Singleton, Sr. v. Eli Lilly, Co.

Filing 12

ORDER DISMISSING Plaintiff's complaint with leave to amend. Plaintiff SHALL file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of service of this order. Order signed by Magistrate Judge Sheila K. Oberto on 6/28/2011. (Timken, A)

Download PDF
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LAMAR SINGLETON, SR., 12 CASE NO. 1:10-cv-02019-AWI-SKO Plaintiff, 13 v. 14 ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND ELI LILLY, CO., 15 Defendant. 16 / 17 18 I. INTRODUCTION 19 On October 7, 2010, Plaintiff, LaMar Singleton (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding pro 20 se and in forma pauperis, filed this action against Eli Lilly, Co. (“Defendant”). Plaintiff claims that 21 taking Zyprexa caused him to develop type 2 diabetes, obesity, severe metabolic complications with 22 multiple cysts, and tumors on both kidneys. (Doc. 11, p. 3.) Zyprexa is a prescription medication 23 used to treat mental conditions such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. See generally UFCW 24 Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 2010). Plaintiff states that Eli Lilly 25 violated his constitutional rights. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED 26 WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 27 28 1 2 II. A. DISCUSSION Screening Requirement 3 In cases where the plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is required 4 to screen each case and shall dismiss the case at any time if the Court determines that the allegation 5 of poverty is untrue or the action or appeal is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which 6 relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 7 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). If the Court determines that the complaint fails to state a claim, leave to 8 amend may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by 9 amendment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 10 B. Legal Standard 11 In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, the Court uses the same pleading 12 standard used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Under Rule 8(a), a complaint must 13 contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. 14 R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual 15 allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 16 accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. 17 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 18 accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 19 550 U.S. at 557). “[A] complaint [that] pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's 20 liability . . . ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id. 21 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Further, although a court must accept as true all factual 22 allegations contained in a complaint, a court need not accept a plaintiff's legal conclusions as true. 23 Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 24 statements, do not suffice.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 25 C. No Cognizable Federal Claim 26 The only potential federal claims that appear on the face of Plaintiff’s complaint are vague 27 allegations of a violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. To the extent that Plaintiff is asserting 28 2 1 civil rights causes of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,1 those claims are not viable. Section 2 1983 provides: 3 Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. . . . 4 5 To state a claim pursuant to Section 1983, a plaintiff must plead facts indicating that the 6 defendant acted under color of state law at the time the act complained of was committed and that 7 the defendant deprived the plaintiff of the rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 8 Constitution or laws of the United States. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 9 1986). Generally, private parties are not acting under color of state law, and their conduct does not 10 constitute state action. See Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1991). 11 For the conduct of a private person or entity to constitute state action, there must generally 12 be two elements: (1) the exercise of a state-created right, privilege, or rule of conduct (state policy); 13 and (2) an actor who is either a state official, one who has acted together with a state official or has 14 obtained significant aid therefrom, or one whose conduct is otherwise chargeable to the state (state 15 actor). Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). Plaintiff has pled no facts indicating 16 that Defendant is a state actor or was acting under the color of state law. Defendant appears to be 17 a private corporation. Therefore, Plaintiff states no cognizable Section 1983 claim. 18 D. No Cognizable State Law Claim 19 To the extent that Plaintiff has attempted to set forth a products liability claim pursuant to 20 state law, that claim is insufficient. Plaintiff asserts that he was prescribed Zyprexa while living with 21 his family. (Doc. 11, p. 3.) At some point later, while in custody at the Los Angeles County Jail, 22 he “was summoned along with 20 other inmates who were taking Zyprexa”; the inmates were tested 23 for diabetes “because of possible dangers of Zyprexa.” (Doc. 11, p. 3.) A week after he was tested, 24 Plaintiff was informed that he had diabetes “directly from Zyprexa” and that he would have to take 25 medication to treat the diabetes. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s “lab[el] change did not take place 26 27 1 28 If Plaintiff is not attempting to assert a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he should identify the federal statute applicable to his claim(s). 3 1 until Sept. 03, and clear doctors letter was not released until 3-04. Year after I had suffered lifelong 2 diabet[es] from Zyprexa.” (Doc. 11, p. 4.) 3 There are three theories of recovery which may be available to a plaintiff in an action against 4 a prescription drug manufacturer if the manufacturer fails to warn of side effects association with 5 a prescription drug: negligence, strict liability in tort, and breach of implied warranty. In any of the 6 theories relied upon, the liability of a drug manufacturer in an action for a failure to warn of side 7 effects associated with a prescription drug requires the plaintiff to allege (and later in the litigation, 8 to prove) that: (1) the manufacturer had a duty to warn medical professionals or, in some limited 9 cases, the consumer, regarding the known side effects of the drug; (2) the standard of care the 10 manufacturer was required to use in fulfilling its duty to warn; (3) breach of the manufacturer’s duty 11 to warn by providing an inadequate warning; (4) injury suffered by the plaintiff is attributable to the 12 manufacturer’s failure to provide an adequate warning; and (5) the manufacturer’s failure to warn 13 was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. See generally Carlin v. Super. Ct., 13 Cal. 4th 14 1104 (1996)). 15 A manufacturer of prescription drugs owes to medical professionals the duty of adequate 16 warnings if it knows, or has reason to know, of any dangerous side effects of its drugs. See Motus 17 v. Pfizer, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 984, 990 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (citing Carlin, 13 Cal. 4th at 1112-13. 18 California law provides that, in the case of prescription drugs, the duty to warn “runs to the 19 physician, not to the patient.” Carlin, 13 Cal. 4th at 1116. Therefore, a prescription drug 20 manufacturer discharges its duty to warn if it provides adequate warnings to the physician about any 21 known or reasonably knowable dangerous side effects, regardless of whether any warning reaches 22 the patient. Motus, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 990-91. A plaintiff who asserts a products liability action 23 based on a failure to warn must prove not only that no warning was provided or the warning was 24 inadequate, but also that the inadequacy or the lack of the warning caused plaintiff’s injury. Lummer 25 v. Lederle Labs., 819 F.2d 349, 358 (2d Cir. 1987) (applying California law). The duty to warn is 26 a continuing duty, requiring a manufacturer to notify the medical profession of any side effects of 27 a prescription drug which are subsequently discovered, and is based on the application of scientific 28 4 1 knowledge available at the time of manufacture and distribution of the drug. See Brown v. Super. 2 Ct. 44 Cal. 3d 1049 (1988); Carlin, 13 Cal. 4th at 1109 (manufacturers are strictly liable for injuries 3 caused by failure to give warning of dangers known to scientific community at the time of 4 manufacture and distribution of the product). 5 Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to set forth a products liability claim against 6 Defendant. First, Plaintiff does not allege that Eli Lilly manufactured Zyprexa. For there to be any 7 potential liability against Defendant, Defendant must be alleged to have been the manufacturer of 8 Zyprexa and that Defendant put it into the stream of commerce. Thus, Plaintiff has not adequately 9 asserted that Defendant had any duty to warn the medical profession regarding the side effects of 10 Zyprexa. 11 Second, Plaintiff claims that he was first prescribed Zyprexa in 1999, but there are no facts 12 pled that Defendant or the wider scientific community was aware of any of the alleged harmful side 13 effects of the drug in 1999 for which it failed to warn the medical profession. 14 manufacturer’s duty to warn is a continuing one, Plaintiff has not set forth when Defendant or the 15 wider scientific community became aware of the harmful side effects Plaintiff alleges resulted from 16 the use of Zyprexa. Plaintiff alleges that a “label change” occurred in September 2003 and that 17 Defendant sent letters to medical professionals in March 2004. Plaintiff has not alleged, however, 18 to what the label change related, whether it contained a warning, or what that warning included. 19 Further, Plaintiff provides no facts regarding the March 2004 letter to the medical professionals, 20 whether the letter contained a warning about side-effects of a drug, and whether that warning was 21 inadequate. Plaintiff must allege more than that he took Zyprexa and suffered adverse side-effects. 22 Rather, to sufficiently allege that Defendant breached its duty of care, Plaintiff must allege facts 23 showing that Defendant distributed Zyprexa at a time when Defendant knew or had reason to know 24 of harmful side-effects of the drug about which it failed to adequately warn the medical profession. 25 Without additional facts, a state law claim for products liability is not cognizable. Iqbal, 26 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (“[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual 27 allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 28 accusation.” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555 )). 5 While a 1 E. Amended Complaint Must Be Complete In Itself Without Reference to Any Prior Pleading 2 Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to amend the deficiencies of the complaint as outlined 3 above. Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be complete in 4 itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes 5 the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once Plaintiff files an 6 amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in 7 an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each 8 defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 9 III. CONCLUSION 10 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiff 11 SHALL file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of service of this order. If 12 Plaintiff again fails to file an amended complaint that states a claim, the Court will recommend that 13 the entire action be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 14 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 17 Dated: ie14hj June 28, 2011 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6

Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.


Why Is My Information Online?