Annette C Cochran v. Carolyn W Colvin, No. 5:2014cv01165 - Document 17 (C.D. Cal. 2014)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER AFFIRMING DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY by Magistrate Judge John E. McDermott. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Judgment be entered affirming the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security and dismissing this case with prejudice. [See Order for details.] (san)
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Annette C Cochran v. Carolyn W Colvin Doc. 17 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA ) ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) ) CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, ) ) ) Defendant. ) ANNETTE C. COCHRAN, 18 19 Case No. EDCV 14-01165-JEM MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER AFFIRMING DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY PROCEEDINGS On June 16, 2014, Annette C. Cochran (“Plaintiff” or “Claimant”) filed a complaint 20 seeking review of the decision by the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) 21 denying Plaintiff’s applications for Social Security Disability and Disability Insurance 22 benefits and for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits. The Commissioner filed 23 an Answer on September 17, 2014. On November 24, 2014, the parties filed a Joint 24 Stipulation (“JS”). The matter is now ready for decision. 25 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), both parties consented to proceed before this 26 Magistrate Judge. After reviewing the pleadings, transcripts, and administrative record 27 (“AR”), the Court concludes that the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed and this 28 case dismissed with prejudice. Dockets.Justia.com BACKGROUND 1 2 Plaintiff is a 64-year-old female who applied for Social Security Disability 3 Insurance benefits and Supplemental Security Income benefits on October 13, 2011. 4 (AR 12.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity 5 since October 13, 2011, the alleged onset date. (AR 14.) 6 Plaintiff’s claims were denied initially on February 28, 2012 and on reconsideration 7 on September 18, 2012. (AR 12.) Plaintiff filed a timely request for hearing, which was 8 held before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Joseph D. Schloss on May 1, 2013 in 9 Moreno Valley, California. (AR 12.) Claimant appeared and testified at the hearing and 10 was represented by counsel. (AR 12.) Vocational expert (“VE”) Corinne J. Porter also 11 appeared and testified at the hearing. (AR 12.) 12 The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on May 20, 2013. (AR 12-22.) The 13 Appeals Council denied review on April 9, 2014. (AR 1-3.) DISPUTED ISSUES 14 15 As reflected in the Joint Stipulation, Plaintiff raises the following disputed issues as 16 grounds for reversal and remand: 17 1. Whether the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s treating physician’s opinion. 18 2. Whether the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s testimony and made proper 19 credibility findings. 20 STANDARD OF REVIEW 21 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the ALJ’s decision to determine 22 whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error. 23 Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996); see also DeLorme v. Sullivan, 24 924 F.2d 841, 846 (9th Cir. 1991) (ALJ’s disability determination must be supported by 25 substantial evidence and based on the proper legal standards). 26 Substantial evidence means “‘more than a mere scintilla,’ but less than a 27 preponderance.” Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521-22 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting 28 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). Substantial evidence is “such 2 1 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 2 conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401 (internal quotation marks and citation 3 omitted). 4 This Court must review the record as a whole and consider adverse as well as 5 supporting evidence. Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006). 6 Where evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ’s 7 decision must be upheld. Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 8 (9th Cir. 1999). “However, a reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole 9 and may not affirm simply by isolating a ‘specific quantum of supporting evidence.’” 10 Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882 (quoting Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 11 1989)); see also Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). 12 13 THE SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION The Social Security Act defines disability as the “inability to engage in any 14 substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental 15 impairment which can be expected to result in death or . . . can be expected to last for a 16 continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 17 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential process to 18 determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. 19 The first step is to determine whether the claimant is presently engaging in 20 substantial gainful activity. Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). If the 21 claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity, disability benefits will be denied. 22 Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987). Second, the ALJ must determine whether 23 the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments. Parra, 481 F.3d at 24 746. An impairment is not severe if it does not significantly limit the claimant’s ability to 25 work. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1290. Third, the ALJ must determine whether the impairment 26 is listed, or equivalent to an impairment listed, in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, Appendix I 27 of the regulations. Parra, 481 F.3d at 746. If the impairment meets or equals one of the 28 listed impairments, the claimant is presumptively disabled. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141. 3 1 Fourth, the ALJ must determine whether the impairment prevents the claimant from 2 doing past relevant work. Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 844-45 (9th Cir. 2001). 3 Before making the step four determination, the ALJ first must determine the claimant’s 4 residual functional capacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). The RFC is “the most 5 [one] can still do despite [his or her] limitations” and represents an assessment “based 6 on all the relevant evidence.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). The RFC 7 must consider all of the claimant’s impairments, including those that are not severe. 20 8 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(e), 416.945(a)(2); Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8p. 9 If the claimant cannot perform his or her past relevant work or has no past 10 relevant work, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth step and must determine whether the 11 impairment prevents the claimant from performing any other substantial gainful activity. 12 Moore v. Apfel, 216 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2000). The claimant bears the burden of 13 proving steps one through four, consistent with the general rule that at all times the 14 burden is on the claimant to establish his or her entitlement to benefits. Parra, 481 F.3d 15 at 746. Once this prima facie case is established by the claimant, the burden shifts to 16 the Commissioner to show that the claimant may perform other gainful activity. 17 Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 2006). To support a finding that a 18 claimant is not disabled at step five, the Commissioner must provide evidence 19 demonstrating that other work exists in significant numbers in the national economy that 20 the claimant can do, given his or her RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 21 C.F.R. § 416.912(g). If the Commissioner cannot meet this burden, then the claimant is 22 disabled and entitled to benefits. Id. THE ALJ DECISION 23 24 In this case, the ALJ determined at step one of the sequential process that Plaintiff 25 has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 13, 2011, the alleged onset 26 date. (AR 14.) 27 28 4 1 At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the following medically 2 determinable severe impairments: osteoarthritis, arthritis, degenerative disc disease of 3 the lumbar spine, and fibromyalgia. (AR 14-16.) 4 At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or 5 combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the 6 listed impairments. (AR 16.) 7 The ALJ then found that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform medium work as defined 8 in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(c) and 416.967(c) with the following limitations: 9 . . . Claimant can lift and/or carry 50 pounds occasionally and 25 10 pounds frequently; she can stand and/or walk for 6 hours out of an 8- 11 hour workday with regular breaks; she can sit for 6 hours out of an 8- 12 hour workday with regular breaks; she is unlimited with respect to 13 pushing and/or pulling, other than as indicated for lifting and/or 14 carrying; she can frequently kneel, stoop, crawl, crouch, balance, and 15 climb. 16 (AR 16-20.) In determining the above RFC, the ALJ made an adverse credibility 17 determination. (AR 18.) 18 At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is able to perform her past relevant work 19 as a cashier and apartment manager. (AR 20-21.) 20 Consequently, the ALJ found that Claimant was not disabled, within the meaning 21 of the Social Security Act. (AR 21.) 22 23 DISCUSSION The ALJ decision must be affirmed. The ALJ properly considered the medical 24 evidence and properly discounted Plaintiff’s alleged subjective symptoms. The ALJ’s 25 RFC is supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ’s nondisability determination is 26 supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error. 27 28 5 1 I. THE ALJ PROPERLY REJECTED THE OPINION OF PLAINTIFF’S TREATING PHYSICIAN 2 Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in rejecting the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating 3 physician Dr. Hemchand Kelli. The Court disagrees. 4 A. 5 The ALJ’s RFC is not a medical determination but an administrative finding or Relevant Federal Law 6 legal decision reserved to the Commissioner based on consideration of all the relevant 7 evidence, including medical evidence, lay witnesses, and subjective symptoms. See 8 SSR 96-5p; 20 C.F.R. § 1527(e). In determining a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ must 9 consider all relevant evidence in the record, including medical records, lay evidence, and 10 the effects of symptoms, including pain reasonably attributable to the medical condition. 11 Robbins, 446 F.3d at 883. 12 In evaluating medical opinions, the case law and regulations distinguish among 13 the opinions of three types of physicians: (1) those who treat the claimant (treating 14 physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat the claimant (examining physicians); 15 and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the claimant (non-examining, or consulting, 16 physicians). See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.927; see also Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 17 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). In general, an ALJ must accord special weight to a treating 18 physician’s opinion because a treating physician “is employed to cure and has a greater 19 opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 20 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). If a treating source’s opinion on the 21 issues of the nature and severity of a claimant’s impairments is well-supported by 22 medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, and is not 23 inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the case record, the ALJ must give it 24 “controlling weight.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2). 25 Where a treating doctor’s opinion is not contradicted by another doctor, it may be 26 rejected only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. However, if the 27 treating physician’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor, such as an examining 28 6 1 physician, the ALJ may reject the treating physician’s opinion by providing specific, 2 legitimate reasons, supported by substantial evidence in the record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 3 830-31; see also Orn, 495 F.3d at 632; Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 4 2002). Where a treating physician's opinion is contradicted by an examining 5 professional’s opinion, the Commissioner may resolve the conflict by relying on the 6 examining physician’s opinion if the examining physician’s opinion is supported by 7 different, independent clinical findings. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 8 (9th Cir. 1995); Orn, 495 F.3d at 632. Similarly, to reject an uncontradicted opinion of an 9 examining physician, an ALJ must provide clear and convincing reasons. Bayliss v. 10 Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005). If an examining physician’s opinion is 11 contradicted by another physician’s opinion, an ALJ must provide specific and legitimate 12 reasons to reject it. Id. However, “[t]he opinion of a non-examining physician cannot by 13 itself constitute substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an 14 examining physician or a treating physician”; such an opinion may serve as substantial 15 evidence only when it is consistent with and supported by other independent evidence in 16 the record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31; Morgan, 169 F.3d at 600. 17 B. Analysis 18 Plaintiff Annette Celia Cochran has the medically determinable severe 19 impairments of osteoarthritis, arthritis, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine and 20 fibromyalgia. (AR 14.) Plaintiff alleges she can lift less than 10 pounds and stand up to 21 10 minutes only, and has difficulty walking, bending, reaching, sitting, kneeling and using 22 her hands. (AR 17.) She also alleges migraines and problems with concentration. (AR 23 17.) Nonetheless, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff with a medium work RFC except she can 24 sit, stand and/or walk only 6 hours in an 8 hour workday and only frequently kneel, 25 stoop, crawl, crouch, balance and climb. (AR 16.) 26 Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC. In a January 27, 2012 internal 27 medicine evaluation, consulting examiner and internist Dr. Brian To found Plaintiff to 28 have normal muscle tone and mass, and normal range of motion of all extremities. (AR 7 1 293.) He noted degenerative changes in the lumbar spine without significant annular 2 bulging. (AR 294.) He diagnosed Plaintiff with back pain, history of fibromyalgia and 3 depression. (AR 19, 295.) He assessed Plaintiff with a medium RFC with frequent 4 postural limitations. (AR 19, 295.) Similarly, consulting orthopedic surgeon Dr. Vincente 5 Bernabe in a February 27, 2013 report noted that despite Plaintiff’s complaints of back 6 pain and extremity pain she presented in no acute or chronic distress. (AR 300, 301.) 7 Her gait was normal and she did not use any assistive device to ambulate. (AR 19, 8 301.) He found full range of motion without tenderness or pain in Plaintiff’s cervical and 9 thoracic spine. (AR 302.) MRI imaging indicated moderate degenerative changes in the 10 lumbar spine (AR 300) and tenderness. (AR 19, 302.) Range of motion was full and 11 painless in both upper and lower extremities. (AR 302.) He diagnosed degenerative 12 disc disease and cervical, thoracic and lumbar musculoligamentous strain. (AR 19, 13 303.) He too gave a medium work RFC assessment with frequent posturals. (AR 19, 14 304.) 15 Two State reviewing physicians also provided medium work RFC assessments. 16 (AR 20, 52-53, 78.) The ALJ gave great weight to the assessments of Dr. To, 17 Dr. Bernabe and the State agency physical consultants in determining Plaintiff’s physical 18 RFC. (AR 20.) The ALJ also gave great weight to State agency psychological 19 consultants who concluded Claimant’s mental impairments are nonsevere (AR 20), with 20 only mild limitations in activities of daily living, social functioning and concentration, 21 persistence and pace. (AR 15.) The ALJ further found no objective medical evidence 22 for Plaintiff’s alleged migraines, including no medical signs or laboratory findings and no 23 medical source opinions. (AR 15.) 24 Plaintiff relies on a brief note from Dr. Kelli dated November 1, 2011: “per 25 patient’s condition she is only [able] to work one day out of the week, and light duty.” 26 (AR 19, 20, 285.) This disabling assessment apparently is based on MRI findings 27 showing degenerative changes in the lumbar spine. (AR 277-290.) The ALJ assigned 28 little weight to Dr. Kelli’s opinion. (AR 20.) Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ did not provide 8 1 specific, legitimate reasons for discounting Dr. Kelli’s opinion. Quite to the contrary, the 2 ALJ first noted that Dr. Kelli’s opinion was “not consistent with the record as a whole.” 3 (AR 20.) Plaintiff challenges this finding, citing to various imaging studies and medical 4 evidence of impairments, but fails to present any functional assessments that are 5 inconsistent with the opinions of the numerous other physicians who assessed Plaintiff 6 with a medium RFC. The contradictory opinions of other physicians provide specific, 7 legitimate reasons for rejecting a physician’s opinion. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 8 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff makes no mention of this substantial contrary 9 medical evidence. 10 Second, the ALJ noted that Claimant “continuously received conservative 11 treatment in the form of pain medications and no further aggressive treatment has been 12 recommended.” (AR 20.) Plaintiff argues there is no evidence Plaintiff was not following 13 her treatment plan which was only taking medication. This argument misses the ALJ’s 14 point that mere medication and no further aggressive treatment is inconsistent with 15 disabling impairments. (AR 18.) 16 Third, the ALJ cited activities of daily living, such as preparing simple meals, 17 washing dishes, making her bed and picking up mail, that are inconsistent with disabling 18 impairments. (AR 20.) The ALJ also found that Plaintiff has engaged in a somewhat 19 normal level of activity. (AR 17.) Plaintiff never responded to this evidence. An 20 inconsistency between a doctor’s opinion and Plaintiff’s own observed abilities is a 21 reason for not relying on the opinion. Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216. 22 Plaintiff also asserts that the ALJ had a duty to recontact Dr. Kelli to obtain 23 clarification of his terse note and/or additional evidence than provided in the note. Quite 24 to the contrary, the ALJ’s duty to conduct further inquiry is triggered only when the 25 evidence is ambiguous or inadequate to allow proper evaluation of the evidence. Mayes 26 v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459-60 (9th Cir. 2001). What matters is not the 27 insufficiency of Dr. Kelli’s note but the adequacy of the record as a whole. Id. at 460 28 (“the record before the ALJ was neither ambiguous nor inadequate for proper evaluation 9 1 of the evidence”); Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1217 (no duty to recontact doctors because the 2 ALJ with support in the record found the evidence adequate to make a determination 3 regarding disability). Here, with the medium work RFC assessments of Dr. To, 4 Dr. Bernabe and two State agency medical reviewers, the ALJ properly viewed the 5 record as sufficient to determine Plaintiff’s RFC. There was no duty to recontact Dr. 6 Kelli. Plaintiff disputes the ALJ’s evaluation of the record in discounting Dr. Kelli’s 7 8 opinion but it is the ALJ’s responsibility to resolve conflicts in the medical evidence and 9 ambiguities in the record. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039. Where the ALJ’s interpretation of 10 the medical evidence and the record is reasonable as it is here, it should not be second11 guessed. Rollins v. Massanari, 216 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ rejected Dr. Kelli’s opinion for specific, legitimate reasons supported by 12 13 substantial evidence. 14 II. 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 THE ALJ PROPERLY DISCOUNTED PLAINTIFF’S SUBJECTIVE SYMPTOMS Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in discounting the credibility of Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms. The Court disagrees. A. Relevant Federal Law The test for deciding whether to accept a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony turns on whether the claimant produces medical evidence of an impairment that reasonably could be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998); Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281-82 esp. n.2. The Commissioner may not discredit a claimant’s testimony on the severity of symptoms merely because they are unsupported by objective medical evidence. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722; Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 343, 345. If the ALJ finds the claimant’s pain testimony not credible, the ALJ “must specifically make findings which support this conclusion.” Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345. The ALJ must set forth “findings sufficiently specific to permit the court to conclude 28 10 1 that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit claimant’s testimony.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958; 2 see also Rollins, 261 F.3d at 856-57; Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345-46. Unless there is 3 evidence of malingering, the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity 4 of a claimant’s symptoms only by offering “specific, clear and convincing reasons for 5 doing so.” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1283-84; see also Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722. The ALJ 6 must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence discredits the testimony. 7 Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722; Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. 8 B. Analysis 9 In determining Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s medically 10 determinable impairments reasonably could be expected to cause her alleged 11 symptoms. (AR 18.) The ALJ, however, also found that Plaintiff’s statements regarding 12 the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms were “not entirely 13 credible.” (AR 17, 18.) Because the ALJ did not make a finding of malingering, he was 14 required to provide clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence for 15 discounting Plaintiff’s credibility. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1283-84. The ALJ did so. 16 First, the ALJ found that the objective medical evidence did not support the 17 alleged severity of Claimant’s symptoms. An ALJ is entitled to consider whether there is 18 a lack of medical evidence to corroborate a claimant’s alleged pain symptoms so long as 19 it is not the only reason for discounting a claimant’s credibility. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 20 F.3d 676, 680-81 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, the ALJ specifically found that Plaintiff’s 21 allegations of back pain, migraines, osteoarthritis, fibromyalgia and depression were 22 inconsistent with the objective medical evidence. (AR 17.) The ALJ also found that 23 Plaintiff’s treatment was essentially routine, conservative non-emergency treatment 24 limited to medication and routine follow-up care. (AR 18.) An ALJ may consider 25 conservative treatment in evaluating credibility. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 26 1039 (9th Cir. 2008). Impairments that can be controlled effectively with medication are 27 not disabling. Warre v. Comm’s of Soc. Sec., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006). The 28 ALJ found that the lack of more aggressive treatment suggests the Claimant’s symptoms 11 1 are not as severe as alleged. (AR 18.) Plaintiff argues that medical evidence cannot be 2 used to discredit the severity of Plaintiff’s alleged pain symptoms but the Ninth Circuit 3 has held otherwise as long as it is not the only reason for doing so. Rollins, 261 F.3d at 4 857 (“the medical evidence is still a relevant factor in determining the severity of the 5 claimant’s pain and its disabling effects”). The ALJ properly concluded that the objective 6 medical evidence does not support the alleged severity of Plaintiff’s symptoms. (AR 20.) 7 Second, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s daily activities are inconsistent with disabling 8 limitations, which is a legitimate consideration in evaluating credibility. Bunnell, 947 F.2d 9 at 345-46. The ALJ noted Plaintiff has described everyday activities that include doing 10 laundry, washing dishes, preparing simple meals, takes cares of a cat and shops. (AR 11 17, 20.) She lives alone and did not need help in maintaining her residence. (AR 17.) 12 She also worked as a cashier six or seven hours a week after the onset date which is 13 not enough to establish substantial gainful activity but demonstrates Plaintiff is capable 14 of doing more than claimed. (AR 18.) Plaintiff asserts that work activity should not be 15 considered but the ALJ may consider the fact that Claimant worked despite alleged 16 impairments. See Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1165-66 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff 17 argues that her daily activities do not necessarily prove Plaintiff can work, but they do 18 suggest Claimant has greater functional abilities than alleged. See Valentine v. Comm’r, 19 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009). 20 Plaintiff disputes the ALJ’s interpretation of the evidence regarding the credibility 21 of Plaintiff’s subjective symptom allegations but it is the ALJ who is responsible for 22 revolving conflicts in the medical evidence and ambiguities in the record. Andrews, 53 23 F.3d at 1039. Where the ALJ’s interpretation of the record evidence is reasonable as it 24 is here, it should not be second-guessed. Rollins, 261 F.3d at 857. 25 The ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s subjective symptom allegations for clear and 26 convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence. 27 *** 28 12 1 The ALJ’s RFC is supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ’s nondisability 2 determination is supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error. ORDER 3 4 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Judgment be entered affirming the decision of the 5 Commissioner of Social Security and dismissing this case with prejudice. 6 7 DATED: December 9, 2014 8 /s/ John E. McDermott JOHN E. MCDERMOTT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13
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