James v. Sheklanian, et al., No. 1:2008cv01943 - Document 33 (E.D. Cal. 2010)
Court Description: Memorandum Decision Re Defendants' City of Madera and Officer Jason Gutknecht's 25 Motion for Summary Judgment signed by Judge Oliver W. Wanger on 3/8/2010. (Figueroa, O)
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1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 6 JOHN JUSTIN JAMES, 1:08-CV-01943 OWW GSA 7 Plaintiff, 8 9 v. 10 SHANT SHEKLANIAN, et al., 11 MEMORANDUM DECISION RE DEFENDANTS CITY OF MADERA AND OFFICER JASON GUTKNECHT S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. 25) Defendants. 12 I. INTRODUCTION 13 Defendants City of Madera and Officer Jason Gutknecht move 14 15 for summary judgment on all claims brought against them by 16 Plaintiff John Justin James. This motion was originally set for hearing on February 8, 2010. Doc. 25. 17 On January 27, 2010, 18 Plaintiff was granted a continuance to accommodate counsel s 19 staffing problems. Doc. 29. The hearing was reset for March 1, 20 21 2010, making Plaintiffs opposition due February 16, 2010. 22 Plaintiff failed to timely file any opposition or request a 23 further continuance. 24 II. UNDISPUTED FACTUAL BACKGROUND 25 A. Officer Gutknecht s Conduct. 26 On the evening of January 26, 2007, City of Madera Police 27 28 Officers Shant Sheklanian and Jason Gutknecht were on duty, 1 1 riding together in a marked patrol vehicle. 2 Fact ( UMF ) # 1. 3 that there were approximately thirty suspects involved in an Undisputed Material At approximately 11:25 p.m., dispatch advised 4 altercation outside of the Back Street Bar & Grill in Madera. 5 UMF #2. Dispatch advised that a person with his shirt off was 6 7 fighting. UMF #3. Upon their arrival on the scene, the Officers encountered 8 9 numerous subjects in the middle of Modoc Avenue. 10 Officer Gutknecht heard yelling and screaming, and noticed 11 persons with their shirts off as though they had been fighting. 12 UMF #6. UMF ## 4-5. He then exited the passenger side of the vehicle. UMF 13 #7. Officer Gutknecht then encountered a subject who directed 14 15 Gutknecht s attention to another individual with his shirt off. 16 Gutknecht later learned that the second individual was Plaintiff, 17 Justin Page. 18 the curb. UMF #8. Officer Gutknecht ordered Page to sit on UMF #9. 19 Gutknecht then approached Page near the curb. 20 Plaintiff was aware that Gutknecht was a police officer. UMF #10. UMF 21 #11. Officer Gutknecht asked Plaintiff what s going on? UMF #12. Plaintiff responded: I don t know what s going on. #13. According to Plaintiff, Plaintiff was then tackled from the 22 UMF 23 24 25 side by Officer Sheklanian. UMF #14. 26 to the ground, Plaintiff swung at Officer Sheklanian 27 approximately 2-3 times. UMF #15-16. 28 2 While the two were falling 1 Plaintiff ended up on top of Officer Sheklanian, at which 2 time Plaintiff realized Sheklanian was a police officer. 3 17-18. UMF ## According to Plaintiff, after realizing Sheklanian was a 4 police officer, he took 3-4 steps back and sat on the sidewalk. 5 UMF #19. During this physical confrontation, Officer Gutknecht 6 7 8 took action to keep the crowd away from Officer Sheklanian and Plaintiff. UMF #20. Officer Sheklanian then ordered Plaintiff to lie on his 9 10 stomach. 11 Plaintiff told Officer Sheklanian that he didn t do anything 12 wrong. UMF #21. UMF #22. Instead of complying with the order, Plaintiff contends that Officer Sheklanian 13 deployed his taser on him as soon as I got done saying I didn t 14 15 do anything wrong. UMF #23. Plaintiff was then handcuffed by 16 another police officer, and placed in a patrol vehicle. 17 UMF No. 24. 18 B. Facts Related to the City of Madera s Liability. 19 1. General Background. 20 The Madera Police Department ( MPD ) is a recognized and 21 22 fully certified law enforcement agency, in full compliance with 23 the minimum standards set forth by the California Commission on 24 Peace Officer Standards and Training ( P.O.S.T. ). 25 relevant to the instant action, it was the policy of MPD that its 26 police officers must comply with general standards in law 27 enforcement. UMF ## 28-29. 28 3 At all times 1 2. 2 MPD had at all relevant times a written use of force policy General Use of Force Guidelines. 3 that was consistent with state and federal law, and the use of 4 force policies of other police agencies in California and across 5 the nation. UMF ## 31-32. Each new employee at MPD was 6 presented with the policy manual. UMF #33. It was the policy of 7 8 MPD that police officers shall use only that amount of force that 9 reasonably appears necessary, given the facts and circumstances 10 perceived by the officer at the time of the event, to effectively 11 bring an incident under control. 12 policy authorized officers to use reasonable force to defend 13 UMF #34. The use of force themselves or others, effect an arrest or detention, prevent 14 escape and/or overcome resistance. UMF #35. 15 16 3. 17 It was the policy of MPD to only apply those pain compliance 18 techniques for which the officer received departmentally-approved 19 Pain Compliance and Taser Guidelines. training, and only when the officer reasonably believed that the 20 use of such a technique appears reasonably necessary to further a 21 22 23 legitimate law enforcement purpose. UMF No. 36. Likewise, it was the policy of MPD for an officer to provide 24 a verbal announcement of the intended use of the Taser prior to 25 the application of the Taser, unless doing so would endanger 26 officer safety or was otherwise impractical. 27 UMF #37. The use of a Taser on a subject by authorized personnel was allowed when 28 4 1 circumstances at the time indicated that the use of the Taser 2 would be reasonable to subdue or control a violent or physically 3 resisting subject. UMF #38. The use of the Taser to subdue a 4 potentially violent or physically resisting subject was allowed 5 if (1) the subject has verbally or physically demonstrated an 6 7 intention to resist; (2) the officer provided a verbal warning to 8 the subject and an opportunity to comply; and (3) other available 9 options reasonably appear ineffective or would present a greater 10 danger to the officer or the subject. UMF #39. 11 12 13 4. Hiring & Training Practices. MPD followed the standards set forth by P.O.S.T. in hiring 14 officers. 15 an oral interview, a background investigation, a polygraph and a 16 psychological evaluation. 17 to attend a P.O.S.T. certified academy. 18 It has a selection and screening process that includes UMF #40. MPD officers were required UMF #41. It was the policy of the MPD to comply with the officer 19 training requirements outlined by P.O.S.T. UMF ## 42-43. 20 21 Officers received training in the police academy, field-training 22 programs, on-the-job training, advanced officer courses, and 23 various classes and seminars offered throughout the State of 24 California. UMF ## 44-46. 25 26 27 28 5. Supervision. At the time of the subject incident, MPD officers were supervised through a standard chain of command. 5 UMF #48. 1 Officers were supervised on a daily basis, and received yearly 2 written performance reviews. 3 expected to comply with MPD policies, practices, procedures, and UMF ## 49-50. MPD Officers were 4 training requirements, and were subject to disciplinary actions 5 if they failed to do so. UMF #51. 6 7 6. 8 It was the policy and practice of MPD to conduct thorough 9 Investigations of Alleged Officer Misconduct. investigations into allegations of misconduct on the part of its 10 police officers. UMF #53. An administrative investigation could 11 be initiated by a citizen through the presentation of a citizen 12 13 complaint or internally. 14 take sufficient corrective action to prevent its employees from 15 committing misconduct. 16 17 18 UMF #54. It was the policy of MPD to UMF No. 55. MPD executive management reviewed the incident at issue in this case. UMF #56. MPD Chief Kime did not request an administrative investigation because he did not believe the 19 evidence suggested that excessive force was utilized, or an 20 21 22 23 improper arrest was made. UMF #57. III. STANDARD OF DECISION Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, the 24 discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits 25 show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 26 27 28 that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A party moving for summary judgment 6 1 always bears the initial responsibility of informing the 2 district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those 3 portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to 4 interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 5 affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of 6 7 8 9 a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where the movant will have the burden of proof on an issue 10 at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable 11 trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. 12 Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 13 2007); see also S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 14 15 885, 888 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that a party moving for summary 16 judgment on a claim as to which it will have the burden at trial 17 must establish beyond controversy every essential element of 18 the claim) (internal quotation marks omitted). With respect to an 19 issue as to which the non-moving party will have the burden of 20 proof, the movant can prevail merely by pointing out that there 21 is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. 22 Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984. 23 24 When a motion for summary judgment is properly made and 25 supported, the non-movant cannot defeat the motion by resting 26 upon the allegations or denials of its own pleading, rather the 27 non-moving party must set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise 28 7 1 provided in Rule 56, specific facts showing that there is a 2 genuine issue for trial. 3 Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986)). Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Conclusory, speculative 4 testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to 5 Id. raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary judgment. 6 To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving 7 8 party must show there exists a genuine dispute (or issue) of 9 material fact. 10 outcome of the suit under the governing law. 11 at 248. 12 A fact is material if it might affect the Anderson, 477 U.S. [S]ummary judgment will not lie if [a] dispute about a material fact is genuine, that is, if the evidence is such that 13 a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 14 15 party. Id. at 248. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, 16 the district court does not make credibility determinations; 17 rather, the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and 18 all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. 19 255. Id. at 20 IV. DISCUSSION 21 22 A. Claims Against Officer Gutknecht. 23 The Complaint, which is brought under Title 42 U.S.C., 24 section 1983 ( Section 1983 ) and the Fourth and Fourteenth 25 Amendments to the United States Constitution, alleges that 26 Officer Gutknecht s unlawful and malicious physical abuse of 27 Plaintiff... caused Plaintiff grievous bodily harm, and 28 8 1 deprived [him] of his right to be secure in his person against 2 unreasonable seizure of his person, in violation of the Fourth 3 and Fourteenth Amendments.... Doc. 1, Compl., at 3-4. 4 Officer Gutknecht invokes the defense of qualified immunity, 5 which protects defendants from liability for civil damages 6 7 insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 8 statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 9 would have known. 10 936, 943 (9th Cir. 2004). 11 to inquire whether, taken in the light most favorable to the 12 Squaw Valley Dev. Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d Qualified immunity requires the court party asserting injury, do the facts alleged show the officer s 13 conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right. 14 15 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-201 (2001); see also Pearson 16 v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009). If the plaintiff s factual 17 allegations do not establish a violation of a constitutional (or 18 other federal) right, the court need not inquire whether the 19 right was clearly established. 20 (permitting court to exercise its sound discretion to determine Pearson, 12 S. Ct. at 818 21 the order in which qualified immunity is analyzed). 22 23 1. 24 Liability for a constitutional tort arises only upon a 25 26 Personal Participation. showing of personal participation by the defendant. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Taylor v. Plaintiff must 27 establish the integral participation of Officer Gutknecht in 28 9 1 the alleged constitutional violations. 2 Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 935 (9th Cir. 2002). 3 Here, it is undisputed that the only contact Officer 4 Gutknecht had with Plaintiff was to ask him to sit onthe curb, 5 followed by asking him a single question: What s going on? 6 7 Plaintiff does not allege that this conduct implicated his Fourth See I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216-217 8 Amendment rights. 9 (1984)(unless circumstances of encounter with police are so 10 intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable person would 11 have believed that he was not free to leave if he did not 12 respond, questioning does not result in detention under the 13 Fourth Amendment). Officer Gutnecht did not attempt to detain 14 15 Plaintiff prior to the altercation with Officer Sheklanian, UMF 16 ## 10-13, nor did Officer Gutknecht participate in the force 17 applied by Officer Sheklanian, UMF ## 14¬17, 21-23. 18 Gutknecht s subsequent participation was limited to keeping the 19 crowd away. 20 Fourth Amendment violation. 1 Officer Gutknecht had no direct participation in any alleged 21 Officer Gutknecht s motion for summary judgment on the 22 Fourth Amendment claim is GRANTED. 23 24 2. 25 Plaintiff also alleges that his Fourteenth Amendment rights 26 27 28 Fourteenth Amendment Claim. were violated. 1 The central basis for this allegation appears to Plaintiff has not argued that Gutknecht is liable under the Fourth Amendment for failing to intercede. 10 1 be Plaintiff s claim of excessive use of force. 2 particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of 3 constitutional protection against a particular sort of government Where a 4 behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of 5 substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these 6 7 claims. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994). For this 8 reason, claims of excessive force or unlawful arrest must be 9 analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its reasonableness 10 standard. 11 12 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). Plaintiff also alleges that he was charged with Penal Code violations based on false and fabricated reports of the 13 defendant officers. However, generally, the due process 14 15 requirements for criminal proceedings do not include a standard Albright v. 16 for the initiation of a criminal prosecution. 17 Oliver, supra, 510 U.S. at 283. 18 Section 1983 claim for false arrest and/or malicious under the 19 Fourth Amendment, see Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 20 F.3d 1119, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002), such a claim requires a showing Although a Plaintiff may bring a 21 that the criminal prosecution was induced by fraud, corruption, 22 perjury, fabricated evidence, or other wrongful conduct 23 24 undertaken in bad faith. See Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 25 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff has presented no such 26 evidence. 27 The Fourteenth Amendment is not implicated in this case. 28 11 1 2 Office Gutknecht s Motion for Summary Judgment on the Fourteenth Amendment Claim is GRANTED. 3 Because Plaintiff has failed to establish that Officer 4 Gutknecht has violated any federal right, it is not necessary to 5 further examine qualified immunity. 6 7 B. Claims Against the City of Madera 8 9 A public entity can only liable under Section 1983 for 10 injuries inflicted pursuant to a governmental policy or custom. 11 Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 12 (1978). 13 To establish such liability, the plaintiff must establish that: (1) a violation of constitutional rights 14 occurred; (2) the existence of a municipal policy or custom; and 15 16 (3) a causal nexus between the constitutional rights violation 17 and the municipal custom or policy. 18 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385-386 (1989). 19 Plaintiff alleges, among other things, that: (1) MPD failed 20 to discipline Officers Sheklanian and Gutknecht, despite having 21 knowledge that the two Officers were involved in several previous 22 excessive force incidents; (2) the City of Madera was aware of a 23 pattern of excessive force and inadequate discipline within MPD, 24 25 but took no action; (3) MPD intentionally, knowingly, and 26 recklessly failed to properly instruct its officers on the use of 27 force; (4) the Officers were acting pursuant to official policy 28 12 1 and under the direction of MPD Chief Kime and the City; and (5) 2 MPD and the City approved of and/or ratified the Officers 3 conduct. Compl. at 4-6. However, Plaintiff has presented 4 absolutely no evidence to support these allegations. To the 5 contrary, the undisputed evidence establishes that MPD s policies 6 7 8 9 10 and procedures are consistent with established standards. See UMF ## 40-52. The City of Madera s motion for summary judgment on Monell claims is GRANTED. 11 V. CONCLUSION 12 13 For the reasons set forth above, the City and Officer 14 Gutknetch s motions for summary judgment are GRANTED in their 15 entirety. 16 17 SO ORDERED Dated: March 8, 2010 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger Oliver W. Wanger United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13
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