(PC) McCoy v. Spidle et al, No. 1:2007cv00198 - Document 203 (E.D. Cal. 2011)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING in Part Defendants' 200 Motion to Sever Claims and Bifurcate Damages; ORDER for Telephonic Status Hearing for 3/8/2011 at 01:30 PM (Arizona Time) before Senior Judge Stephen M. McNamee signed by Senior Judge Stephen M. McNamee on 2/23/2011. (Sant Agata, S)
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(PC) McCoy v. Spidle et al Doc. 203 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 Davon E. McCoy, 11 12 13 Plaintiff, vs. R. Spidle, et al., 14 Defendants. 15 16 17 18 19 22 23 24 25 No. CV-07-198-SMM ORDER Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Sever Claims and Bifurcate Damages (Doc. 200.) Plaintiff has responded (Doc. 202) and Defendants did not file a reply. After consideration of the arguments advanced by the parties, the Court makes the following rulings.1 20 21 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) BACKGROUND On February 6, 2007, Plaintiff, who is currently confined at Salinas Valley State Prison, brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Defendants employed by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the “CDCR”). (Doc. 1.) As Defendants prevailed in part on a motion for summary judgment (Doc. 123 at 16), three claims remain: Plaintiff’s retaliation claim (Claim II) against Defendant M. Dangler (“Dangler”) and 26 27 28 1 Neither Defendants in their Motion to Sever Claims and Bifurcate Damages (Doc. 200) nor Plaintiff in his Response (Doc. 202) requested oral argument. The Court therefore finds the action suitable for decision without oral argument. See LRCiv 230(g). Dockets.Justia.com 1 Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims (Claims IV and V) against numerous Defendants. 2 (Doc. 1 at 11-12, 14-19.) Plaintiff also seeks punitive damages. (Doc. 1 at 23.) 3 Claim II – Retaliation 4 Plaintiff alleges that Dangler, an Inmate Appeals Coordinator, retaliated against him 5 for exercising his constitutional right to administratively appeal a disciplinary proceeding. 6 (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 36-42). Plaintiff, while a prisoner at High Desert State Prison, received a Rules 7 Violation Report (“RVR”) resulting in a disciplinary proceeding on June 15, 2005, in which 8 Plaintiff was found to have conspired to murder peace officers. (Doc. 1 ¶ 30; Doc. 123 at 3.) 9 At the conclusion of the disciplinary proceeding, Plaintiff was assessed 48 months at the 10 Secured Housing Unit (“SHU”) at California State Prison, Corcoran. (Doc. 1 ¶ 32; Doc. 123 11 at 3.) On July 17, 2005, Plaintiff filed an initial grievance appealing that disposition. (Doc. 12 1 ¶ 36; Doc. 123 at 3.) 13 On September 6, 2005, Plaintiff filed a second grievance against Dangler for 14 mishandling his initial grievance. (Doc. 1 ¶ 37; Doc. 123 at 3.) Plaintiff alleges this second 15 grievance led to an Internal Affairs Directive. (Doc. 1 ¶ 37; Doc. 123 at 3.) On January 25, 16 2006, the initial grievance related to the RVR was granted, the disciplinary proceeding was 17 dismissed, the 48 months in SHU was suspended, and Plaintiff was returned to general 18 population. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 38-39; Doc. 123 at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that in retaliation for the 19 second grievance filed against Dangler, Dangler “reassessed” Plaintiff’s assignment by 20 sending a memorandum on April 27, 2006, resulting in Plaintiff’s return to SHU. (Doc. 1 ¶ 21 40; Doc. 123 at 3.) Dangler contends that he was unaware of Plaintiff’s second grievance at 22 that time. (Doc. 100 at 23.) Dangler further asserts that his decision to return Plaintiff to SHU 23 was supported by legitimate penological grounds relating to evidence that Plaintiff had 24 conspired to murder peace officers, and that the decision was affirmed by the Institutional 25 Classification Committee on June 15, 2006. (Doc. 100 at 22-23, Doc. 123 at 3.) 26 27 28 -2- 1 Claims IV and V – Deliberate Indifference 2 Plaintiff suffers from a seizure disorder, which requires close observation and routine 3 seizure medication. (Doc. 142 at 10.) While at SHU, Plaintiff allegedly complained to a nurse 4 on June 5, 2006 that he was having a seizure and requested hospitalization. (Doc. 142 at 10.) 5 The nurse allegedly advised that Plaintiff was to be watched and referred to the yard nurse 6 in the morning. (Doc. 142 at 10.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants M. R. Garcia, B. Kee, I. 7 Rubalcaba, and S. Tomlin (“Defendant Prison Officials”) ignored his and other inmate’s 8 subsequent pleas for medical assistance, and that Plaintiff had a seizure, allegedly suffering 9 serious injury to his foot, head, and shoulders. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 48-54; Doc. 142 at 10.) It is 10 undisputed that Plaintiff had a seizure, fell, and dislocated his shoulder. (Doc. 142 at 10.) 11 After Plaintiff regained consciousness, Defendant Prison Officials allegedly ignored 12 repeated calls for help for more than an hour before summoning medical staff. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 55- 13 56; Doc. 123 at 4.) After Plaintiff’s seizure, Defendants K. Campos, C. Gonzales, Morales, 14 R. Poblete, C. Reyes, and D. Reynoso (“Defendant Prison Medical Officials”) allegedly 15 denied Plaintiff immediate emergency care but told Plaintiff he would be seen in sick call the 16 next day. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 58-74; Doc. 123 at 4.) The following day, on June 6, 2006, Plaintiff 17 allegedly received seizure medications but Defendant Prison Medical Officials allegedly did 18 not treat his shoulder injury. (Doc. 1 ¶ 68; Doc. 142 at 10.) On June 7, 2006, Plaintiff was 19 transferred to a hospital and scheduled for surgery, a procedure that was later cancelled. 20 (Doc. 142 at 10-11.) 21 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 22 On December 21, 2010, the Court issued a Pretrial Order in this case stating that 23 discovery is closed with the exception of expert discovery, which is to be completed by 24 February 28, 2011. (Doc. 198 at 1.) The parties’ proposed Pretrial Order shows that evidence 25 related to Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims will include testimony from ten 26 Defendants, exhibits related to Plaintiff’s medical record, and at least one medical expert; 27 while evidence related to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is more limited. (Doc. 187 at 4-9.) At 28 a January 11, 2011 status conference, the parties in this case estimated needing at least twelve -3- 1 full trial days. 2 On January 10, 2011, Defendants filed a Notice of Motion and Motion to Sever 3 Claims (Doc. 200), accompanied by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 4 Motion to Sever Claims and Bifurcate Damages (Doc. 200-1). First, Defendants argue for 5 severance of Plaintiff’s retaliation claim from his deliberate indifference claims on grounds 6 that the claims do not share common questions of fact or law or arise out of the same 7 transaction. (Doc. 200-1 at 1.) Defendants also state that the claims are against different 8 Defendants who worked at separate prisons. (Doc. 200-1 at 1.) Second, Defendants argue 9 that because Plaintiff is an inmate bringing claims against Defendants employed by CDCR, 10 the Court should bifurcate the punitive damages issue. (Doc. 200-1 at 1, 7.) 11 Plaintiff filed his Opposition to Motion to Sever Cases on February 11, 2011 (Doc. 12 202). First, Plaintiff contends that the Court should deny Defendants’ request for severance 13 on grounds that Defendants were properly joined and that judicial economy and fairness 14 favor one trial for Plaintiff’s claims. (Doc. 202 at 1, 4, 7.) Second, Plaintiff states that he does 15 not oppose Defendants’ request to bifurcate punitive damages issues. (Doc. 202 at 9.) 16 STANDARD OF REVIEW 17 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 permits a plaintiff to join multiple defendants if 18 a claim is asserted “arising out of the same transaction or occurrence” and if “any question 19 of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). 20 “Rule 20 is designed to promote judicial economy, and reduce inconvenience, delay, and 21 added expense.” Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir. 1997). The Ninth Circuit 22 has held that Rule 20 “is to be construed liberally in order to promote trial convenience and 23 to expedite final determination of disputes, thereby preventing multiple lawsuits.” League 24 to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 558 F.2d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 1977); see 25 also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966) (“Under the Rules, the 26 impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness 27 to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged.”) The interests 28 of Rule 20 are not served if “[e]ach claim raises potentially different issues, and must be -4- 1 viewed in a separate and individual light by the Court.” Coughlin, 130 F.3d at 1351. 2 In contrast to joinder, “[t]wo types of severances or separations of claims are 3 contemplated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-one within the action itself, the other 4 resulting in a second, or new action.” Acevedo-Garcia v. Monroig, 351 F.3d 547, 558 (1st 5 Cir. 2003) (quoting Official Comm. Unsecured Creditors v. Shapiro, 190 F.R.D. 352, 354 6 (E.D. Pa. 2000)). First, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) allows a court to issue “[a]n 7 order for a separate trial [which] keeps the lawsuit intact while enabling the court to hear and 8 decide one or more issues without trying all of the controverted issues at the same hearing.” 9 88 C.J.S. Trial § 17; see also 9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and 10 Procedure § 2387. A court has discretion to issue separate trials under Rule 42(b) “[f]or 11 convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b); Tuey 12 v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, 2009 WL 928328, at * 4 (E.D. Cal. April 6, 2009) (citing 13 Green v. Baca, 226 F.R.D. 624, 630 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“The issue of whether to bifurcate is 14 guided by consideration of several factors: (1) whether separation of the issues for trial will 15 expedite disposition of the action; (2) whether such separation will conserve trial time and 16 other judicial resources; (3) whether such separation will avoid prejudice; and (4) whether 17 the issues are essentially independent of each other so that there will be no need to duplicate 18 the presentation of significant areas of the evidence in the separated proceedings.”) When 19 ordering a separate trial, the court must preserve any federal right to a jury trial.” Fed. R. Civ. 20 P. 42(b). Second, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 20 and 21(b) allows a court to find that 21 a case should be “divided into two or more separate and independent or distinct causes.” 88 22 C.J.S. Trial § 17 (2010). The purpose of severance under Rules 20 and 21 is to avoid 23 prejudice to a party. See Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1296 (9th Cir. 2000). 24 25 26 27 28 -5- 1 DISCUSSION 2 I. Severance 3 A. Whether Plaintiff Meets the Permissive Joinder Requirements 4 Defendants claim that Plaintiff cannot meet the requirements for permissive joinder 5 because Plaintiff’s retaliation claim and deliberate indifference claims do not “aris[e] out of 6 the same transaction or occurrence” or have “any question of law or fact common to all 7 defendants.” (Doc. 200-1 at 4-6 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)).) Defendants contend that 8 Plaintiff’s claims address distinct factual and legal theories and that “[t]he circumstances out 9 of which Plaintiff’s [] claims arose against the Defendants in this case are vastly different in 10 essential respects,” including Defendants’ job descriptions, and the time period and locations 11 in which the alleged conduct occurred. (Doc. 200-1 at 4-5 (citing Saval v. BL Ltd., 710 F.2d 12 1027, 1031-32 (4th Cir. 1983); Harris v. Spellman, 150 F.R.D. 130 (N.D. Ill. 1993)).) 13 Plaintiff contends that the retaliation claim is logically and factually related to the deliberate 14 indifference claim because Plaintiff’s injuries “were caused or exacerbated by the fact that 15 he was wrongfully confined in SHU, and he was confined in SHU because Defendant 16 Dangler had him put there.” (Doc. 202 at 5-6.) 17 The Court finds that the Plaintiff has met the requirements for permissive joinder. 18 Plaintiff’s retaliation claim and deliberate indifference claims form a single “transaction” and 19 have a factual causal connection, as Plaintiff contends that his confinement in SHU as a 20 result of Dangler’s alleged retaliation is what led to the alleged deliberate indifference to his 21 medical needs. (Doc. 202 at 5-6.) The cases that Defendants cite in support of its severance 22 argument lack such an alleged causal connection. (Doc. 202 at 6. (citing Saval, 710 F.2d at 23 1031-32 (joinder of four plaintiffs’ warranty breach allegations relating to same defective car 24 and engine improper because different defects and service histories); Harris v. Spellman, 150 25 F.R.D. 130 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (joinder of two inmates’ claims challenging disciplinary 26 proceedings improper because facts and circumstances related to hearings differed). Further, 27 this case has been pending for more than four years, and the Court fails to see how the Rule 28 20 aim of “expedit[ing] final determination of disputes, thereby preventing multiple lawsuits” -6- 1 would be served if this case was severed now. League to Save Lake Tahoe, 558 F.2d at 917. 2 B. Whether Fairness or Judicial Economy Favor Severance or Separate Trials 3 Defendants argue that even if Plaintiff has met the requirements for permissive 4 joinder, the Court should sever the retaliation and deliberate indifference claims under either 5 Rule 20 or Rule 42 “because the potential confusion to the jury and prejudice to Defendants[] 6 offsets any possible benefits of a joint trial. (Doc. 200-1 at 5-6.) Defendants contend that a 7 joint trial on all cases would “require a jury to keep separate the two different claims that 8 occurred at two different institutions” and cause the retaliation claim to “be colored by 9 evidence concerning the unrelated claim of deliberate indifference . . . and vice versa.” (Doc. 10 200-1 at 5-6.) Plaintiff contends that the principles of “fairness and judicial economy” favor 11 a single trial on grounds that the three claims Plaintiff alleges are unlikely to confuse a jury. 12 (Doc. 202 at 7.) Plaintiff further asserts that the retaliation claim and deliberate indifference 13 claims are related, and thus should be adjudicated together. (Doc. 202 at 9.) 14 The Court finds that although severance of Plaintiff’s claims is inappropriate, 15 bifurcation of the retaliation and deliberate indifference claims will aid the interests of 16 judicial economy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42. At this late stage in the litigation, after discovery is 17 nearly completed and the Court has issued its Pretrial Order (Doc. 198), it would not serve 18 the interests of judicial economy or fairness to sever the claims in this case under Rule 20. 19 However, the Court will exercise its discretion under Rule 42(b) to order separate trials. Fed. 20 R. Civ. P. 42(b). First, the bifurcation of Plaintiff’s claims into separate trials will “expedite” 21 its disposition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). Litigation of the deliberate indifference claims is likely 22 to take more time at trial than the retaliation claim. See (Doc. 187 at 4-9.) Because the Court 23 must balance its caseload in the District of Arizona with this case in the Eastern District of 24 California, it would be hard-pressed in 2011 to find the nearly three weeks necessary for one 25 trial on all of Plaintiff’s claims. However, because the Court can likely schedule two shorter 26 trials in this matter for 2011, the aims of Rule 42 will be well-served by bifurcating this 27 matter. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42. Second, although the retaliation and deliberate indifference claims 28 are related, they are not so extrinsically linked that holding separate trials on these claims -7- 1 would prejudice Plaintiff or create excessive duplication of evidence. Separating the 2 retaliation claim from the deliberate indifference claims under Rule 42(b) allows the Court 3 to “keep[] the lawsuit intact while enabling the court to hear and decide one or more issues 4 without trying all of the controverted issues at the same hearing.” 88 C.J.S. Trial § 17; see 5 also 9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2387. 6 II. Bifurcation of Punitive Damages 7 Defendants further request that the Court exercise its discretion under Rule 42(b) to 8 separately try Plaintiff’s punitive damages claims. (Doc. 200-1 at 7.) Defendants argue that 9 bifurcation will “expedite and economize” this case, because if Defendants prevail, no 10 punitive damages trial will be needed, while if Plaintiff prevails, a settlement could occur. 11 (Doc. 200-1 at 7 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b)).) Defendants also argue that allowing 12 Plaintiff, a prisoner, access to Defendants’ personal and confidential information prior to a 13 determination of liability could “undermine their ability to effectively operate.” (Doc. 200-1 14 at 7.) Plaintiff states that he is not opposed to bifurcation of the punitive damages claim. 15 (Doc. 202 at 9.) Because Plaintiff does not oppose Defendants’ request to bifurcate the 16 liability and punitive damages stages of this proceedings, and because bifurcation may 17 expedite the matter by creating the possibility of settlement, the Court will grant Defendants’ 18 request. CONCLUSION 19 20 21 22 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED GRANTING Defendants’ Motion to Sever Claims & Bifurcate Damages only to the extent that: 1. This case will be bifurcated into two separate jury trials, with the first trial 23 addressing Plaintiff’s Retaliation Claim (Claim II), and the second trial 24 addressing Plaintiff’s Deliberate Indifference Claims (Claims IV and V). 25 2. 26 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court will set firm trial dates at a telephonic 27 status hearing before the Honorable Stephen M. McNamee on Tuesday, March 8, 2011 at 28 1:30 p.m. Arizona time. Plaintiff’s counsel shall initiate a conference call and secure all The Court will bifurcate the liability and punitive damages stages of this case. -8- 1 participants on the line before telephoning Judge McNamee’s chambers at (602) 322-7555, 2 no later than 1:25 p.m. Arizona time, on March 8, 2011. 3 DATED this 23rd day of February, 2011. 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -9-
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