Guthrey v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation et al, No. 1:2010cv02177 - Document 15 (E.D. Cal. 2011)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM DECISION regarding 8 Motion to Dismiss, signed by Judge Oliver W. Wanger on 3/29/2011. (Kusamura, W)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Guthrey v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation et al Doc. 15 1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 8 1:10-cv-02177-OWW-GSA RAYMOND GUTHREY, 9 MEMORANDUM DECISION REGARDING MOTION TO DISMISS (Doc. 8) Plaintiff, 10 11 12 13 14 v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al., Defendants. 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 I. INTRODUCTION. Plaintiff Raymond Guthrey ( Plaintiff ) brings this employment discrimination action against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ( CDCR ) and Michael Pate, Jr. ( Pate ). On December 16, 2010, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff s complaint. (Doc. 8). Plaintiff filed opposition to Defendants motion on February 18, 2011. on February 24, 2011. Defendants filed a reply (Doc. 10). II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND. Plaintiff is a 56-year-old Caucasian male who subscribes to the Ananda Marga faith. Followers of the Ananda Marga believe in allowing the hair on their heads, faces, and bodies to grow 28 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 naturally. 2 beard and long hair. 3 In observance of his faith, Plaintiff maintains a full From 1984 until retirement in 2008, Plaintiff worked as a 4 Correctional 5 facility. 6 standards during his annual performance reviews. 7 During Counselor at Sierra Conservation Center, a CDCR Throughout his employment, Plaintiff exceeded expected his employment, Defendant Pate, a CDCR employee, 8 regularly called Plaintiff Ragjeesh and other slurs directed 9 towards persons of Middle Eastern or South Asian ancestry. 10 Plaintiff was also accused of being homosexual because he did not 11 identify with the macho male stereotype embraced by Pate and 12 other CDCR employees. After wearing a kilt in honor of a colleague 13 who was given an award, Plaintiff was told that men don t wear 14 dresses and was derogatorily referred to as a woman by CDCR 15 employees. 16 In early 2010, Plaintiff applied to participate in CDCR s 17 retired annuitant program as a contract employee. 18 2010, Pate contacted Plaintiff and extended an offer of employment 19 to him on behalf of the CDCR. 20 agreed to begin working on May 3, 2010. 21 phone call, Plaintiff discussed grooming standards with Pate. Pate 22 stated just don t wear a kilt. 23 had gone south at the time that Plaintiff instituted a counseling 24 program at Sierra Conservation Center involving turban-wearing 25 Ananda Marga clergy. 26 On April 29, Plaintiff accepted the offer and During the April 29, 2010 Pate also stated that Plaintiff On May 3, 2010, Plaintiff arrived at Sierra Conservation 27 Center to begin his position. 28 week-long training. Plaintiff was scheduled to attend a Upon his arrival in the training classroom, 2 1 Plaintiff observed Pate gesturing wildly and jabbing his finger 2 toward the door while staring at Plaintiff. 3 Plaintiff, grabbed him by the arm, and forced him into the hallway. 4 Pate physically blocked Plaintiff from entering the classroom. 5 Pate told Plaintiff that this was not going to work and that 6 Plaintiff was to leave the grounds immediately. 7 Plaintiff 8 incident, 9 attempted but none of to his contact CDCR telephone or Pate stomped toward employees email about messages the were returned. III. LEGAL STANDARD. 10 11 Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate where the 12 complaint lacks sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal 13 theory. 14 (9th Cir.1990). 15 survive a 12(b) (6) motion, the pleading does not need detailed 16 factual allegations but the [f]actual allegations must be enough 17 to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Bell Atl. 18 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 19 929 20 recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Id. 21 Rather, there must be enough facts to state a claim to relief that 22 is plausible on its face. Id. at 570. In other words, the 23 complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 24 true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. 25 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ----, ----, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 26 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (2007). Mere To sufficiently state a claim to relief and labels and conclusions or a formulaic 27 The Ninth Circuit has summarized the governing standard, in 28 light of Twombly and Iqbal, as follows: In sum, for a complaint to 3 1 survive a motion to dismiss, the nonconclusory factual content, and 2 reasonable 3 suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief. Moss v. 4 U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir.2009) (internal 5 quotation marks omitted). Apart from factual insufficiency, a 6 complaint is also subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) where it 7 lacks a cognizable legal theory, Balistreri, 901 F.2d at 699, or 8 where the allegations on their face show that relief is barred 9 for some legal reason, Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215, 127 S.Ct. 10 inferences from that content, must be plausibly 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007). 11 In deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the court 12 must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the 13 pleading under attack. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. A court is not, 14 however, required to accept as true allegations that are merely 15 conclusory, 16 inferences. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 17 (9th Cir.2001). When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, 18 if a district court considers evidence outside the pleadings, it 19 must normally convert the 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56 motion for 20 summary 21 opportunity to respond. 22 907 (9th Cir. 2003). A court may, however, consider certain 23 materials-documents 24 incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial 25 notice-without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for 26 summary judgment. Id. at 908. 27 /// 28 /// unwarranted judgment, and deductions it must of give fact, the or unreasonable nonmoving party an United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, attached to 4 the complaint, documents IV. Discussion 1 2 A. The CDCR s Eleventh Amendment Immunity 3 Plaintiff s first, second, third, and seventh causes of action 4 are advanced only against CDCR. As Plaintiff acknowledges, CDCR is 5 a state entity. 6 United States Constitution grants state entities such as the CDCR 7 immunity from suits for damages in federal court. 8 Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (noting that Nevada Department 9 of Corrections was a state agency immune from suit under the 10 (Complaint at 1). The Eleventh Amendment of the See, e.g., Eleventh Amendment). 11 Although Plaintiff s prayer for relief includes a request for 12 injunctive relief, Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue the remedy he 13 requests. 14 The complaint seeks an injunction: enjoining [Defendants] from discriminating against CDCR employees on the basis of religion, ancestry, or gender identity, and compelling Defendant CDCR to take affirmative steps to promote a culture of understanding and diversity among its employees. 15 16 17 (Complaint at 11). As Plaintiff is no longer working for the CDCR, 18 he has no standing to seek injunctive relief tailored to benefit 19 current employees. See Walsh v. Nev. Dep't of Human Res., 471 F.3d 20 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 2006) (recognizing that former employees lack 21 standing to seek injunctive relief because they would not stand to 22 benefit from an injunction requiring the anti-discriminatory 23 policies to cease at their former place of work)(citation omitted). 24 The first, second, third, and seventh causes of action fail to 25 state cognizable claims; these claims are DISMISSED. 26 /// 27 /// 28 5 1 B. Federal Claims 2 1. Section 1981 Claim 3 Plaintiff s fourth cause of action under section 1981 is 4 advanced against all Defendants. Plaintiff s section 1981 claim 5 is based on his contention that he was deprived [] of the...right 6 to be free from intentional discrimination based on race, as 7 provided in 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 8 Section 1981 guarantees 'all persons' the right to 'make and 9 enforce contracts.' Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys, LP, 534 10 F.3d 1116, 1122 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)). 11 "This right includes the right to the 'enjoyment of all benefits, 12 privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship,' 13 including the relationship between employer and employee." Id. 14 (quoting section 1981(b)). In the employment context, courts apply 15 Title VII standards to section 1981 claims. See Manatt v. Bank of 16 America, 17 principles guiding a court in a Title VII dispute apply with equal 18 force in a § 1981 action"). 19 employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire 20 or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 21 against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 22 conditions, 23 individual's race." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. NA, 339 or F.3d 792, privileges 797 (9th Cir. 2003) (the "legal Title VII makes it an "unlawful or employment, because of such 24 As an initial matter, Plaintiff s fourth cause of action fails 25 as to CDCR because section 1981 does not provide a cause of action 26 against state entities. 27 1065, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007) ( we hold that § 1981 does not contain 28 a cause of action against states ). See, e.g., Pittman v. Oregon, 509 F.3d 6 To the extent Plaintiff seeks 1 to sue 2 cognizable, because an official capacity claim is in effect one 3 against the state. 4 (9th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (official capacity suit against 5 employee of state agency not cognizable under section 1981). 6 Pate in his official capacity, such a claim is not See Binum v. Warner, 314 Fed. Appx. 914, 914-15 Plaintiff s only cognizable section 1981 claim is against Pate 7 in his individual capacity. Defendants contend that the complaint 8 fails to state a claim under section 1981 because its allegations 9 are implausible. Defendants argue that plaintiff s allegations 10 regarding his 11 annuitant position 12 discriminatory animus. 13 discussion of the complaint s allegations is incomplete. 14 interactions do not with Pate suggest concerning the influence (Motion to Dismiss at 8). the retired of racially Defendants The complaint alleges that Pate used derogatory racial slurs 15 to refer to Plaintiff. 16 Pate 17 directed 18 ancestry. 19 Pate s decision to take adverse employment action against Plaintiff 20 was motivated by Pate s perception of Plaintiff s race. 21 complaint contains sufficient factual allegations to support an 22 inference that Pate s adverse employment action against Plaintiff 23 was motivated by racial animus; Plaintiff s allegations, accepted 24 as true, "give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination." 25 See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 26 (1981) (discussing elements of emloyment discrimination claim); see 27 also Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 28 2003) (same). regularly towards called Specifically, the complaint alleges that Plaintiff persons of (Complaint at 3). Ragjeesh Middle Eastern and other slurs or South Asian The complaint also alleges that The The credibility of Plaintiff s theory is a matter 7 1 for trial. 2 2. Section 1983 Claim 3 Plaintiff s fifth cause of action is a section 1983 employment 4 discrimination claim. Section 1983 imposes liability upon any 5 person who, acting under color of state law, deprives another of a 6 federally protected right. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police 7 Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1988); 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 8 The complaint does not allege any cognizable section 1983 9 claim against the CDCR, as the CDCR is immune from damages suits in 10 federal court and Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue the injunctive 11 relief he requests. Plaintiff s only cognizable section 1983 claim 12 is against Pate in his individual capacity. 13 Defendants contend that Plaintiff s section 1983 claim is 14 subject to dismissal because Plaintiff has not alleged a protected 15 property 16 argument is misplaced. 17 Valley Dev. Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 948 (9th Cir.2004), 18 Wedges/Ledges of Cal., Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 24 F.3d 56, 62 19 (9th Cir.1994), Nicholas v. Pa. State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 142-43 20 (3d Cir.2000), and Lum v. Jensen, 876 F.2d 1385, 1389 -1390 (9th 21 Cir.1989) all concern due process claims under section 1983, not 22 employment discrimination claims. 23 violation 24 termination, 25 violation. 26 interest of in employment the CDCR. Defendants The cases Defendants cite, such as Squaw Plaintiff s the with due complaint Although the complaint alleges process also alleges rights an based equal on his protection Plaintiff s opposition to the motion to dismiss argues that 27 Plaintiff s section 1983 claim 28 provides relief for alleged violations of his federal statutory 8 survives because section 1983 1 rights under Title VII. To the extent Plaintiff s claim is based 2 on purported violations of Title VII, Plaintiff s claim is not 3 cognizable. 4 violation of its own terms. 5 City, 873 F. Supp. 1293, 1323 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (citing Johnston v. 6 Harris County Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 928, 933 (5th Cir. 7 1988); see also Learned v. Bellevue, 860 F.2d 928, 933 (9th Cir. 8 1988) ( Violation of rights created by Title VII cannot form the 9 basis of section 1983 claims ) (citing Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan 10 Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 378 (1979) superceded on other 11 grounds by statute as stated in Alexander v. Gerhardt Enters., 40 12 F.3d 187, 192 (7th Cir. 1994)). 13 C. Remaining Claims Title VII provides the exclusive federal remedy for See, e.g., Mummelthie v. City of Mason 14 Plaintiff s sixth and seventh causes of action assert claims 15 under California Government Code section 12940, California s Fair 16 Employment and Housing Act ( FEHA ). 17 Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 179 F.3d 846, 847 (9th Cir. 1999) 18 ( California has not waived its immunity to FEHA actions in federal 19 court ). 20 only an individual s employer may be held liable under FEHA. 21 Janken v. GM Huges Electronics, 46 Cal. App. 4th 55, 80 (Cal. Ct. 22 App. 1996). CDCR is immune. Freeman v. Pate is not subject to claims under section 12940, as 23 Plaintiff s eighth cause of action is for termination in 24 violation of public policy; this claim is not cognizable against a 25 state entity or its employees. Miklosy v. Regents of University of 26 California, 44 Cal. 4th 876, 900 (Cal. 2008). 27 28 Plaintiff concedes the sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action are subject to dismissal. These claims are DISMISSED, with 9 1 prejudice. ORDER 2 3 For reasons stated above, IT IS ORDERED: 4 1) Plaintiff s first, second, third, and fifth causes of 5 action are DISMISSED, without prejudice; 6 2) Plaintiff s sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action are 7 DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; 8 3) Plaintiff shall submit an amended complaint within 20 days 9 of electronic service of this order; Defendants shall file 10 responsive pleading within 30 days of service of any amended 11 complaint; and 12 4) Defendants shall file a form of order consistent with this 13 memorandum decision within 5 days of electronic service of 14 this decision. 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 Dated: hkh80h March 29, 2011 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
