-DLB R.G. v. Clovis Unified School District, et al., No. 1:2010cv01979 - Document 39 (E.D. Cal. 2011)
Court Description: ORDER Denying Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration signed by Chief Judge Anthony W. Ishii on 6/9/2011. (Nazaroff, H)
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-DLB R.G. v. Clovis Unified School District, et al. Doc. 39 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) CLOVIS UNIFIED SCHOOL ) DISTRICT, ) ) Defendant ) ____________________________________) R.G. on behalf of M.G., 10 11 12 13 14 CV F 10 - 1979 AWI DLB ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION Doc. # 14 15 16 This is an action for declaratory and injunctive relief and compensatory education and 17 tuition reimbursement by plaintiff R.G. on behalf of M.G. (collectively, Plaintiff) against 18 defendant Clovis Unified School District (“Defendant”). On March 22, 2011, the court 19 issued a memorandum opinion and order (the “March 22 Order”) dismissing individual 20 Defendant Mary Bass and otherwise denying Defendants motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s First 21 Amended Complaint (“FAC”). In the instant motion, Defendant seeks reconsideration of 22 certain limited portions of the court’s March 22 Order. For the reasons that follow, 23 Defendant’s motion for reconsideration will be denied. 24 PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 25 The currently operative FAC was filed by R.G. on behalf of M.G. on January 24, 26 2011. All claims set forth in Plaintiff’s FAC were set forth pursuant to the Individuals With 27 Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). The parties agree that M.G. is a person with a learning 28 Dockets.Justia.com 1 disability within the meaning of the IDEA. Pursuant to the IDEA, the parties in this action 2 engaged in a yearly reassessment of an Individual Education Plan (“IEP”); a plan that is 3 designed with the input of parents, mental health professionals and involved educators to 4 determine how the school district will provide a Free and Appropriate Public Education 5 (“FAPE”) in the Least Restrictive Environment (“LRE”) for the student. Plaintiff contends 6 the plan that was developed failed to adequately address M.G.’s needs, failed to provide for 7 an appropriate education of M.G. in the least restrictive environment, and failed to 8 incorporate the independent S/L evaluation (Independent Educational Evaluation or “IEE”) 9 that was obtained by Plaintiff at her own expense. Plaintiff declined to sign off on the 10 11 12 13 proposed IEP and requested that M.G. receive an IEE at Defendant’s expense. On January 19, 2010, District submitted a Request for Due Process (OAH Case No. 2010010583). The questions submitted by Defendant for adjudication were: 1. May the District deny [Plaintiff] an independent educational evaluation (IEE) in speech and language because its assessment, presented on November 9, 2009, was conducted in compliance with the law? 2. May the District Deny [Plaintiff] an IEE on reading abilities because its assessments, presented on November 9, 2009, were conducted in compliance with the law? 3. Was the individualized education program (IEP) of November 9 and 16, 2009, for the 2010 extended school year (ESY) and 2010-2011 school year (SY) reasonably calculated to provide [Plaintiff] with meaningful educational progress? 14 15 16 17 18 19 Doc. 24 at 21:15-22 (quoting OH Decision at page 2). The ALJ ruled in Plaintiff’s favor with 20 respect to the second question and ruled in District’s favor with regard to the first and third 21 questions. This action followed. 22 As the court noted in its March 22 Order, Plaintiff’s FAC somewhat confusingly 23 states only a single “claim” in the section of the FAC denoted as “Claims” – the claim that 24 Defendant violated the IDEA. However, the court concluded after examination of the section 25 of the FAC titled “Legal Basis for the Appeal” that Plaintiff’s FAC alleges two substantive 26 claims, both of which directly challenge the ALJ’s prior decision. The first of the claims 27 28 2 1 alleges that Defendants failed to provide M.G. with a FAPE in the LRE. The second of the 2 two claims challenges the ALJ’s finding that Defendant the S/L evaluation conducted by 3 Defendant was “appropriate.” Based on these two substantive claims, Plaintiff’s FAC makes, 4 inter alia, the following prayers for relief: 5 6 7 (2) Tuition reimbursement for any and all monies that R.G. paid to provide M.G. an appropriate education in the least restrictive environment for the 2010-11 school year. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(b). (3) Compensatory education to compensate M.G. for the denial of an appropriate education in the least restrictive environment for the 2010-11 school year. 8 9 (4) [Provide] services to compensate M.G. for direct speech and language services she has missed due to the District’s failure to offer appropriate S/L services in its offered IEP. 10 (5) Reimburse R.G. for the cost of the IEE she obtained at her own expense. 11 12 13 14 (6) [Provide] an academic program for M.G. that ensures that the program will provide her with meaningful benefit. Doc. # 12 at 16. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the FAC was filed on January 31, 2011. Although 15 Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC characterized Plaintiff’s FAC as alleging 16 more “claims” than the court found, Defendant’s motion to dismiss essentially challenged all 17 of Plaintiff’s claims against both the District and Mary Bass on both jurisdictional and 18 substantive grounds. The court’s March 22 Order Dismissed all claims as to Mary Bass but 19 otherwise denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss all claims stated in the FAC or to strike the 20 prayers for relief set forth in the FAC. The court will not recount the particulars of its March 21 22 Order here but will refer to relevant portions of that document below as needed. See 22 generally Doc. # 19. 23 The instant motion for reconsideration was filed on April 22, 2011. In the motion for 24 reconsideration, Defendant specifically does not request reconsideration of the court’s order 25 denying dismissal as to (1) Plaintiff’s claim seeking reversal of the ALJ’s finding that 26 Defendant’s November 2009 Speech and Language (“S/L”) assessment was appropriate, and 27 28 3 1 (2) the court’s denial of dismissal as to Plaintiff’s claim seeking reversal of the finding by the 2 ALJ that the Individual Education Plan (“IEP”) drafted by Defendant on November 5 and 19, 3 2009, represented a Free and Appropriate Public Education (“FAPE”) in the Least Restrictive 4 Environment (“LRE”). 5 Defendant’s request for reconsideration with regard to the court’s decision to deny 6 Defendant’s motion to dismiss as to Plaintiff’s claim challenging the ALJ determination that 7 the S/L assessment by Defendant was appropriate. The central contention of Defendant’s 8 motion is that Plaintiffs did not allege any facts related to the ALJ’s decision that, if proven, 9 would render the ALJ’s conclusion erroneous. Defendant’s motion for reconsideration also 10 requests the court reconsider its decision to deny Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s 11 second, third, fourth and sixth prayers for relief. 12 The instant motion for reconsideration was filed on April 22, 2011. Plaintiff’s 13 opposition was filed on May 10, 2011, and Defendant’s reply was filed on May 16, 2011. On 14 May 20, 2011, the court vacated the date set for hearing and took the matter under 15 submission. 16 LEGAL STANDARD 17 Motions to reconsider are committed to the discretion of the trial court. Combs v. 18 Nick Garin Trucking, 825 F.2d 437, 441 (D.C.Cir. 1987); Rodgers v. Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 19 460 (9th Cir. 1983) (en banc). To succeed, a party must set forth facts or law of a strongly 20 convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior decision. See, e.g., Kern-Tulare 21 Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634 F.Supp. 656, 665 (E.D.Cal. 1986), aff’d in part and 22 rev’d in part on other grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015, 108 23 S.Ct. 1752, 100 L.Ed.2d 214 (1988). 24 DISCUSSION 25 “At the conclusion of a due process hearing, an aggrieved party may file a civil action 26 on federal court challenging the decision rendered [by the OAH hearing officer]. 20 U.S.C. § 27 28 4 1 1415(i)(2)(A). In such a case, the court’s inquiry is twofold: (1) has the state complied with 2 the procedures set forth in the Act, and (2) is the IEP reasonably calculated to enable the child 3 to receive educational benefits.” D.B. v. Bedford County Sch. Bd., 708 F.Supp.2d 564, 568- 4 569 (W.D. Va. 2010) (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-207 (1982). In 5 adjudicating an appeal from an administrative decision regarding the rights of students with 6 disabilities, the court is charged with receiving the record of the administrative proceeding 7 which, in essence, forms the undisputed facts of the case.” J.P. v. Rippon Unified Sch. Dist., 8 2009 WL 1034993 (E.D. Cal. 2009) at *2. “A summary judgment motion is the most 9 pragmatic procedural mechanism for resolving IDEA cases.” D.B., 708 F.Supp.2d at 569. 10 At the core of Defendant’s motion for reconsideration is the argument that the court 11 erred in its determination that Defendant’s reliance on J.P. v. Rippon Sch. Dist. was 12 misplaced. Defendant argues that J.P. “Stands for the proposition that a party may not 13 challenge the adequacy of an agency assessment at any stage of any case for judicial review 14 of IDEA matters in district court to support a claim for an IEE because J.P. endorsed the 15 hearing officer’s legal conclusion that disagreements with agency findings will not render the 16 agency assessment improper.” Doc. # 24 at 19:27-20:3 (italics added). The court disagrees. 17 In J.P. the parent objected to, among other things, the S/L assessment provided by the 18 school district based primarily on the fact that the parent had no input to the assessment and, 19 to a lesser extent, because the findings by the district’s assessors were not entirely consistent. 20 The J.P. court discounted the plaintiff’s claim that parental input was not factored into the 21 assessment based on documents incorporated in the administrative record. See generally, 22 J.P., 2009 WL 1034993 at *6 -*7. The court also noted that “the fact that some findings 23 noted by [the district’s S/L assessors] were contradictory does not render their report 24 inappropriate.” Id. at *7 (italics added). The sentence just quoted, when read in context, 25 does not state a legal proposition, it observes a factual conclusion. The court in J.P. carefully 26 examined the administrative record in that case and came to the conclusion that the fact of 27 28 5 1 disagreement between two of the district’s assessors was not enough to render the report 2 inappropriate in light of all the other facts derived from the administrative record that were 3 noted in the same paragraph. 4 5 6 With regard to civil actions brought in district court under the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C) provides as follows: In any action brought under this paragraph, the court – 7 (i) shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings; 8 (ii) shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party; and 9 (iii) basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate. 10 Id. If J.P. can be taken to support any legal proposition, it is the proposition that a district 11 court generally must undertake an appeal from an unfavorable administrative decision with 12 careful consideration of the full administrative record. Each of the court’s findings in J.P. 13 were made in that context and none of those findings support’s the sweeping limitation on a 14 plaintiff’s right to judicial review that Defendant urges on this court. 15 It is significant that Defendant proffers no other case authority for its argument that 16 disagreement between the parent/plaintiff and the administrative hearing officer is legally 17 insufficient to allege a claim for relief in an appellate action in district court. Even if J.P. 18 could be said to support the legal proposition Defendant contends, the case would 19 nonetheless be distinguishable on factual grounds inasmuch as the basis for Plaintiff’s 20 disagreement in this case is the outcome of an independent S/L evaluation she procured at her 21 own cost. The court concludes that Defendant has not put forward arguments of a convincing 22 nature that would warrant reconsideration of the court’s decision in its March 22 Order 23 regarding Plaintiff’s right to proceed to summary judgment regarding her challenge to the 24 ALJ’s finding that the S/L evaluation provided by Defendant was appropriate. 25 Defendants also move that the court reconsider its March 22 Order with regard to 26 Plaintiff’s second, third, fourth and sixth prayers for relief. The court will deny Defendant’s 27 28 6 1 request for much the same reason as noted above. Basically, the court finds Defendant’s 2 motion to strike potential remedies is procedurally improper. As noted in the court’s March 3 22 Order, the court’s remedial powers are broad where there is a finding that the student was 4 not provided with a FAPE in the LRE. The thrust of the court’s March 22 Order was that the 5 court is not inclined to decide issues that represent subsets of the major issues on appeal on a 6 piecemeal basis in the absence of a complete administrative record. That remains the court’s 7 chosen approach. In the present context, this means that the court must be concerned that 8 litigation of the available remedial options prior to the time the court decides Plaintiff’s 9 substantive claims might unnecessarily complicate the court’s consideration of the proper 10 available remedies. In short, it is a matter of keeping the horse before the cart. 11 In summary, the court is not inclined to take remedial options “off the table” in 12 advance of the time the court determines that Plaintiff is or is not entitled to relief, and in the 13 absence of a complete administrative record. If Defendant is of the opinion that certain 14 requested remedies are improper in light of the court’s later substantive findings, Defendants 15 will have ample opportunity to move to restrict the available remedies at that time. The court 16 finds that this approach serves the purposes of both judicial efficiency and relevant prudential 17 concerns. The court will permit a full consideration of the issue of what remedies are 18 available if and when it has been determined that there is an entitlement to any remedy. 19 Contrary to Defendant’s contention, there is no prejudice that arises from the court’s 20 approach. As Defendant concedes, Plaintiff is entitled to proceed to summary judgment on 21 the main underlying question of whether the ALJ correctly held that the IEP proposed by 22 Defendant will provide Plaintiff with a FAPE in the LRE. Summary judgment is based on 23 the entirety of the administrative record plus other materials as may properly be submitted to 24 augment the record. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(ii). Given that the issue of proper remedy 25 will be reserved to follow the court’s decision as to the merits of Plaintiff’s substantive 26 issues, it follows that Defendant’s burden, both as to discovery and as to legal argument, will 27 28 7 1 be substantially the same whether or not Plaintiff’s second, third, fourth and sixth prayers for 2 relief are in play. 3 The court finds that reconsideration of its March 22 Order is not warranted. 4 5 THEREFORE, for the reasons discussed above, it is hereby ORDERED that 6 Defendant’s motion for reconsideration of the court’s March 22 Order is hereby DENIED. 7 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 10 Dated: 0m8i78 June 9, 2011 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8
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