-SMS Estate of Angel Antonio Mendoza-Saravia v. Fresno County Sheriff's Dept. et al., No. 1:2010cv00618 - Document 52 (E.D. Cal. 2011)
Court Description: ORDER DENYING defendants County of Fresno and City of Mendota's Motion to Strike Matters from Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, document 35 ; order signed by Judge Oliver W. Wanger on 2/16/2011. (Rooney, M)
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-SMS Estate of Angel Antonio Mendoza-Saravia v. Fresno County Sheriff&#039;s Dept. et al. Doc. 52 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 10 11 12 ESTATE OF ANGEL ANTONIO MENDOZASARAVIA, by and through successors of interest; TERESA REYNA MENDOZA-SARAVIA; PEDRO MENDOZA; ANGIE MELISSA CASTRO, by and through her general guardian; and BLANCA ESTELA CASTRO, 13 Plaintiffs, 14 v. 15 16 17 FRESNO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; CITY OF MENDOTA; COUNTY OF FRESNO; WEST COAST AMMUNITION; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, 18 Defendants. 19 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 1:10-cv-0618 OWW SMS ORDER RE: COUNTY OF FRESNO’S AND CITY OF MENDOTA’S MOTION TO STRIKE MATTERS FROM PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT (Doc. 35) 20 21 22 Moving Defendants, County of Fresno and City of Mendota 23 (“Defendants”), seek to strike matters from the Second Amended 24 Complaint, specifically the claim by Blanca Estela Castro as the 25 unmarried domestic partner of decedent, Angel Antonio Mendoza- 26 Saravia, for deprivation of her United States Constitution 27 Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in and right of familial 28 association, allegedly caused when decedent was fatally shot with 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 a bean bag round by a Fresno Sheriff’s Deputy. 2 3 A. 4 Standard of Review. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) authorizes the Court 5 to strike from any pleading “an insufficient defense or any 6 redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter from any 7 complaint or defense.” 8 any material matter is “that which has no essential or important 9 relationship to the claim for relief or the defense being For the purposes of a motion to strike, 10 pleaded.” Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1528 (9th 11 Cir. 1993), rev. on other grounds, 510 U.S. 517 (1994). 12 12(f) is designed to eliminate from consideration issues that 13 “can have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the 14 litigation.” 15 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 1976). 16 inherent authority to manage its docket authorizes the court to 17 strike matters from the docket. Rule Naton v. Bank of California, 72 F.R.D. 550, 552, In addition to Rule 12, a District Court’s 18 19 20 B. Essential Allegations of the Complaint. Plaintiff, Blanca Estela Castro, claims an intimate 21 relationship with decedent Mendoza-Saravia arising from her 22 status as the mother of the decedent’s child, Angie Melissa 23 Castro. 24 domestic partner, and with the decedent’s children in a “family 25 unit.” 26 Plaintiff Angie Melissa Castro was born approximately three 27 months after the death of her father, Mendoza-Saravia. 28 Castro’s second claim is for deprivation of her Fourteenth Complaint ¶ 17. She resided with the decedent as his Ms. Castro depended on decedent for necessities of life. 2 Plaintiff 1 Amendment rights of intimate association with the decedent. 2 Their daughter, Angie’s claim for loss of familial relationship 3 with her deceased father is not challenged. 4 5 6 LAW AND ANALYSIS A. Fourteenth Amendment Familial Association Right. 7 The Supreme Court has recognized that “certain kinds of 8 personal bonds,” Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 9 618 (1984) and “certain [kinds of] intimate conduct,” Lawrence v. 10 Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) are protected by the substantive 11 component of the Due Process Clause. 12 Fourteenth Amendment right to intimate association, or First 13 Amendment right to privacy, the Supreme Court consistently has 14 recognized that “choices to enter into and maintain certain 15 intimate human relationships must be secured against undue 16 intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships 17 in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our 18 Constitutional scheme.” 19 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 20 association have been recognized in unmarried, long-term 21 relationships. 22 F.3d 454, 463 (7th Cir. 2007) (reh’g and reh’g en banc denied 23 2007). 24 Whether subsumed under the Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18; see also, Protected rights of intimate Christensen v. County of Boone, Illinois, 483 In Christensen, the Plaintiffs, an unmarried couple, brought 25 a civil rights action against the County and a Deputy Sheriff 26 alleging the Deputy Sheriff interfered with the couple’s 27 Constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and 28 seizures, their right to intimate association, and intentional 3 1 infliction of emotional distress. The trial court sustained a 2 motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim 3 based on lack of standing. 4 heterosexual couple in a long-term relationship was a form of 5 “intimate association” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 Roberts recognized that intimate associations protected by the 7 Due Process Clause “have played a critical role in the culture 8 and traditions of the nation by cultivating and transmitting 9 shared ideals and beliefs; they thereby foster diversity and act The Seventh Circuit held an unmarried 10 as critical buffers between the individual and the power of the 11 State.” 12 bestow “the ability independently to define one’s identity that 13 is central to any concept of liberty.” 14 discussing Lawrence v. Texas, supra, Christensen held: “It is 15 impossible to see how an unmarried heterosexual couple in a long- 16 term relationship could receive less protection than a private 17 homosexual relationship, whether or not the participants are 18 married.” 19 the authority of Lawrence, “that the plaintiffs’ relationship 20 (unmarried) is a form of ‘intimate association’ protected by the 21 Constitution.” 22 933, 937 (7th Cir. 2005)); see also, e.g., Anderson v. City of 23 LaVergne, 371 F.3d 879, 882 (6th Cir. 2004) (an unmarried couple 24 is engaged in a constitutionally-protected intimate association 25 where they were living together, were romantically and sexually 26 involved, and were monogamous). 27 addition to marriage, courts have recognized both personal 28 friendships and non-marital relationships as types of ‘highly Roberts, supra, 468 U.S. at 618. Christensen at 463. These relationships Id. at 619. In The Seventh Circuit concluded on Id. (citing Montgomery v. Stefaniak, 410 F.3d Anderson found: “Therefore, in 4 1 personal relationships’ within the ambit of intimate associations 2 contemplated by Roberts.” 3 Akers v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 1030, 1039-40 (6th Cir. 2003) 4 further citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18, held: “Concerning 5 intimate association the Supreme Court ‘has concluded the choices 6 to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships 7 must be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of 8 the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual 9 freedom that is central to our Constitutional scheme.’” 10 Although neither party has cited a Ninth Circuit case 11 directly on point, the Complaint’s allegations of an intimate 12 domestic association, albeit unmarried, where decedent’s family 13 was combined with Plaintiff; they lived together; she was 14 pregnant with decedent’s child at the time of his death; they 15 shared finances; and co-habited and shared the intimate details 16 of each other’s lives; all converge to satisfy the intimate 17 association familial relationship requirement of the Fourteenth 18 Amendment. 19 the relationship as an insufficient intimate association, this 20 factual dispute is not resolvable as a matter of law on a Rule 21 12(f) motion to strike. If Defendants challenge the duration and quality of 22 23 24 B. Intimate Association Analysis The Ninth Circuit in IDK, Inc. v. County of Clark, 836 F.2d 25 1185 recognizes that the relationships protected by the 26 Fourteenth Amendment “are those that attend the creation and 27 sustenance of a family” and similar “highly personal 28 relationships.” Id. at 1193 (citing, Roberts, 468 U.S. at 6185 1 19). Individuals who are deeply attached and committed to each 2 other as a result of their having shared each other’s thoughts, 3 lives and experiences and who, by the very nature of such 4 relationships, are involved in relatively few intimate 5 associations during his or her lifetime, are all relevant factors 6 to determine whether a particular association is eligible for 7 protection by the Due Process Clause. 8 number of persons involved in the relationship; the congeniality 9 of the relationship; its duration; the purposes for which it was These factors include the 10 formed; and the selectivity in choosing participants. 11 Involvement in procreation, here present; raising and educating 12 children, here present; cohabitation with relatives, here 13 present; or other activities of family life all typify the 14 required intimate association. 15 interpretation of Roberts’ intimate association factors are here 16 present. 17 between Plaintiff Castro and the decedent to support a Fourteenth 18 Amendment Due Process claim for unlawful State interference in 19 protected a family relationship. 20 All the incidents of the IDK The Complaint alleges a sufficient intimate association There is no question that for Plaintiff Angie Melissa Castro 21 the Ninth Circuit expressly recognizes a parent’s due process 22 right to associate with his or her child and the standing of a 23 child to sue for the deprivation of the loss of the familial 24 association right with her parent. 25 F.3d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 2008) (recognizing parent’s Fourteenth 26 Amendment Due Process right to associate with their deceased 27 son). 28 sufficiently weighty by itself to constitute a cognizable liberty See Porter v. Osborn, 546 A “child’s interest in her relationship with a parent is 6 1 interest.” Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1419 (9th 2 Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 935 (1987) overruled on other 3 grounds by Hodgers-Duran v. Lopez, 199 F.3d 1037, 1040 n.1 (9th 4 Cir. 1999). 5 6 7 C. Interaction of Fourteenth and First Amendments. The First Amendment guarantees the right to “[T]wo sometimes 8 overlapping types of protective association.” Rode v. 9 Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1204 (3d Cir. 1998). The Third 10 Circuit explained: “Associations founded on intimate human 11 relationships in which freedom of association is protected as a 12 fundamental element of liberty and associations formed for the 13 purpose of engaging in activities protected by the First 14 Amendment, such as the exercise of speech, assembly, and 15 religion.” 16 The claim in this case is more properly analyzed consistent with 17 the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process guarantees, association 18 “founded on intimate human relationships in which freedom of 19 association is protected as a fundamental element of liberty.” 20 Rees v. Office of Children & Youth, 2010 WL 3906311 (W.D. Pa. 21 2010). 22 Clark County, 53 F.3d 337 (9th Cir. 1995) recognizes that “a 23 state violates the Fourteenth Amendment when it seeks to 24 interfere with the social relationship of two or more people.” 25 Id. at 3 (citing IDK, 836 F.2d at 1193). 26 purposes: “At least by 1988, it was clearly established that the 27 Fourteenth Amendment protects relationships between “individuals 28 [who] are deeply attached and committed to each other as a result Id. at 1204 (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18). An unpublished Ninth Circuit decision, Bevelhymer v. 7 For qualified immunity 1 of their having shared each other’s thoughts, beliefs, and 2 experiences.” 3 The Circuit Court rejected the Defendant’s claim in Bevelhymer 4 “that a reasonable public official could not have known that the 5 Fourteenth Amendment protects intimate associations between 6 unmarried couples.” 7 Citing, Wilson v. Taylor, 733 F.2d 1539, 1544. Bevelhymer, a pleading case, held that “despite the clarity 8 of the law protecting intimate associations,” it is necessary 9 that sufficient facts be alleged to identify the nature and 10 extent of the intimate association and that action was taken 11 against the decedent as a result of his association with 12 Plaintiff. 13 that the case be remanded for opportunity to amend complaint: 14 “intrusion into Plaintiff’s intimate association causing 15 termination of the relationship is an important and necessary 16 part of the Fourteenth Amendment claim.”). 17 not moved to dismiss the claim, rather, they move to strike the 18 claim as unauthorized by law, invoking state law, an apparent 19 misapprehension that federal law also governs intimate 20 association. Id. at 4 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (recommending Here, Defendants have 21 22 23 D. State Law. Defendants argue that the interface between State law and 24 Civil Rights Act § 1983 is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Section 25 1988 requires a three-step analysis in considering whether to 26 apply State law in a Civil Rights action. 27 look for a Federal rule. 28 counsel correctly argued at the hearing on this motion, a First, the Court must Here, the inquiry ends, as Plaintiffs’ 8 1 cognizable Federal right to intimate association exists under the 2 Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 3 law, the Fourteenth Amendment governs this deprivation of 4 intimate association claim. 5 unnecessary. 6 Federal Recourse to State law is Even, arguendo, if the next stage of the inquiry were 7 reached, the Court looks for a State law and, applies it “only if 8 it is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the 9 United States.” 10 Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 267 (1985). Defendant contends that the State wrongful death statutes, 11 borrowed to supplement § 1983 in the general area of wrongful 12 death actions (citing Dell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 13 1235-41 (7th Cir. 1984), a red flagged case), prevent standing in 14 this case based on California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 377.60 15 and (f)(1), requiring a registered domestic partnership to have 16 been perfected to authorize a survivorship action for wrongful 17 death. 18 survivorship law of California, the inquiry then turns to whether 19 the claimed right is consistent with the Constitution and laws of 20 the United States. 21 Accepting that no state right exists under the Wilson v. Garcia, supra, 471 U.S. at 267. The policies underlying § 1983 include compensation of 22 persons injured by deprivation of Federal rights and prevention 23 of abuses of power by those acting under color of State law. 24 Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590-91 (1978). 25 Plaintiff cannot bring suit under C.C.P. § 377 as recognized in 26 Reynolds v. County of San Diego, 858 F.Supp. 1064, 1069 (S.D. 27 Cal. 1994), denying Plaintiff a claim for loss of decedent’s 28 intimate association and domestic relationship, resulting from 9 Because 1 his allegedly wrongful death under color of state law, is 2 inconsistent with the § 1983 goals of compensation and deterrence 3 when applied to Blanca’s own loss. 4 Federal claims denies Plaintiff any compensation for her own 5 constitutionally protected interest in decedent’s companionship. 6 It also limits the deterrent effect of § 1983 by allowing state 7 actors to avoid compensating for the full extent of the injuries 8 they cause. 9 Plaintiff from bringing a claim under § 1983 for violation of her Barring both State and California law should not be applied to prohibit 10 own constitutionally protected Fourteenth Amendment intimate 11 association interests. 12 13 CONCLUSION 14 Under the United States Constitution and Federal law, 42 15 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, both Plaintiffs, Blanca Estela Castro 16 and Angie Melissa Castro, the former unmarried domestic partner 17 and child of the decedent, Angel Mendoza-Saravia, have standing 18 under the United States Constitution and Federal law to assert a 19 Civil Rights claim for deprivation of their intimate familial 20 association with the decedent allegedly in violation of their due 21 process right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 22 States Constitution. 23 Defendants’ Motion to Strike the allegations of the Second Claim 24 of the Second Amended Complaint as to Blanca Castro is DENIED. For all the reasons discussed above, 25 26 IT IS SO ORDERED. 27 Dated: February 16, 2011 emm0d6 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 28 10
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