Diane Beall v. Quality Loan Service Corp et al, No. 5:2012cv00601 - Document 32 (C.D. Cal. 2013)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS 23 .Plaintiffs claims are dismissed with prejudice by Judge Dean D. Pregerson. ( MD JS-6. Case Terminated ). (lc). Modified on 3/28/2013 .(lc).
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Diane Beall v. Quality Loan Service Corp et al Doc. 32 1 2 O 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DIANE BEALL fka TEMPLIN, 12 Plaintiff, 13 14 v. QUALITY LOAN SERVICE CORP; ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B., 15 Defendants. 16 ___________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. EDCV 12-00601 DDP (DTBx) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS [Dkt. No. 23] 17 Presently before the court is Defendant OneWest Bank, FSB’s 18 19 Motion to Dismiss. 20 parties, the court grants the motion and adopts the following 21 order.1 22 I. 23 24 Having considered the submissions of the Background In July 2003, Plaintiff executed a Promissory Note and obtained a home loan, secured by a Deed of Trust, for property 25 26 27 28 1 The court notes that Plaintiff, an attorney proceeding pro se, failed to timely oppose the instant Motion, and did not seek an extension of time or continuance of the motion. See C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-9. This alone would warrant granting of the motion and dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims. C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-12. Nevertheless, in the interest of deciding issues on the merits to the extent possible, the court has reviewed Plaintiff’s late-filed opposition. Dockets.Justia.com 1 located at 16377 Arnold Avenue, Lake Elsinore, California 92530. 2 (Amended Complaint ¶ 7; Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice Ex. 3 1.) 4 March 10, 2010. 5 recorded a Notice of Default. 6 substituted Quality Loan Service Corporation as Trustee. 7 4.) 8 Ex. 5.) 9 An Assignment of the Deed of Trust to OneWest was recorded on (RJN Ex. 2.) In May 2010, OneWest’s agent (RJN Ex. 3.) In July 2010, OneWest (RJN Ex. Quality subsequently filed a Notice of Trustee’s Sale. (RJN The sale has not yet occurred. In September, 2010, Plaintiff filed an action in the United 10 States District Court for the Southern District of California. See 11 Beall v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., No. 10-CV-1900 AJB, 2011 WL 12 2784594 (S.D. Cal. Jul. 15, 2011) (Beall I). 13 twenty causes of action related to the pending foreclosure, . 14 at *1. 15 allowed Plaintiff to amend her claims twice, the Beall I court 16 dismissed all of Plaintiff’s causes of action with prejudice, 17 including claims for violations of the Truth in Lending Act, the 18 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, California Business and 19 Professions Code Section 7200, California Civil Code Section 20 2923.5, and wrongful foreclosure, fraud, quiet title, and 21 declaratory relief. 22 Plaintiff alleged Id. Ultimately, after extensive motion practice and having (Beall I, Dkt. Nos. 14, 15, 50, 51.) On April 4, 2012, Plaintiff filed another complaint, this time 23 in Riverside County Superior Court. 24 an amended complaint (“FAC”), which OneWest removed to this court.2 Plaintiff subsequently filed 25 2 26 27 28 It is somewhat unclear how many separate causes of action are included in the FAC. The FAC’s caption includes sixteen causes of action, six of which are some variant of wrongful foreclosure. The body of the complaint lists only ten numbered causes of action, but includes several that appear to be subsumed in or duplicative (continued...) 2 1 OneWest now seeks to dismiss the FAC in its entirety.Aside from 2 introductory comments regarding res judicata, however, Plaintiff’s 3 opposition only addresses three causes of action (Truth in Lending 4 Act, Declaratory Relief, and Quiet Title). 5 II. 6 Legal Standard A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss when it contains 7 “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to 8 relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 9 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 10 570 (2007)). 11 “accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe 12 those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick 13 v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). 14 need not include “detailed factual allegations,” it must offer 15 “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 16 accusation.” 17 allegations that are no more than a statement of a legal conclusion 18 “are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 679. 19 other words, a pleading that merely offers “labels and 20 conclusions,” a “formulaic recitation of the elements,” or “naked 21 assertions” will not be sufficient to state a claim upon which 22 relief can be granted. 23 quotation marks omitted). 24 25 When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although a complaint Conclusory allegations or In Id. at 678 (citations and internal “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they 26 27 28 2 (...continued) of others. Defendants appear to believe the FAC asserts at least eighteen causes of action. (Mot. at 6.) 3 1 plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.” Id. at 679. 2 Plaintiffs must allege “plausible grounds to infer” that their 3 claims rise “above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 4 555. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 5 relief” is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing 6 court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” 7 556 U.S. at 679. 8 III. Discussion 9 10 A. Iqbal, Res Judicata The principle of res judicata “bars litigation in a subsequent 11 action of any claims that were raised or could have been raised in 12 the prior action.” 13 244 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation and citation 14 omitted). 15 claims, (2) a final judgment on the merits, and (3) identity or 16 privity between parties.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). 17 Owens v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., The doctrine applies when there is “(1) an identity of It appears to the court that the majority of Plaintiff’s 18 claims, with three exceptions described below, were either raised 19 during prior proceedings in the Southern District or could have 20 been raised then. 21 and this case are premised on Plaintiff’s assertion that the Deed 22 of Trust was never properly assigned to OneWest. 23 Plaintiff’s Opposition does not address the res judicata issue. 24 The Opposition’s preambulatory language does include a numbered 25 list of reasons why Plaintiff believes this case is different from 26 her earlier case. 27 are recitations of the FAC’s allegations regarding the provenance 28 of the Deed. The bulk of the claims in both the earlier case (Opp. at 3-4.) The body of Of these, however the majority Plaintiff’s additional contention that her prior 4 1 counsel suffered from a medical condition that compromised his 2 ability to provide adequate representation was raised before, and 3 addressed by, the court in the earlier case. 4 at *1. 5 causes of action alleged in the FAC were already addressed and 6 dismissed by the Southern District, with prejudice, or should have 7 been, but were not, raised in the prior action. See Beall I, 2011 WL Thus, it appears to the court that virtually all of the 8 B. 9 The FAC does allege certain causes of action that were not Remaining Claims 10 brought in the earlier litigation. 11 Action for “W[rongful] F[oreclosure] - Violation of P[enal] C[ode] 12 [§] 115.5” and a Sixteenth Cause of Action for “Violation of 42 USC 13 1983.” 14 action could have been raised earlier because neither is supported 15 by any factual allegations. 16 violation anywhere beyond the caption of the complaint. 17 Penal Code Section 115.5 criminalizes false statements to notaries 18 and the filing of false documents related to single family 19 residences. 20 suggest that OneWest’s allegedly fraudulent recordations constitute 21 criminal behavior. 22 however, a criminal statute does not give rise to a civil cause of 23 action. 24 3062690 at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 26, 2012.) 25 The FAC lists a Fifth Cause of The court is unable to determine whether these causes of There is no mention of a Penal Code California The court presumes that Plaintiff is attempting to Absent explicit language to the contrary, See Rodriguez v. U.S. Bank N.A., No. C 12-989 WHA, 2012 WL The factual basis for Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim is 26 similarly lacking. 27 1983 within her Business and Professions Code claim. 28 That reference appears to be a cut-and-pasted portion of a treatise Plaintiff makes a single reference to Section 5 (FAC ¶ 241.) 1 or primer discussing an attorney’s duty of reasonable inquiry, the 2 relevance of which is unclear to the court. 3 the FAC allege that Plaintiff’s Constitutional rights have been 4 violated or that any such violation was committed by a person 5 acting under color of state law, as is required to state a claim 6 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 7 P.S., No. C 11-03577 JSW, 2012 WL 2792360 at * 2 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 9, 8 2012). 9 (Id.) Nowhere does See Mitchell v. Routh Crabtree Olsen, The Third Cause of Action also alleges Wrongful Foreclosure, 10 this time on the basis that Plaintiff’s Debt was discharged in 11 bankruptcy. The body of the FAC does list some facts regarding 12 this claim. Specifically, the FAC alleges that Plaintiff listed 13 the debt as unsecured and listed Defendants as unsecured creditors, 14 that the debt was therefore discharged in her Chapter 7 bankruptcy, 15 and that Defendants did not file a proof of claim. 16 The FAC does not, however, indicate when these events took place, 17 again rendering it unclear whether this claim could have been 18 brought earlier. 19 Defendants as both unsecured and secured creditors. 20 OneWest argues, the dischargeability of a debt is not affected by 21 the way it is scheduled in a Chapter 7 no-assets, no-bar bankruptcy 22 such as Plaintiff’s, and the filing of a proof of claim, or lack 23 thereof, is meaningless in such a case. 24 922, 926-27 (9th Cir. 2004). 25 address Defendant’s argument, or the authority cited therein, and 26 is therefore dismissed.3 (FAC ¶¶ 31-35.) Regardless, OneWest argues that Plaintiff listed Furthermore, In re Nielsen, 383 F.3d Plaintiff’s opposition does not 27 3 28 The court notes that Plaintiff’s opposition only (continued...) 6 1 2 3 IV. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed with prejudice. 4 5 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 8 9 Dated: March 28, 2013 DEAN D. PREGERSON United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 3 27 28 (...continued) specifically addresses three causes of action (Truth in Lending Act, Declaratory Relief, and Quiet Title), all of which are res judicata, as described above. 7
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