(PC) Howard v. Sullivan et al, No. 1:2008cv01236 - Document 15 (E.D. Cal. 2010)
Court Description: ORDER DENYING Plaintiff's 13 Motion to Amend ; ORDER DISMISSING (Strike) 12 First Amended Complaint for Failure to State a Claim signed by District Judge G. Murray Snow on 6/7/2010. CASE CLOSED. (Sant Agata, S)
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(PC) Howard v. Sullivan et al Doc. 15 1 JKM 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 Clarence E. Howard, 9 Plaintiff, 10 vs. 11 W.J. Sullivan, et al., 12 Defendants. 13 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) No. CV 1-08-1236-GMS ORDER 14 Clarence E. Howard, who is confined in the California Correctional Institution in 15 Tehachapi, California, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 16 (Doc. #1.) The Court dismissed the Complaint for failure to comply with Rules 8 and 10 of 17 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with leave to amend. (Doc.# 9.) After obtaining an 18 extension of time, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint. (Doc.# 12.) The Court will 19 dismiss the First Amended Complaint without leave to amend. 20 I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 21 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against 22 a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 23 § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised 24 claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may 25 be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 26 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 27 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 28 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does not Dockets.Justia.com 1 demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant- 2 unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). 3 “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 4 statements, do not suffice.” Id. 5 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 6 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 7 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 8 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 9 misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 10 relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 11 experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual 12 allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there 13 are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 1951. 14 II. First Amended Complaint 15 In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff sues Defendants Institution Classification 16 Committee Chairperson K. Holland and CCI L. Prieto. The identity of the named defendants 17 is the only thing that is clear in the First Amended Complaint. Identification of the relevant 18 facts and interpretation of Plaintiff’s intended meaning in his rambling narrative is 19 substantially more difficult. Notwithstanding the Court’s explicit instruction that “Plaintiff 20 may allege only one claim per count” (Doc. #9 at 5), he asserts at least five different 21 claims—double jeopardy, due process, retaliation, equal protection, and cruel and unusual 22 punishment—scattered throughout his single-count, 74-paragraph First Amended Complaint. 23 Although the specific facts underlying Plaintiff’s claims are difficult to discern, it is 24 apparent that they involve his commitment to administrative segregation. Plaintiff alleges 25 that he was falsely accused of rules violations on six occasions, each of which resulted in 26 terms of confinement in administrative segregation: (1) on July 20, 2001, he was given a 12- 27 month minimum eligibility release date (“MERD”); (2) on October 10, 2001, he was given 28 a 4-month MERD; (3) on June 12, 2003, he was given a 9-month MERD; (4) on April 11, -2- 1 2003, he was given an 18-month MERD; (5) on May 6, 2003, he was given a 45-day MERD; 2 (6) on March 2, 2004, he was given a 18-month MERD. Plaintiff does not, however, allege 3 that either Defendant Holland or Defendant Prieto were involved in any of those disciplinary 4 events. 5 Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Holland and Prieto. The six disciplinary events are apparently presented only as background for 6 Plaintiff alleges that at a hearing held on August 14, 2009, Defendants Holland and 7 Prieto, acting as members of the Institution Classification Committee, classified Plaintiff for 8 an indeterminate term in administrative segregation. Although the claims are murky, 9 Plaintiff appears to contend that Defendants’ decision subjected him to double jeopardy 10 because the basis for his indeterminate classification included the incidents underlying his 11 prior disciplinary convictions. Plaintiff also makes conclusory claims that his classification 12 to administrative segregation was cruel and unusual punishment, violated his due process and 13 equal protection rights, and was retaliatory. The facts alleged by Plaintiff are insufficient to 14 give rise to a cognizable claim under any of these theories. 15 III. Failure to State a Claim 16 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts supporting that (1) the 17 conduct about which he complains was committed by a person acting under the color of state 18 law and (2) the conduct deprived him of a federal constitutional or statutory right. Wood v. 19 Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989). In addition, to state a valid constitutional 20 claim, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific injury as a result of the conduct of 21 a particular defendant, and he must allege an affirmative link between the injury and the 22 conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). 23 A. 24 The Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to a prison’s 25 administrative determination that disruptive conduct requires transfer to a higher security 26 facility. United States v. Brown, 59 F.3d 102, 105 (9th Cir. 1995) (“such sanctions can still 27 be explained solely as serving the government’s remedial purpose of maintaining institutional 28 order—they are designed to punish only insofar as such sanctions enable the government to Double Jeopardy -3- 1 fulfill its remedial goals”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegations concerning his excessive 2 confinement in administrative segregation do not state a claim under the Double Jeopardy 3 Clause. 4 B. 5 When prison officials classify a prisoner to even the harshest administrative 6 segregation unit, due process only requires notice to the prisoner of the charges against him 7 and a chance for the prisoner to present his views. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 225- 8 229 (2005); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 1986). Plaintiff does 9 not allege that he was not given notice and an opportunity to be heard before he was 10 classified to administrative segregation. In fact, Plaintiff affirmatively alleges that he was 11 given a hearing before Defendants Holland and Prieto at which he explained that he should 12 not be classified to administrative segregation because his prior “MERD had expired.” (Doc. 13 #12 at 4.) Because Plaintiff fails to allege that he was deprived of any constitutionally 14 required procedural protection, he has failed to state a cognizable due process claim. Due Process 15 C. 16 A plaintiff can establish an equal protection claim in one of two ways: (1) by showing 17 that a fundamental right is involved or that a defendant intentionally discriminated against 18 him on the basis of his membership in a suspect class, such as race, see Nordlinger v. Hahn, 19 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992); or (2) by showing that he is a member of an identifiable class, that he 20 was intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated, and that there was no 21 rational basis for the different treatment, see Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 22 564 (2000). Plaintiff does not allege either that a fundamental right is involved or that he is 23 a member of a suspect class. Nor does he allege that Defendants treated him differently from 24 similarly situated prisoners without a rational basis and based upon an impermissible motive. 25 Plaintiff alleges only that “both defendants acts are motivated by racial-classed [sic] based 26 invidious discriminatory animus.” (Doc. #12 at 7.) But Plaintiff offers no facts to support 27 this threadbare recital of the elements of an equal protection cause of action—he does not 28 even allege that his race is different than the race of the Defendants. In fact, Plaintiff alleges Equal Protection -4- 1 that the reason for his classification to administrative segregation was the conduct underlying 2 his six prior disciplinary offenses—not his race. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a 3 cognizable equal protection claim. 4 D. 5 To state a viable First Amendment retaliation claim, a prisoner must allege facts 6 supporting five elements: “(1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action 7 against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action 8 (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not 9 reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567- 10 68 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). “To prevail on a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show 11 that his protected conduct was ‘the “substantial” or “motivating” factor behind the 12 defendant’s conduct.’” Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 13 Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989)). Retaliation 14 Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants knew of, and acted classified him to 15 administrative segregation because of, his prior exercise of his First Amendment rights. 16 Plaintiff’s threadbare and conclusory assertion that Defendants Holland and Prieto retaliated 17 against him does not suffice to state a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim against 18 them. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1937. 19 E. 20 Classification of a prisoner to administrative segregation for an indeterminate term, 21 without more, does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 22 Amendment. See Toussaint v. Yockey, 722 F.2d 1490, 1494 n. 6 (9th Cir. 1984) (more than 23 the usual hardships associated with administrative segregation are required to state an Eighth 24 Amendment claim). Moreover, “prison officials have a legitimate penological interest in 25 administrative segregation, and they must be given wide-ranging deference in the adoption 26 and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal 27 order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 28 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotations omitted). Cruel and Unusual Punishment -5- 1 A prisoner can state a cruel and unusual punishment claim only by alleging sufficient 2 facts to support an inference that the defendants acted with “‘deliberate indifference’ to a 3 substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). The 4 Supreme Court has set out a two part test for deliberate indifference. “First, the alleged 5 constitutional deprivation must be, objectively, ‘sufficiently serious’” i.e., the official’s “act 6 or omission must result in the denial of ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” 7 Id. at 834 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 8 337, 347 (1981)). Second, the prison official must have a “sufficiently culpable state of 9 mind,” i.e., he must act with deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety. Farmer, 511 10 U.S. at 834. The Supreme Court has further defined this subjective test: “the official must 11 both be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of 12 serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. 13 In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff fails to set forth specific facts to support 14 a claim that Defendants Holland and Prieto were aware that their actions deprived Plaintiff 15 of “‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities’” or presented a serious risk of harm. 16 Plaintiff alleges that in administrative segregation he has been deprived of personal property, 17 prevented from working or gaining an education, denied contact visits, and provided with 18 only one hour of outdoor exercise per week. But he does not allege that Defendants Holland 19 and Prieto were responsible for these conditions or that they were subjectively aware of them. 20 In its prior Order, the Court warned Plaintiff that in his amended complaint he must allege 21 that he “suffered a specific injury as a result of specific conduct of a defendant and show an 22 affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant.” (Doc. #9 at 3.) 23 Plaintiff has not complied with that requirement. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state 24 a cognizable claim for violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. 25 IV. Motion to Amend 26 Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Amend (Doc. #13) seeking leave to amend his 27 complaint to add to his demand a claim for $1,000 compensatory damages and $2,000 28 punitive damages per day for every day he has spent in administrative segregation. Because -6- 1 Plaintiff does not seek leave to amend in order to allege additional facts in support of his 2 claims for relief, and because the Court has determined that he has failed to state any 3 cognizable claims for relief, his Motion to Amend will be denied. 4 V. Dismissal without Leave to Amend 5 As no claim remains, the Court will dismiss the First Amended Complaint and this 6 action. Leave to amend need not be given if a complaint as amended is subject to dismissal. 7 Moore v. Kayport Package Exp., Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989). The Court’s 8 discretion to deny or grant leave to amend is particularly broad where Plaintiff has previously 9 been permitted to amend his complaint. See Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v. United 10 States, 90 F.3d 351, 355 (9th Cir. 1996). Failure to cure deficiencies by previous 11 amendments is one of the factors to be considered in deciding whether justice requires 12 granting leave to amend. Moore, 885 F.2d at 538. The Court has reviewed the First 13 Amended Complaint and finds that further amendment of Plaintiff’s claims would be futile. 14 The Court will therefore dismiss the First Amended Complaint without leave to amend. 15 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 16 (1) That Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend (Doc. #13) is denied 17 (2) That the First Amended Complaint (Doc. #12) and this action are dismissed 18 for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), and the Clerk of Court must 19 enter judgment accordingly. 20 21 22 (3) That the Clerk of Court must make an entry on the docket stating that the dismissal for failure to state a claim may count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). DATED this 7th day of June, 2010. 23 24 25 26 27 28 -7-
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