(HC) Campbell v. Rios, No. 1:2010cv01681 - Document 14 (E.D. Cal. 2012)
Court Description: ORDER DENYING the 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; ORDER DIRECTING Clerk to Enter Judgment for Respondent signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe on 12/20/2012. CASE CLOSED. (Sant Agata, S)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
(HC) Campbell v. Rios Doc. 14 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 OLIVER A. CAMPBELL, 13 Petitioner, 14 v. 15 H. A. RIOS, 16 Respondent. 17 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 1:10-cv—01681-BAM-HC ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (DOC. 1) ORDER DIRECTING THE CLERK TO ENTER JUDGMENT FOR RESPONDENT 18 19 Petitioner is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se and in 20 forma pauperis with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant 21 to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 22 parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the United States 23 Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings in the case, 24 including the entry of final judgment, by manifesting their 25 consent in writings signed by the parties or their 26 representatives and filed by Petitioner on September 27, 2010, 27 and on behalf of Respondent on May 23, 2011. 28 Court is the petition, which was filed on September 16, 2010. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the Pending before the 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 Respondent filed an answer to the petition on March 28, 2011. 2 traverse was filed. 3 4 5 No I. Jurisdiction A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Relief by way of a writ of habeas corpus extends to a 6 prisoner in custody under the authority of the United States who 7 shows that the custody violates the Constitution, laws, or 8 treaties of the United States. 9 a federal prisoner who challenges the validity or 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Although 10 constitutionality of his conviction must file a petition for writ 11 of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a federal prisoner 12 challenging the manner, location, or conditions of the execution 13 of a sentence must bring a petition for writ of habeas corpus 14 under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 15 864-65 (9th Cir. 2000). 16 Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, Here, Petitioner alleges that he was denied procedural 17 rights and due process of law in connection with a prison 18 disciplinary hearing, which resulted in a loss of good conduct 19 time credits. 20 or other rules administered by a prison administrator that 21 challenges the duration of a sentence is a cognizable claim of 22 being in custody in violation of the Constitution pursuant to 28 23 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 24 445, 454 (1985) (determining a procedural due process claim 25 concerning disciplinary procedures and findings). 26 constitutional violation has resulted in the loss of time 27 credits, it affects the duration of a sentence, and the violation 28 may be remedied by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. A due process claim concerning parole, good time, See, e.g., Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 2 If a 1 2 3 Young v. Kenny, 907 F.2d 874, 876-78 (9th Cir. 1990). Accordingly, the Court concludes that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the petition. 4 5 B. Jurisdiction over the Person Title 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) provides that writs of habeas 6 corpus may be granted by the district courts “within their 7 respective jurisdictions.” 8 upon the prisoner, but upon the prisoner’s custodian. 9 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 494-495 A writ of habeas corpus operates not Braden v. 10 (1973). 11 under § 2241 must file the petition in the judicial district of 12 the petitioner's custodian. 13 672, 677 (9th Cir. 1990). 14 prisoner is confined constitutes the custodian who must be named 15 in the petition, and the petition must be filed in the district 16 of confinement. 17 (2004). 18 Court of personal jurisdiction. 19 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2003). 20 A petitioner filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus Brown v. United States, 610 F.2d The warden of the penitentiary where a Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 446-47 A failure to name and serve the custodian deprives the Johnson v. Reilly, 349 F.3d Here, at all pertinent times, Petitioner has been 21 incarcerated at the United States Prison at Atwater, California 22 (USPA), which is located within the territory of the Eastern 23 District of California. 24 of USPA, as Respondent. 25 26 Petitioner named H. A. Rios, the Warden Accordingly, the Court concludes that it has personal jurisdiction over the Respondent. 27 II. 28 The facts and procedural history are derived from copies of Factual and Procedural Summary 3 1 reports that were filed by Respondent in support of the answer 2 and that are established by the declaration of Robert J. Ballash, 3 Discipline Hearing Administrator of the Federal Bureau of Prisons 4 (BOP), to be true and accurate copies of documents created and 5 maintained by the BOP in the ordinary course of business. 6 8-1, 2-7.) 7 (Doc. The incident report of Correctional Officer B. Pavey dated 8 October 3, 2009, reflects that on that date, Officer Pavey 9 discovered a sharpened metal object approximately six and one- 10 half inches long while he was conducting a random search of a 11 cell that Petitioner shared with another inmate. 12 found magnetized underneath the door of the cell. 13 told both the investigating officer and the unit disciplinary 14 committee that the object was his. 15 Petitioner assured the committee that his cell mate had nothing 16 to do with it, and Petitioner was going to take responsibility 17 for the object. 18 fact finder also included a photograph of the object. 19 doc. 8-2 at 3, 6.) 20 (Id. at 16.) The object was Petitioner (Ans., doc. 8-1 at 16-17.) Evidence before the disciplinary (Ans., Petitioner received a copy of the incident report on October 21 4, 2009. 22 referred the charge to the disciplinary hearing officer (DHO) for 23 further hearing and consideration of sanctions on October 5, 24 2009. 25 referral of the charge of possession of a weapon to the DHO; he 26 stated that he did not wish to have a staff representative or 27 witnesses. 28 his procedural rights concerning the disciplinary proceedings. (Ans., doc. 8-1, 16.) (Id.) The unit disciplinary committee On October 5, 2009, Petitioner signed a notice of (Id. at 19.) On the same date he signed a notice of 4 1 2 (Id. at 20.) The DHO hearing was held on October 8, 2009. Petitioner 3 admitted the charges. 4 incident report and investigation, Petitioner’s admission, and 5 the photograph of the weapon. 6 that Petitioner had possessed a weapon in violation of prohibited 7 acts code 104 based on the written report of the incident made by 8 staff; Petitioner’s admissions that the weapon was his to the 9 investigating lieutenant, the unit disciplinary committee, and (Doc. 8-2 at 2.) The DHO considered the (Doc. 8-2 at 3.) The DHO found 10 the DHO at the hearing; and the photograph taken at the time of 11 the incident that reflected one metal homemade weapon that was 12 six and three-quarters inches in length and sharpened to a point 13 on one end. 14 (Id.) The DHO imposed thirty (30) days of disciplinary segregation 15 with ten (10) days suspended, disallowed forty (40) days of good 16 conduct time, and prohibited commissary privileges for 180 days. 17 (Id. at 4.) 18 inmate’s unit manager and was delivered to Petitioner within 19 three working days of October 30, 2009. 20 The DHO report was electronically sent to the (Id. at 5.) Respondent admits that Petitioner exhausted administrative 21 remedies. 22 received a copy of the unit disciplinary committee’s report 23 during the administrative appeal. (Ans., doc. 8 at 5-6.) It appears that Petitioner (Doc. 8-2 at 13.) 24 III. 25 Petitioner alleges that Lieutenant D. Tyson, the Alternate 26 Disciplinary Hearing Officer who presided over the DHO hearing, 27 was not certified to conduct a DHO hearing and was not an 28 impartial party. The Hearing Officer 5 1 2 A. Certification Petitioner alleges no facts concerning the certification or 3 authority of Lt. Tyson to conduct the hearing. 4 submits the declaration of Discipline Hearing Administrator 5 Ballash, who supervises the discipline hearing officers within 6 the western region of the BOP. 7 the appeal response within the administrative remedial process 8 confirmed that Lt. Tyson was trained and certified as a DHO, even 9 though it was not the staff person’s primary job assignment. 10 11 Respondent Ballash’s declaration notes that (Doc. 8-1, 6; doc. 8-2, 13.) Accordingly, the Court concludes that there is no merit to 12 Petitioner’s generalized assertion that the DHO was not 13 authorized or certified to preside over the DHO hearing. 14 15 B. Impartiality A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of 16 due process. 17 Fairness requires an absence of actual bias and of the 18 probability of unfairness. 19 consist of the appearance of partiality in the absence of actual 20 bias. 21 showing that the adjudicator has prejudged, or reasonably appears 22 to have prejudged, an issue is sufficient. 23 967 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992). In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). Id. Bias may be actual, or it may Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732, 741 (9th Cir. 1995). A Kenneally v. Lungren, 24 However, there is a presumption of honesty and integrity on 25 the part of decision makers which may be overcome by evidence of 26 a risk of actual bias or prejudgment based on special facts and 27 circumstances. 28 Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46-47, 58 (1975). The mere fact that a decision maker denies relief in a given 6 1 case or has denied relief in the vast majority of cases does not 2 demonstrate bias. 3 because unfavorable judicial rulings alone are generally 4 insufficient to demonstrate bias unless they reflect such extreme 5 favoritism or antagonism that the exercise of fair judgment is 6 precluded. 7 The Supreme Court has ruled that a committee of correctional 8 officers and staff, acting with the purpose of taking necessary 9 disciplinary measures to control inmate behavior within 10 acceptable limits, was sufficiently impartial to conduct 11 disciplinary hearings and impose penalties including revocation 12 of good time credits. 13 (1974). 14 Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d at 742. This is Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570-71 Here, Petitioner does not state any facts in support of his 15 general assertion that the DHO was not impartial. 16 Respondent has submitted the response of the BOP in the 17 administrative appeal process, which was made by Harrell Watts, 18 Administrator of National Inmate Appeals, and authenticated by 19 Ballash. 20 investigating officer, a member of the unit disciplinary 21 committee, a witness to the incident, or one who played any 22 significant part in having the charges referred to the DHO. 23 Accordingly, the DHO met the criteria established by BOP policy. 24 (Doc. 8-2 at 13.) 25 to rebut or otherwise undermine the presumption that DHO Tyson 26 was not impartial. 27 28 In contrast, It reflects that the DHO was not the reporting officer, Under these circumstances, there is no basis Therefore, the Court concludes that Petitioner has not met his burden of showing that the DHO was not impartial. 7 1 2 Accordingly, Petitioner’s claims concerning the DHO will be denied. 3 IV. Denial of Due Process Based on Allegedly Defective Notice 4 Petitioner argues that he was not provided a copy of the 5 unit disciplinary committee’s hearing decision before the DHO 6 hearing was held, and therefore his due process rights were 7 violated. 8 The process due in a prison disciplinary proceeding 9 includes: 1) written notice of the charges; 2) at least a brief 10 period of time after the notice (no less than twenty-four hours) 11 to prepare for the hearing; 3) a written statement by the fact 12 finders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for the 13 disciplinary action; 4) an opportunity for the inmate to call 14 witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when 15 permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to 16 institutional safety or correctional goals; and 5) aid from a 17 fellow inmate or staff member where an illiterate inmate is 18 involved, or where the complexity of the issues makes it unlikely 19 that the inmate will be able to collect and present the evidence 20 necessary for an adequate comprehension of the case. Wolff v. 21 McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 564, 566, 570. 22 Further, where good-time credits are a protected liberty 23 interest, the decision to revoke credits must be supported by 24 some evidence in the record. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. at 25 454. The Court in Hill stated: 26 27 28 We hold that the requirements of due process are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary board to revoke good time credits. This standard is met if “there was some evidence from 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 which the conclusion of the administrative tribunal could be deduced....” United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S., at 106, 47 S.Ct., at 304. Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board. See ibid.; United States ex rel. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131, 133-134, 44 S.Ct. 260, 260-261, 68 L.Ed. 590 (1924); Willis v. Ciccone, 506 F.2d 1011, 1018 (CA8 1974). 8 Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56. 9 does not require that the evidence logically preclude any The Constitution 10 conclusion other than the conclusion reached by the disciplinary 11 board; rather, there need only be some evidence in order to 12 ensure that there was some basis in fact for the decision. 13 Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. at 457. 14 In Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1270-71 (9th Cir. 15 1989), an inmate was found to have committed the disciplinary 16 violation of possession of contraband (stolen sandwiches) and was 17 assessed a forfeiture of thirty days of credit. 18 report, the violation was described as “stealing.” 19 sought relief under § 2241 for alleged due process violations. 20 The court stated the following with respect to the adequacy of 21 the notice given to the prisoner: 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 In the incident The prisoner Nor does appellant assert that the officer's description of the incident as “stealing” rather than as “possession of contraband” in the incident report deprived him of the opportunity to present a proper defense. The incident report described the factual situation that was the basis for the finding of guilt of possession of contraband and alerted Bostic that he would be charged with possessing something he did not own. Cf. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-64, 94 S.Ct. at 2978-79 (stating that “the function of [the] notice [of a claimed violation] is to give the charged party a chance to marshal the facts in his defense and to clarify what the charges are”). The incident report 9 1 adequately performed the functions of notice described in Wolff. See id. 2 Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d at 1270-71. 3 Here, the incident report received by Petitioner before the 4 occurrence of both the unit disciplinary committee hearing and 5 the DHO hearing described the basic facts of the allegation (the 6 discovery of the sharpened metal object magnetized and hidden on 7 the bottom of Petitioner’s cell door). The incident report thus 8 unambiguously described the factual situation that was the basis 9 for the finding of guilt. 10 Petitioner has not stated any facts or mounted any argument 11 regarding how the failure to receive a copy of the later unit 12 discipline committee report prejudiced him or affected his 13 ability to defend against the charge. The Court notes that 14 Petitioner admitted ownership of the weapon. Petitioner has not 15 shown that any technical defect with respect to receipt of the 16 committee report resulted in diminution of his opportunity to 17 marshal the facts in his defense or to respond to clearly 18 identified charges. In view of the specificity of the 19 allegations, and considering Petitioner’s admission of guilt, it 20 is clear that Petitioner had an opportunity to marshal the facts 21 in his defense and to clarify what the charges were. The 22 incident report thus adequately performed the essential functions 23 of notice that were determinative in Bostic and detailed in 24 Wolff. 25 Therefore, the Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to 26 show a due process violation with respect to notice of the 27 charges. 28 10 1 To the extent that Petitioner challenges the disciplinary 2 finding itself, Petitioner’s challenge lacks merit. 3 Petitioner’s admission, the report of the officer who discovered 4 the weapon, and the photograph constituted some evidence in 5 support of the decision. 6 at 447-48, 456-57 (an officer’s testimony and report of 7 discovering an assaulted inmate, along with corroborating 8 circumstantial evidence, were held sufficient to support a 9 finding of assault). 10 The Cf., Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. In summary, Petitioner has failed to establish a violation 11 of his right to due process of law. 12 due process claim or claims will be denied. Accordingly, Petitioner’s 13 V. 14 The Court concludes that Petitioner failed to establish his Disposition 15 claims, and the petition should be denied. 16 Accordingly, it is ORDERED that: 17 1) Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is 18 19 20 21 DENIED; and 2) The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment for Respondent. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: 10c20k December 20, 2012 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
