(PS) Brainard v Willmon et al, No. 1:2010cv01126 - Document 21 (E.D. Cal. 2010)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM DECISION Re: Defendant Bryan and Carol Willmon's Motion to Dismiss 8 , and Plaintiff William Brainard's Motion for Summary Judgment 17 signed by Judge Oliver W. Wanger on 9/21/2010. CASE CLOSED. (Esteves, C)
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(PS) Brainard v Willmon et al Doc. 21 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 WILLIAM JAMES BRAINARD, 10 Plaintiff, 11 12 13 BRYAN WILLMON, CAROL WILLMON, et al, Defendants. 15 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: DEFENDANT BRYAN AND CAROL WILLMON’S MOTION TO DISMISS, (Doc. 7), and PLAINTIFF WILLIAM BRAINARD’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. 17) v. 14 16 1:10-CV-01126-OWW-SMS I. By this action INTRODUCTION. Plaintiff William Brainard alleges that Defendants Bryan and Carol Willmon violated his patent rights in real property by conducting a non-judicial foreclosure of a deed of trust and by subsequently pursuing an unlawful detainer action in state court. Before the Court for decision are two motions. One motion is brought by Defendants Bryan and Carol Willmon on grounds, among others, that Plaintiff William Brainard’s Complaint is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The other motion, filed by Plaintiff William Brainard, proceeding pro se, is styled as a “Motion for Summary Judgment in Open Court on the Declaration for Impeachment of the Defense.” 28 1 Dockets.Justia.com II. BACKGROUND. 1 2 The following background facts are taken from the parties' 3 submissions in connection with the motions and other documents on 4 file in this case. 5 This matter involves a dispute between Plaintiff William 6 Brainard (“Brainard”) and Defendants Bryan and Carol Willmon (“the 7 Wilmons”) concerning the sale and subsequent transfer of 38.75 8 acres of real property in Toulumne County. 9 On April 25, 2006, the Willmons sold real property located at 10 9201 Priest Coulterville Road, Toulumne County, California to Kay 11 Brainard, Plaintiff’s mother. 12 price was secured by a Deed of Trust (“DOT”) recorded in the 13 Toulumne County Recorder’s Office memorializing Kay Brainard’s 14 obligation to make monthly payments under the terms of the Sale 15 Agreement. Plaintiff William Brainard subsequently took possession 16 of the property. 17 The debt for the unpaid purcahse On July 31, 2009, a deed was recorded in the Toulumne County 18 Recorder’s 19 Coulterville Road property from Kay Brainard to William Brainard. 20 Office purporting to transfer the 9201 Priest In the fall of 2009, Kay Brainard defaulted under the terms of 21 the Sales Agreement. The default was not cured. The Willmons 22 initiated a non-judicial foreclosure action on the property through 23 Dual Arch International, a foreclosure trustee. 24 On December 3, 2009, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Bryan 25 and Carol Willmon in the Superior Court of California, County of 26 Toulumne, 27 affecting title to real property, i.e., the property located at 28 9201 Priest Coulterville Road. alleging that defendants filed false instruments On March 22, 2010, the Complaint 2 1 was dismissed without leave to amend on grounds that “the Complaint 2 fail[ed] to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action 3 against the moving Defendants [and] the pleading is uncertain, 4 ambiguous 5 (“RJN”), Doc. 10.1) and unintelligible.” (Request for Judicial Notice 6 On February 19, 2010, Plaintiff filed for bankruptcy in the 7 United States Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of California, 8 Bakersfield Division, In re William James Brainard, No. 10-90573-E- 9 7. On February 26, 2010, Plaintiff filed an adversary proceeding 10 against Bryan and Carol Willmon, Brainard v. Willmon, et al, 11 10-09015, asserting fee ownership in the 12 Road property. 13 late date assert their beneficial equity interest over Brainard’s 14 property, 15 interest confirmed without any mention of such an interest in the 16 federal patent proceedings.” 17 when Plaintiff’s 9201 Priest Coulterville Plaintiff alleged that defendants “cannot at this Brainard’s adversary predecessor’s-in-interest proceeding was had dismissed their without 18 prejudice on September 10, 2010 after Plaintiff failed to attend a 19 September 8, 2010 “Show Cause” hearing. 20 case was dismissed on September 14, 2010. Plaintiff’s bankruptcy 21 On June 14, 2010, Plaintiff filed this action against Bryan 22 Willmon, Carol Willmon, and David Absher on grounds that they 23 infringed on his “federal land patent,” which he identifies as 24 “Certificate No. 2314.” Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that 25 26 27 28 1 Defendants’ request for judicial notice of this document is GRANTED. See MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986) (a court may take judicial notice of matters of public record outside the pleadings on a motion to dismiss). 3 1 “defendants have filed a fraudulent deed [] and cannot sustain an 2 action of ejectment, eviction or unlawful detainer.” 3 requests that defendants “cease and desist their unlawful detainer 4 action” and 5 trustee’s deed.” file “a notice of recission of their Plaintiff fraudulent Defendants Bryan and Carol Willmon filed this motion to 6 7 dismiss Plaintiff’s 8 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s complaint is barred under the 9 doctrine res judicata or, alternatively, that it fails to state a 10 claim for relief. 11 (Doc. 14.) complaint on July 1, 2010. (Doc. 8.) Plaintiff opposed the motion on June 24, 2010. 12 On September 8, 2010, Plaintiff filed a “Motion for Summary 13 Judgment in Open Court on the Declaration for Impeachment of the 14 Defense.” (Doc. 17.) 15 III. 16 17 A. LEGAL STANDARD Motion to Dismiss 18 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a motion to 19 dismiss can be made and granted when the complaint fails “to state 20 a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 21 12(b)(6) is appropriate where the complaint lacks a cognizable 22 legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal 23 theory. 24 (9th Cir. 1990). Dismissal under Rule Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 25 To sufficiently state a claim to relief and survive a 12(b)(6) 26 motion, a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations” 27 but the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to 28 relief above the speculative level.” 4 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 1 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Mere “labels and conclusions” or a 2 “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 3 do.” Id. Rather, there must be “enough facts to state a claim to 4 relief that is plausible on its face.” 5 a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 6 matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is 7 plausible on its face.” 8 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 9 plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but 10 it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has 11 acted unlawfully. 12 consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line 13 between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” 14 Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Id. at 570. “To survive Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ----, 129 “The Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely 15 In deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the court 16 must accept as true all “well-pleaded factual allegations.” Iqbal, 17 129 S.Ct. at 1950. 18 true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions 19 of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” 20 Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001); see, e.g., Doe I v. 21 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., --- F.3d ----, 2009 WL 1978730, at *3 (9th 22 Cir. July 10, 2009) (“Plaintiffs' general statement that Wal-Mart 23 exercised control over their day-to-day employment is a conclusion, 24 not a factual allegation stated with any specificity. We need not 25 accept Plaintiffs' unwarranted conclusion in reviewing a motion to 26 dismiss.”). A court is not, however, “required to accept as Sprewell v. Golden State 27 The Ninth Circuit has summarized the governing standard, in 28 light of Twombly and Iqbal, as follows: “In sum, for a complaint to 5 1 survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, 2 and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly 3 suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” 4 U.S. Secret 5 quotation marks omitted). Service, 572 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2009) Moss v. (internal 6 IV. 7 8 A. DISCUSSION Jurisdiction 9 In the operative complaint, filed on June 14, 2010, Plaintiff 10 alleges that this court has jurisdiction over this action because 11 defendants infringed on his “federal land patent [...] Certificate 12 No. 2314.” 13 as: Plaintiff further provides the basis for jurisdiction Article 3, Section 2 United States Constitution. Treaty of Guadulupe Hidalgo. Act of Congress, Approved 20th May 1862. To secure Homesteads to Actual Settlers on the Public Domain [] and Acts supplemental thereto, Title 28 United States Codes Section 1331 et seq. 14 15 16 17 (Doc. 1 at 1:25-1:28.) 18 Attached to Plaintiff’s complaint are two documents allegedly 19 relevant to his federal land patent infringement claims: (1) a copy 20 of a federal land patent, Certificate No. 2314, which allegedly 21 bars Defendants’ right to the 9201 Priest Coulterville Road 22 property; and (2) a “Land Patent” treatise. 23 Although Defendants make no specific objection on the issue 24 of jurisdiction, district courts in this Circuit are bound to 25 uphold the “bedrock principle that federal courts are courts of 26 limited jurisdiction.” Alcala v. Holder, 563 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th 27 Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). The burden of establishing that 28 6 1 jurisdiction 2 jurisdiction: 3 [the] limited jurisdiction [of the federal courts] and the burden 4 of 5 jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 6 375, 377 (1994) (internal citations omitted). 7 exists rests squarely on the party asserting “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and cannot 8 hear every dispute presented by litigants. Stock West, Inc. v. 9 Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221, 10 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). A district court is empowered to hear only 11 those cases which are within the judicial power conferred by the 12 United States Constitution and those which fall within the area of 13 jurisdiction granted by Congress. Richardson v. United States, 943 14 F.2d 1107, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 503 U.S. 936 15 1992). 16 citizenship (suits involving more than $75,000 between citizens of 17 different 18 Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, 28 USC § 19 1331, or on some other statute providing original jurisdiction in 20 federal court. Original jurisdiction must be based either on diversity of states), 28 USC § 1332, on a claim involving the 21 22 1. Diversity Jurisdiction 23 Diversity jurisdiction requires that all plaintiffs be 24 citizens of different states than all defendants. 25 Jenkins, 26 jurisdiction, Brainard must allege that he resides in a state 27 different from all of the defendants, i.e., Brainard resides in the 28 State of California and all of the defendants reside in other 305 U.S. 534, 541 (1939). 7 To Pullman Co. v. establish diversity 1 states. 2 than $75,000. 3 Brainard must also allege that he seeks damages of more Brainard’s pleading precludes any possibility of diversity 4 jurisdiction. Brainard does not allege that is a citizen of any 5 state; nor does he provide a citizenship for Bryan Willmon, Carol 6 Willmon, or David Absher. 7 proper based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331, i.e., original jurisdiction. Rather, he alleges that jurisdiction is 8 9 2. Federal Question Jurisdiction 10 To invoke federal question jurisdiction, Brainard must plead 11 that defendants have violated some constitutional or statutory 12 provision. 13 in his pleadings as possible grounds for this court to exercise 14 jurisdiction. 15 reveals that they either provide no basis for jurisdiction or are 16 simply inapplicable to Brainard’s underlying allegations. 17 Brainard cites a host of federal statutes and treaties However, a careful review of those authorities Brainard’s primary argument in favor of subject matter 18 jurisdiction is that he holds a federal land patent which the 19 defendants 20 infringement necessarily invokes the Court’s original jurisdiction, 21 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 22 federal land patents, specifically, he confuses a “land patent” and 23 a “patent” right. 24 incorporate one another. 25 concern “a new 26 composition of 27 thereof.”).v 28 infringed on. According to Brainard, such an However, Brainard misunderstands the law of The two terms are not synonymous and do not and See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (A patent must useful matter, or process, any new machine, and manufacture, useful or improvement In Virgin v. County of San Luis Obispo, 201 F.3d 1141, 1143 8 1 (9th Cir. 2000) (per curiam), the Ninth Circuit stated that: “the 2 rule that federal land patents do not confer federal question 3 jurisdiction has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Supreme Court, 4 the Ninth Circuit, and other lower courts.” 5 explained that federal land patents are an improper basis for 6 federal question jurisdiction, citing the Supreme Court’s decision 7 in Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561 (1912): 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 The Ninth Circuit Federal land patents and acts of Congress do not provide bases for federal question jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has clearly stated that: [a] suit to enforce a right which takes its origin in the laws of the United States is not necessarily, or for that reason alone, one arising under those laws, for a suit does not so arise unless it really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy respecting the validity, construction or effect of such a law, upon the determination of which the result depends. This is especially so of a suit involving rights to land acquired under a law of the United States. If it were not, every suit to establish title to land in the central and western states would so arise, as all titles in those states are traceable back to those laws. 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569-70, 32 S.Ct. 704, 56 L.Ed. 1205 (1912). Furthermore, it is well established that ‘a controversy in respect of lands has never been regarded as presenting a Federal question merely because one of the parties to it has derived his title under an act of Congress.’ Id. at 570, 32 S.Ct. 704. Shulthis's rule that federal land patents do not confer federal question jurisdiction has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit, and other lower courts. See, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 676-77, 94 S.Ct. 772, 39 L.Ed.2d 73 (1974) (“Once patent issues, the incidents of ownership are, for the most part, matters of local property law to be vindicated in local courts, and in such situations it is normally insufficient for ‘arising under’ jurisdiction merely to allege that ownership or possession is claimed under a United States patent.”); Barnett v. Kunkel, 264 U.S. 16, 20, 44 S.Ct. 254, 68 L.Ed. 539 (1924) (same); Landi v. Phelps, 740 F.2d 710, 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 713-714 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that “the United States has no continuing interest in the property” acquired through federal land patents); Standage Ventures, Inc. v. Arizona, 499 F.2d 248, 249 (9th Cir. 1974) (“The complaint does not allege expressly that any law of the United States is directly or indirectly involved in the dispute; it is not alone enough that appellant's title is traceable to such a law.”); Hilgeford v. Peoples Bank, 776 F.2d 176, 178 (7th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (“It is well settled ... that a controversy regarding land has never been regarded as presenting a federal question simply because one of the parties to it has derived his title from a patent or under an act of Congress.”). 8 Id. at 1143. 9 This language applies with equal force to the facts of this 10 case. Even if Plaintiff holds a federal land patent, he has no 11 right to bring suit in a United States Court. 12 On a similar facts, Judge Coyle determined that the court 13 lacked subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the action with 14 prejudice. See Jenan v. Erwin, No. 03-CV-6425-REC-DLB (E.D. Cal. 15 Mar. 31, 2004). Judge Coyle’s ruling dismissing the action for 16 lack of prejudice was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in Jenan v. 17 Erwin, 125 F. App’x 867 (9th Cir. 2005). Citing Virgin v. County 18 of San Luis Obispo, 201 F.3d 1141, the Ninth Circuit held that 19 “[t]he district court properly concluded that it lacked subject 20 matter jurisdiction over Jenan's claims involving a federal land 21 patent.” Id. at *1. 22 Here, well-established Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit 23 precedent make clear that federal land patents do not confer 24 federal question jurisdiction. As that is the only enumerated 25 basis for jurisdiction, Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED. 26 It is further ordered that Plaintiff’s motion for summary 27 28 10 1 2 judgment and Defendants’ motion to dismiss are DENIED as MOOT.2 Assuming, arguendo, that jurisdiction is proper, which it is 3 not, the action is dismissed based on the doctrine of res judicata. 4 The claims advanced by Plaintiff in this case are identical to 5 Toulumne County Superior Court, Case No. CV-55249, which was 6 dismissed with prejudice on March 22, 2010.3 The doctrine of res 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 Assuming, arguendo, that jurisdiction is proper, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is still deficient because he did not attach a separate statement of undisputed facts as required by Local Rule 56-260. Local Rule of Civil Procedure 56-260(a) provides, in part, that summary judgment motions shall be accompanied by “a statement of undisputed facts that shall enumerate discretely each of the specific material facts relied upon in support of the motion.” E.D. Cal. R. 56-260(a). That rule also provides that the movant shall “cite the particular portions of any pleading, affidavit, deposition, interrogatory answer, admission, or other document relied upon to establish that fact.” Id. Plaintiff’s motion neither includes nor is accompanied by a separate statement of material facts. Since Plaintiff carries the burden of setting forth facts that establish a genuine issue of material fact, his failure to present those facts is fatal to his motion for summary judgment. The motion fails to comply with the requirements of Local Rule 56-260(a). 3 The "causes of action" in this federal action are the same as those asserted by plaintiff in his prior state court action. The two actions involve the same alleged injury to plaintiff and the same alleged wrongs by defendants. Specifically, in both actions, plaintiff alleged that defendants violated his rights by foreclosing on his property - and filing a fraudulent deed demonstrating their ownership over the property. The factual allegations in both the state action and the present federal action involve the same alleged misconduct by defendants, involve the same alleged actors, and occurs over the same alleged period of time. Moreover, there is no dispute that the prior state court proceeding was a "final judgment on the merits." Plaintiff's state court action was dismissed after the court sustained defendants' demurrer, without leave to amend. Under California law, "[a] judgment entered after a general demurrer has been sustained ‘is a judgment on the merits to the extent that it adjudicates that the facts alleged do not constitute a cause of action, and will accordingly, be a bar to a subsequent action alleging the same 11 1 judicata 2 against Defendants Bryan Willmon, Carol Willmon, and David Absher. 3 See Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Federal 4 courts "are required to give state court judgments the preclusive 5 effect they would be given by another court of that state."); see 6 also Kay v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 504 F.3d 803, 809 (9th 7 Cir. 2007) (“Res judicata [claim preclusion] prevents litigation of 8 all grounds for, or defenses to, recovery that were previously 9 available to the parties, regardless of whether they were asserted 10 bars Plaintiff from maintaining this federal action or determined in the prior proceeding."). 11 V. CONCLUSION. 12 13 For the reasons stated: 14 (1) The action is dismissed for lack of subject matter 15 jurisdiction under Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561 and 16 Virgin v. County of San Luis Obispo, 201 F.3d 1141. 17 Those precedents make clear that federal land patents do 18 not confer federal question jurisdiction. 19 (2) 20 Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and Defendants' motion to dismiss are DENIED as MOOT. 21 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 Dated: aa70i8 September 21, 2010 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 24 25 26 27 28 facts.'" Crowley v. Modern Faucet Mfg. Co., 44 Cal.2d 321, 323, 282 P.2d 33 (1955). 12
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