Stockton v. Billings
Filing
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ORDER DISMISSING Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus for Lack of Exhaustion; ORDER DIRECTING the Clerk of the Court to Enter Judgment and Close the File; ORDER DECLINING to Issue a Certificate of Appealability signed by Magistrate Judge Jennifer L. Thurston on 5/12/2010. CASE CLOSED. (Bradley, A)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Petitioner, 13 v. 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PROCEDURAL HISTORY Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The instant petition, which concerns a disciplinary hearing held on October 10, 2009, was filed on April 5, 2010. (Doc. 1). In the petition, Petitioner alleges a single ground for relief as follows: (1) a prison counselor, T. Billings, repeatedly rejected Petitioner's appeal from a disciplinary rules violation finding that resulted, inter alia, in the loss of thirty days' credits. (Doc. 1, pp. 3; 19). On April 16, 2010, Petitioner filed his written consent to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge for all purposes. (Doc. 4). After a preliminary screening of the petition, the Court, on April 26, 2010, issued an Order to Show Cause why the petition 1 T. BILLINGS, Respondent. PERCY STOCKTON, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 1:10-cv-00586-JLT HC ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR LACK OF EXHAUSTION ORDER DIRECTING THE CLERK OF THE COURT TO ENTER JUDGMENT AND CLOSE THE FILE ORDER DECLINING TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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should not be dismissed for lack of exhaustion of state court remedies. (Doc. 5). The Order to Show Cause gave Petitioner thirty days to file a response or face dismissal of the petition. On May 10, 2010, Petitioner filed a response indicating, in essence, that he did not understand how to exhaust his remedies or what in what court he should attempt such exhaustion. (Doc. 7). Petitioner made no claim that his sole ground for relief had been exhausted nor did he present any evidence of exhaustion. DISCUSSION A. Preliminary Review of Petition. Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition if it "plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . ." Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent's motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed. Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir.2001). B. Exhaustion. A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 1988). A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365 (legal basis); 2
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Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 (9th Cir. 2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999); Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998). In Duncan, the United States Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows: In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion of state remedies requires that petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the state courts in order to give the State the "opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some internal quotation marks omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only in federal court, but in state court. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating: Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly presented" (and thus exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to that court that those claims were based on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must make the federal basis of the claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even if the federal basis is "self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the underlying claim would be decided under state law on the same considerations that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F3d 1098, 110607 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996); . . . . In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to the fact that the relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the state and federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the violation of federal law is. Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added). In the petition, Petitioner does not allege that he ever presented his claim to the California Supreme Court. Instead, he states, "I have other pending suits, both civil and habeas corpus." (Doc. 1, p. 6). Petitioner does not identify the courts in which those cases were filed, the dates on which they were filed, or the issues raised in those cases. More importantly, Petitioner does not allege that he has ever presented his claim of wrongful rejection of his disciplinary appeal to the State's highest court, i.e., the California Supreme Court. In Petitioner's response to the April 26, 2010 Order to Show Cause, he essentially concedes that he does not understand the concept 3
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of exhaustion or how to accomplish it.1 Here, it appears that the sole claim raised in the instant petition is unexhausted. Because Petitioner has not presented his claim for federal relief to the California Supreme Court, the Court must dismiss the petition. See Calderon v. United States Dist. Court, 107 F.3d 756, 760 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc); Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1273 (9th Cir. 1997). The Court cannot consider a petition that is entirely unexhausted. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 52122 (1982); Calderon, 107 F.3d at 760. Moreover, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. A state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district court's denial of his petition, and an appeal is only allowed in certain circumstances. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-336 (2003). The controlling statute in determining whether to issue a certificate of appealability is 28 U.S.C. § 2253, which provides as follows: (a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 before a district judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held. (b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding to test the validity of a warrant to remove to another district or place for commitment or trial a person charged with a criminal offense against the United States, or to test the validity of such person's detention pending removal proceedings. (c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from-(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court; or (B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255. (2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. (3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2). If a court denied a petitioner's petition, the court may only issue a certificate of appealability when a petitioner makes a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
P e titio n e r requests the Court's guidance in this regard. (Doc. 7) Unfortunately, the Court cannot provide le g a l advice to litigants, even when they are pro se litigants who lack legal training or understanding. The Court has p r o v id e d a full discussion of the exhaustion doctrine both in the Order to Show Cause and in this order. Beyond p r o v id in g that basic explanation, no other options for assisting Petitioner exist for the Court at this time. Should P e titio n e r wish to pursue his federal habeas claim in this Court, he must first "fairly present" his claim to the highest s ta te court in California.
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right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make a substantial showing, the petitioner must establish that "reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were `adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further'." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983)). In the present case, the Court finds that Petitioner has not made the required substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right to justify the issuance of a certificate of appealability. Reasonable jurists would not find the Court's determination that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief debatable, wrong, or deserving of encouragement to proceed further. Accordingly, the Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. ORDER Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS as follows: 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1), is DISMISSED for lack of exhaustion; 2. 3. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment and close the file; and, The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: May 12, 2010 9j7khi /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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