Andre Lawrence v. John McMahon et al, No. 5:2014cv01331 - Document 10 (C.D. Cal. 2014)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal. If Plaintiff still wishes to pursue this action, he is granted thirty (30) days from the date of this Memorandum and Order with in which to file a Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiff is strongly encouraged to utilize the standard civil rights complaint form when filing any amended complaint, a copy of which is attached. Plaintiff is further advised that if he no longer wishes to pursue this action, he may voluntarily dismiss it by filing a Notice of Dismissal in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1). A form Notice of Dismissal is attached for Plaintiff's convenience. (See document for further details). (Attachments: # 1 Civil Rights Complaint Form, # 2 Notice of Dismissal Form) (mr)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ANDRE LAWRENCE, Plaintiff, 12 v. 13 14 Case No. EDCV 14-1331 DMG (SS) JOHN MCMAHON, et al., Defendants. 15 MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 16 17 I. 18 INTRODUCTION 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 On June 28, 2014, Andre Lawrence ( Plaintiff ), a pretrial detainee proceeding pro se, constructively filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. No. 3). On August 8, 2014, the Court dismissed the Complaint with leave to amend due to certain pleading defects.1 (Dkt. No. 7). The Court received Plaintiff s First Amended Complaint ( FAC ) on August 26 27 28 1 Magistrate judges may dismiss a complaint with leave to amend without approval of the district judge. See McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 795 (9th Cir. 1991). 1 27, 2014.2 2 but not all, of the pleading defects previously identified by the 3 Court, the FAC is dismissed, with leave to amend. (Dkt. No. 9). Because Plaintiff has cured only some, 4 5 Congress mandates that district courts perform an initial 6 screening of complaints in civil actions where a prisoner seeks 7 redress 8 § 1915A(a). 9 portions thereof, before service of process if it concludes that 10 the complaint (1) is frivolous or malicious, (2) fails to state a 11 claim upon which relief can be granted, or (3) seeks monetary 12 relief 13 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1-2); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 14 1122, 1126-27 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). from a governmental entity or employee. 28 U.S.C. This Court may dismiss such a complaint, or any from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 15 16 II. 17 ALLEGATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 18 19 The FAC names as defendants three employees of the San 20 Bernardino County Sheriff s Department, the latter two of whom 21 worked during the relevant period at the West Valley Detention 22 Center 23 Bernardino 24 Reverend Scraggs (collectively, Defendants ). 25 2 26 ( WVDC ), County where Plaintiff Sheriff John is currently McMahon, housed: Deputy Jones, San and (FAC at 1, 3).3 The Court notes that although the Court filed the FAC on August 27, 2014, the signature block indicates that Plaintiff signed the FAC on August 28, 2014. (See FAC at 6). 27 3 28 The Court will cite to the FAC as though it were consecutively paginated. 2 1 Plaintiff 2 official capacities. sues all Defendants in both their individual and practice[s] the (Id. at 3). 3 4 Although Plaintiff is not Jewish, he 5 Jewish faith. (Id. at 4). 6 a kosher diet. (Id.). 7 questioning Plaintiff about his faith, informed Plaintiff that 8 despite 9 receive a kosher diet because the prison does not have a resident 10 rabbi and it would take at least two weeks to contact a synagogue 11 to see if Plaintiff is on a list so that his request for a 12 kosher diet could be approved. (Id.). 13 never got back to Plaintiff. (Id.). the apparent On May 23, 2014, Plaintiff requested On May 29, 2014, Reverend Scraggs, after sincerity of his beliefs, he could not However, Reverend Scraggs 14 15 Plaintiff immediately filed a grievance. Jones answered the grievance after On May 30, 2014, 16 Deputy verbally informing 17 Plaintiff that his request would be deemed unfounded. 18 Deputy Jones also stated that per his supervisor, Plaintiff s 19 request was a dead issue and there were no further levels of 20 appeal. (Id.). (Id.). 21 22 The FAC s allegations concerning Sheriff McMahon are faded 23 to the point of near illegibility. 24 the Sheriff is in charge of all of his deputies and the staff at 25 the WVDC. (Id. at 5). 26 Sheriff responsible 27 policies of the facilities under his supervision. is However, Plaintiff notes that As such, Plaintiff contends that the for his 28 3 subordinates actions and (Id. at 5). the 1 Although the FAC is not entirely clear, Plaintiff appears to 2 raise three claims, one against each Defendant. 3 alleges 4 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act, 42 U.S.C. 5 §§ 2000cc et seq. ( RLUIPA ), by unjustifiably denying [him] a 6 kosher diet. 7 that Deputy Jones violated his due process rights by denying him 8 a fair and impartial investigation of [his] grievance. 9 Third, that Reverend Scraggs (FAC at 3). Plaintiff and claims violated First, Plaintiff his rights under the Second, Plaintiff appears to argue that executor Sheriff of (Id.). McMahon, Defendants policy, WVDC as is ultimately 10 supervisor 11 responsible for the failure of his administration and staff to 12 conduct a fair grievance investigations [sic]. (Id.). 13 14 Plaintiff prays for injunctive relief, but not damages. 15 Plaintiff seeks an order requiring the WVDC to provide him a 16 kosher diet and to employ a rabbi. 17 demands 18 administration 19 grievance system. that WVDC in change regards the to (See id. at 6). actions blocking of the its He also staff processes of and the (Id.). 20 21 III. 22 DISCUSSION 23 24 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), the Court must dismiss the FAC 25 due to defects in pleading. 26 cases, however, must be given leave to amend their complaints 27 unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies cannot be 28 cured by amendment. See Pro se litigants in civil rights Lopez, 4 203 F.3d at 1128-29. 1 Accordingly, 2 indicated below. the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend, as 3 4 A. 5 Plaintiff Fails To State A Claim Based On The Screening And Investigation Of His Grievances 6 7 Plaintiff contends that Deputy Jones violated his rights by 8 denying him a fair and impartial investigation of his grievance. 9 (FAC at 3). Plaintiff further argues that Sheriff McMahon, as 10 Deputy Jones s superior, 11 grievance 12 explained, however, claims that a defendant improperly screened 13 or 14 violation of constitutional rights. policy. investigated is responsible (Id.). As grievances, the standing for this Court alone, has do improper previously not state a 15 16 A prisoner must exhaust his administrative remedies before 17 filing a lawsuit concerning 18 Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 821 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 19 1997e(a)). 20 procedure 21 under the Due Process Clause. 22 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996) ( With respect to the Due 23 Process 24 procedural right, not substantive one. 25 inmate 26 interest 27 omitted); Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1350 (11th Cir. 2005) 28 ( State-created However, does not Clause, grievance the create any right procedures protected by the procedural prison conditions. existence any of a substantive Sapp prison rights v. grievance enforceable See, e.g., Antonelli v. Sheahan, to do Due a not that procedure is a Accordingly, a state s give Process rights 5 grievance rise to Clause. ) do not a liberty (citations guarantee a 1 particular 2 Fourteenth 3 mandatory. ) (internal quotation marks omitted). substantive Amendment, outcome even are where not such protected procedural by rights the are 4 5 Consequently, an inmate does not have a right to any 6 particular grievance procedure or result. 7 Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) ( [I]nmates lack a 8 separate 9 grievance procedure. ) (citing Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 10 (9th Cir. 1988)); Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 374 (5th Cir. 11 2005) (an inmate does not have a federally protected liberty 12 interest 13 satisfaction. ). 14 properly process a grievance, without more, is insufficient to 15 establish liability under section 1983. 16 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993). constitutional in having . As entitlement . such, See, e.g., Ramirez v. to a . grievances a prison specific resolved official s prison to failure his to See Buckey v. Barlow, 17 18 Plaintiff s claims against Deputy Jones and Sheriff McMahon 19 are based entirely on the processing of Plaintiff s grievance. 20 However, Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to any 21 particular grievance 22 Court previously 23 Deputy Jones and Sheriff McMahon based on the handling of his 24 grievance must be dismissed. 25 amended complaint, he should omit claims for which he has no 26 legal or factual basis. 27 \\ 28 \\ has process or result. instructed, Accordingly, Plaintiff s claims as the against Plaintiff is cautioned that in any 6 1 B. There Is No Vicarious Liability In Section 1983 Cases 2 3 Plaintiff appears to allege that Sheriff McMahon is liable 4 only because as the head of the Sheriff s Department, he is 5 vicariously 6 implemented by his subordinates. 7 Plaintiff 8 liability under section 1983. 9 held liable simply because a subordinate violated plaintiff s responsible is once again for any advised As acts committed or policies (See FAC at 3). that such, there a is However, no supervisor vicarious cannot be 10 rights. Therefore, even if Plaintiff were able to assert a 11 cognizable claim again Deputy Jones, Sheriff McMahon would not be 12 liable merely because he is Deputy Jones s superior. 13 14 To demonstrate a civil rights violation against government 15 officials, 16 participation or some sufficient causal connection between the 17 official s conduct and the alleged constitutional violation. 18 Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 2011). 19 held liable, a supervising officer has to personally take some 20 action against the plaintiff or set in motion a series of acts 21 by others . . . which he knew or reasonably should have known, 22 would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury on the 23 plaintiff. 24 Cir. 1991) (internal quotations omitted). 25 has explained, [s]upervisory liability [may be] imposed against 26 a supervisory official in his individual capacity [only] for his 27 own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or 28 control of a plaintiff must show either direct, personal See To be Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th his subordinates, for 7 his As the Ninth Circuit acquiescence in the 1 constitutional deprivations of which the complaint is made, or 2 for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the 3 rights 4 Trustees, 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007). of others. Preschooler II v. Clark County Bd. Of 5 6 Whether or not Deputy Jones caused Plaintiff a harm 7 cognizable under section 1983, Sheriff McMahon would be liable 8 only if he either personally participated in the violation or 9 committed some act as a supervisor that 10 constitutional 11 Sheriff McMahon violated his rights by inadequately supervising 12 his administration and staff. 13 does not state what specifically was inadequate about Sheriff 14 McMahon s supervision that led directly to the harm alleged. 15 state any sort of claim against Sheriff McMahon (or any other 16 Defendant), Plaintiff must allege specific facts showing what he 17 personally did or did not do, when and where, and how his action 18 or 19 rights. 20 amend. 21 advised that the Court will recommend dismissal of these claims 22 with prejudice and without leave to amend. inaction violation. directly caused Plaintiff directly led to the generically (FAC at 3). a violation of alleges that However, Plaintiff Plaintiff s To civil Accordingly, the FAC must be dismissed, with leave to If Plaintiff fails to correct this defect, Plaintiff is 23 24 25 C. The FAC Fails To State A Claim Against Deputy Jones And Sheriff McMahon In Their Official Capacity 26 27 Similarly, even if the improper screening or investigation 28 of a grievance could form the basis of a claim under section 8 1 1983, which it cannot, the FAC would still fail to state a claim 2 against 3 capacities.4 4 capacity seek[s] to impose personal liability upon a government 5 official for actions he takes under color of state law . . . . 6 Official-capacity suits, in contrast, generally represent only 7 another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an 8 officer is an agent. 9 (1985) Deputy Jones A (internal suit and Sheriff against in their defendant a McMahon in his official individual Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 quotation marks omitted; emphasis added); 10 see also Community House, Inc. v. City of Boise, Idaho, 623 F.3d 11 945, 966-67 (9th Cir. 2010) (an official capacity suit is treated 12 as a suit against the entity). 13 allegations against Deputy Jones and Sheriff McMahon in their 14 official capacity may be construed as an attempt to sue the 15 County 16 constitutional rights under section 1983, however, the FAC fails 17 to state a claim and must be dismissed with leave to amend. of San Bernardino To the extent that Plaintiff s for violations of Plaintiff s 18 19 As the Court has previously explained, a local government is 20 liable in a section 1983 action only if the plaintiff can 21 establish that the municipality or county sued had a deliberate 22 policy, custom, or practice that was the moving force behind 23 the constitutional violation he suffered. 24 Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 667 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Monell v. 25 Dep t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694-95 (1978)). 26 the Supreme Court specifically rejected governmental liability Galen v. County of In Monell, 27 4 28 As previously mentioned the FAC purports to sue all Defendants in both their individual and official capacities. (FAC at 3-4). 9 1 based 2 liability. 3 government 4 because one or more of its employees violated a person s rights. 5 Id. on the doctrine of respondeat superior, Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-94. cannot be held liable or vicarious Therefore, a local under section 1983 merely 6 7 The FAC does not identify, as required by Monell, any 8 specific policies or practices in the County of San Bernardino 9 that caused Plaintiff s alleged injuries. Furthermore, Plaintiff 10 is cautioned that [a] plaintiff cannot prove the existence of a 11 municipal policy or custom based solely on the occurrence of a 12 single incident of unconstitutional action by a non-policymaking 13 employee. 14 Cir. 1989); see also Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 15 1996) ( Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on 16 isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon practices 17 of 18 conduct 19 policy. ). 20 able 21 identify the specific County polices or practices that caused his 22 injury or limit his suit to claims against Defendants in their 23 individual 24 dismissed, with leave to amend. 25 that lack a legal basis. 26 he is warned that the Court will recommend dismissal of such 27 claims with prejudice and without leave to amend. Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230, 1233 (9th sufficient has to duration, become a frequency and traditional consistency method of that the carrying out In any amended complaint, assuming that Plaintiff is identify a capacity cognizable only. harm, Plaintiff Accordingly, the must FAC either must be Plaintiff should omit claims If Plaintiff again pleads such claims, 28 10 1 D. 2 The FAC s RLUIPA Claim Against Reverend Scraggs In His Individual Capacity Is Improper 3 4 The FAC alleges that Reverend Scraggs violated Plaintiff s 5 R.L.U.I.P.A. rights by 6 diet. 7 claim appears 8 rights under 9 rights under section 1983. (FAC at 3). to be denying [him] a kosher Accordingly, the FAC s religious exercise grounded RLUIPA, plaintiff unjustifiably not must solely his in First Plaintiff s Amendment statutory constitutional To state a claim under RLUIPA, an 10 inmate allege facts establishing that the 11 government substantially burdened the exercise of his religious 12 beliefs.5 13 Cir. 2005) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc 1(a)(1)-(2)). 14 liberally, 15 appears to state a claim as Plaintiff alleges that in furtherance 16 of his sincerely held religious beliefs, he presented his request 17 for kosher meals to Reverend Scraggs, who failed to grant the 18 request or follow through. See Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Plaintiff s RLUIPA claim adequately, Construed if minimally, 19 20 However, if Plaintiff is in fact raising his religious 21 exercise claim solely under RLUIPA, as the FAC suggests, the 22 claim 23 improper. 24 and commerce powers, Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 902 (9th Cir. 25 5 26 27 28 against Reverend Scraggs in his individual capacity is RLUIPA was enacted pursuant to Congress s spending The statute defines the term government to mean (i) a State, county, municipality or other governmental entity created under the authority of a State; (ii) any branch, department, agency, instrumentality, or official of an entity listed in clause (i); and (iii) any other person acting under color of State law . . . . 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(4)(A). 11 1 2014), and applies in relevant part to any program or activity 2 that receives Federal financial assistance. 3 1(b)(1). 4 employees are not the governmental recipients of federal funds, 5 they are not liable in their personal capacities under RLUIPA. 6 See Wood, 753 F.3d at 904 ( [T]here is nothing in the language or 7 structure 8 liability 9 capacity. . . . . The statute does not authorize suits against a 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc- The Ninth Circuit has explained that because individual of RLUIPA of in to suggest government other employees than an Congress in an official or contemplated individual 10 person 11 capacity, for it is only in that capacity that the funds are 12 received. ). 13 claim 14 Reverend Scraggs in his individual capacity.6 is anything that governmental To the extent that the FAC s religious exercise brought solely under RLUIPA, Plaintiff may not sue 15 16 IV. 17 CONCLUSION 18 19 For the reasons stated above, the FAC is dismissed with 20 leave to amend. If Plaintiff still wishes to pursue this action, 21 he is granted thirty (30) days from the date of this Memorandum 22 and Order within which to file a Second Amended Complaint. 23 any amended complaint, Plaintiff shall cure the defects described 24 above. Plaintiff shall not include new Defendants or In new 25 26 27 28 6 The Court notes, however, that a constitutional claim under section 1983 may be asserted against Reverend Scraggs in his individual capacity if Plaintiff is able to allege facts showing that Reverend Scraggs personally violated his First Amendment rights. See Starr, 652 F.3d at 1205-06. 12 1 allegations 2 asserted 3 Complaint, if any, shall be complete in itself and shall bear 4 both 5 number assigned to this action. 6 to the original Complaint or FAC. 7 action only to those Defendants who are properly named in such a 8 complaint, consistent with the authorities discussed above. that in the the are not reasonably original designation related Complaint. Second Amended The to the Second Complaint and claims Amended the case It shall not refer in any manner Plaintiff shall limit his 9 10 In any amended 11 allegations 12 claims. 13 Civil Procedure 8(a), all that is required is a short and plain 14 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 15 relief. 16 standard 17 complaint, 18 complaint, Plaintiff should make clear the nature and grounds for 19 each claim and specifically identify the Defendants he believes 20 are liable for that claim. 21 for which he cannot allege a proper factual or legal basis. to complaint, those Plaintiff operative facts should supporting confine each of his his Plaintiff is advised that pursuant to Federal Rule of Plaintiff civil a is rights copy strongly complaint of which encouraged form is when to filing attached. In utilize the any amended any amended Plaintiff shall not assert any claims 22 23 Plaintiff is explicitly cautioned that failure to timely 24 file a Second 25 deficiencies described above, will result in a recommendation 26 that 27 prosecute and obey Court orders pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 28 Procedure 41(b). this Amended action be Complaint, dismissed or with failure prejudice to for correct failure the to Plaintiff is further advised that if he no 13 1 longer wishes to pursue this action, he may voluntarily dismiss 2 it by filing a Notice of Dismissal in accordance with Federal 3 Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1). 4 attached for Plaintiff s convenience. A form Notice of Dismissal is 5 6 7 DATED: September 9, 2014 /S/ SUZANNE H. SEGAL UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 8 9 10 11 THIS MEMORANDUM IS NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION NOR IS IT INTENDED TO BE INCLUDED IN OR SUBMITTED TO ANY ONLINE SERVICE SUCH AS WESTLAW OR LEXIS. 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 14

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