Beco Dairy Automation, Inc. v. Global Tech Systems, Inc., No. 1:2012cv01310 - Document 138 (E.D. Cal. 2016)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: Global Tech Systems Inc.'s 114 Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike Counterclaim and Answer of Stan Brown; ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 114 , signed by District Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill on 02/26/2016. (Martin-Gill, S)
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1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 4 5 BECO DAIRY AUTOMATION, Inc., Plaintiff, 6 MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: GLOBAL TECH SYSTEMS INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE COUNTERCLAIM AND ANSWER OF STAN BROWN (Doc. 114) v. 7 8 1:12-cv-01310 LJO SMS GLOBAL TECH SYSTEMS, Inc. and DOES 150, 9 Defendants. 10 GLOBAL TECH SYSTEMS, Inc., A New 11 Mexico Corporation 12 13 Counterclaimant, v. 14 BECO DAIRY AUTOMATION, INC., a California Corporation, and STAN BROWN, 15 an individual, 16 Counter-defendants. 17 18 I. INTRODUCTION 19 20 This litigation involves a dispute between Beco Dairy Inc. (“BECO”) and Global Tech Systems, Inc. (“GTS”) concerning the development and distribution of dairy technology. 21 II. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE 22 The procedural history of this case has been documented repeatedly in previous orders. E.g. Doc. 23 128. BECO’s fifth amended complaint is operative and alleges claims arising under contract, tort and 24 patent law against GTS. Doc. 81. GTS filed an answer and several counterclaims on August 3, 2015. 25 1 1 Doc. 95. The counterclaims added Stan Brown as a counter-defendant. Id. Its amended answer and 2 counterclaims (“FAA”), Doc. 107, are operative. On November 5, 2015, Stan Brown filed an Answer to 3 the FAA, (“Brown Answer”), Doc. 110, and his own cross claims (“Brown Claims”) against GTS, 4 Robert and Agnes Borchert (“the Borcherts”), Antonio Fematt and Madison One Holdings, LLC 5 (“Madison”). Doc. 110-1 ¶¶ 2-5. Brown alleges that the cross-defendants are liable for interference with 6 prospective economic advantage (Count I), breach of contract (Counts II & III), breach of fiduciary duty 7 (Counts IV & V), and negligence (Count VI). Brown Claims ¶¶ 61, 68, 80, 84, 90, 95. Brown also seeks 8 a declaratory judgment against GTS regarding the validity of several patents at issue (Count VII). Id. ¶ 9 97-99. 10 On November 30, 2015 GTS moved to dismiss Brown’s first six claims pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) 11 and to strike several of his defenses pursuant to rule 12(f). Mem. of P. & A. in Support of GTS’s Mot. to 12 Dismiss Countercl. And Mot. to Strike (“MTD”), Doc. 114-1. Brown filed an opposition on December 13 30, 2015. Stan Brown’s Opp’n, (“Opposition”), Doc. 126. GTS timely replied. Reply, Doc. 129. The 14 matter was taken off-calendar pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). Doc. 123. 15 On January 25, 2016 the other third party defendants moved to dismiss Counts I through VI on 16 the basis that this Court does not have personal jurisdiction over them. Doc. 131. In an order filed 17 concurrently with this one, the Court transferred these claims to the U.S. District Court for the District of 18 New Mexico, as to all cross-defendants. The Court severed and retained Count VII (alleged only against 19 GTS and intimately related to the underlying cases). Because Counts I through VI are no longer before 20 this Court, Defendant’s motion to dismiss them is moot. Accordingly, this order only addresses 21 Defendant’s motion to strike. 22 III. STANDARD OF DECISION 23 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that a court may “order stricken from any 24 pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” 25 “Immaterial matter is that which has no essential or important relationship to the claim for relief or the 2 1 defenses being pleaded.... Impertinent’ matter consists of statements that do not pertain, and are not 2 necessary, to the issues in question.” Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir.1993) 3 (citing 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 4 2d, § 1382, pp. 706–07, 711 (1990)), rev’d. on other grounds, 510 U.S. 517 (1994). “Redundant” 5 allegations are those that are needlessly repetitive or wholly foreign to the issues involved in the action. 6 Gilbert v. Eli Lilly Co., Inc., 56 F.R.D. 116, 121, n. 4 (D.P.R.1972). Immaterial matter “is that which has 7 no essential or important relationship to the claim for relief or the defenses being pleaded.” California 8 Dept. of Toxic Substance Control v. ALCO Pacific, Inc., 217 F.Supp.2d 1028, 1032 (C.D.Cal.2002) 9 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Impertinent material “consists of statements that do not 10 pertain, or are not necessary to the issues in question.” Id. The purpose of a Rule 12(f) motion is to avoid 11 the costs that arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial. See 12 Fogerty, 984 F.2d at 1527; Sidney–Vinstein v. A .H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). 13 14 IV. ANALYSIS GTS characterizes Brown’s fourth through seventh and tenth through eighteenth affirmative 15 defenses, as well as the last three sentences in his eighth affirmative defense as patent-related defenses 16 that have no bearing on Brown since he was not named as a defendant in GTS’s patent law counter 17 claims. MTD at 13. GTS seeks to strike these defenses as immaterial. Id. at 14. Brown responds that he 18 read Counts VIII and IX of GTS’s counter claims as alleging patent claims against him. Opposition at 2. 19 This is based on the fact that GTS incorporated its patent law claims by reference into two copyright 20 counts alleged against Brown. Id. at 8-9. Upon review of GTS’s counterclaims, the Court finds it 21 obvious that GTS only alleged its patent law claims against BECO; while it alleged copyright 22 infringement claims against BECO and Brown. Doc. 95 ¶¶ 406-687. To the extent that this was ever 23 unclear, GTS’s briefs on the topic remove any doubt. MTD at 12-14, Reply at 7-9. The Court therefore 24 agrees with GTS that these defenses are immaterial and should be stricken. Quintana v. Baca, 233 25 F.R.D. 562, 565 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (striking affirmative defenses against claims that had not been 3 1 pleaded). Because it would be futile at this time, Plaintiff is not granted leave to amend these defenses. 2 For these reasons the Court GRANTS GTS’s motion to strike Brown’s fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, tenth, 3 eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenths affirmative 4 defense, as well as the last three sentences in his eighth affirmative defense. V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 5 6 7 8 9 10 For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendant’s motion to dismiss and to strike, Doc. 114, as follows: Counts I-VI are no longer before this Court. Thus, the Court DENIES as MOOT Defendant’s request to dismiss them. The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to strike Brown’s fourth through seventh and tenth 11 through eighteenth affirmative defenses, as well as the last three sentences in his eighth affirmative 12 defense. 13 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 Dated: /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill February 26, 2016 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 4
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