Imelda Mendoza De Santacruz v. Michael J Astrue, No. 5:2012cv00100 - Document 16 (C.D. Cal. 2012)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION by Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Chooljian. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. See memorandum for details. (hr)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 IMELDA MENDOZA DE SANTACRUZ, Plaintiff, 13 v. 14 15 16 17 18 MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. _________________________ 19 I. 20 ) Case No. EDCV 12-100 JC ) ) ) MEMORANDUM OPINION ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) SUMMARY On January 25, 2012, plaintiff Imelda Mendoza de Santacruz ( plaintiff ) 21 filed a Complaint seeking review of the Commissioner of Social Security s denial 22 of plaintiff s application for benefits. The parties have consented to proceed 23 before a United States Magistrate Judge. 24 This matter is before the Court on the parties cross motions for summary 25 judgment, respectively ( Plaintiff s Motion ) and ( Defendant s Motion ). The 26 Court has taken both motions under submission without oral argument. See Fed. 27 R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15; January 27, 2012 Case Management Order ¶ 5. 28 // 1 1 Based on the record as a whole and the applicable law, the decision of the 2 Commissioner is AFFIRMED. The findings of the Administrative Law Judge 3 ( ALJ ) are supported by substantial evidence and are free from material error.1 4 II. BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE 5 DECISION 6 On January 26, 2009, plaintiff filed applications for Supplemental Security 7 Income and Disability Insurance Benefits. (Administrative Record ( AR ) 19, 8 135, 140). Plaintiff asserted that she became disabled on November 1, 2008, due 9 to depression. (AR 152). The ALJ examined the medical record and heard 10 testimony from plaintiff (who was represented by counsel and assisted by a 11 Spanish language interpreter), plaintiff s husband, a medical expert and a 12 vocational expert on July 29, 2010. (AR 33-66). 13 On September 21, 2010, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not disabled 14 through the date of the decision. (AR 19-29). Specifically, the ALJ found: 15 (1) plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: psychotic disorder 16 (not otherwise specified), mood disorder (not otherwise specified), and anxiety 17 disorder (AR 21); (2) plaintiff s impairments, considered singly or in combination, 18 did not meet or medically equal a listed impairment (AR 21); (3) plaintiff retained 19 the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional 20 levels with certain nonexertional limitations2 (AR 22-23); (4) plaintiff could not 21 22 1 The harmless error rule applies to the review of administrative decisions regarding 23 disability. See Batson v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 359 F.3d 1190, 1196 24 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying harmless error standard); see also Stout v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, 454 F.3d 1050, 1054-56 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing contours of 25 application of harmless error standard in social security cases). 26 2 The ALJ determined that plaintiff could perform a full range of work at all exertional 27 levels, but was limited to jobs that (1) involved simple, repetitive tasks; (2) required no public interaction; (3) did not involved hypervigilance or fast-paced work; and (4) did not require being 28 responsible for the safety of others. (AR 22-23). 2 1 perform her past relevant work (AR 27); (5) there are jobs that exist in significant 2 numbers in the national economy that plaintiff could perform, specifically cleaner, 3 industrial cleaner, and laundry room attendant (AR 28-29); and (6) plaintiff s 4 allegations regarding her limitations were not credible to the extent they were 5 inconsistent with the ALJ s residual functional capacity assessment (AR 25). 6 The Appeals Council denied plaintiff s application for review. (AR 1). 7 III. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS 8 A. 9 To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must show that the claimant is Sequential Evaluation Process 10 unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically 11 determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in 12 death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of at 13 least twelve months. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing 14 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)). The impairment must render the claimant incapable of 15 performing the work claimant previously performed and incapable of performing 16 any other substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy. 17 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. 18 § 423(d)(2)(A)). 19 In assessing whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ is to follow a five-step 20 sequential evaluation process: 21 (1) 22 23 Is the claimant presently engaged in substantial gainful activity? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step two. (2) Is the claimant s alleged impairment sufficiently severe to limit 24 the claimant s ability to work? If not, the claimant is not 25 disabled. If so, proceed to step three. 26 27 (3) Does the claimant s impairment, or combination of impairments, meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. 28 /// 3 1 Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1? If so, the claimant is disabled. If 2 not, proceed to step four. 3 (4) Does the claimant possess the residual functional capacity to 4 perform claimant s past relevant work? If so, the claimant is 5 not disabled. If not, proceed to step five. 6 (5) Does the claimant s residual functional capacity, when 7 considered with the claimant s age, education, and work 8 experience, allow the claimant to adjust to other work that 9 exists in significant numbers in the national economy? If so, 10 the claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. 11 Stout v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th 12 Cir. 2006) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920). 13 The claimant has the burden of proof at steps one through four, and the 14 Commissioner has the burden of proof at step five. Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 15 F.3d 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098); see also 16 Burch, 400 F.3d at 679 (claimant carries initial burden of proving disability). 17 B. 18 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), a court may set aside a denial of Standard of Review 19 benefits only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is based on legal 20 error. Robbins v. Social Security Administration, 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 21 2006) (citing Flaten v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 22 (9th Cir. 1995)). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable 23 mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 24 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citations and quotations omitted). It is more than a 25 mere scintilla but less than a preponderance. Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882 (citing 26 Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 183 (9th Cir. 1990)). 27 To determine whether substantial evidence supports a finding, a court must 28 consider the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and 4 1 evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner s] conclusion. Aukland v. 2 Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 3 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1993)). If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming 4 or reversing the ALJ s conclusion, a court may not substitute its judgment for that 5 of the ALJ. Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882 (citing Flaten, 44 F.3d at 1457). 6 IV. DISCUSSION 7 A. 8 9 The ALJ Properly Evaluated the Medical Opinion Evidence 1. Pertinent Law In Social Security cases, courts employ a hierarchy of deference to medical 10 opinions depending on the nature of the services provided. Courts distinguish 11 among the opinions of three types of physicians: those who treat the claimant 12 ( treating physicians ) and two categories of nontreating physicians, namely 13 those who examine but do not treat the claimant ( examining physicians ) and 14 those who neither examine nor treat the claimant ( nonexamining physicians ). 15 Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1996) (footnote reference omitted). A 16 treating physician s opinion is entitled to more weight than an examining 17 physician s opinion, and an examining physician s opinion is entitled to more 18 weight than a nonexamining physician s opinion.3 See id. In general, the opinion 19 of a treating physician is entitled to greater weight than that of a non-treating 20 physician because the treating physician is employed to cure and has a greater 21 opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual. Morgan v. 22 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 23 1999) (citing Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 1987)). 24 25 26 27 28 3 Cf. Le v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 1200, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2008) (not necessary or practical to draw bright line distinguishing treating physicians from non-treating physicians; relationship is better viewed as series of points on a continuum reflecting the duration of the treatment relationship and frequency and nature of the contact) (citation omitted). 5 1 The treating physician s opinion is not, however, necessarily conclusive as 2 to either a physical condition or the ultimate issue of disability. Magallanes v. 3 Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 4 759, 761-62 & n.7 (9th Cir. 1989)). Where a treating physician s opinion is not 5 contradicted by another doctor, it may be rejected only for clear and convincing 6 reasons. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal 7 quotations omitted). The ALJ can reject the opinion of a treating physician in 8 favor of another conflicting medical opinion, if the ALJ makes findings setting 9 forth specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on substantial 10 evidence in the record. Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted); Thomas v. 11 Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (ALJ can meet burden by setting out 12 detailed and thorough summary of facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating 13 his interpretation thereof, and making findings) (citations and quotations omitted); 14 Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751, 755 (same; ALJ need not recite magic words to 15 reject a treating physician opinion court may draw specific and legitimate 16 inferences from ALJ s opinion). The ALJ must do more than offer his 17 conclusions. Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1988). He must 18 set forth his own interpretations and explain why they, rather than the 19 [physician s], are correct. Id. Broad and vague reasons for rejecting the 20 treating physician s opinion do not suffice. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 21 602 (9th Cir. 1989). 22 23 2. Analysis In an August 2, 2009 Narrative Report, plaintiff s treating physician, Dr. 24 Jesus A. Bucardo (1) diagnosed plaintiff with: mood disorder (not otherwise 25 specified), rule out major depressive disorder vs. bipolar depression vs. borderline 26 personality disorder; (2) noted that plaintiff had ruminative thought, auditory 27 delusions, delusions/paranoid thoughts, insomnia, depression, anxiety, panic 28 episodes, manic syndrome, suicidal ideation, decreased energy, isolation, and 6 1 social withdrawal, difficulty concentrating on tasks, and was mildly impaired in 2 memory and judgment; and (3) opined that plaintiff (a) had no ability to maintain a 3 sustained level of concentration, (b) could do only very simple tasks for brief 4 periods of time, (c) could not adapt to new or stressful situations, (d) could not 5 interact appropriately with anyone but her family, and (e) could not complete a 40 6 hour work week without decompensating (collectively Dr. Bucardo s Opinions ). 7 (AR 230). Plaintiff contends that a remand or reversal is warranted because the 8 ALJ s rejection of Dr. Bucardo s Opinions was not supported by substantial 9 evidence. (Plaintiff s Motion at 4-10). The Court disagrees. 10 First, the ALJ properly rejected Dr. Bucardo s Opinions as unsupported by 11 the physician s own notes or the record as a whole. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 12 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005) ( The ALJ need not accept the opinion of any 13 physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and 14 inadequately supported by clinical findings. ) (citation and internal quotation 15 marks omitted); Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 2003) (treating 16 physician s opinion properly rejected where treating physician s treatment notes 17 provide no basis for the functional restrictions he opined should be imposed on 18 [the claimant] ). For example, as the ALJ noted, contrary to the significant mental 19 limitations stated in Dr. Bucardo s Opinions, Dr. Bucardo s records for plaintiff 20 reflect multiple mental status examinations that were generally within normal 21 limits, and that plaintiff s symptoms were stable when plaintiff was compliant 22 with prescribed medication. (AR 25-26, see AR 230, 243, 248, 256, 265, 274, 23 313, 324, 325, 332, 340, 354-55, 367). Similarly, the results of mental status 24 examinations of plaintiff conducted by a social worker in Dr. Bucardo s office 25 were, on the whole, unremarkable. (AR 232, 235, 238, 240, 246, 249, 251, 253, 26 257, 259, 263, 266, 276, 311, 315, 320, 322, 330, 333, 335, 338, 341, 343, 345, 27 349, 351, 356, 359, 362, 364). 28 /// 7 1 Second, the ALJ properly rejected Dr. Bucardo s Opinions in favor of the 2 conflicting opinions of the state-agency examining psychiatrist, Dr. Romualdo R. 3 Rodriguez (who determined that plaintiff had no functional limitations from a 4 psychiatric standpoint ) (AR 212), and the medical expert, Dr. David M. 5 Glassmire (who testified that plaintiff would be [limited] to simple, repetitive 6 tasks, no interaction with the public, no task requiring hypervigilance, and no fast 7 paced work ) (AR 52). The opinion of Dr. Rodriguez was supported by his 8 independent psychiatric examination of plaintiff (AR 207-13), and thus, even 9 without more, constituted substantial evidence upon which the ALJ could properly 10 rely to reject the treating physician s opinions. See, e.g., Tonapetyan v. Halter, 11 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (consultative examiner s opinion on its own 12 constituted substantial evidence, because it rested on independent examination of 13 claimant); Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995). Dr. 14 Glassmire s testimony also constituted substantial evidence supporting the ALJ s 15 decision since it was supported by the other medical evidence in the record as well 16 as Dr. Rodriguez s opinion and underlying independent examination. See 17 Morgan, 169 F.3d at 600 (testifying medical expert opinions may serve as 18 substantial evidence when they are supported by other evidence in the record and 19 are consistent with it ). 20 Finally, Dr. Glassmire did not, as plaintiff contends, rely solely on the same 21 clinical findings used by Dr. Bucardo (i.e., Dr. Bucardo s treatment records). Cf., 22 e.g., Orn, 495 F.3d at 632 ( When an examining physician relies on the same 23 clinical findings as a treating physician, but differs only in his or her conclusions, 24 the conclusions of the examining physician are not substantial evidence. ). 25 Instead, as just noted, Dr. Glassmire also relied, in part, on the opinion of Dr. 26 Rodriguez which itself was based on the examining physician s independent 27 clinical findings (i.e., findings based on objective medical tests that the treating 28 physician has not [] considered ). Id. ( [W]hen an examining physician provides 8 1 independent clinical findings that differ from the findings of the treating 2 physician, such findings are substantial evidence. ) (citations omitted). The 3 record belies plaintiff s assertion that Dr. Glassmire . . . rejected the opinion of 4 Dr. Rodriguez . . . . (Plaintiff s Motion at 8) (citing AR 54-55) (emphasis added). 5 At the hearing, Dr. Glassmire did not entirely reject, but instead merely discounted 6 the weight given to Dr. Rodriguez s opinion. (AR 54-55) ( I did not give as much 7 weight . . . to [Dr. Rodriguez s] opinion ) (emphasis added). It was the sole 8 province of the ALJ to resolve any conflict in this properly supported medical 9 opinion evidence. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041. 10 Accordingly, a remand or reversal is not warranted on this basis. 11 B. 12 13 The ALJ Properly Evaluated Plaintiff s Credibility 1. Pertinent Law Questions of credibility and resolutions of conflicts in the testimony are 14 functions solely of the Commissioner. Greger v. Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968, 972 (9th 15 Cir. 2006). If the ALJ s interpretation of the claimant s testimony is reasonable 16 and is supported by substantial evidence, it is not the court s role to second17 guess it. Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). 18 An ALJ is not required to believe every allegation of disabling pain or other 19 non-exertional impairment. Orn, 495 F.3d at 635 (citing Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 20 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)). If the record establishes the existence of a medically 21 determinable impairment that could reasonably give rise to symptoms assertedly 22 suffered by a claimant, an ALJ must make a finding as to the credibility of the 23 claimant s statements about the symptoms and their functional effect. Robbins, 24 466 F.3d at 883 (citations omitted). Where the record includes objective medical 25 evidence that the claimant suffers from an impairment that could reasonably 26 produce the symptoms of which the claimant complains, an adverse credibility 27 finding must be based on clear and convincing reasons. Carmickle v. 28 Commissioner, Social Security Administration, 533 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 9 1 2008) (citations omitted). The only time this standard does not apply is when 2 there is affirmative evidence of malingering. Id. The ALJ s credibility findings 3 must be sufficiently specific to allow a reviewing court to conclude the ALJ 4 rejected the claimant s testimony on permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily 5 discredit the claimant s testimony. Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 885 (9th 6 Cir. 2004). 7 To find the claimant not credible, an ALJ must rely either on reasons 8 unrelated to the subjective testimony (e.g., reputation for dishonesty), internal 9 contradictions in the testimony, or conflicts between the claimant s testimony and 10 the claimant s conduct (e.g., daily activities, work record, unexplained or 11 inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow prescribed course of 12 treatment). Orn, 495 F.3d at 636; Robbins, 466 F.3d at 883; Burch, 400 F.3d at 13 680-81; SSR 96-7p. Although an ALJ may not disregard such claimant s 14 testimony solely because it is not substantiated affirmatively by objective medical 15 evidence, the lack of medical evidence is a factor that the ALJ may consider in his 16 credibility assessment. Burch, 400 F.3d at 681. 17 18 2. Analysis Plaintiff contends that the ALJ inadequately evaluated the credibility of her 19 subjective complaints. (Plaintiff s Motion at 12-18). The Court disagrees. 20 First, an ALJ may properly discount a plaintiff s credibility based on an 21 unexplained failure to seek treatment consistent with the alleged severity of 22 subjective complaints. See Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir. 1991) 23 (en banc) (in assessing credibility, ALJ may properly rely on plaintiff s 24 unexplained failure to request treatment consistent with alleged severity of 25 symptoms); see also Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 1999) (in 26 assessing credibility, ALJ properly considered doctor s failure to prescribe and 27 claimant s failure to request any serious medical treatment for supposedly 28 excruciating pain); Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1999) (lack of 10 1 treatment and reliance upon nonprescription pain medication clear and 2 convincing reasons for partially rejecting [claimant s] pain testimony ); Fair, 885 3 F.2d at 604 (ALJ permissibly considered discrepancies between the claimant s 4 allegations of persistent and increasingly severe pain and the nature and extent 5 of treatment obtained). Here, as the ALJ noted, the medical evidence reflects that 6 despite plaintiff s complaints of disabling mental limitations, plaintiff made 7 relatively infrequent trips to the doctor, and received no more than 8 routine/conservative treatment for her symptoms. (AR 24-26) (citing, inter alia, 9 Exhibits 5F [AR 229-291], 7F [AR 308-68]). Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that 10 she was proscribed or even requested any more aggressive medical treatment or, as 11 plaintiff alleges (without any citation to the record) (Plaintiff s Motion at 15), that 12 non-conservative treatment options did not exist for plaintiff s impairments. See 13 Burch, 400 F.3d at 683 ( claimant carries the initial burden of proving a 14 disability ); Meanel, 172 F.3d at 1113 ( The claimant bears the burden of proving 15 that she is disabled. ). 16 Second, the ALJ properly discounted plaintiff s subjective complaints as 17 inconsistent with plaintiff s daily activities. See Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958-59 18 (inconsistency between the claimant s testimony and the claimant s conduct 19 supported rejection of the claimant s credibility); Verduzco v. Apfel,188 F.3d 20 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 1999) (inconsistencies between claimant s testimony and 21 actions cited as a clear and convincing reason for rejecting the claimant s 22 testimony). For example, as the ALJ noted, contrary to plaintiff s allegations of 23 disabling mental symptoms and limitations, plaintiff stated in a Function Report 24 that she would care for her daughter; At the hearing plaintiff testified that she 25 would attempt to take primary care responsibilities for [her] daughter. (AR 2326 24, 40, 175). During a consultative examination plaintiff reported that she had 27 driven her own vehicle to the evaluation. (AR 24, 207-09). Plaintiff also told the 28 examining psychiatrist that she could take care of household chores, cook and 11 1 make snacks, go to the store, run errands and handle her own personal care and 2 finances. (AR 209). While plaintiff contends that none of the foregoing activities 3 relate to the ability to perform gainful work activity over a 40 hour, five day work 4 week (Plaintiff s Motion at 15), the Court will not second-guess the ALJ s 5 reasonable determination that they do, even if such evidence could give rise to 6 inferences more favorable to plaintiff. 7 Third, the ALJ properly discredited plaintiff due to internal conflicts within 8 plaintiff s own statements and testimony. See Light v. Social Security 9 Administration, 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir.), as amended (1997) (in weighing 10 plaintiff s credibility, ALJ may consider inconsistencies either in [plaintiff s] 11 testimony or between [her] testimony and [her] conduct ); see also Fair, 885 F.2d 12 at 604 n.5 (9th Cir.1989) (ALJ can reject pain testimony based on contradictions 13 in plaintiff s testimony). For example, as the ALJ noted, although plaintiff 14 testified at the hearing that she did not drive, she also stated that she still had a 15 valid driver s license, and had previously told the examining psychiatrist that she 16 had her own vehicle and had been able to drive herself to the examination. (AR 17 24) (citing AR 40; Exhibit 1F at 1, 3 [AR 207, 209]). As the ALJ also noted, 18 contrary to the statement in plaintiff s Function Report that plaintiff had problems 19 getting along with neighbors, plaintiff told the examining psychiatrist that she 20 [had] a good relationship with family, relatives, friends, neighbors, and others. 21 (AR 24) (citing Exhibits 5E at 6 [AR 179]; 1F at 3 [AR 209]) (emphasis added). 22 Finally, the ALJ properly discounted plaintiff s credibility due, in part, to 23 the absence of supporting objective medical evidence. Burch, 400 F.3d at 681; 24 Rollins, 261 F.3d at 857 ( While subjective pain testimony cannot be rejected on 25 the sole ground that it is not fully corroborated by objective medical evidence, the 26 medical evidence is still a relevant factor in determining the severity of the 27 claimant s pain and its disabling effects. ) (citation omitted)). As the ALJ noted, 28 and as discussed above, plaintiff s treatment records reflect mental status 12 1 examinations that were generally within normal limits, and that plaintiff s 2 symptoms were to some degree controlled by her medication. (AR 24-26) (citing, 3 inter alia, Exhibits 5F [AR 229-291], 7F [AR 308-68]). 4 Accordingly, a remand or reversal is not warranted on this basis. 5 V. CONCLUSION 6 For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner of Social 7 Security is affirmed. 8 LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 9 DATED: June 18, 2012 10 11 12 _____________/s/____________________ Honorable Jacqueline Chooljian UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13
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