Armstrong v. California State Correctional Institutions
Filing
37
ORDER on Defendants' 31 Motions for Judgment on Pleadings signed by District Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill on 11/03/2011. (Flores, E)
<![CDATA[
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
8
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
9
10
CARRIE ARMSTRONG,
11
12
13
14
CASE NO. CV-F-10-1856 LJO JLT
Plaintiff,
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR
JUDGMENT ON PLEADINGS (Doc. 31)
vs.
SHIRLEEN WRIGHT-PEARSON, et al.,
Defendants,
15
/
16
INTRODUCTION
17
Plaintiff Carrie Armstrong (“Ms. Armstrong”), appearing in propria persona, asserts First
18
Amendment retaliation and defamation claims against defendants Shirleen Wright Pearson (“Ms.
19
Pearson”), Manjula Nair (“Ms. Nair”), Waldine Doering (“Ms. Doering”), Marta Sapeth (“Dr. Spaeth”),
20
Jonathan Akanno (“Dr. Akanno”), Ismail Patel (“Dr. Patel”), and Lourdes Villaruz (“Ms. Villaruz”)
21
(collectively “Defendants”). Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Ms.
22
Armstrong’s First Amendment claims are barred by the statute of limitations and her defamation claims
23
fail for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Ms. Armstrong opposes the motion for judgment on
24
the pleadings, arguing that the statute of limitations on her First Amendment claims did not begin until
25
she discovered the basis on her claims in 2010. In addition, Ms. Armstrong argues that her defamation
26
claims fall outside of the California Government Tort Claims Act. Finally, Ms. Armstrong submits a
27
proposed fourth amended complaint, asking for leave to amend. For the following reasons, this Court
28
GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) motion.
1
1
BACKGROUND
2
Ms. Armstrong was employed as a registered nurse with the California Department of
3
Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) from 2005 through 2006. She alleges that during her
4
employment, she “stood up and spoke out against” behavior that she found to be improper at CDCR.
5
“Shortly after” she spoke out, Ms. Armstrong alleges, Defendants retaliated against her by plotting
6
against her to have her terminated, investigated at CDCR and investigated criminally. Ms. Armstrong
7
alleges that Defendants’ actions and defamatory statements led to her termination and a criminal
8
prosecution.
9
Speech Activities
10
During 2005 and 2006, Ms. Armstrong spoke to her supervisors and union regarding what she
11
considered to be illegal practices and procedures at Kern Valley State Prison. Specifically, Ms.
12
Armstrong voiced concern that nurses were forced to respond to emergencies and other medical
13
situations that required the presence of a physician. Ms. Armstrong complained that as a result, nurses
14
were forced to practice medicine, outside the scope of their authority, by responding to these medical
15
situations and being forced to write prescriptions for inmates. Ms. Armstrong also complained about
16
one particular inmate who needed a special diet but who did not receive the special diet.
17
Alleged Retaliation
18
Ms. Armstrong alleges that Defendants retaliated against her for making these complaints in a
19
number of ways. Ms. Armstrong contends that Dr. Spaeth told Ms. Armstrong to “shut her yap” and
20
stated that she hated Ms. Armstrong and would like to see her fired. Ms. Armstrong further alleges that
21
Dr. Spaeth told her that she had “nice implants.” Ms. Armstrong alleges that she was also subjected to
22
false accusations regarding her job performance, including: (1) accusations by Drs. Akanno, Spaeth, and
23
Patel that Ms. Armstrong issued medical orders without a physician’s consent; (2) accusations by Ms.
24
Spaeth, Ms. Doering, Ms. Wright-Pearson, and Ms. Nair that Ms. Armstrong was practicing medicine
25
outside the scope of her authority; (3) accusations by Ms. Wright-Pearson that Ms. Armstrong appeared
26
to be using drugs; (4) accusations by Ms. Villaruz that the narcotics cart was always off-count when Ms.
27
Armstrontg was working; and (5) accusations by Ms. Doering that Ms. Armstrong worked unapproved
28
overtime. In addition, Ms. Armstrong alleges that Ms. Spaeth, Ms. Nair, Ms. Doering, and Ms. Wright2
1
Pearson tampered with “vital documents” relating to her employment to have Ms. Armstrong fired and
2
investigated by the Board of Nursing. Ms. Armstrong asserts that Ms. Wright-Pearson, Ms. Doering,
3
and Ms. Nair even fabricated Ms. Armstrong’s resignation letter.
4
Defamation
5
Ms. Armstrong alleges three claims for defamation. She alleges that Ms. Wright-Pearson falsely
6
informed agents of CDCR that Ms. Armstrong appeared to be in drugs. She alleges that Ms. Nair falsely
7
informed agents of CDCR that Ms. Armstrong was practicing outside the scope of her authority as a
8
nurse. Ms. Armstrong alleges that Ms. Villaruz falsely informed agents of CDCR that the med car was
9
always off count for narcotics when Ms. Armstrong controlled it. These defendants allegedly made
10
these statements in 2005 and 2006.
11
Adverse Employment Actions
12
In 2006, Ms. Armstrong was “placed on a leave of absence.” TAC ¶12. Ms. Armstrong alleges
13
that the actions of Defendants eventually led to her termination of employment. In addition, Ms.
14
Armstrong alleges that Defendants’ actions and false accusations caused Ms. Armstrong to face criminal
15
prosecution.
16
Procedural History
17
Ms. Armstrong initiated this action on April 30, 2010. Ms. Armstrong proceeds on her third
18
amended complaint (“TAC”) and asserted ten causes of action against Defendants. In Counts One
19
through Seven, Ms. Armstrong asserts that Defendants retaliated against her in violation of the First
20
Amendment and 42 U.S.C. §1983 (“Section 1983"). In Counts Eight through Ten,1 she asserts state law
21
claims for defamation against Ms. Villaruz, Ms. Wright-Pearson, and Ms. Nair. Ms. Armstrong seeks
22
to recover compensatory and punitive damages.
23
On April 27, 2011, the court found that Ms. Armstrong’s TAC stated cognizable claims and
24
authorized service against Defendants. Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings on September
25
26, 2011. Ms. Armstrong opposed the motion on October 24, 2011. Defendants filed a reply on
26
October 31, 2011. This Court found this motion suitable for a decision without a hearing and vacated
27
1
28
In her third amended complaint, Ms. Armstrong erroneously asserts “Ninth Claim for Relief” twice. This Court
construes the second “Ninth Claim for Relief” as her “Tenth Claim for Relief” and refers to that claim herein as Count Ten.
3
1
the November 8, 2011 hearing on this motion. Having considered the parties arguments, the TAC, and
2
the applicable case law, this Court issues the following order.
3
4
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
5
Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). This Court
6
applies essentially the same standards of review on a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) motion as those applied to
7
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motions: i.e., judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when, even if all material
8
facts in the pleading under attack are true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
9
Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir.1990). The Court
10
must assume the truthfulness of the material facts alleged in the complaint and all inferences reasonably
11
drawn from these facts must be construed in favor of the responding party. General Conference Corp.
12
of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Seventh-Day Adventist Congregational Church, 887 F.2d 228, 230 (9th
13
Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1079, 110 S.Ct. 1134, 107 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1990). Defendants are not
14
entitled to judgment on the pleadings if the complaint raises issues of fact which, if proved, would
15
support recovery. Id. at 230.
16
Like a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) motion challenges the
17
legal sufficiency of an opposing party's pleadings. “When a federal court reviews the sufficiency of a
18
complaint, before the reception of any evidence either by affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily
19
a limited one.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1990). Dismissal is
20
proper where there is either a “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts
21
alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Id. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
22
above the speculative level ... on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even
23
if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965, 167 L.Ed.2d 929
24
(2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted). “While a complaint ... does not need detailed factual
25
allegations ... a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more
26
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
27
Id . at 1964. To survive this motion, plaintiff's allegations must be plausible on their face. Id. at 1973.
28
///
4
1
B.
First Amendment Claims
2
In Counts One through Seven, Ms. Armstrong asserts a claim of retaliation in violation of the
3
First Amendment against each defendant. “[P]ublic employees do not shed their First Amendment
4
rights simply because they are employed by the government." Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d
5
696, 702 (9th Cir. 2009). "[T]he state may not abuse its position as employer to stifle ‘the First
6
Amendment rights its employees would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public
7
interest.'" Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391
8
U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). A First Amendment retaliation claim against a government employer in this
9
regard involves a sequential five-step series of questions:
10
11
12
(1) whether the plaintiff spoke on a matter of public concern; (2) whether the
plaintiff spoke as a private citizen or public employee; (3) whether the plaintiff's
protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment
action; (4) whether the state had an adequate justification for treating the employee
differently from other members of the general public; and (5) whether the state would
have taken the adverse employment action event absent the protected speech.
13
14
Eng, 552 F.3d at 1070. Ms. Armstrong bears the burden on the first three steps, but the burden then
15
shifts to the defendant at the fourth and fifth steps. Id. at 1070-72.
16
Defendants argue that Ms. Armstrong’s First Amendment claims are barred by the statute of
17
limitations. In Section 1983 actions, federal courts apply the statute of limitations of the forum state for
18
personal injury claims. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 269, 105 S. Ct. 1938 (1985); Fink v. Shedler,
19
192 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1999). California Civil Code of Procedure section 335.1 provides a two-
20
year statute of limitations for personal injury claims.
21
While state law determines the statute of limitations, “[t]he accrual date of a Section 1983 cause
22 of action is a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law.” Wallace v. Kato, 127
23 S.Ct. 1091, 1095 (2007) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, Ms. Armstrong’s argument, related to the
24 California discovery rule, is inapposite. Pursuant to federal law, a Section 1983 “claim accrues when the
25 plaintiff knows, or should know, of the injury which is the basis of the cause of action.” Fink v. Shedler,
26 192 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1999); Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 1996). “Under federal
27 law, the touchstone for determining the commencement of the limitations period is notice: ‘a cause of
28 action generally accrues when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis
5
1 of his action.’” Hoesterey v. City of Cathedral City, 945 F.2d 317, 319 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Cline v.
2 Brusett, 661 F.2d 108, 110 (9th Cir. 1981)).
3
To determine when the statute of limitations for a First Amendment retaliation commences, the
4 Court first must “identify precisely the unlawful employment practice of which [the plaintiff] complains.”
5 Delaware College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257 (1980) (internal quotations omitted). Adverse employment
6 actions within the context of a First Amendment retaliation claim are actions taken by a defendant that
7 are "reasonably likely to deter [a plaintiff] from engaging in protected activity under the First
8 Amendment." Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 976 (9th Cir. 2003).
9
In her third amended complaint, Ms. Armstrong asserts that each Defendant and his or her
10 actions: (1) created a hostile work environment for her; (2) set in motion her termination; and (3) set in
11 motion the criminal prosecution of Ms. Armstrong. This Court considers Ms. Armstrong’s claims as to
12 each group of allegations. The Court first considers whether the allegations constitute an “unlawful
13 employment practice.” If so, the Court will then consider whether these allegations are barred by the
14 statute of limitations.
15
As to the hostile work environment, Ms. Armstrong alleges that Defendants created a hostile work
16 environment in an effort to retaliate against her for her speech. In particular, Ms. Armstrong contends
17 that Dr. Akanno physically harassed Ms. Armstrong; Dr. Spaeth verbally harassed Ms. Armstrong; and
18 Defendants disparaged her and made false accusations against her regarding her job performance. These
19 actions qualify as “reasonably likely to deter” Ms. Armstrong from engaging in protected speech. See,
20 Moore v. California Institute of Technology Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 275 F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 2002)
21 (several proposals to change his work conditions adversely constituted adverse employment action even
22 though those proposals were never carried out).
23
As to these hostile work environment allegations, however, Ms. Armstrong had notice of those
24 actions when they took place. According to Ms. Armstrong, Defendants created a hostile work
25 environment while she worked at CDCR from 2005 through 2006. Ms. Armstrong was aware of these
26 actions at the time they took place, since she was the target of the alleged harassment and
27
28
6
1 contemporaneously experienced the allegations at the time they took place.2 The statute of limitations
2 for these claims accrued, at the time Ms. Armstrong had notice of these adverse employment actions.
3 Hoesterey, 945 F.2d at 319. Pursuant to the statute of limitations, Ms. Armstrong was required to file
4 her First Amendment claim based on these allegations within two years of those actions. Because the
5 statute of limitations began to accrue on these claims at the time they happened between 2005 and 2006,
6 Ms. Armstrong was required to file her claim in 2007 or 2008. Ms. Armstrong’s First Amendment claims
7 based on the hostile work environment, filed in 2010, are untimely. Accordingly, Ms. Armstrong’s First
8 Amendment claims are time-barred to the extent that they are based on the hostile work environment
9 allegations.
10
Ms. Armstrong further asserts that Defendants sought to have her fired and took actions to get
11 her fired “shortly after” she “stood up and spoke out” against what she considered to be “illegalities”
12 occurring at the prison.3 These allegations include wrongfully accusing Ms. Armstrong of improper
13 conduct and forging Ms. Armstrong’s resignation letter. Two adverse employment actions are at issue
14 here: (1) the scheme to terminate Ms. Armstrong and (2) Ms. Armstrong’s termination. These events
15 began “shortly after” she engaged in the speech, which she alleges to have begun in 2005 and continued
16 through 2006.
17
Ms. Armstrong had notice of both of those adverse employment actions no later than the time she
18 was placed on a leave of absence in 2006. Thus, the statute of limitations related to the alleged scheme
19 have her terminated from her employment and her termination began to accrue at the time Ms. Armstrong
20 was placed on the leave of absence. As discussed above, Ms. Armstrong was required to assert claims
21 based on these allegations no later than 2008. Accordingly, Ms. Armstrong’s untimely First Amendment
22 retaliation claims are barred by the statute of limitations to the extent that they rely on her employment
23 termination.
24
The third group of allegations relate to Defendants’ actions that allegedly set in motion a criminal
25
26
27
2
This includes allegations discussed in paragraph 12 (a) - (h) and (t) - (w) of the third amended complaint (“TAC”).
28
3
This includes allegations discussed in paragraph 12 (b), (d), (j) - (o) and (q) - (w).
7
1 prosecution of Ms. Armstrong.4 Specifically, Ms. Armstrong alleges that certain defendants “altered vital
2 documents,” made slanderous accusations against her, including accusing her of practicing medicine
3 without authority and that she took drugs from the drug cart. In addition, Ms. Armstrong contends that
4 Defendants provided false declarations and testified falsely against her during the criminal prosecution.
5 Some of these actions took place while Ms. Armstrong was employed; others took place after she was
6 terminated.
7
At this stage of the proceedings, this Court cannot determine that Ms. Armstrong’s claims based
8 on the conduct that led to the criminal prosecution are barred entirely as a matter of law. The TAC is not
9 specific as to when the criminal prosecution or the conduct that led to the criminal prosecution happened.
10 As set forth above, in a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) motion, this Court must draw reasonable inferences in Ms.
11 Armstrong’s favor. Construing the pleading in a light most favorable to Ms. Armstrong, some of those
12 statements or actions may have occurred within two years of the date this action was filed. To the extent
13 that the allegedly retaliatory conduct took place after April 30, 2008, or within two years of the filing of
14 this civil action on April 30, 2010, the claims based on that conduct are timely. On the other hand, Ms.
15 Armstrong’s claims are barred to the extent that they rely on conduct that took place outside the
16 limitations period. Moreover, Ms. Armstrong’s claims are barred to the extent that Ms. Armstrong had
17 notice of that conduct outside the limitations period.
18
B.
19
In Counts Eight through Ten, Ms. Armstrong alleges defamation against Ms. Wright-Pearson, Ms
Defamation
20 Nair, and Ms. Villaruz. Defamation can take the form of slander or libel. Cal. Civ. Code § 44. Slander
21 is defined as a false and unprivileged publication, orally uttered, which:
22
1. Charges any person with crime, or having been indicted, convicted, or punished for
crime;
23
24
25
26
2. Imputes in him the present existence of an infectious, contagious, or loathsome
disease;
3. Tends directly to injure him in respect to his office, profession, trade or business,
either by imputing to him general disqualification in those respects which the office or
other occupation peculiarly requires, or by imputing something with reference to his
office, profession, trade, or business that has a natural tendency to lessen its profits;
27
28
4
This includes allegations discussed in paragraph 12(b), (d) , and (i) - (w).
8
1
4. Imputes to him impotence or a want of chastity; or
2
5. Which, by natural consequence, causes actual damage.
3
4 Cal. Civ. Code § 46. Libel is a false and unprivileged publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy or
5 other fixed representation to the eye. Cal. Civ. Code § 45. A written statement is libel per se if it
6 defames the plaintiff on its face, that is, without the need of extrinsic evidence to explain the defamatory
7 nature of the statement. Cal. Civ. Code § 45a.
8
Ms. Armstrong alleges that Ms. Nair, Ms. Wright-Pearson, and Ms. Villaruz made false, oral
9 statements imputing her professional integrity as a nurse, including that she was on drugs, practicing
10 medicine as if she were a physician; and that the narcotics cart was always off-count whenever Ms.
11 Armstrong was working. These allegations state a claim for defamation (slander per se). See Regalia
12 v. Nethercutt Collection, 172 Cal. App. 4th 361, 369 (2009) (noting that false allegations of unethical
13 activity or professional incompetence give rise to a claim for slander per se).
14
Although her allegations are sufficient factually, Defendants contend that Ms. Armstrong’s
15 defamation claims fail procedurally. In her TAC, Ms. Armstrong fails to allege that she exhausted her
16 administrative remedies with regards to her defamation claims. Under the California Tort Claims Act,
17 suits against a public entity for damages may not proceed unless the plaintiff presents a written claim
18 that is resolved by the entity. Cal. Gov. Code § 945.4. Pursuant to this Act:
19
20
one who sues a public employee on the basis of acts or omissions in the course of the
[employee's] employment [must] have filed a claim against the public entity employer
pursuant to the procedure for claims against public entities.
21 Briggs v. Lawrence, 230 Cal. App. 3d 605, 612-13 (1991). Claims are not filed directly with the "public
22 entity," but with the Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board. Cal. Gov't Code § 905.2. In
23 addition to the filing requirement, there are time limits for filing, id. at § 911.2, and procedures for
24 applying to file late, id. at § 911.4 & 946.6. "Claim presentation is not merely procedural, it is "an
25 integral part of plaintiff's cause of action." California v. Sup. Court, 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1240 (2004).
26 Therefore, a plaintiff must allege facts in his complaint demonstrating compliance with the California
27 Tort Claims Act. Id. at 1241-42. Otherwise, the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a
28 claim upon which relief can be granted. Id. Failure to timely present a claim for money or damages to
9
1 a public entity bars a plaintiff from filing a lawsuit against that entity. Id.
2
Ms. Armstrong argues that the California Tort Claim Act claim presentation requirement is
3 inapplicable to her defamation claims because the defamatory statements were made after her
4 employment was terminated. Because the statements were made after her employment was terminated,
5 Ms. Armstrong argues, the statements were not made “in the course of the [defendants’] employment as
6 a public employee[s],” as required. Ms. Armstrong maintains that she discovered that “defendants
7 engaged in defamatory statements about Plaintiff AFTER the time she left the employ of the prison where
8 she and the defendants worked.” Ms. Armstrong attached a declaration to her opposition in an attempt
9 to establish these facts outside the allegations of the complaint.
10
Defendants argue that Ms. Armstrong’s position contradicts the allegations of the complaint. As
11 to Counts 8 and 9, Ms. Armstrong alleges that the defamatory “statement occurred in or about 2006[.]”
12 TAC ¶¶ 67, 74. As to Count 10, Ms. Armstrong alleges that the defamatory “statement occurred in or
13 about 2005 or 2006[.]” TAC ¶81. Although the TAC establishes the year or years in which the allegedly
14 defamatory statements were made, the TAC is silent as to when Ms. Armstrong’s employment was
15 terminated. While the TAC alleges that Ms. Armstrong was placed on a leave of absence in 2006, it does
16 not specify which month the statements were made or when she was placed on leave. In addition, Ms.
17 Armstrong alleges only that she was terminated from CDCR and that Defendants set in motion their
18 scheme to terminate Ms. Armstrong after she spoke out on certain issues. The date of the termination
19 is not specified.
20
Ms. Armstrong improperly attaches a declaration to establish the factual timeline upon which she
21 relies in her opposition. In a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) motion, however, this Court cannot consider
22 documents outside of the pleadings. Accordingly, this Court sustains Defendants’ objection to Ms.
23 Armstrong’s declaration and will not consider it.
24
Nevertheless, as set forth above, this Court must assume the truthfulness of the material facts
25 alleged in the complaint and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of Ms. Armstrong. General
26 Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 887 F.2d at 230. According to these standards, and for
27 purposes of this motion, this Court must assume that the statements that were made in 2006 were made
28 during a time when Ms. Armstrong was no longer employed. The allegations do not contradict this
10
1 assumption. According to this inference drawn Ms. Armstrong’s favor, Defendants fail to establish that
2 the statements were made during the time that Ms. Armstrong was employed.
3
As to the defamation claims, Defendants fail to establish that they are entitled to judgment in their
4 favor as a matter of law on the pleadings. Defendants’ arguments are based on the assumption that the
5 statements were made by Defendants during the time that Ms. Armstrong was employed at CDCR.
6 Based on that premise, Defendants argue that the speech was made “within the scope of their
7 employment.” In their reply, Defendants concede that when the statements were made are of “relevant
8 importance” as to the issue of whether Defendants were speaking in the scope of their employment. In
9 addition, Defendants fail to present authority that would establish that statements made about someone
10 who is not employed at the public entity fall within the California Tort Claim Act.”5 Moreover,
11 Defendants’ argument assumes facts not alleged in the TAC, and draws inferences against Ms. Armstrong
12 to argue that the allegedly defamatory statements were true. Defendants’ arguments are ill-suited for a
13 motion on the pleadings. See Balistreri, 901 F.2d at 699 (“When a federal court reviews the sufficiency
14 of a complaint, before the reception of any evidence either by affidavit or admissions, its task is
15 necessarily a limited one.”). Accordingly, based on the appropriate standards, Defendants have failed
16 to establish that they are entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to Ms. Armstrong’s defamation claims.
17
18
Leave to Amend
Ms. Armstrong requests leave to amend her complaint in her opposition to this motion. Because
19 this Court is considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, leave to amend is improper. To the
20 extent Ms. Armstrong’s claims survive this motion, and if appropriate, Ms. Armstrong may raise her
21 motion to amend separately. Accordingly, Ms. Armstrong’s request to amend her complaint is denied
22 without prejudice.
23
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
24
For the foregoing reasons, this Court:
25
1.
GRANTS in part Defendants’ judgment on the pleadings. This Court GRANTS
26
27
28
5
This Court makes no legal conclusion about whether or not such statements may fall within the notice requirement
of the California Tort Claims Act. This Court’s ruling is based on Defendants’ failure to carry their burden to establish that
Ms. Armstrong’s claims fail as a matter of law.
11
1
judgment in Defendants’ favor on Counts 1-7 to the extent those claims rely on
2
allegations related to hostile work environment and a scheme to terminate Ms.
3
Armstrong;
4
2.
DENIES in part Defendants’ judgment on the pleadings. This Court DENIES
5
judgment to the extent that Ms. Armstrong’s claims rely on allegations that took place
6
during the limitations period; and
7
3.
DENIES without prejudice Ms. Armstrong’s request for leave to amend.
8 IT IS SO ORDERED.
9 Dated:
b9ed48
10
November 3, 2011
/s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
12
]]>
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?
