De'veron J Ratliff v. Elin Vanlenzuela
Filing
4
MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS by Magistrate Judge Sheri Pym:, Order to Show Cause Why Petition Should Not Be Dismissed as Being Barred by the One-Year Statute of Limitations or as Being Barred by AEDPAs Limitation on Successive Petitions. The court hereby ORDERS petitioner to show cause in writing by June 18, 2012 (SEE MINUTES FOR DETAILS). (kca)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.
ED CV 12-785-R (SP)
Title
De’Veron J. Ratliff v. Elin Vanlenzuela
Present: The Honorable
Date
May 21, 2012
Sheri Pym, United States Magistrate Judge
Kimberly I. Carter
Deputy Clerk
None Appearing
Court Reporter / Recorder
n/a
Tape No.
Attorneys Present for Petitioner:
Attorneys Present for Respondent:
None Appearing
None Appearing
Proceedings:
(In Chambers) Order to Show Cause Why Petition Should Not Be
Dismissed as Being Barred by the One-Year Statute of Limitations or as
Being Barred by AEDPA’s Limitation on Successive Petitions
On May 15, 2012, petitioner De’Veron J. Ratliff filed a Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this court. The court has reviewed the
petition and, for the reasons discussed below, finds three apparent defects.
First and most easily resolved, petitioner failed to sign his petition. Rule 11
requires: “Every pleading, written motion, and other paper must be signed by at least one
attorney of record in the attorney’s name – or by a party personally if the party is
unrepresented.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a). Since petitioner here is unrepresented, he was
required to sign the petition personally. Rule 11 further provides: “The court must strike
an unsigned paper unless the omission is promptly corrected after being called to the
attorney’s or party’s attention.” Id. If petitioner is able to satisfactorily address the more
serious apparent defects as described below, he may cure his failure to sign the petition
by filing a signed First Amended Petition, after he responds to this Order to Show Cause
as described below.
Second, as discussed below further, it appears that the petition is barred by the
one-year statute of limitations set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Third, it appears petitioner does not have
permission to file a successive petition under § 2244(b)(3)(A). In light of these latter
two defects, the petition may be subject to dismissal. The court will not make a final
determination regarding whether the petition should be dismissed, however, without
giving petitioner an opportunity to address both the timeliness of his petition and its
successive nature.
Accordingly, the court hereby ORDERS petitioner to show cause in writing by
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.
ED CV 12-785-R (SP)
Date
Title
May 21, 2012
De’Veron J. Ratliff v. Elin Vanlenzuela
June 18, 2012 why the petition should not be dismissed as being barred by AEDPA’s
one-year statute of limitations or as being barred by AEDPA’s limitation on successive
petitions. The court further directs petitioner to review the information that follows,
which provides additional explanation as to why the federal petition appears to be
subject to dismissal and may assist petitioner in determining how to respond.
AEDPA’s One-Year Statute of Limitations
AEDPA mandates that a “1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application
for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); see also Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 329, 127 S.
Ct. 1079, 166 L. Ed. 2d 924 (2007); Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 921 (9th Cir.
2003). After the one-year limitation period expires, the prisoner’s “ability to challenge
the lawfulness of [his] incarceration is permanently foreclosed.” Lott v. Mueller, 304
F.3d 918, 922 (9th Cir. 2002).
To assess whether a petition is timely filed under AEDPA, it is essential to
determine when AEDPA’s limitation period starts and ends. By statute, AEDPA’s
limitation period begins to run from the latest of four possible events:
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct
review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by
State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is
removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by
the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral
review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented
could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Ordinarily, the starting date of the limitation period is the date
on which the judgment becomes final after the conclusion of direct review or the time
passed for seeking direct review. See Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir.
2001).
AEDPA may also allow for statutory tolling or equitable tolling. Jorss v. Gomez,
311 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 2002). But “a court must first determine whether a
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.
ED CV 12-785-R (SP)
Date
Title
May 21, 2012
De’Veron J. Ratliff v. Elin Vanlenzuela
petition was untimely under the statute itself before it considers whether equitable [or
statutory] tolling should be applied.” Id.
Here, by petitioner’s account, the California Court of Appeal affirmed his
conviction on August 24, 2004. Pet. at 3. Petitioner filed a petition for review in the
California Supreme Court, which was denied on November 10, 2004. Id. Under 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), petitioner’s conviction became final on February 8, 2005 –
ninety days after the California Supreme Court denied review – when the time to file a
petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court expired. See
Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999) (period of direct review in 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) includes ninety-day period within which petitioner can file
petition for writ of certiorari in United States Supreme Court, whether or not petitioner
actually files such petition).
Accordingly, the statute of limitations commenced to run on February 8, 2005
and, absent tolling, expired on February 8, 2006. From the record before this court, it
does not appear that petitioner is entitled to a later start date of the limitation period
under §§ 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D). Petitioner did not constructively file the instant petition
until May 9, 2012, over six years after the statute of limitations expired. Thus, absent
sufficient tolling, the petition is untimely.
First, it appears that petitioner is entitled to some statutory tolling of the limitation
period pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), but not enough to render the instant petition
timely. Statutory tolling is available under AEDPA during the time “a properly filed
application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the
pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); accord Evans v.
Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 192, 126 S. Ct. 846, 163 L. Ed. 2d 684 (2006); Patterson v.
Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 2001). But “in order to qualify for statutory
tolling during the time the petitioner is pursuing collateral review in the state courts, the
prisoner’s state habeas petition must be constructively filed before, not after, the
expiration of AEDPA’s one-year limitations period.” Johnson v. Lewis, 310 F. Supp. 2d
1121, 1125 (C.D. Cal. 2004); see also Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001)
(the petitioner was not entitled to statutory tolling for state habeas petition filed “well
after the AEDPA statute of limitations ended”). Further, statutory tolling is not available
for the time when a federal habeas petition is pending. Duncan v. Walker, 563 U.S. 167,
181-82, 121 S. Ct. 2120, 150 L. Ed. 2d 251 (2001).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.
ED CV 12-785-R (SP)
Date
Title
May 21, 2012
De’Veron J. Ratliff v. Elin Vanlenzuela
In this case, petitioner states that he filed habeas petitions before the Riverside
County Superior Court (filed July 6, 20051; denied July 13, 2006), the California Court
of Appeal (denied August 12, 2005), and the California Supreme Court (denied June 28,
2006). See Pet. at 4-5. Petitioner filed a second set of habeas petitions while his habeas
petition was pending in the California Supreme Court, beginning on April 3, 2006 in the
Riverside County Superior Court and ending February 7, 2007, when the California
Supreme Court denied the second petition. See Deveron J. Ratliff v. Tony Hedge Peth,
No. ED CV 07-627-RSWL (RC) docket no. 31 at 4-5. Assuming, as this court
previously found in case number ED CV 07-627, that petitioner is entitled tolling for the
entire period between June 27, 2005, when petitioner first filed a state habeas petition,
and February 7, 2007, when the California Supreme Court denied petitioner’s second
habeas petition in that court, petitioner still does not accrue sufficient statutory tolling to
render the instant petition timely. With such tolling, the limitation period would have
expired on September 21, 2007.
Second, on the record now before this court, it does not appear as though
petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling. The United States Supreme Court has decided
that “§ 2244(d) is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases.” Holland v. Florida,
__ U.S. __ , 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560, 177 L. Ed. 2d 130 (2010). Tolling is appropriate
when “extraordinary circumstances” beyond a petitioner’s control make it impossible to
file a petition on time. Id. at 2562; see Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir.
2002) (“the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high,
lest the exceptions swallow the rule” (citation omitted and brackets in original)). “When
external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file
a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles
v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999).
A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must establish two elements: “(1) that he has
been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood
in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 161 L. Ed. 2d
669 (2005). Petitioner must also establish a “causal connection” between the
extraordinary circumstance and his failure to file a timely petition. See Bryant v.
Arizona Att’y Gen., 499 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007). Here, at least in his petition,
petitioner cites no extraordinary circumstance beyond his control that made it impossible
1
This court, in case number ED CV 07-627-RSWL (RC), found that the
application of the “prison mailbox rule” rendered the Riverside Superior Court petition
constructively filed June 27, 2005. See docket No. 31 at 3, n. 3.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.
ED CV 12-785-R (SP)
Date
Title
May 21, 2012
De’Veron J. Ratliff v. Elin Vanlenzuela
to file a timely petition. See generally Pet. at 1-25.
In sum, the petition, constructively filed May 9, 2012, appears untimely on the
record now before this court, and therefore subject to dismissal with prejudice as
untimely. In responding to the instant Order to Show Cause, if petitioner believes he
has a basis for a later start date of the limitation period, or for tolling – statutory,
equitable, or both – then he should state it, with any supporting documents, in his
response to the Order to Show Cause by June 18, 2012.
AEDPA’s Bar on Successive Petitions
Before a habeas petitioner may file a second or successive petition in a district
court, he must apply to the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the
district court to consider the application. Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 152-53, 127
S. Ct. 793, 166 L. Ed. 2d 628 (2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A)). This provision
“creates a ‘gatekeeping’ mechanism for the consideration of second or successive
applications in district court.” Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 657, 116 S. Ct. 2333, 135
L. Ed. 2d 827 (1996); see also Reyes v. Vaughn, 276 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1028-30 (C.D.
Cal. 2003) (discussing applicable procedures in Ninth Circuit). A district court lacks
jurisdiction to consider the merits of a second or successive habeas petition in the
absence of proper authorization from a court of appeals. Cooper v. Calderon, 274 F.3d
1270, 1274 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (citing United States v. Allen, 157 F.3d 661, 664
(9th Cir. 1998)). The provision applies where there has been a decision on the merits, as
opposed to a decision on technical or procedural grounds. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.
473, 485-487, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 146 L. Ed. 2d 542 (2000); Henderson v. Lampert, 396
F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2005) (dismissal on procedural default grounds constitutes
disposition on the merits rendering subsequent petition “second or successive”).
A claim in a second or successive habeas petition that was not previously
presented may be considered if the petitioner shows that the factual predicate for the
claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of reasonable
diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(I). However, a petitioner is still required to seek
authorization from the court of appeals in order to have the district court consider the
petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A), see also Reyes v. Vaughn, 276 F. Supp. 2d 1027,
1030 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (“[T]o the extent that petitioner would like to try to show that he
falls within one of the exceptions to dismissal of successive habeas petitions, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b)(2)(B), he must first present any such claim to the Court of Appeals rather than
to this Court.”)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.
ED CV 12-785-R (SP)
Date
Title
May 21, 2012
De’Veron J. Ratliff v. Elin Vanlenzuela
Here, petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition in this court on May 24, 2007, in
case number ED CV 07-627-RSWL (RC), challenging the same 2002 conviction in the
Riverside County Superior Court. On May 4, 2010, this court denied the petition and
dismissed the action with prejudice. The instant petition is therefore successive, and was
apparently filed without leave of the Ninth Circuit. Until the Ninth Circuit authorizes
the filing of a new habeas corpus petition, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the
merits. See Burton, 549 U.S. at 157.
In responding to the instant Order to Show Cause, if petitioner in fact has
received such authorization from the Ninth Circuit, or if petitioner otherwise believes he
has a basis for contending that this court maintains jurisdiction over his successive
petition, then he should state his reasons, with any supporting documents, in his response
to the Order to Show Cause by June 18, 2012.
The court warns petitioner that failure to timely file and serve a response as
directed in this order will result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed
with prejudice as untimely, for lack of jurisdiction, or both.
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