Jacobs v. Hubbard
Filing
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ORDER to Petitioner to SHOW CAUSE in Thirty (30) Days Why The Petition Should Not Be Dismissed for Petitioner's Failure to Exhaust State Remedies, signed by Magistrate Judge Sheila K. Oberto on 6/20/11: Petitioner is forewarned that failure to follow this order will result in dismissal of the petition pursuant to Local Rule 110. (Hellings, J)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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GEORGE JACOBS IV,
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Petitioner,
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v.
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SUSAN HUBBARD, Warden, et al.,)
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Respondents.
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1:11-cv—00934-SKO-HC
ORDER TO PETITIONER TO SHOW CAUSE
IN THIRTY (30) DAYS WHY THE
PETITION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED
FOR PETITIONER’S FAILURE TO
EXHAUST STATE REMEDIES
(Doc. 1)
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Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in
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forma pauperis with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant
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to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
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Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 636(b)(1) and Local Rules
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302 and 303.
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which was filed in this Court on June 9, 2011.
The matter has been referred to the
Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s petition,
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I.
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Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United
Screening the Petition
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States District Courts (Habeas Rules) requires the Court to make
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a preliminary review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus.
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The Court must summarily dismiss a petition "[i]f it plainly
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appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the
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petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court....”
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Habeas Rule 4; O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir.
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1990); see also Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir.
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1990).
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grounds of relief available to the Petitioner; 2) state the facts
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supporting each ground; and 3) state the relief requested.
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Notice pleading is not sufficient; rather, the petition must
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state facts that point to a real possibility of constitutional
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error.
Habeas Rule 2(c) requires that a petition 1) specify all
Rule 4, Advisory Committee Notes, 1976 Adoption;
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O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d at 420 (quoting Blackledge v.
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Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n. 7 (1977)).
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that are vague, conclusory, or palpably incredible are subject to
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summary dismissal.
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Cir. 1990).
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Allegations in a petition
Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th
Further, the Court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas
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corpus either on its own motion under Habeas Rule 4, pursuant to
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the respondent's motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the
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petition has been filed.
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8, 1976 Adoption; see, Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1042-43
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(9th Cir. 2001).
Advisory Committee Notes to Habeas Rule
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II.
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A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to challenge
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collaterally a conviction by a petition for writ of habeas corpus
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must exhaust state judicial remedies.
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The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and
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gives the state court the initial opportunity to correct the
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state's alleged constitutional deprivations.
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Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509,
Exhaustion of State Court Remedies
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28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1).
Coleman v.
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518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1162-63 (9th Cir.
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1988).
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A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by
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providing the highest state court with the necessary jurisdiction
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a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before
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presenting it to the federal court, and demonstrating that no
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state remedy remains available.
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275-76 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir.
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1996).
Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270,
A federal court will find that the highest state court
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was given a full and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the
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petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's
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factual and legal basis.
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(1995) (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 9-10
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(1992), superceded by statute as stated in Williams v. Taylor,
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529 U.S. 362 (2000) (factual basis).
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Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365
Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the
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state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim.
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Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669
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(9th Cir. 2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Hiivala
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v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999); Keating v. Hood,
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133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998).
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States Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows:
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In Duncan, the United
In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275...(1971),
we said that exhaustion of state remedies requires that
petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the
state courts in order to give the State the
"'opportunity to pass upon and correct’ alleged
violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some
internal quotation marks omitted). If state courts are
to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations
of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be
alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting
claims under the United States Constitution. If a
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habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary
ruling at a state court trial denied him the due
process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment,
he must say so, not only in federal court, but in state
court.
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Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366.
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further in Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-69 (9th Cir.
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2000), as amended by Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-05 (9th
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Cir. 2001), stating:
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The Ninth Circuit examined the rule
Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly
presented" (and thus exhausted) his federal claims
in state court unless he specifically indicated to
that court that those claims were based on federal law.
See, Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir.
2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in Duncan,
this court has held that the petitioner must make the
federal basis of the claim explicit either by citing
federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even
if the federal basis is "self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding,
189 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v.
Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7... (1982)), or the underlying
claim would be decided under state law on the same
considerations that would control resolution of the claim
on federal grounds, see, e.g., Hiivala v. Wood, 195
F.3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon,
88 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996); Crotts, 73 F.3d
at 865.
...
In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert
the state court to the fact that the relevant claim is a
federal one without regard to how similar the state and
federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how
obvious the violation of federal law is.
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Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-69 (9th Cir. 2000), as
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amended by Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-05 (9th Cir.
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2001).
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Where none of a petitioner’s claims has been presented to
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the highest state court as required by the exhaustion doctrine,
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the Court must dismiss the petition.
Raspberry v. Garcia, 448
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F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478,
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481 (9th Cir. 2001).
The authority of a court to hold a mixed
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petition in abeyance pending exhaustion of the unexhausted claims
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has not been extended to petitions that contain no exhausted
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claims.
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Raspberry, 448 F.3d at 1154.
Where some claims are exhausted and others are not (i.e., a
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“mixed” petition), the Court must dismiss the petition without
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prejudice to give Petitioner an opportunity to exhaust the
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unexhausted claims if he can do so.
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22; Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Gordon), 107 F.3d 756,
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760 (9th Cir. 1997), en banc, cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 265 (1997);
Rose, 455 U.S. at 510, 521-
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Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1273 (9th
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cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1794 (1997).
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give a petitioner an opportunity to amend a mixed petition to
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delete the unexhausted claims and permit review of properly
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exhausted claims.
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United States Dist. Ct. (Taylor), 134 F.3d 981, 986 (9th Cir.
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1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 920 (1998); James v. Giles, 221
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F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000).
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Cir. 1997),
However, the Court must
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 520; Calderon v.
Here, Petitioner alleges that he is an inmate of the
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Corcoran State Prison serving a sentence of fifty-four (54) years
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to life for convictions on multiple counts of violating Cal. Pen.
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Code §§ 4501, 4501.5, 4502, and 4500 sustained in the Kings
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County Superior Court on January 8, 2010.
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alleges four claims in the petition: 1) with respect to
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Petitioner’s conviction in count 2 of battery by a prisoner on a
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non-confined person in violation of Cal. Pen. Code § 4501.5, the
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evidence failed to establish that Petitioner wilfully touched the
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victim in a harmful of offensive manner; 2) a concurrent prison
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term imposed on count four 4, possession of a deadly and
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(Pet. 1.)
Petitioner
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dangerous weapon by an inmate in violation of Cal. Pen. Code §
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4502(a), must be stayed because the evidence failed to
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demonstrate that Petitioner possessed a sharp instrument at any
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time other than when assaulted and battered correctional
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officers; 3) the trial court abused it discretion by imposing a
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consecutive sentence on count 6, aggravated assault while serving
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a life sentence in violation of Cal. Pen. Code § 4500, instead of
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imposing a concurrent term; and 4) Petitioner’s sentence
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constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the state and
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federal constitutions.
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(Pet. 6-9.)
With respect to Petitioner’s presentation of his claims to
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the state courts, Petitioner alleges that he presented two issues
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to the California Supreme Court:
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establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner wilfully
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touched the victim in a harmful or offensive manner; and 2)
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Petitioner’s sentence of fifty-four (54) years to life with a
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determinate term of forty (40) years constituted cruel and
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unusual punishment in violation of the state and federal
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constitutions.
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1) the evidence failed to
Therefore, upon review of the instant petition for writ of
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habeas corpus, it appears that Petitioner has not presented at
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least two of his claims to the California Supreme Court.
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Petitioner has not presented all his claims to the California
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Supreme Court, the Court cannot proceed to the merits of those
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claims.
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Petitioner has presented all his claims to the California Supreme
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Court but has simply neglected to inform this Court.
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28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1).
If
It is possible, however, that
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Thus, Petitioner must inform the Court if his claim
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concerning ineffective assistance of counsel has been presented
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to the California Supreme Court, and if possible, provide the
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Court with a copy of the petition filed in the California Supreme
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Court, along with a copy of any ruling made by the California
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Supreme Court.
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to the California Supreme Court, the Court is unable to proceed
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to the merits of the petition.
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Without knowing what claims have been presented
III. Order to Show Cause
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Accordingly, Petitioner is ORDERED to show cause why the
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petition should not be dismissed for Petitioner’s failure to
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exhaust state remedies as to all his claims.
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ORDERED to inform the Court within thirty (30) days of the date
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of service of this order whether or not his claims concerning
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been presented to the California Supreme Court.
Petitioner is
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Petitioner is forewarned that failure to follow this order
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will result in dismissal of the petition pursuant to Local Rule
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110.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Dated:
ie14hj
June 20, 2011
/s/ Sheila K. Oberto
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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