-GSA Rucker v. Paden et al, No. 1:2011cv00904 - Document 4 (E.D. Cal. 2011)
Court Description: FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS to DISMISS Plaintiff's 1 Complaint Without Leave to Amend signed by Magistrate Judge Gary S. Austin on 6/13/2011. Objections to F&R due by 7/18/2011. (Bradley, A)
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-GSA Rucker v. Paden et al Doc. 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 SHON DATHEN RUCKER, 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) HONORABLE GARY PADEN, ARTHUR ) HAMPAR, NEAL PEDIWITZ, VISALIA ) POLICE DEPARTMENT, STERLING ) SECURITY, TULARE PUBLIC ) DEFENDER’S OFFICE, ) ) Defendants. ) _____________________________________ ) 1:11-cv-00904 OWW GSA FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND (Document 1) 18 19 Plaintiff Shon Dathen Rucker (“Plaintiff”), appearing pro se and proceeding in forma 20 pauperis, filed a civil rights complaint on June 6, 2011, against the Honorable Gary Paden, 21 Arthur Hampar, and Neal Pedowitz1, as well as the Visalia Police Department, Sterling Security 22 and the Tulare Public Defender’s Office (collectively “Defendants”). Plaintiff asks this Court to 23 obtain and review evidence related to a state criminal proceeding. (Doc. 1.) 24 // 25 26 27 28 1 The correct spelling of Mr. Pedowitz’s name was found on the California State Bar’s website. See http://www.cal.bar.ca.gov. 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 DISCUSSION 2 A. 3 Pursuant to Title 28 of the United States Code section 1915(e)(2), the Court must conduct Screening Standard 4 an initial review of the complaint for sufficiency to state a claim. The Court must dismiss a 5 complaint or portion thereof if the Court determines that the action is legally “frivolous or 6 malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from 7 a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). If the Court determines 8 that the complaint fails to state a claim, leave to amend may be granted to the extent that the 9 deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. 10 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 11 pleader is entitled to relief . . ..” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 12 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 13 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing 14 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)). Plaintiff 15 must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its 16 face.’” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While legal conclusions 17 can provide a framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. Iqbal, 18 129 S.Ct. at 1950. While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusion are not. Iqbal 19 at 1949. 20 In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the Court must accept as true the allegations 21 of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. V. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 740 22 (1976), construe the pro se pleadings liberally in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, Resnick 23 v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000), and resolve all doubts in the Plaintiff’s favor, 24 Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 25 A pleading may not simply allege a wrong has been committed and demand relief. The 26 underlying requirement is that a pleading give “fair notice” of the claim being asserted and the 27 28 2 1 “grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957); Yamaguchi v. 2 United States Department of Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1481 (9th Cir. 1997). 3 B. 4 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows: 5 7 Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 8 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, to state a claim under Title 42 of the United States Code section 1983,2 9 a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted under color of state law, and (2) the defendant 6 1983 Actions 10 deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los 11 Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). 12 Moreover, section 1983 requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 13 actions of defendant and the deprivation allegedly suffered. See Monell v. Department of Social 14 Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The Ninth Circuit Court of 15 Appeals has held that “a person ‘subjects’ another to deprivation of constitutional right, within 16 the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative 17 acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of 18 which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 19 C. 20 Plaintiff claims the judge presiding over his criminal matter pending before the Tulare Plaintiff’s Allegations 21 County Superior Court has violated his constitutional rights by refusing “to allow [a] video” to be 22 viewed in open court. Plaintiff claims the video would establish he is guilty only of a 23 misdemeanor, rather than the felony with which he has been charged. He claims the judge is 24 trying to “railroad” him and that he has been denied his constitutional rights to due process and a 25 fair trial. (Doc. 1 at 2-3.) 26 27 28 2 All further statutory references are to Title 42 of the United States Code unless otherwise indicated . 3 1 2 Plaintiff also complains that his defense attorney or public defender is “not helping at all.” (Doc. 1 at 2.) 3 D. 4 For the reasons that follow, this Court will recommend that Plaintiff’s complaint be 5 6 7 8 9 Analysis dismissed without leave to amend. 1. Younger Abstention First and foremost, the Court finds that abstention is appropriate and therefore will recommend against exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s action. “Younger abstention is a common law equitable doctrine holding that a federal court 10 generally should refrain from interfering with a pending state court proceeding.” Poulos v. 11 Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654, 669, n.13 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted); see also 12 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 49-53 (1971). Younger abstention is required if (1) state 13 proceedings are ongoing; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state 14 proceedings provide an adequate opportunity to raise federal questions. Wiener v. County of San 15 Diego, 23 F.3d 263, 266 (9th Cir. 1994). “When all three conditions are present, a district court 16 must dismiss the federal action.” Id. To determine whether there is a pending state judicial 17 proceeding within the meaning of Younger, the critical question is “whether the state proceedings 18 were underway before the initiation of the federal proceedings.” Id. 19 Here, it is clear from Plaintiff’s complaint that there are ongoing state court proceedings 20 in the Tulare County Superior Court, and that those proceedings were “underway before the 21 initiation” of the instant proceeding. Additionally, those proceedings clearly implicate important 22 state interests where the proceedings allege a crime was committed. Clearly, the state has an 23 interest in prosecuting persons alleged to have committed a criminal violation. Finally, the state 24 proceedings provide an adequate opportunity for Plaintiff to raise his federal constitutional 25 questions. Thus, it will be recommended that this Court refrain from interfering with the now- 26 pending Tulare County Superior Court criminal proceedings. 27 28 4 1 2. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 2 Plaintiff’s complaint vaguely references that he may have been declared incompetent in 3 the state proceedings below. To the degree Plaintiff’s complaint can be interpreted as a request 4 that the Court review the state court’s determination, Plaintiff is advised that this Court lacks 5 jurisdiction to do so. 6 Federal courts lack jurisdiction to review or modify state court judgments under the 7 Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Company, 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149 8 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303 9 (1983). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is based on section 1257 which grants the United States 10 Supreme Court jurisdiction to review decisions of the highest state courts for compliance with 11 the federal Constitution. See Rooker, 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149; Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482, 103 12 S.Ct. 1303. The doctrine provides that “lower federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review a 13 case litigated and decided in state court; only the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to 14 correct state court judgments.” Gottfried v. Medical Planning Services, 142 F.3d 326, 330 (6th 15 Cir. 1998). “This is equally true in constitutional cases brought under § 1983, since federal 16 courts must give ‘full faith and credit’ to the judicial proceedings of state courts.’” Gottfried, 17 142 F.3d at 330 (citing§ 1738). 18 “Federal district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to review such final adjudications 19 or to exclude constitutional claims that are ‘inextricably intertwined with the state court’s 20 [decision] in a judicial proceeding.’” Valenti v. Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288, 296 (3rd Cir. 1992) 21 (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483, n.16). This rule applies to “inextricably intertwined” with 22 final state court decisions, even if such “inextricably intertwined” claims were not raised in state 23 court. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483-487 & n.16; 24 Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413; Olson Farms, Inc. v. Barbosa, 134 F.3d 933, 937 25 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is jurisdictional). Thus, “a losing party in 26 state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state 27 28 5 1 judgment in a United States District Court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state 2 judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.” Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 3 1005-1006 (1994). 4 5 6 7 To the degree Plaintiff asks this Court to review or modify a state court order or judgment, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes such review. 3. Eleventh Amendment Plaintiff is further advised the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing 8 suits brought against an unconsenting state. Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Co., 951 9 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted); see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 10 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1122 (1996); Puerto Rico Aqueduct Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 11 U.S. 139, 144 (1993); Austin v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 939 F.2d 676, 677 (9th Cir. 1991). The 12 Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state agencies as well as those where the state itself is 13 named as a defendant. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. California Dep't of Transp., 96 14 F.3d 420, 421 (9th Cir. 1996); Brooks, 951 F.2d at 1053; Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th 15 Cir. 1989); Mitchell v. Los Angeles Community College Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1989). 16 "The Eleventh Amendment’s jurisdictional bar covers suits naming state agencies and 17 departments as defendants, and applies whether the relief is legal or equitable in nature.” Brooks, 18 951 F.2d at 1053. 19 4. 20 21 22 Municipalities Plaintiff named the Visalia Police Department and the Tulare County Public Defender’s Office as Defendants. (Doc. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff is advised that section 1983 requires that there be an actual connection or link 23 between the actions of defendant and the deprivation allegedly suffered. See Monell v. 24 Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658; Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362. The Ninth Circuit 25 Court of Appeals has held that “a person ‘subjects’ another to deprivation of constitutional right, 26 within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s 27 28 6 1 affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the 2 deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d at 743. 3 To the extent Plaintiff seeks to pursue a section 1983 claim, the complaint fails to allege a 4 Monell claim against either the Visalia Police Department or the Tulare County Public 5 Defender’s Office. A local government unit may not be held liable for the acts of its employees 6 under a respondeat superior theory. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 7 1473, 1480 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 899 (1991); Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 8 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989). Because liability of a local governmental unit must rest on 9 its actions, not the actions of its employees, a plaintiff must go beyond the respondeat superior 10 theory and demonstrate the alleged constitutional violation was the product of a policy or custom 11 of the local governmental unit. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S.Ct. 12 1197 (1989); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478-480, 106 S.Ct. 1292 (1986). 13 A “rule or regulation promulgated, adopted, or ratified by a local governmental entity’s 14 legislative body unquestionably satisfies Monell’s policy requirements.” Thompson, 885 F.2d at 15 1443. Official policy may derive from “a decision properly made by a local governmental 16 entity’s authorized decisionmaker – i.e., an official who possesses final authority to establish 17 [local government] policy with respect to the [challenged] action.” Thompson, 885 F.2d at 1443 18 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Only if a plaintiff shows that his injury resulted from a 19 ‘permanent and well-settled’ practice may liability attach for injury resulting from a local 20 government custom.” Thompson, 885 F.2d at 1444. “[O]fficial policy must be the moving force 21 of the constitutional violation in order to establish the liability of a government body under § 22 1983.” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 23 Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 370-377 (general allegation of administrative negligence fails to state a 24 constitutional claim cognizable under § 1983). 25 Here, Plaintiff’s complaint lacks any allegation of a policy or custom and resulting 26 constitutional violation to set forth a Monell claim. Simply alleging a wrong has been committed 27 28 7 1 and demanding relief is not enough. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. at 47-48. Moreover, 2 because this Court will recommend abstention, leave to amend is not appropriate. 3 4 a. Public Defender Defendant Pedowitz is an attorney with the Tulare County Public Defender’s Office. 5 Whether Defendant Hampar was similarly employed during the proceedings of which Plaintiff 6 complains is not clear. Even though a Tulare County public defender is an attorney appointed by 7 the state court and paid by government funds, a public defender is not acting under color of state 8 law at the time of his or her legal representation. It is well established that court appointed 9 attorneys are not state actors. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (public defender 10 who is performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal 11 proceeding is not acting under color of state law); Miranda v. Clark County of Nevada, 319 F. 3d 12 465, 468 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding dismissal of a complaint on the basis that public defender 13 was not acting on behalf of the county for purposes of § 1983 when defendant’s function in his 14 role as plaintiff’s attorney was to represent plaintiff’s interests, not the interests of the state). As 15 such, a public defender or defenders appointed to represent Plaintiff in the criminal proceedings 16 in Tulare County are not acting under color of state law, and thus, Plaintiff’s complaint fails state 17 a claim under section 1983. 18 5. Judicial Officers & Prosecutors 19 Next, Plaintiff’s complaint names the Honorable Gary Paden, Tulare County Superior 20 Court Judge, as a Defendant. Plaintiff claims Judge Paden is “railroading” him by pressuring 21 him to plead guilty to a felony charge, and because the judge apparently declared Plaintiff 22 incompetent. 23 Plaintiff is advised that state court judges and prosecutors are immune from liability 24 under section 1983. See Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Medicine, 363 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2004) 25 (“Absolute immunity is generally accorded to judges and prosecutors functioning in their official 26 capacities”); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that judges and 27 28 8 1 prosecutors are immune from liability for damages under section 1983). Thus, Judge Paden is 2 entitled to immunity in any section 1983 action. 3 Finally, even if Defendant Hampar was employed with the Tulare County District 4 Attorney’s Office, rather than as a public defender, he is immune from liability in this action. 5 Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Medicine, 363 F.3d at 922; Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d at 1075. 6 6. 7 8 Due Process Plaintiff ambiguously claims his “due process rights” were violated as well because Judge Paden will not permit his attorney to obtain a copy of a videotape. (Doc. 1 at 2.) 9 a. 10 Procedural The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects prisoners from being 11 deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 12 539, 556, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (1974). Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would support a claim 13 that he was deprived of a protected interest without procedural due process. 14 b. 15 Substantive “To establish a violation of substantive due process . . . , a plaintiff is ordinarily required 16 to prove that a challenged government action was clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no 17 substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. Where a particular 18 amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular 19 sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive 20 due process, must be the guide for analyzing a plaintiff’s claims.” Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d 21 868, 874 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations, internal quotations & brackets omitted), cert. denied, 117 S. 22 Ct. 1845 (1997); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842, 118 S.Ct. 1708 (1998). 23 Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would support a claim that his rights under the substantive 24 component of the Due Process Clause were violated. 25 // 26 // 27 28 9 1 2 7. Sterling Security Plaintiff also names Sterling Security as a Defendant in this action. However, he fails to 3 explain how Sterling Security is involved. Assuming for the sake of discussion that Sterling 4 Security is the entity in possession of the videotape Plaintiff seeks, Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim 5 against this Defendant fails as a matter of law. 6 Sterling Security was not acting under color of state law at the time of its actions, 7 assuming it has withheld a videotape in its possession. Sterling Security is a private entity or 8 company. “Like the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 9 under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no 10 matter how discriminatory or wrongful.” American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 11 49-50 (1999) (internal quotations & citations omitted). 12 13 Because Sterling Security did not act under color of state law, Plaintiff’s claim against this private company fails as a matter of law. 14 15 16 17 RECOMMENDATION Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that this action be DISMISSED in its entirety because Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a cognizable claim. These findings and recommendations are submitted to the assigned district judge, 18 pursuant to section 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 304. Within thirty (30) days of service of this 19 recommendation, any party may file written objections to these findings and recommendations 20 with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections 21 to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The district judge will review the 22 magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations pursuant to section 636(b)(1)(C). The parties 23 are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal 24 the district judge’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 25 26 IT IS SO ORDERED. 27 28 10 1 Dated: 6i0kij June 13, 2011 /s/ Gary S. Austin UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11
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