The Secretary contends that the federal defendants adequately represent North Fork’s 13 interest. The Secretary’s interest—to defend her determinations and the determinations of the 14 assistant secretary—are certainly in line with North Fork’s interest. However, as North Fork 15 points out, at least one action by the Secretary (proscribing procedures by which North Fork 16 could conduct class III gaming) was taken as a result of relief sought by North Fork from this 17 Court. Where governmental defendants take action as a result of successful litigation by a 18 putative intervenor, the governmental defendant’s interest in defending that action are presumed 19 to be less strong than the intervenor’s interest. See Citizens for Balanced Use v. Montana 20 Wilderness Ass’n, 647 F.2d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 2011). 21 Moreover, some Picayune’s claims are more related to conduct by the State of California 22 than to conduct by the Secretary. The federal defendants’ interest in defending determinations by 23 California that directly impact North Fork is certainly less than North Fork’s interest in 24 defending determinations by California that directly impact North Fork. 25 The federal defendants may not adequately represent North Fork’s interests. 26 F. Conclusion 27 North Fork will be permitted to intervene in this action as a matter of right. Even if that 28 were that not the case, North Fork would be permitted to permissively intervene because it “has a 6 1 … defense that shares with the main action … common question[s] of law or fact” and North 2 Fork’s intervention will not “unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ 3 rights.” 4 IV. Order 5 Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that North Fork’s motion to 6 intervene is GRANTED. 7 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 Dated: October 21, 2016 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 7
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