C.B. v. Sonora School District, et al., No. 1:2009cv00285 - Document 110 (E.D. Cal. 2011)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM DECISION Regarding Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment 84 , signed by Judge Oliver W. Wanger on 2/11/2011. (Defendants motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs claim for punitive damages against the City is GRANTED; The remainder of Defendants motion is DENIED; and Plaintiff shall lodge a form of order consistent with this opinion within five (5) days of electronic service of this decision.) (Gaumnitz, R)
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C.B. v. Sonora School District, et al. Doc. 110 1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 8 1:09-cv-00285-OWW-SMS C.B., 9 MEMORANDUM DECISION REGARDING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. 84) Plaintiff, 10 11 v. 12 SONORA SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., 13 Defendants. 14 I. INTRODUCTION. 15 16 Plaintiff C.B., a minor, proceeds with an action pursuant to 17 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Sonora School District (“the 18 District”), 19 (“McIntosh”), and Hal Prock (“Prock”). 20 the City of Sonora (“the City”), Mace McIntosh The City, McIntosh, and Prock (“Defendants”) filed a motion 21 for summary judgment on January 7, 2011. 22 Plaintiff filed opposition to the motion for summary judgment on 23 January 24, 2011. 24 31, 2011. (Doc. 93). (Docs. 84, 89). Defendants filed a reply on January (Doc. 102). II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND. 25 26 On September 29, 2008, Plaintiff was an eleven year-old 27 student at Sonora Elementary School (“the School”). (Def’s. SUF 1, 28 2, 3). Sonora Police Officers McIntosh and Prock responded to a 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 call from dispatch regarding an “out-of-control juvenile” at the 2 School. 3 School at approximately the same time; McIntosh set off in search 4 of the juvenile, while Prock went to the school’s main office. 5 (McIntosh Dep. at 7). 6 Sinclair (“Sinclair”), a coach at the School, in the vicinity of 7 the School’s eastside basketball courts. 8 Plaintiff was sitting on a bench when McIntosh arrived. 9 Dep. at 8). 10 (Prock Dep. at 6). McIntosh and Prock arrived at the McIntosh encountered Plaintiff and Karen Prock arrived at after McIntosh did. (Prock Dep. at 11). (McIntosh Plaintiff’s location a few minutes (McIntosh Dep. at 7). 11 The parties dispute the distance between Plaintiff’s location 12 on the bench and Greenly Road: Defendants contend the distance was 13 50 yards, while Plaintiff contends the distance was approximately 14 127 yards. (Response to Def’s. SUF 15). 15 encountered Plaintiff was surrounded by a fence with at least two 16 openings. The area where Defendants (Response to Def’s. SUF 20). 17 Before Prock arrived at the scene, Sinclair told McIntosh that 18 Plaintiff had been yelling, cussing, screaming, and was out of 19 control. 20 Plaintiff had not taken his medications for the day. 21 Dep. at 8). 22 Sinclair. 23 Plaintiff, but Plaintiff did not verbally respond. 24 at 8). 25 not want Plaintiff on campus anymore. (McIntosh Dep. at 8). Sinclair also told McIntosh that (McIntosh McIntosh did not make any further inquiries of (McIntosh Dep. at 8). McIntosh began speaking to (McIntosh Dep. Before Prock arrived, Sinclair told McIntosh that she did (McIntosh Dep. at 9). 26 Prock first spoke with Sinclair when he arrived on the scene; 27 when Prock arrived, Plaintiff was sitting on the bench, complacent, 28 and looking down. (Prock Dep. at 13, 15). 2 Another officer named 1 Bowly was also on the scene when Prock arrived. 2 17). Sinclair told Prock that Plaintiff was out of control, acting 3 up, and might run. 4 statement that Plaintiff might run, Plaintiff looked up and stared 5 at Sinclair with an angry look. 6 attempted to speak with Plaintiff while Plaintiff was seated on the 7 bench, but Plaintiff did not verbally respond. (Prock Dep. at 15). 8 Prock then ordered Plaintiff to stand up, and Plaintiff complied. 9 (Prock Dep. at 15). (Prock Dep. at 13). Upon hearing Sinclair’s (Prock Dep. at 15). Prock and directed him to handcuff Plaintiff. 11 17). 12 Plaintiff into temporary custody. 13 Plaintiff was placed in the back of a patrol car. Prock handcuffed Plaintiff. The School Prock When Plaintiff stood up, McIntosh signaled to 10 14 (Prock Dep. at provided Prock (Id.). (McIntosh Dep. at McIntosh and Prock took (Response to Def’s. SUF 30). with contact information for 15 Plaintiff’s uncle, and Plaintiff was transported to his uncle’s 16 place of business and released to the custody of his uncle. 17 parties dispute whether the Plaintiff’s uncle asked for Plaintiff 18 to be taken to him. (Response to Def’s. SUF 35). III. LEGAL STANDARD. 19 20 The Summary judgment/adjudication is appropriate when "the 21 pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any 22 affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 23 fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 24 law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The movant "always bears the initial 25 responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its 26 motion, 27 depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 28 together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate and identifying those 3 portions of the pleadings, 1 the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. 2 Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 3 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). 4 Where the movant will have the burden of proof on an issue at 5 trial, it must "affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier 6 of fact could find other than for the moving party." 7 Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). 8 respect to an issue as to which the non-moving party will have the 9 burden of proof, the movant "can prevail merely by pointing out 10 that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving 11 party's case." Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984. Soremekun v. With 12 When a motion for summary judgment is properly made and 13 supported, the non-movant cannot defeat the motion by resting upon 14 the 15 "non-moving party must set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise 16 provided in Rule 56, 'specific facts showing that there is a 17 genuine issue for trial.'" Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984. (quoting 18 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S. Ct. 19 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986)). "A non-movant's bald assertions or 20 a mere scintilla of evidence in his favor are both insufficient to 21 withstand summary judgment." FTC v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 929 22 (9th Cir. 2009). "[A] non-movant must show a genuine issue of 23 material fact by presenting affirmative evidence from which a jury 24 could find in his favor." Id. (emphasis in original). "[S]ummary 25 judgment will not lie if [a] dispute about a material fact is 26 'genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury 27 could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." 28 U.S. at 248. In determining whether a genuine dispute exists, a allegations or denials of 4 its own pleading, rather the Anderson, 477 1 district court does not make credibility determinations; rather, 2 the 3 justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Id. at 255. 4 IV. DISCUSSION. 5 A. "evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment Claim 6 1. Constitutional Violation 7 Plaintiff asserts a claim under section 1983 against McIntosh 8 and Prock for alleged violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment 9 rights. Plaintiff contends that McIntosh and Prock effected an 10 unreasonable seizure of Plaintiff without probable cause, and that 11 they employed excessive force. 12 The Fourth Amendment protects from unreasonable 13 searches and seizures in the school environment. See, e.g., 14 Preschooler II v. Clark County Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 15 1178 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. 16 Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2647 (2009). 17 by school administrators are reviewed under a special standard of 18 reasonableness, e.g., N.J. v. T. L. O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-42 19 (1985), seizures of students at a school by a police officers are 20 generally subject to traditional Fourth Amendment analysis when 21 made for traditional law enforcement purposes, see Greene v. 22 Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that 23 N.J. v. T.L.O. standard did not apply to seizure of student at 24 school where child was not seized for a “special need” beyond the 25 normal need for law enforcement). 26 Plaintiff must be evaluated under traditional Fourth Amendment 27 standards or under the special reasonableness standard set forth in 28 N.J. v. T.L.O. depends on the nature and purpose of Defendants’ in5 students Although seizures effected Whether Defendant’s seizure of 1 school seizure of Plaintiff. See Greene, 588 F.3d at 1025 (citing 2 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)). 3 The threshold inquiry in a "special needs" case is whether the 4 government has identified some need, "beyond the normal need for 5 law enforcement," to justify a departure from traditional Fourth 6 Amendment standards. 7 Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989)). 8 The Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Greene is instructive regarding the 9 showing required to establish the applicability of the special 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Greene, 588 F.3d at 1026 (citing Nat'l needs framework: the Court's decision in T.L.O. was premised on a "special need" of government..."the substantial interest of teachers and administrators in maintaining discipline in the classroom and on school grounds." 469 U.S. at 339. The Court noted that disciplinary problems and student drug use had been rising in recent years, and that "the preservation of order and a proper educational environment requires close supervision of schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of rules against conduct that would be perfectly permissible if undertaken by an adult." Id. It was in light of these considerations that the Court concluded that the school's need swiftly to discipline T.L.O., suspected of smoking in the lavatory in violation of school rules, would be frustrated if school officials were required first to obtain a warrant based on probable cause. Id. at 340-41. In this case, by contrast, S.G. is not suspected of having violated any school rule, nor is there any evidence that her immediate seizure was necessary to "maintain discipline in the classroom and on school grounds." Id. at 339. The "special need" animating the Court's decision in T.L.O. is therefore entirely absent. Greene, 588 F.3d at 1024-25 (emphasis added). Defendants’ motion for summary judgment does not contend that the special needs standard is applicable to Plaintiff’s seizure, nor does the motion present sufficient evidence to establish that Plaintiff’s immediate seizure was necessary to "maintain discipline 28 6 1 in the classroom and on school grounds." See id. When McIntock and 2 Prock arrived at the school, Plaintiff was sitting on a bench 3 outside of any classroom or the presence of other students, was 4 under the supervision of a school administrator, was not violating 5 any school rules, and was not posing any threat to the maintenance 6 of school discipline. 7 as required by Rule 56, there is insufficient evidence to satisfy 8 Defendant’s burden on the threshold question of the applicability 9 of the special needs standard.1 Drawing all inferences in Plaintiff’s favor 10 Defendants fail to provided sufficient evidence to establish, 11 as a matter of law, that McIntosh and Prock’s seizure of Plaintiff 12 and use of handcuffs to effect such seizure was reasonable under 13 traditional 14 probable cause to believe a crime had been committed, were not 15 faced with exigent circumstances, and did not have a warrant. 16 Defendants also do not establish the lawfulness of their conduct 17 under the lesser reasonableness standard applicable to “special 18 needs” cases, as discussed below. Fourth Amendment standards. The officers had no Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on the issue 19 20 of whether 21 rights. 22 /// Plaintiff’s seizure violated his Fourth Amendment 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 There is evidence on the record that supports an inference that McIntosh and Prock were not acting in a traditional law enforcement capacity when they seized Plaintiff, and it may be that the finder of fact will conclude that under the circumstances, the officers conduct was based on “special needs.” For the purposes of this motion, however, all inferences must be drawn in favor of Plaintiff. Further, as Defendants motion does not contend that the special needs standard applies, Plaintiff has not had an opportunity to provide briefing or to marshal evidence in opposition to the issue. Summary judgment on this issue is therefore inappropriate. 7 1 2. Qualified Immunity2 2 Government officials are generally shielded from liability for 3 civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 4 established 5 reasonable person would have known. 6 F.3d-- (9th Cir. 2010); 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 25895 * 33-34; 2010 WL 7 4925422 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 8 800, 818 (1982)). 9 was not clearly established that a police officer’s in-school 10 seizure of a student in connection with a school administrator’s 11 request for assistance with an unruly student was subject to the 12 same Fourth Amendment standards applicable outside the school 13 context. 14 analysis 15 Accordingly, Defendant’s are entitled to qualified immunity unless 16 their 17 "special needs" reasonableness standard. statutory or constitutional rights of which a E.g., Bryan v. MacPherson, -- At the time of Defendants’ conduct in 2008, it See Greene, 588 F.3d at 1031 (applying special needs for conduct purposes was of ascertaining clearly qualified unconstitutional immunity). under the lesser Id. 18 The lesser standard of reasonableness applicable in "special 19 needs" cases requires a two part inquiry: first, a court must 20 consider whether the action was justified at its inception; second, 21 the court considers whether the action was reasonably related in 22 scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the 23 first place. The 24 25 Id. (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341). evidence presented in Defendant’s motion does not establish that McIntosh and Prock’s seizure of Plaintiff and use of 26 27 28 2 Plaintiff contends that Defendants waived the qualified immunity defense by not including it in their answer. However, Defendant’s asserted the defense in their motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint. 8 1 handcuffs on him was necessary or justified at the inception of 2 their actions. The officers’ investigation of the situation before 3 seizing Plaintiff was minimal, and they had no reason to believe 4 Plaintiff had been violent or posed any threat of physical harm to 5 others or to himself. 6 handcuffs, the officers were faced with a passive, complaint 7 eleven-year old child in the presence of three police officers and 8 at least one other adult, who was a school official. 9 Plaintiff was verbally unresponsive, he complied with Prock’s order 10 to stand and the officers had no reason to believe Plaintiff would 11 not continue to comply with their directives, other than Sinclair’s 12 statement that Plaintiff was “a runner.” A jury presented with all 13 the evidence could conclude that, under all the circumstances, a 14 reasonable police officer would not have believed it was lawful to 15 place Plaintiff in handcuffs, detain him in a police vehicle, and 16 remove him from school. 17 At the time Plaintiff was placed in Although Defendants’ reliance on California Welfare and Institutions 18 Code section 625 is misplaced. 19 officers to take minors into temporary custody where the minor is 20 suffering from “any sickness or injury which requires care, medical 21 treatment, hospitalization, or other remedial care.” 22 & Inst. Code § 625. 23 sufficient 24 sufficient knowledge of Plaintiff’s medical condition to invoke 25 section 625. The officers where unaware of what type of medication 26 Plaintiff was on and had no reason to believe Plaintiff was 27 suffering 28 treatment or hospitalization. to from Cal. Welfare Defendants’ motion does not provide evidence establish a Section 625 authorizes police that “sickness either or injury” McIntosh that or Prock required had medical Defendants’ motion does not present 9 1 evidence sufficient to support a finding as a matter of law that 2 the officers had sufficient knowledge to believe that taking 3 Plaintiff to his uncle’s place of business constituted “other 4 remedial care” under section 625. 5 Prock were authorized to take Plaintiff into temporary custody 6 under section 625 presents a question of fact. 7 At best, whether McIntosh and 3. Municipal Liability 8 Government entities and local government officials acting in 9 their official capacity can be sued for monetary, declaratory, or 10 injunctive relief, but only if the allegedly unconstitutional 11 actions took place pursuant to some "policy statement, ordinance, 12 or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's 13 officers." Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 14 (1978). Alternatively, if no formal policy exists, plaintiffs may 15 point to "customs and usages" of the local government entity. Id. 16 A local government entity cannot be held liable simply because it 17 employs someone who has acted unlawfully. Id. at 694. See also 18 Haugen, 351 F.3d at 393 ("Municipalities cannot be held liable 19 under a traditional respondeat superior theory. Rather, they may be 20 held liable only when "action pursuant to official municipal policy 21 of some nature caused a constitutional tort…. [T]o establish 22 municipal liability, a plaintiff must prove the existence of an 23 unconstitutional municipal policy."). 24 Defendants contend they are entitled to summary judgment on 25 Plaintiff’s claim for municipal liability because Plaintiff cannot 26 prove that a municipal policy or custom was the moving force behind 27 the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. 28 Defendants contend that “the Sonora Police Department’s handcuffing 10 1 policy is a discretionary policy, not an absolute rule of the 2 department.” 3 (MSJ at 18). Whether Plaintiff was handcuffed pursuant to an official 4 policy, custom, or practice of the Sonora Police Department 5 presents a question of fact. 6 her Plaintiff was being handcuffed in accordance with “procedure.” 7 (Sinclair Dep. at 57-58). Plaintiff’s uncle, Mark Banks, testified 8 at his deposition that McIntosh told him Plaintiff was handcuffed 9 in accordance with “policy.” (Banks Dep. at 12, 13). Plaintiff has 10 presented sufficient evidence that the Department had a policy of 11 indiscriminately handcuffing detainees without regard to whether 12 use of such force was reasonable or necessary under all the 13 circumstances presented. 14 B. State Law Claims According to Sinclair, McIntosh told 15 1. False Imprisonment 16 The elements of a tortious claim of false imprisonment are: 17 (1) the nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, (2) 18 without lawful privilege, and (3) for an appreciable period of 19 time, however brief. 20 4th 485, 496 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). Easton v. Sutter Coast Hosp., 80 Cal. App. 21 Defendants contend they are entitled to summary judgment on 22 Plaintiff’s cause of action for false imprisonment because (1) 23 “Defendants 24 pursuant to California Welfare and Institutions Code section 625; 25 (2) Plaintiff was reported as “out of control” by the School and 26 had not taken his medication; and (3) Plaintiff had threatened 27 suicide in the past. 28 were acting reasonably and with lawful privilege Defendants have not produced sufficient evidence to establish 11 1 that they acted pursuant to section 625. 2 establishes that Defendants believed Plaintiff was suffering from 3 an injury or illness that required medical attention. Nor does the 4 record support a finding that Defendants took Plaintiff into 5 custody in connection with an attempt to provide Plaintiff with 6 medical treatment or other remedial care. 7 With respect to Defendants’ second Nothing in the record contention, although 8 Defendants were aware that Plaintiff had not taken medication and 9 had been “out of control” prior to Defendants’ arrival at the 10 school, the lawfulness of Defendants’ conduct must be based on the 11 totality of the circumstances faced by the officers at the time 12 they seized Plaintiff. 13 cooperative, was not suspected of any crime, and did not pose a 14 threat to maintenance of discipline at the School. Defendants have 15 not established that their seizure of Plaintiff was lawful. 16 Defendants’ third contention is disingenuous. 17 effected Plaintiff’s seizure, McIntosh and Prock were not aware of 18 Plaintiff’s alleged threats of suicide. When Defendants seized Plaintiff, he was At the time they 19 2. Battery 20 The elements of civil battery are: (1) defendant intentionally 21 performed an act that resulted in a harmful or offensive contact 22 with the plaintiff's person; (2) plaintiff did not consent to the 23 contact; and (3) the harmful or offensive contact caused injury, 24 damage, loss or harm to the plaintiff. 25 Cal. App. 4th 516, 526-527 (2009). 26 a counterpart to a federal claim of excessive use of force...[i]n 27 both, a plaintiff must prove that the peace officer's use of force 28 was unreasonable.” Id. 12 Brown v. Ransweiler, 171 “A state law battery claim is 1 Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment 2 on Plaintiff’s cause of action for battery because (1) Defendant’s 3 contact with Plaintiff was not harmful; (2) Plaintiff appeared to 4 consent to the contact as he voluntarily complied with officer’s 5 instructions and walked to the patrol car without resistance; (3) 6 Plaintiff did not suffer injury or damages. 7 Defendants have not established that Plaintiff was not harmed 8 or injured by Defendants’ conduct. According to Plaintiff, he felt 9 physical pain as a result of being handcuffed and began to cry at 10 some point due to the handcuffs. 11 of an action for battery is not limited to physical harm. See, 12 e.g., Friedman v. Merck & Co., 107 Cal. App. 4th 454, 486 (Cal. Ct. 13 App. 14 proposition that “[a]n action for battery allows a recovery for a 15 physical contact 'that causes no bodily harm’”). 16 2003) (citing The Further, injury for the purposes Restatement Second of Torts for the Defendants’ contention that Plaintiff “appeared to consent” to 17 their contact with him is devoid of merit. A handcuffed eleven- 18 year old child’s compliance with orders made by armed police 19 officers in no way suggests that the child consented to being 20 placed in handcuffs in the first place. 21 3. Infliction of Emotional Distress 22 Under California law, the elements of a claim for intentional 23 infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous 24 conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless 25 disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) 26 the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and 27 (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the 28 defendant's outrageous conduct. Hergenroeder v. Travelers Property 13 1 Cas. Ins. Co., 249 F.R.D. 595, 620 (E.D.Cal.2008). Conduct to be 2 outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that 3 usually tolerated in a civilized community. Id. 4 As noted in the memorandum decision denying Defendants’ motion 5 to dismiss 6 "outrageous" and caused "severe emotional distress" are questions 7 of fact. C.B. v. Sonora Sch. Dist., 691 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1189 8 (E.D. 9 uncontroverted facts to establish that their conduct was not 10 “outrageous” or that Plaintiff did not suffer sever emotional 11 distress as a result of being placed in handcuffs and removed from 12 school. Cal. the FAC, 2009). whether Defendants’ Defendants have not alleged conduct presented was sufficient 13 Defendants’ motion focuses on the alleged minimal amount of 14 force used to place Plaintiff in handcuffs and to remove him from 15 school. 16 and of itself, excessive force. 17 point. 18 circumstances do not warrant the use of any force. 19 handcuffing Plaintiff was necessary presents a question of fact for 20 the jury. 21 conclude that handcuffing and removing an eleven-year old child 22 from school under the circumstances Defendants were confronted with 23 constituted 24 distress. Defendants argue that the act of handcuffing is not, in Defendants’ arguments miss the Even minor uses of force may be unreasonable where the Here, whether A rational jury presented with all the evidence could outrageous conduct resulting in severe emotional 25 4. Claim for Punitive Damages 26 A municipality entity is immune from punitive damages under 27 Section 1983. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 28 271, 101 S. Ct. 2748, 69 L. Ed. 2d 616 (1981). 14 Similarly, 1 2 California Government Code section 818 provides: 4 Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a public entity is not liable for damages awarded under Section 3294 of the Civil Code or other damages imposed primarily for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant. 5 According, the City’s motion for summary judgment on the limited 6 issue of its liability for punitive damages is GRANTED. 3 7 In order to establish entitlement to punitive damages, 8 Plaintiff must show that Defendants acted with evil motive or with 9 reckless or callous indifference to Plaintiff’s rights. See, e.g., 10 Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 55 (1983)(discussing standard for 11 punitive damages in 1983 actions) accord Neal v. Farmers Ins. 12 Exchange, 21 Cal. 3d 910, 922 (Cal. 1978) (discussing California’s 13 standard). 14 unlawfully seized him in order to “teach him a lesson,” a punitive 15 damages award may be appropriate. 16 evidence in the record to create a factual dispute regarding the 17 officers’ intent, whether Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages 18 against McIntosh and Prock is a question for the jury. Plaintiff contends that if he can prove the officers Because there is sufficient ORDER 19 20 For the reasons stated, IT IS ORDERED: 21 1) Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s 22 claim for punitive damages against the City is GRANTED; 23 2) The remainder of Defendants’ motion is DENIED; and 24 3) Plaintiff shall lodge a form of order consistent with this 25 opinion within five (5) days of electronic service of this 26 decision. 27 28 15 1 IT IS SO ORDERED. 2 Dated: hkh80h February 11, 2011 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 16
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