Margaret Meehan v. Michael J Astrue, No. 8:2011cv01310 - Document 20 (C.D. Cal. 2012)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal; IT IS ORDERED that judgment be entered REVERSING the decision of the Commissioner and REMANDING this matter for further proceedings consistent with this decision. See order for details. (jy)

Download PDF

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MARGARET MEEHAN, 12 Plaintiff, 13 14 15 v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, 16 Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) NO. SACV 11-01310 (SS) MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 17 18 I. 19 INTRODUCTION 20 21 Margaret Meehan ( Plaintiff ) brings this action seeking to reverse 22 the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration 23 (the Commissioner 24 Disability Insurance Benefits ( DIB ) and Supplemental Security Income 25 ( SSI ) benefits. 26 636(c), to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate 27 Judge. 28 REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings. or the Agency ) denying her application for The parties consented, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § For the reasons stated below, the decision of the Agency is 1 2 II. 3 PROCEDURAL HISTORY 4 5 Asserting that she became disabled on June 1, 2007, Plaintiff filed 6 an application for Title II DIB on October 3, 2008 and an application 7 for Title XVI SSI on November 4, 2008. (Administrative Record ( AR ) 8 139-144). 9 3, 2009 and on reconsideration on August 6, 2009. The Agency denied Plaintiff s initial applications on March (AR 69, 79). 10 Plaintiff then requested a hearing, which was held before Administrative 11 Law Judge Helen E. Heese (the ALJ ) on November 15, 2010. (AR 16). 12 Plaintiff appeared with counsel and testified at the hearing. (AR 41). 13 A vocational expert and a non-examining medical expert also testified 14 at the hearing. (AR 58-60, 49-52). 15 a decision denying benefits. 16 before the Appeals Council, (AR 11), which denied Plaintiff s request 17 on July 25, 2011. (AR 1-3). On September 2, 2011, Plaintiff filed the 18 instant action. On December 3, 2010, the ALJ issued (AR 13-24). Plaintiff sought review 19 20 III. 21 THE FIVE-STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS 22 23 To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must demonstrate a 24 medically determinable physical or mental impairment that not only 25 prevents engagement in substantial gainful activity, defined by 20 26 C.F.R. § 416.910 as for-profit work involving significant and productive 27 physical or mental duties, but that is expected to either last for a 28 continuous period of at least twelve months or result in death. 2 See 1 Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 721 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing 42 U.S.C. 2 § 423(d)(1)(A)); see also Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th 3 Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)) (noting that the impairment 4 must 5 performed work or any other substantial gainful employment that exists 6 in the national economy. ). 7 claimant is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. 8 Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098. render the claimant incapable of performing his previously Unless those two requirements are met, a 9 10 11 To decide if a claimant is entitled to benefits, an ALJ conducts a five-step inquiry. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. The steps are: 12 13 (1) Is the claimant presently engaged in substantial gainful 14 activity? 15 If not, proceed to step two. 16 (2) Is the If so, the claimant is found not disabled. claimant s impairment 17 claimant is found not disabled. 18 severe? If not, the three. 19 (3) Does the claimant s If so, proceed to step impairment meet or equal the 20 requirements of any impairment listed at 20 C.F.R. Part 21 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1? 22 found disabled. 23 (4) If so, the claimant is If not, proceed to step four. Is the claimant capable of performing his past work? 24 so, the claimant is found not disabled. 25 If to step five. 26 (5) If not, proceed Is the claimant able to do any other work? 27 claimant is found disabled. 28 found not disabled. 3 If not, the If so, the claimant is 1 Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098-99; see also Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 2 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2001); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b)-(g)(1). 3 4 The claimant has the burden of proof at steps one through four, and 5 the Commissioner has the burden of proof at step five. 6 F.3d at 953-54. 7 establishing an inability to perform the past work, the Commissioner 8 must show that the claimant can perform some other work that exists in 9 significant numbers in the national economy, taking into account the 10 claimant s residual functional capacity ( RFC ),1 age, education and 11 work experience. 12 The Commissioner may do so by the testimony of a vocational expert or 13 by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines appearing in 20 C.F.R. 14 Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2 (commonly known as the Grids ). 15 Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001). 16 claimant 17 limitations, the Grids are inapplicable and the ALJ must take the 18 testimony of a vocational expert. 19 (9th Cir. 2000). has Bustamante, 262 If, at step four, the claimant meets his burden of Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1100; 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g)(1). both exertional (strength-related) and When a nonexertional Moore v. Apfel, 216 F.3d 864, 869 20 21 IV. 22 THE ALJ S DECISION 23 24 The ALJ employed the five-step sequential evaluation process and 25 concluded, at step one, that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial 26 gainful employment since June 1, 2007. 27 (AR 18). At step two, the ALJ 1 Residual functional capacity is the most [one] can still do despite [his] limitations and represents an assessment based on all 28 the relevant evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a). 4 1 found that Plaintiff had severe impairments of fibromyalgia 2 degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine. 3 explained that Plaintiff s conditions of fibromyaldia and degenerative 4 disc disease have caused [Plaintiff] more than minimal limitations in 5 her ability to perform work related activity and are therefore severe 6 as defined by Social Security Regulations. (Id.). 7 that Plaintiff s mental impairment of depression . . . does not cause 8 more than minimal limitation in her ability to perform basic mental work 9 activities and is therefore nonsevere. (Id.). (Id.). and The ALJ The ALJ determined 10 11 At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an 12 impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals 13 one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 14 1. (AR 20). 15 residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 16 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except that she must be able to change 17 positions briefly throughout the day, for 1-3 minutes per hour. 18 20). 19 relevant work as a loan officer. 20 Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work with restrictions and that 21 Plaintiff s 22 performance of work-related activities precluded by the claimant s 23 [RFC]. Accordingly, the ALJ did not proceed to step five and instead 24 found that Plaintiff was not under a disability within the meaning of 25 the Social Security Act. 26 \\ 27 \\ 28 \\ At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the (AR The ALJ found that Plaintiff is capable of performing her past past work as a (AR 24). loan officer (AR 16, 24). 5 The ALJ reasoned that does not require the 1 V. 2 STANDARD OF REVIEW 3 4 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the 5 Commissioner s decision to deny benefits. The court may set aside the 6 Commissioner s decision when the ALJ s findings are based on legal error 7 or are not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 8 Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001); Smolen v. 9 Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). 10 11 Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a 12 preponderance. 13 which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a 14 conclusion. 15 a finding, the court must consider the record as a whole, weighing 16 both 17 [Commissioner s] conclusion. Aukland, 257 F.3d at 1035 (quoting Penny 18 v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1993)). 19 reasonably support either affirming or reversing that conclusion, the 20 court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. 21 Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720-21. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720. Id. evidence It is relevant evidence To determine whether substantial evidence supports that supports and evidence that detracts from the If the evidence can 22 23 VI. 24 DISCUSSION 25 26 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred for two reasons: (1) the ALJ 27 did 28 Plaintiff s not provide specific credibility and and convincing subjective 6 reasons complaints, for rejecting (Memorandum in 1 Support of Plaintiff s Complaint ( Complaint Memo. ) at 6); and (2) the 2 ALJ failed to give specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting the 3 opinion of Plaintiff s treating physician. (Id.). 4 5 The Court agrees with Plaintiff s two grounds for remand. For the 6 reasons discussed below, the Court finds that the ALJ s decision should 7 be reversed and this action remanded for further proceedings. 8 9 10 A. The ALJ Failed To Provide Clear And Convincing Reasons For Rejecting Plaintiff s Subjective Complaints 11 12 Plaintiff s first claim is that the ALJ erred by failing to 13 articulate clear and convincing reasons for rejecting her subjective 14 complaints. 15 that the ALJ erred in demanding objective evidence regarding Plaintiff s 16 subjective symptoms of pain and fatigue arising from fibromyalgia. 17 (Complaint Memo. at 8). 18 discounted the treating physician s evaluation of Plaintiff because it 19 was based largely on Plaintiff s subjective complaints. (Plaintiff s 20 Reply to Memorandum in Support of Defendant s Answer ( Reply ) at 3). 21 For the reasons discussed below, the Court agrees with Plaintiff's 22 contentions. (Complaint Memo. at 6). Specifically, Plaintiff contends Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly 23 24 The Court notes that an ALJ may reject a plaintiff s testimony upon 25 an explicit credibility finding that is supported by a specific, cogent 26 reason for the disbelief. Rashad v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th 27 Cir. 1990) (internal citations omitted). 28 evidence showing that the plaintiff is malingering, the ALJ s reasons 7 Unless there is affirmative 1 for rejecting the plaintiff s testimony must be clear and convincing. 2 Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995). 3 4 The record provides no affirmative evidence showing that Plaintiff 5 was malingering. 6 truthful. Dr. Sami Nafoosi, a non-examining medical expert, testified 7 before the ALJ that he found no indication, based on either Plaintiff s 8 testimony or medical records, that Plaintiff was a malingerer. (AR 57). 9 Similarly, the State s examining psychiatrist, Dr. Romualdo Rodriguez, that Instead, the record suggests that Plaintiff was 10 concluded Plaintiff 11 examination. 12 that Plaintiff was malingering, the ALJ was required to provide clear 13 and convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff s testimony. 14 reasons were provided. (AR 343-44). appeared genuine and truthful during Given the absence of affirmative evidence No such 15 16 The ALJ explained that objective medical evidence did not support 17 Plaintiff s allegations of work-related limitations. 18 reached this conclusion by relying on examinations performed by the 19 State s 20 rheumatologist, Dr. Javid Ahmed. (AR 21-22). Upon examining Plaintiff, 21 Dr. Moazzaz concluded that she had a normal gait and full, pain-free 22 range of motion in the neck, elbow, forearm, wrists, fingers, knees, 23 ankles, and feet. 24 Plaintiff could not only lift and carry 50 pounds occasionally and 25 25 pounds frequently but also sit, stand and walk six hours out of an eight 26 hour workday. 27 that Plaintiff had normal range of motion of all joints [and] no 28 synovitis or effusion [on all joints]. examining physician, Dr. (AR 276-77). (AR 279). Payam Moazzaz, (AR 22). and The ALJ Plaintiff s Dr. Moazzaz further concluded that Dr. Ahmed s examination similarly revealed 8 (AR 22, 327). 1 These findings, however, are not inconsistent with Plaintiff s 2 complaint of fibromyalgia and do not amount to a clear and convincing 3 reason for rejecting Plaintiff s substantive pain complaints. The Ninth 4 Circuit has recognized that objective findings do not establish the 5 presence or absence of fibromyalgia. 6 Welfare Plan, 370 F.3d 869, 872 (9th Cir. 2004) (overruled on other 7 grounds by Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 963 (9th 8 Cir. 2006)). Jordan v. Northrop Grumman Corp. As stated in Jordan: 9 10 [F]ibromyalgia s cause or causes are unknown, there is no 11 cure, and, of greatest importance to disability law, its 12 symptoms are entirely subjective. 13 tests for the presence or severity of fibromyalgia. There are no laboratory 14 15 Id.; see also Green-Young v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 108-09 (2d Cir. 16 2003) (explaining that physical examinations for fibrositis patients 17 will usually yield normal results-a full range of motion, no joint 18 swelling, normal muscle strength and neurological reactions). 19 20 Here, Plaintiff provides ample evidence that she suffers from 21 fibromyalgia. Dr. Ahmed diagnosed Plaintiff 22 associated with irritable bowel syndrome, hypothyroidism, osteoarthritis 23 of the first CMC joint and depression. 24 Plaintiff had multiple tissue tender and trigger points and tenderness 25 in the right first CMC joint , (Id.), and concluded that Plaintiff s 26 condition satisfied the American College of Rheumatology criteria for 27 fibromyalgia. (AR 308). (AR 327-28). with fibromyalgia He explained that Further, Plaintiff s complaint of disabling 28 9 1 pain, extreme fatigue and disturbed sleep are consistent with the 2 symptoms of fibromyalgia. See Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 306 (7th 3 Cir. 1996) (observing that the principle symptoms of fibromyalgia are 4 pain all over, fatigue, disturbed sleep, and multiple tender spots). 5 Nearly two years of medical records obtained from Plaintiff s treating 6 physician, 7 persistent joint pain and fatigue. 8 402, 407). Dr. Daniel Strub, show that Plaintiff suffered from (AR 329, 378, 381, 384, 389, 399, 9 10 The Ninth Circuit has recognized that objective findings are not 11 dispositive with respect to whether a person does or does not suffer 12 from fibroyalgia. 13 ALJ erred in rejecting Plaintiff s subjective symptoms as inconsistent 14 with the objective medical evidence. 15 341, 346-47 (9th Cir. 1991). Jordan, 370 F.3d at 872 (9th Cir. 2004). Thus, the See Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 16 17 Further, because Plaintiff s subjective statements of depression 18 were consistent with her medical records, the ALJ erred in rejecting 19 Plaintiff's assertion that she suffered from depression. 20 reasoned that Plaintiff did not allege any depression symptoms in her 21 application of benefits, only recently sought formal treatment for this 22 disorder, and [provided] no indication that her symptoms . . . will 23 persist for one year. (AR 22). Although Plaintiff did not mention any 24 depression symptoms in her initial application, the disability report 25 filed with Plaintiff s appeal lists depression as one reason for seeking 26 treatment 27 consistently noted that Plaintiff s symptoms were consistent with from Dr. Strub. (AR 28 10 185-86). Moreover, The ALJ Dr. Strub 1 depression. 2 399, 402, 407). 3 depression was progressing and referred Plaintiff to a psychiatrist, (AR 4 387, 404), who noted that Plaintiff presented with at least a 3 year 5 history of mood swings and depression, exacerbated by difficulty with 6 fibromyalgia. 7 noted that Plaintiff had at least a three-year history of depression and 8 had been taking Celexa, an antidepressant, for eight years. 9 Dr. Dey (AR 22, 282, 329, 364, 367, 370, 375, 378, 381, 384, 389, On several occasions, Dr. Strub noted that Plaintiff s (AR 410). That psychiatrist, Dr. Samuel Dey, further advised Plaintiff (AR 410-11). continue taking Celexa and (AR 410). consider 10 psychotherapy. The ALJ failed to provide a clear and 11 convincing basis for rejecting Plaintiff s testimony that she was 12 depressed. 13 14 The ALJ also failed to offer a clear and convincing basis for 15 denying Plaintiff s claim that daily headaches contributed to her 16 alleged disability. 17 history of headaches , 18 384, 389, 399, 402, 407), Dr. Ahmed s notes indicate that Plaintiff 19 suffered from headaches once or twice a week. 20 inconsistency is not a sufficiently clear and convincing reason to 21 reject Plaintiff s claim. Although Dr. Strub s treatment notes report no (AR 22, 282, 329, 364, 367, 370, 375, 378, 381, (AR 326). This single 22 23 The ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons, supported 24 by the record, to reject Plaintiff s testimony. 25 required and full credit must be given to Plaintiff s testimony. 26 \\ 27 \\ 28 11 Accordingly, remand is 1 2 B. The ALJ Failed To Provide Specific And Legitimate Reason To Reject The Treating Physician s Opinions 3 4 Plaintiff s second claim is that the ALJ failed to properly 5 consider the opinions of her treating physician, Dr. Strub. (Complaint 6 Memo. at 10). 7 relied on the opinions of one-time examining physicians hired by the 8 Social Security Administration, namely, Dr. Moazzaz, D. Rodriguez, and 9 Dr. Nafoosi. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly (Id.). Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ improperly 10 disregarded Dr. Strub s opinion regarding her physical and mental 11 limitations. (Id.). The Court agrees. 12 13 The opinions of treating physicians are entitled to special weight 14 because the treating physician is hired to cure and has a better 15 opportunity 16 Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). 17 treating physician s opinion is not contradicted by another doctor, it 18 may be rejected only for clear and convincing reasons. 19 F.3d at 830. 20 contradicted by another doctor, an ALJ may not reject the treating 21 physician s opinion without providing specific, legitimate reasons, 22 supported by substantial evidence in the record. to know and observe the claimant as an individual. Where a Lester, 81 Further, even where a treating physician s opinion is Id. 23 24 Here, because Dr. Strub s opinions are arguably contradicted by 25 other doctors, the ALJ must provide specific and legitimate reasons 26 to reject Dr. Strub s opinions. 27 found that Dr. Strub s diagnosis was inconsistent with those of Dr. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. 28 12 The ALJ 1 Ahmed, Dr. Moazzaz and Dr. Nafoosi. 2 Dr. Ahmed's findings, there was no substantive inconsistency. Dr. Strub 3 referred Plaintiff to Dr. Ahmed for possible early lupus or a collagen 4 connective tissue disease. (AR 326). 5 lupus 6 fibromyalgia, associated with irritable bowel syndrome, hypothyroidism, 7 osteoarthritis of the first CMC joint and depression. 8 subsequent examinations, Dr. Strub consistently stated that Plaintiff 9 presented with fibromyalgia, irritable bowel syndrome, hypothyroidism erythematosus at this time (AR 23). However, at least as to Dr. Ahmed ruled out systemic and diagnosed Plaintiff (AR 327). (AR 330, 379, 382, 385, 387, 390, 400, 403, 408). with In 10 and depression. Dr. 11 Ahmed s diagnosis does not conflict with Dr. Strub s assessment of 12 Plaintiff s physical RFC. 13 14 The ALJ was correct that Dr. Strub s conclusions about Plaintiff s 15 work-related limitations differ from those of Dr. Moazzaz and Dr. 16 Nafoosi, but the ALJ erred in failing to provide specific and legitimate 17 reasons to reject Dr. Strub s conclusions in favor of those of Dr. 18 Moazzaz and Dr. Nafoosi. 19 determined that pain and fatigue would prevent her from maintaining 20 continuous employment in any job. 21 Plaintiff could sit, stand or walk for no more than two hours in a 22 eight-hour day. 23 Plaintiff could sit, stand and walk six hours out of an eight hour 24 workday. 25 for eight hours of an eight-hour day and stand and walk for six hours 26 of an eight-hour day. (Id.). Based on examinations of Plaintiff, Dr. Strub (AR 325). (AR 324). Dr. Strub explained that In contrast, Dr. Moazzaz concluded that Dr. Nafoosi also concluded that Plaintiff could sit (AR 51). 27 28 13 1 The Court notes, however, that Dr. Strub treated Plaintiff for two 2 years, while Dr. Moazzaz conducted a single examination of Plaintiff and 3 Dr. Nafoosi did not examine Plaintiff at all. 4 physician, Dr. Strub is presumed to be in a better position to assess 5 Plaintiff s functional limitations. 6 In order to overcome this presumption, the ALJ must provide specific and 7 legitimate reasons to adopt Dr. Moazzaz and Dr. Nafoosi s opinions over 8 Dr. Strub s opinion. As Plaintiff s treating See Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. 9 10 Here, the ALJ did not provide a sufficiently specific or legitimate 11 reason for her rejection of Dr. Strub s medical opinions. The ALJ found 12 that Dr. Strub s opinion on limitations appears to be based entirely 13 on 14 radiological studies or laboratory reports. 15 treating physician s diagnoses should not be discounted merely because 16 they are based on the patient-plaintiff s subjective complaints. 17 Morgan v. Comm r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 602 (9th Cir. 1999). 18 Further, 19 radiological studies or laboratory reports to demonstrate the severity 20 of fibromyalgia. 21 that fibromyalgia is a disabling impairment that lacks objective tests 22 to conclusively confirm the disease. See e.g., Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 23 F.3d 587, 594 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the ALJ erred by requiring 24 objective evidence for a disease that eludes such measurement); Green- 25 Young, 335 F.3d at 108. 26 is not a legitimate ground to reject Dr. Strub's opinions. the claimant s the ALJ subjective erred in (See AR 23). complaints demanding and are unsupported (AR 23). objective by However, a evidence such See as As noted above, courts have recognized Accordingly, the absence of objective findings 27 28 14 1 The ALJ also erred in discounting Dr. Strub s medical opinions 2 merely because his treatment notes allegedly failed to either indicate 3 that Plaintiff had complained of disabling pain or was referred to a 4 pain management specialist. 5 the record. Dr. Strub s treatment notes recorded Plaintiff s complaints 6 of severe joint pain throughout the treatment period. 7 30, 364-65, 367-68, 370-71, 375-76, 378-79, 381-82, 384-85, 389-90, 399- 8 400, 402-03, 407-08). 9 Plaintiff to a pain (AR 23). This reason is contradicted aby (AR 282-86, 329- Moreover, although Dr. Strub did not refer management specialist, Dr. Strub prescribed 10 Plaintiff pain medication including Tramadol, Norco and Vicodin. (AR 11 330, 379, 382, 385, 387, 390, 400, 403, 408). 12 refer Plaintiff to a pain management specialist was not a specific and 13 legitimate reason to reject his opinions. Dr. Strub s failure to 14 15 In sum, because the ALJ failed to provide specific and legitimate 16 reasons for rejecting the treating physician s opinions, the case must 17 be remanded. 18 additional proceedings could remedy defects in the Commissioner s 19 decision. 20 Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1497 (9th Cir. 1984). Remand for further proceedings is appropriate where See Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 2000); 21 22 Here, if the treating physician s opinions as well as Plaintiff s 23 testimony are fully credited, Plaintiff must be found disabled. But 24 there is an outstanding issue of whether Plaintiff was disabled as early 25 as June 1, 2007. 26 Plaintiff alleged disability beginning from June 1, 2007, Plaintiff did 27 not seek treatment from Dr. Strub until November or December of 2008. 28 (AR 52, 160, 296). As Dr. Nafoosi pointed out at the hearing, although Dr. Nafoosi noted that there was no medically 15 1 determinable severe condition prior to January 1, 2009. (AR 52). Thus 2 remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation, to 3 determine when Plaintiff's disability began, is more appropriate in this 4 case. 5 6 VII. 7 CONCLUSION 8 9 Consistent with the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that judgment be 10 entered REVERSING the decision of the Commissioner and REMANDING this 11 matter for further proceedings consistent with this decision. 12 FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court serve copies of this 13 Order and the Judgment on counsel for both parties. IT IS 14 15 DATED: August 30, 2012 16 17 18 19 ______/S/____________________ SUZANNE H. SEGAL UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 16

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.