Timothy Scott Adams v. RTC Grounds, No. 5:2012cv00338 - Document 3 (C.D. Cal. 2012)
Court Description: ORDER DENYING AND DISMISSING ACTION WITH PREJUDICE by Judge Terry J. Hatter, Jr; Order by Judge Terry J. Hatter, Jr denying Certificate of Appealability (ec)
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Timothy Scott Adams v. RTC Grounds Doc. 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TIMOTHY SCOTT ADAMS, 12 Petitioner, 13 v. 14 RTC GROUNDS, WARDEN, 15 Respondent. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) NO. EDCV 12-00338-TJH (MAN) ORDER: DENYING PETITION AND DISMISSING ACTION WITH PREJUDICE; AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 16 17 18 On March 6, 2012, Petitioner, a prisoner in state custody, filed 19 a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition (“Petition”), with supporting 20 exhibits (“Pet. Ex.”). Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases 21 in the United States District Courts requires the summary dismissal of 22 Section 2254 petitions “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and 23 any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in 24 the district court . . . .” Rule 4, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. The Court 25 has concluded that summary dismissal of the Petition is required, 26 because federal habeas relief is foreclosed for the reasons set forth 27 below. 28 Dockets.Justia.com 1 PRIOR PROCEEDINGS 2 3 In 1993, Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder, with 4 a true finding on a California Penal Code § 12022.5(a) (use of a 5 firearm) enhancement. He was sentenced to 15 years to life with the 6 possibility of parole. (Petition 2; Pet. Ex., transcript of April 27, 7 2010 hearing before the State of California Board of Parole Hearings 8 (“HT”) 3.) 9 10 On April 27, 2010, Petitioner appeared before the Board of Parole 11 Hearings (“Board”) for a subsequent parole consideration hearing, which 12 is the proceeding at issue in this action. (Petition at 3; HT, passim.) 13 Petitioner was represented by counsel at the hearing. (HT 4.) 14 Petitioner acknowledged that, prior to the hearing, he received a 15 document listing his rights in connection with the parole consideration 16 hearing and reviewed them with a counselor. (HT 8-9.) Petitioner’s 17 attorney stated that he had discussed with Petitioner his rights and the 18 format for the parole consideration hearing. (HT 9-10.) Petitioner 19 stated that he would prefer to have his attorney speak on his behalf and 20 answer questions for him during the hearing. (HT 7, 11.) Thereafter, 21 Petitioner’s attorney, as well as Petitioner at times, answered the 22 Board’s questions regarding the circumstances of the commitment offense, 23 Petitioner’s prior criminal history, his conduct in prison (including 24 disciplinary infractions, work and educational history, self-help 25 program efforts, and psychological treatment), his parole plans, and his 26 psychological evaluations. (HT 13-23, 28-31, 34-36.) Petitioner’s 27 counsel presented a closing argument regarding Petitioner’s suitability 28 for parole. (HT 40-43.) Petitioner declined to make a closing 2 1 statement. (HT 40, 43.) 2 3 Following the hearing, the Board found Petitioner unsuitable for 4 parole, concluding that he poses an unreasonable risk of danger if 5 released from prison. (HT 46.) The Board specifically explained the 6 reasons for its decision and set a ten-year deferral period for 7 Petitioner’s further consideration for parole. (HT 46-62.) (Hereafter, 8 the “Board Decision.”) 9 10 Petitioner sought habeas relief in the trial court, the California 11 Court of Appeal, and the California Supreme Court. (Petition at 6.) 12 The trial court reviewed the record and concluded that there is some 13 evidence to support the Board’s decision that Petitioner constitutes a 14 current threat to public safety. (Pet. Ex., April 20, 2011 order of the 15 trial court, citing In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th 1181, 1210, 82 Cal. 16 Rptr. 3d 169, 189 (2008).) Both the California Court of Appeal and the 17 California Supreme Court denied relief summarily. (Pet. Ex., June 14, 18 2011 Order of the California Court of Appeal, and February 1, 2012 Order 19 of the California Supreme Court.) 20 21 PETITIONER’S HABEAS CLAIM 22 23 Petitioner’s sole claim is as follows: 24 25 The Board of Parole Hearings’ decision to deny me parole 26 is not supported by facts amounting to some evidence that I 27 am currently dangerous and that my release will unreasonably 28 endanger public safety. 3 1 (Petition at 3, referring generally to the HT and Lawrence, supra.) 2 3 DISCUSSION 4 5 California’s parole scheme contemplates that a prisoner sentenced 6 to a term of life with the possibility of parole must be found suitable 7 for parole before a parole date can be set. California Penal Code 8 § 3041(b) and related implementing regulations set forth criteria for 9 determining whether a prisoner is suitable for parole. 10 REGS. tit. 15, § 2402. See CAL . CODE The prisoner must be found unsuitable and denied 11 a parole date if, in the judgment of the panel, he or she will pose an 12 unreasonable danger to society if released. 13 § 2402(a). CAL . CODE REGS . tit. 15, “[T]he paramount consideration for both the Board and the 14 Governor under the governing statutes is whether the inmate currently 15 poses a threat to public safety and thus may not be released on parole.” 16 Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th at 1210, 82 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 189. As a matter of 17 California law, a finding that a prisoner is unsuitable for parole must 18 be supported by “some evidence” that he currently poses such a threat. 19 See id. at 1212, 82 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 190; In re Shaputis, 44 Cal. 4th 20 1241, 1254, 82 Cal. Rptr. 3d 213, 222-23 (2008). 21 22 The claim alleged in the Petition challenges the validity of the 23 Board Decision under California law. Petitioner contends that 24 California’s “some evidence” requirement was not satisfied by the 25 factors on which the Board relied in finding him unsuitable for parole. 26 27 In Swarthout v. Cooke, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 859 (2011)(per 28 curiam), the Supreme Court considered a habeas claim that a California 4 1 state prisoner’s right to federal due process was violated due to parole 2 unsuitability findings that were not supported by “some evidence.” The 3 Supreme Court concluded that a state, such as California, may create “a 4 liberty interest in parole.” Id. at 861. The existence of such a state 5 liberty interest, however, does not give rise to a federal right to be 6 paroled. Id. at 862; see also Roberts v. Hartley, 640 F.3d 1042, 1045- 7 46 (9th Cir. 2011)(explaining Cooke). Rather, the federal due process 8 protection for such a state-created liberty interest is limited to 9 whether “the minimum procedures adequate for due-process protection of 10 that interest” have been met, namely, whether the prisoner was given the 11 opportunity to be heard and received a statement of the reasons why 12 parole was denied. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. at 862-83; see also Miller v. 13 Oregon Bd. of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, 642 F.3d 711, 716 (9th 14 Cir. 2011)(“The Supreme Court held in Cooke that in the context of 15 parole eligibility decisions the due process right is procedural, and 16 entitles a prisoner to nothing more than a fair hearing and a statement 17 of reasons for a parole board’s decision.”). This procedural question 18 is “the beginning and the end of” a federal habeas court’s inquiry into 19 whether due process has been violated when a state prisoner is denied 20 parole. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. at 862; see also Roberts, 640 F.3d at 1046 21 (“If the state affords the procedural protections required by . . . 22 Cooke, that is the end of the matter for purposes of the Due Process 23 Clause.”). 24 25 In Cooke, the Supreme Court rejected the rationale of prior Ninth 26 Circuit decisions, which found compliance with California’s “some 27 evidence” standard to be a “substantive federal requirement” under the 28 Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 5 1 at 862. Indeed, the Supreme Court unequivocally stated that “it is no 2 federal concern . . . whether California’s ‘some evidence’ rule of 3 judicial review (a procedure beyond what the Constitution demands) was 4 correctly applied.” Id. at 863; see also Miller, 642 F.3d at 716 5 (opining that earlier Ninth Circuit decisions on the scope of federal 6 habeas review of parole decisions have “been superseded” by Cooke). 7 8 Cooke has clearly established that the only federal habeas claim 9 available to a California prisoner found unsuitable for parole is a 10 procedural one, i.e., a claim that the prisoner was not afforded an 11 opportunity to be heard and/or given a statement of the reasons why 12 parole was denied. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. at 862. Petitioner does not make 13 such a claim nor could he, as the record plainly forecloses any such 14 contention. (See HT, passim.) 15 16 The Petition asserts the type of substantive due process claim 17 precluded by Cooke. Petitioner takes issue with the correctness of the 18 Board’s conclusion on the issue of his current dangerousness, and he 19 asks this Court to assess the validity of the Board’s underlying 20 findings -- a task that is outside the scope of the habeas review 21 available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 22 23 Accordingly, a claim such as that presented by Petitioner involves 24 a purely state law issue and may not be considered on federal habeas 25 review. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. at 862-63; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 26 Roberts, 640 F.3d at 1046 (a misapplication of the “some evidence” 27 standard “makes no difference,” because a “state’s misapplication of its 28 own laws does not provide a basis for granting a federal writ of habeas 6 1 corpus”). As the claim alleged in the Petition is not cognizable, Rule 2 4 requires that the Petition be denied summarily, and this action must 3 be dismissed with prejudice. 4 5 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that: the Petition is 6 DENIED; and Judgment shall be entered dismissing this action with 7 prejudice. 8 9 10 2254 In addition, pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section Cases in the United States District Courts, the Court has 11 considered whether a certificate of appealability is warranted in this 12 case. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 48413 85, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 1604 (2000). The Court concludes that a 14 certificate of appealability is unwarranted and, thus, a certificate of 15 appealability is DENIED. 16 17 DATED: March 20, 2012 18 19 TERRY J. HATTER, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 20 21 22 PRESENTED BY: 23 24 MARGARET A. NAGLE 25 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 26 27 28 7
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