Quintero v. United States of America, No. 1:2008cv01890 - Document 87 (E.D. Cal. 2011)
Court Description: AMENDED MEMORANDUM DECISION Regarding Motions to Amend Judgment 61 66 70 74 , signed by Judge Oliver W. Wanger on 3/2/2011. (Gaumnitz, R)
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Quintero v. United States of America Doc. 87 1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 8 ESTEBAN QUINTERO and LETICIA QUINTERO 9 1:08-cv-01890-OWW-SMS AMENDED MEMORANDUM DECISION REGARDING MOTIONS TO AMEND JUDGMENT (Doc. 61, 66, 70, 74) Plaintiff, 10 v. 11 12 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Defendant. 13 14 I. INTRODUCTION. 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Following a bench trial on July 20, 2010, judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiffs Esteban Quintero ( Esteban ) and Leticia Quintero ( Leticia ) against the United States of America. (Doc. 55). On August 11, 2010, Leticia filed a motion to amend the Judgment. (Docs. 61, 62). motion to amend the judgment. On August 16, 2010, Esteban filed a (Docs. 66, 67). Leticia filed an Amended Motion to Amend the Judgment on August 17, 2010. (Doc. 70). The United States filed opposition to Plaintiffs motions on November 1, 2010. (Docs. 75, 76). II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND. This action arises out of a vehicular accident in which 28 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 Plaintiffs motorcycle was struck by a United States Postal Service 2 vehicle. 3 United States was liable to Plaintiffs due to the fact that the 4 driver of the postal vehicle that struck Plaintiffs negligently 5 operated the vehicle within the scope of her public employment and 6 proximately caused Plaintiffs injuries. After a three-day bench trial, the court found that the 7 Evidence established that, at the time of trial, the total 8 amount paid by Esteban and his insurer for all medical care 9 resulting from the accident was $74,864.83. The evidence also 10 established that the total amount billed by care providers for 11 Esteban s medical care was, $363,708.08, significantly higher than 12 the total amount paid. 13 total amount paid in full payment for medical care by Leticia and 14 her insurers was $4,245.88, and the billed amount for such care was 15 $8,295.90. III. LEGAL STANDARD. 16 17 18 19 20 21 The trial evidence established that the A. Rule 52 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(b) permits a court to amend findings rendered after a bench trial. Rule 52(b) provides: On a party's motion filed no later than 28 days after the entry of judgment, the court may amend its findings - or make additional findings - and may amend the judgment accordingly. 22 Motions under Rule 52(b) are primarily designed to correct findings 23 of fact which are central of the ultimate decision; the Rule is not 24 intended to serve as a vehicle for rehearing. Davis v. Mathews, 25 450 F.Supp. 308, 318 (E.D. Cal. 1978). 26 B. Rule 60 27 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) allows the court to 28 2 1 correct at any time, on its own initiative or on the motion of any 2 party, a clerical mistake in a judgment, order or other part of the 3 record. Rule 60(a) may be used by a court to make its decision 4 reflect its actual intention and implications. 5 Platters, Inc., 918 F.2d 1439, 1445 (9th Cir. 1990). 6 amend its decision under Rule 60(a) so long as the change is 7 consistent with the court's original intent. Harman v. Harper, 7 8 F.3d 1455, 1457 (9th Cir. 1993). "The basic distinction between 9 'clerical mistakes' and mistakes that cannot be corrected pursuant 10 to Rule 60(a) is that the former consist of 'blunders in execution' 11 whereas the latter consist of instances where the court changes its 12 mind." Blanton v. Anzalone, 813 F.2d 1574, 1577 n.2 (9th Cir. 13 1987). 14 such as errors of law. 15 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 1997). 16 Robi v. Five A court may Rule 60(a) may not be used to correct substantial errors, Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 936 F.2d Rule 60(b) allows a court to relieve a party from a final 17 judgment, order, or 18 inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 2) newly discovered 19 evidence; 3) fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of the 20 adverse party; 4) the judgment is void; 5) the judgment has been 21 satisfied, 22 justifying relief. 23 motion cannot be brought under Rule 60(b)(6) if it falls into one 24 of the other five areas. Lyon v. Agusta S.P.A., 252 F.3d 1078, 1088 25 (9th Cir. 2001). A motion under Rule 60(b) must be brought in a 26 reasonable time or within a year if brought under subsections (1), 27 (2), or (3). Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). 28 /// released proceeding or for discharged; six and reasons: 6) any 1) mistake, other reason The six reasons are mutually exclusive, a 3 IV. DISCUSSION. 1 2 3 A. Esteban s Request to Increase Medical Damages Award Esteban seeks modification of the judgment in order to 4 increase the amount of medical damages awarded. Esteban contends 5 that he is entitled to medical damages equal to the full amount 6 billed for his medical services, not the amount accepted by health 7 care providers in full satisfaction of his medical debts. Although 8 no published California authority establishes the rule advanced by 9 Esteban, the issue of whether medical damages are limited to the 10 amount actually paid for medical services is currently pending 11 before the California Supreme Court. 12 & Provisions, Inc., 179 Cal. App. 4th 686, 706-07 (Cal. Ct. App. 13 2009) (holding that limiting damages to actual amounts paid by 14 private insurer violated collateral source rule) withdrawn by, 15 petition for review granted at 106 Cal. Rptr. 770 (Cal. 2010). See Howell v. Hamilton Meats 16 1. The Hanif/Nashihama Rule 17 In Hanif v. Housing Authority, the California Court of Appeal 18 19 20 21 held: when the evidence shows a sum certain to have been paid or incurred for past medical care and services, whether by the plaintiff or by an independent source, that sum certain is the most the plaintiff may recover for that care despite the fact it may have been less than the prevailing market rate. 22 23 200 Cal. App. 3d 635, 641 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). The California 24 Court of Appeal affirmed the rule of Hanif in Nishihama v. City and 25 County of San Francisco, 93 Cal. App. 4th 298, 306 (Cal. Ct. App. 26 2001). 27 the amount billed for the plaintiffs medical care, to $3,600, the 28 amount the care provider agreed to accept from plaintiff s insurer Nishihama reduced a jury s award of damages from $17,168, 4 1 as full payment for the plaintiff s medical care. Id. Nishihama 2 is the last published pronouncement of the California Court of 3 Appeal concerning the propriety of the Hanif/Nishihama rule. 4 In Greer v. Buzgheia, the California Court of Appeal clarified 5 Hanif and Nishihama by holding that neither case establishes a rule 6 of evidence: 7 9 Nishihama and Hanif stand for the principle that it is error for the plaintiff to recover medical expenses in excess of the amount paid or incurred. Neither case, however, holds that evidence of the reasonable cost of medical care may not be admitted. 10 141 Cal. App. 4th 1150, 1157 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (emphasis 11 added).1 12 04 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008), the Court of Appeal declined to address 13 the 14 Hanif/Nishihama rule and instead approached the question of the 15 proper measure of damages as an evidentiary issue: 8 16 Similarly, in Olsen v. Reid, 164 Cal. App. 4th 200, 203- parties arguments regarding the propriety of the Olsen and amicus curiae ask this court to reconsider the holdings in cases such as Hanif...and Nishihama. Those cases held that when a plaintiff has medical insurance, damages are limited to the amount actually paid or incurred, not to any greater amount a medical provider billed, even if that amount was reasonable. We need not go that far, however, in order to decide this case. 17 18 19 20 ...[The record is not] clear as to what was paid, what, if anything, was written off, and to what extent Olsen remained liable for any further charges. The cryptic notations the court relied upon may reflect payments, or write-downs or write-offs; we cannot know, and if any evidence revealed the actual facts, they are not present in the record... 21 22 23 24 Reid cross-appeals, arguing it was error for the trial court to permit the jury to hear evidence of the full measure of Olsen's medical damages. We squarely reject 25 26 27 28 1 In Greer, the issue of whether a Nishihama/Hanif reduction was appropriate was not preserved for review and thus the court had no occasion to pass on the merits of the substantive rule. Id. 5 1 this argument. Even the cases holding that a plaintiff is entitled to the lesser amount of damages those incurred rather than billed (and we do not decide that Reid was entitled to such a hearing) have approved of the jury's hearing evidence as to the full amount of plaintiff's damages. There is no reason to assume that the usual rates provided a less accurate indicator of the extent of plaintiff's injuries than did the specially negotiated rates obtained by Blue Cross. Indeed, the opposite is more likely to be true. 2 3 4 5 6 7 (citations and quotations omitted). 8 Three recent California Court of Appeals cases have 9 disapproved the Hanif/Nishihama rule. See Howell v. Hamilton Meats 10 & Provisions, Inc., 179 Cal. App. 4th 686 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009); 11 Yanez v. SOMA Environmental Engineering, Inc., 185 Cal. App. 4th 12 1313 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010); King v. Willmett, 187 Cal. App. 4th 313 13 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010). 14 a damages award pursuant to Hanif and Nishihama where a plaintiff s 15 private 16 satisfaction 17 collateral source rule. 18 Howell, 179 Cal. App. 4th at 703; Yanez, 185 Cal. App. 4th at 1331. 19 Each of these cases has been superceded by the California Supreme 20 Court s grant of review and may not be cited as, and are not, 21 authority pursuant to California Rules of Court rule 8.1115(a).2 22 Id. insurance of These cases express the view that reducing pays the less than plaintiff s the billed medical amount debts in violates full the Willmett, 187 Cal. App. 4th at 330; 23 24 2 25 26 27 Except as provided in (b), an opinion of a California Court of Appeal or superior court appellate division that is not certified for publication or ordered published must not be cited or relied on by a court or a party in any other action. Cal. Rule. Ct. 8.115(a) (2010). Esteban s failure to properly acknowledge that the cases he urges on the court have been superceded by the California Supreme Court s grant of review and are not citable is inappropriate. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. 28 6 2. The Collateral Source Rule 1 a. California s Collateral Source Rule 2 3 California has long adhered to the collateral source rule, 4 e.g. Peri v. Los Angeles Junction Ry. Co., 22 Cal.2d 111, 131 5 (1943), which embodies the venerable concept that a person who has 6 invested years of insurance premiums to 7 should receive the benefits of his thrift, Helfend v. Southern 8 California Rapid Transit Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 1, 9-10 (Cal. 1970). 9 the California Supreme Court explained in Helfend, 10 assure his medical care As The collateral source rule expresses a policy judgment in favor of encouraging citizens to purchase and maintain insurance for personal injuries and for other eventualities. ¦ If we were to permit a tortfeasor to mitigate damages with payments from plaintiff s insurance, plaintiff would be in a position inferior to that of having bought no insurance, because his payment of premiums would have earned no benefit. Defendant should not be able to avoid payment of full compensation for the injury inflicted merely because the victim has had the foresight to provide himself with insurance. 11 12 13 14 15 16 Id. 17 The collateral source rule has two components: (1) a 18 substantive rule that prohibits reduction of the damages plaintiff 19 would otherwise receive for plaintiff's receipt of collateral 20 source compensation; and (2) an evidentiary rule that limits what 21 the jury is told about plaintiff's receipt of collateral source 22 compensation. See, e.g., Arambula v. Wells, 72 Cal. App. 4th 1006, 23 1015 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); see also Lund v. San Joaquin Valley 24 Railroad, 31 Cal. 4th 1, 8 (Cal. 2003). 25 As a general rule, California law prohibits admission of 26 evidence regarding collateral source payments. Lund, 31 Cal. 4th 27 at 10. In essence, evidence of collateral source payments is 28 7 1 subject to a presumption of exclusion under California Evidence 2 Code section 352. See Hrnjak v. Graymar, Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 725, 733 3 (Cal. 1971) ( If defendants fail to make an adequate showing [of 4 substantial probative value of the evidence], the prejudicial 5 impact 6 inadmissible 7 Evidence Code section 352 provides: 8 of the collateral under source Evidence Code evidence section will 352"). render it California The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury. 9 10 11 12 Cal. Evid. Code § 352 (2010). 13 evidence regarding collateral source payments, California courts 14 must 15 California 16 California Supreme Court s admonition that because collateral 17 source evidence is readily subject to misuse by a jury, the 18 likelihood 19 evidence in most cases, Lund, 31 Cal. 4th at 8 (quoting Eichel v. 20 New York Central R. Co., 375 U.S. 253, 255 (1963)). 21 California Supreme Court explained in Lund: 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 evaluate the evidence Evidence of misuse Code In determining whether to admit under section clearly the standard set forth keeping in mind 352, outweighs the value of the such As the The potentially prejudicial impact of evidence that a personal injury plaintiff received collateral insurance payments varies little from case to case. Even with cautionary instructions, there is substantial danger that the jurors will take the evidence into account in assessing the damages to be awarded to an injured plaintiff. Thus, introduction of the evidence on a limited admissibility theory creates the danger of circumventing the salutary policies underlying the collateral source rule. Admission despite such ominous potential should be permitted only upon a persuasive showing that the evidence sought to be introduced is of substantial probative value 8 in 1 2 Id. at 10 (citing Hrnjak, 4 Cal. 3d at 732-33). 3 A California court presented with collateral source evidence 4 must first determine the threshold issue of whether the party 5 offering the evidence has made a persuasive showing that the 6 evidence is of substantial probative value. 7 considering the inherent probative value of the collateral source 8 evidence, California courts must also consider other available 9 evidence on the issue in question that would render resort to the Id. In addition to 10 collateral source evidence unnecessary. 11 734 12 against admission); accord Eichel, 375 U.S. at 255 (evidence should 13 be inadmissible where other less prejudicial evidence on an issue 14 exists). 15 probative value, the court must then apply California Evidence Code 16 section 352 and determine whether the probative value of the 17 evidence 18 admission will necessitate undue consumption of time or create 19 substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or 20 of misleading the jury. 21 22 (noting that existence of See Hrnjak, 4 Cal. 3d at alternative evidence mitigates If the court finds that the evidence is of substantial is substantially outweighed by the probability that Cal. Evid. Code § 352. b. Federal Collateral Source Rule Federal common law recognizes the collateral source rule. 23 See, e.g., McLean v. Runyon, 222 F.3d 1150, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 24 2000)(applying federal common law collateral source rule); Gill v. 25 Maciejewski, 546 F.3d 557, 564 (8th Cir. 2008) (same). 26 collateral source rule embodied in federal common law is not, 27 however, a rule of evidence. 28 56 ( Under the collateral source rule, benefits received by the The See, e.g., Runyon, 222 F.3d at 1155- 9 1 plaintiff from a source collateral to the defendant may not be used 2 to 3 Admissibility of evidence in federal actions is governed by the 4 Federal Rules of Evidence. See, e.g., Bieghler v. Kleppe, 633 F.2d 5 531, 533 (9th Cir. 1980) (applying federal rules of evidence in 6 Federal Tort Claims Act case despite the fact that state law 7 provided the substantive rule of decision); see also England v. 8 Reinauer Transp. Cos., L.P., 194 F.3d 265, 273 (1st Cir. 1999) 9 ( When a case is being heard in federal court, the evidentiary, as 10 opposed to the substantive, aspects of the collateral source rule 11 are governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence, particularly Rules 12 401, 402, and 403") (citation omitted); Sims v. Great Am. Life Ins. 13 Co., 469 F.3d 870, 884 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that Federal Rules 14 of Evidence govern in diversity case, but noting that state rules 15 of evidence may implicate the relevancy of certain evidence under 16 Rule 401). reduce that defendant's liability for damages ).3 17 3. Esteban s Damages Award 18 Esteban s medical damages were not limited pursuant to the 19 Hanif/Nishihama rule. To the contrary, the uncertainty of the 20 Hanif/Nishihama limitation was recognized and the reasonable value 21 of the medical services provided to Plaintiffs was determined based 22 on the evidence adduced at trial. The court s findings of fact and 23 3 24 25 26 27 28 In Eichel, the Supreme Court analyzed a challenge to collateral source evidence and held that the risk of prejudice entailed by the evidence outweighed its probative value. In light of Eichel s case-specific analysis, that case does not establish an evidentiary rule prohibiting collateral source evidence in every instance. Accord McGrath v. Consolidated Rail Corp. 136 F.3d 838, 841 (1st Cir. 1998) ( We do not read Eichel as requiring the per se exclusion of collateral source evidence in FELA cases ). In any event, Eichel predates the Federal Rules of Evidence, which establish an express standard for determining the admissibility of evidence that might be unduly prejudicial. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 conclusions of law provide, in pertinent part: 9. The normal measure of [medical] damages for a person injured by another's tortious conduct is the reasonable value of medical care and services reasonably required and attributable to the tort. Katiuzhinsky v. Perry, 152 Cal. App. 4th 1288, 1294 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Hanif v. Hous. Auth., 200 Cal. App. 3d 635, 639 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); accord CAL . CIV . CODE § 3359 (2009) ( damages must, in all cases, be reasonable ); see also Gimbel v. Laramie, 181 Cal. App. 2d 77, 81-82 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960) ( If the court by reason of evidence adduced during the trial doubted the necessity or reasonableness of any part of the total hospital bill, it had no alternative but to deny the entire amount )... 11. Whether a plaintiff may recover medical damages in excess of the amount accepted as full payment by the medical service provider is an unsettled question under California law that is currently pending review by the California Supreme Court. See Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc., 179 Cal. App. 4th 686, 706-07 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (rejecting Hanif rule) withdrawn by, petition for review granted at 106 Cal. Rptr. 770 (Cal. 2010). However, a court may consider the amount billed for medical services in determining the reasonable value of such services notwithstanding the rule set forth in Hanif. See, e.g., Olsen v. Reid, 164 Cal. App. 4th 200, 202 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (declining to reach Hanif/Nashihama issue and holding that consideration of amounts billed is appropriate in determining reasonable value of services); Greer v. Buzgheia, 141 Cal. App. 4th 1150, 1157 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (consideration of amounts charged appropriate in determining reasonable value of medical services); Katiuzhinsky, 152 Cal. App. 4th at 1295 (same); Chapman v. Mazda Motor of Am., 7 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1124-25 (D. Montana 1998)(same). Unless the finder of fact concludes that the reasonable value of medical services rendered to a plaintiff exceeds the amount that was actually paid for such services, the rule set forth in Hanif is not implicated. See Greer, 141 Cal. App. 4th at 1157 (countenancing trial court s practice of reserving the propriety of a Hanif/Nishihama reduction until after the verdict ) 23 24 25 26 27 28 12. The only evidence in the record evidencing the reasonable value of the past medical services provided to Plaintiffs consists of the amounts billed by the service providers and the amounts accepted by the service providers in full satisfaction of these medical charges. In light of the fact that the service providers accepted reductions of the total billed amounts as full payment, [the record belies] a finding that the billed amounts represent the reasonable value of the services provided. The best evidence of the reasonable value of the services 11 1 received by Plaintiffs contained in the instant record is the evidence showing the payments accepted by the medical service providers in full satisfaction of Plaintiffs medical debts, which proves the actual loss. 2 3 4 (Doc. 52 at 15). 5 Acknowledging that the court did not rely on the 6 Hanif/Nishihama rule to limit Plaintiffs damages, Esteban argues 7 that 8 evidence regarding the amounts paid to satisfy his medical debts. 9 Esteban cites no authority for the proposition that federal courts 10 must apply the evidentiary prong of a state s collateral source 11 rule in determining the proper measure of damages in a Federal Tort 12 Claims Act (FTCA) case, rather than the Federal Rules of Evidence. 13 Ordinarily, the Federal Rules of Evidence apply in FTCA 14 actions, even when the Federal Rule implicates state substantive 15 legal policy concerns. See, e.g., Brocklesby v. United States, 767 16 F.2d 1288, 1292 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying Federal Rule of Evidence 17 408 to bar admission of settlement agreements to prove liability in 18 FTCA case without reference to state rules of evidence); Beech 19 Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 51 F.3d 834, 842 (9th Cir. 1995) 20 (applying Federal Rule of Evidecne 702 in FTCA action without 21 reference to state rules of evidence). The Ninth Circuit has yet 22 to should 23 collateral source evidentiary rule in an FTCA action, see Siverson 24 v. United States, 710 F.2d 557, 559 (9th Cir. 25 decide the issue because, even under state s rule, court had 26 discretion to admit evidence), however, at least one circuit court 27 of appeal has held that the Federal Rules of Evidence, not the 28 forum state s collateral source rule, govern admissibility of the court determine committed whether evidentiary federal courts 12 error when apply it a received state s 1983) (declining to 1 collateral source evidence, see England, 194 F.3d at 273 ( When a 2 case is being heard in federal court, the evidentiary, as opposed 3 to the substantive, aspects of the collateral source rule are 4 governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence, particularly Rules 401, 5 402, and 403") (citation omitted).4 6 collateral source payments is admissible under both the Federal 7 Rules 8 Esteban s claim of evidentiary error is misplaced. of Evidence and Here, because evidence of California s collateral source rule, 9 Under California law, where collateral source evidence is of 10 substantial probative value regarding a disputed issue, a court may 11 admit the evidence unless the probative value is substantially 12 outweighed by the risk of prejudice. 13 Lund, 31 Cal. 4th at 10; Cal. Evid. Code § 352.5 14 evidence of collateral source payments is admissible under the 15 Federal 16 substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 17 England, 194 F.3d at 273 (holding that Rules 401 and 403 govern 18 admissibility of collateral source evidence in federal court); 19 Simmons v. Hoegh Lines, 784 F.2d 1234, 1236 (5th Cir. 1986) 20 (finding 21 purpose); see also Sims, 469 F.3d at 884 (holding that Federal 22 Rules of Evidence govern questions of admissibility of evidence in Rules of collateral Evidence source Hrnjak, 4 Cal. 3d at 732-3l; unless evidence its Similarly, probative admissible value for is See limited 23 24 25 26 27 28 4 Although adoption of the First Circuit s rule here is unnecessary, the reasoning of the rule expressed in England is particularly relevant to this case. California law itself recognizes a distinction between the substantive prong of its collateral source rule and its evidentiary counterpart, which is in essence a procedural rule. See, e.g., Arambula, 72 Cal. App. 4that 1015. 5 None of the de-certified cases Esteban cites in support of his motion address the evidentiary prong of the collateral source rule, as each of the cases decided only the distinct issue of whether reduction of damages awards under Hanif/Nishihama was appropriate. 13 1 federal court even where state law supplies rule of decision). 2 Evidence of the actual amounts paid for Esteban s medical care 3 was considered 4 reasonable value of the medical services provided. As specifically 5 noted in the findings of fact and conclusions of law, evidence 6 regarding the amounts actually paid for Esteban s medical services 7 was the only evidence of the value of such services submitted other 8 than 9 inflated. the billed for the limited amounts, which purpose the of court ascertaining found were the unduly In light of the limited evidence of damages offered by 10 the parties, evidence of the amounts actually paid for all 11 Esteban s medical services was substantially probative. 12 no jury hearing Esteban s case. 13 Rule 403 resulting from the evidence was nonexistent. Contra Lund, 14 31 Cal. 4th at 8; ( because collateral source evidence is readily 15 subject to misuse by a jury, the likelihood of misuse clearly 16 outweighs the value of such evidence ) (emphasis added); Eichel, 17 375 U.S. at 255 (same). 18 satisfaction of Esteban s medical debts was properly admitted under 19 either the evidentiary prong of California s collateral source rule 20 or under the Federal Rules of Evidence to show the value of the 21 services and as bearing on the actual loss qua damages.6 There was The risk of undue prejudice under The evidence of the amounts paid in full 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6 Esteban was free to offer qualified expert testimony to show that the amounts actually paid and accepted by his medical providers for his medical services reflected the value of collateral source benefits. Esteban could have offered evidence establishing the amounts typically paid by uninsured individuals for the medical services he received, or other evidence to show that the amounts paid for his medical services were not based on the reasonable value of such services. He did not. Absent such evidence, there is nothing in the record from which to conclude that the amounts paid for Esteban s medical services are not reliable evidence of the reasonable value of the services, or that the billed amounts are better evidence of the value of the services and extent of the loss. 14 1 At oral argument, the parties discussed the propriety of 2 staying the decision on this motion pending the California Supreme 3 Court s resolution of Hamilton, Yanez, and Wilmett. 4 Hamilton, 5 implicated in this case. 6 (distinguishing collateral source rule from the closely related 7 principle that, as a general rule, jurors should not be told that 8 the plaintiff can recover compensation from a collateral source ) 9 (emphasis Yanez, added); nor Wilmett concerns the Neither evidentiary issue See Howell, 179 Cal. App. 4th at 698 Willmett, 187 Cal. App. 4th at 321 ( the 10 collateral source rule as expressed by case law has two components: 11 an evidentiary rule that limits what the jury is told about 12 plaintiff's 13 substantive rule that prohibits reduction of the damages...This 14 case involves the application of the substantive rule ); Yanez, 185 15 Cal. App. 4th at 1331 ( It could be argued that, in fairness, the 16 jury as fact finder should have heard evidence of both the billed 17 and discounted amounts since both are relevant to determining the 18 reasonable value of the services involved. 19 beyond the scope of this appeal...no such request was made in the 20 trial court ). 21 Hamilton, Yanez, or Wilmett, the California Supreme Court will 22 abrogate the settled evidentiary principle that collateral source 23 evidence is admissible pursuant to California Evidence Code section 24 352,7 e.g. Hrnjak, 4 Cal. 3d at 732-3l, a stay is inappropriate, receipt of collateral source compensation, and a But that issue is Because it is unlikely that, in deciding either 25 26 27 28 7 Even if the California Supreme Court breaks new ground and holds that collateral source evidence is always inadmissible for the purpose of ascertaining the reasonable value of medical services, application of such a rule in FTCA actions is uncertain. See England, 194 F.3d at 273 (rejecting application of state s rule in favor of Federal Rules of Evidence); Siverson, 710 F.2d at 559 (expressing uncertainty regarding the propriety of applying state s rule). 15 1 see, e.g. Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 255 (1936) ( in rare 2 circumstances...a litigant in one cause [may] be compelled to stand 3 aside while a litigant in another settles the rule of law that will 4 define the rights of both ).8 Esteban s motion to modify and/or 5 stay the judgement in order to increase his medical damages award 6 is DENIED. 7 B. Leticia s Motion 8 1. Collateral Source Argument 9 Leticia s motion makes only the conclusory contention that the 10 court did not address her collateral source argument, followed by 11 citation to the decertified Yanez and Willmett cases. 12 Yanez and Willmett as the most recent decisional law on the 13 collateral source rule is unavailing. 14 oral argument, Yanez and Willmett were superceded after Leticia 15 filed her motion and have no precedential value. 16 Ct. 8.1115(a). 17 damages argument was expressly addressed by the findings of fact 18 and conclusions of law. 19 motion is based on the same contentions advanced by Esteban, it is 20 denied for the same reasons discussed above. 21 2. 22 Leticia Reliance on As counsel acknowledged at See Cal. Rule. Further, Leticia s contention lacks merit, as her (Doc. 52 at 15). To the extent Leticia s Non-economic Damages correctly notes that the findings of fact and 23 conclusions of law do not contain a damages award for the pain and 24 suffering she endured as a result of her injuries. 25 limited evidence of Leticia s pain and suffering presented at Based on the 26 27 28 8 Evaluation of all the Landis factors is necessary, as no party has formally requested a stay. At oral argument, Leticia s counsel and Esteban s counsel expressed different opinions on the propriety of a stay. 16 1 trial, ten thousand ($10,000) dollars is a reasonable amount for 2 Leticia s pain and suffering. ORDER 3 4 For the reasons stated, IT IS ORDERED: 5 1) Esteban s motion is DENIED; 6 2) Leticia s motion is DENIED with respect to her request to 7 increase the amount of her medical damages and GRANTED with 8 respect to her request to amend the judgment to include an 9 award for pain and suffering; 10 3) The Judgment will be amended to award an additional 11 $10,000.00 to Leticia for her pain and suffering caused by the 12 accident. 13 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 16 Dated: March 2, 2011 /s/ OLIVER W. WANGER United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 17
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