Olivia Huerta v. Michael J Astrue, No. 5:2011cv01868 - Document 19 (C.D. Cal. 2012)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER by Magistrate Judge Marc L. Goldman: For the reasons stated below, the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed and the action is dismissed with prejudice. (See document for details.) For the reasons stated above, the decision of the Social Security Commissioner is AFFIRMED and the action is DISMISSED with prejudice. (rla)
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1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 EASTERN DIVISION 8 9 OLIVIA HUERTA, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. 12 13 MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, 14 Defendant. 15 Case No. EDCV 11-1868-MLG MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 16 17 Plaintiff Olivia Huerta ( Plaintiff ) seeks judicial review of 18 the Commissioner s final decision denying her application for 19 disability insurance benefits ( DIB ) pursuant to Title II of the 20 Social Security Act. For the reasons stated below, the decision of 21 the Commissioner is affirmed and the action is dismissed with 22 prejudice. 23 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 Plaintiff was born on November 19, 1966. (Administrative 26 Record ( AR ) at 698.) She has relevant work experience as a food 27 server, 28 Plaintiff first filed her application for benefits on June 23, bakery manager, and warehouse 1 worker. (AR at 652.) 1 2006, alleging disability beginning July 18, 2005, due to multiple 2 cervical discopathies, multiple disc protrusions in the lumbar 3 spine, depression, shoulder pain, knee pain, and anxiety. (AR at 4 10.) 5 applications initially and upon reconsideration. (AR at 74-85.) 6 The matter was heard by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who 7 issued an unfavorable decision on June 16, 2009. Plaintiff sought 8 review of that decision, and in a Memorandum Opinion and Order 9 dated March 9, 2011, this Court reversed the decision and remanded 10 to the Commissioner for further consideration of the opinion of 11 examining physician Thomas W. Jackson, M.D. See Huerta v. Astrue, 12 No. EDCV 10-1095, 2011 WL 836660 (C.D. Cal. March 9, 2011). The Social Security Administration denied Plaintiff s 13 A new hearing was held before ALJ Sharilyn Hopson on June 22, 14 2011. (AR at 636.) Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, 15 testified at the hearing, as did a vocational expert ( VE ) and a 16 medical expert. (AR at 636.) The ALJ issued a decision on August 17 11, 2011, denying Plaintiff s application. (AR at 636-54.) The ALJ 18 found that Plaintiff suffers from the following severe impairments: 19 degenerative disc disease of the entire spine, left shoulder 20 tendinitis, 21 Nevertheless, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the residual 22 functional capacity ( RFC ) to perform a limited range of light 23 work activity.1 (AR at 640.) obesity, depression, anxiety. (AR at 639.) 24 25 26 27 28 1 Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff can lift and/or carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; she can stand and/or walk for two hours of an eight-hour workday, 15 minutes at a time, use of a cane as needed; she can sit for six hours out of an eight-hour workday with regular breaks, and the provision to stand and stretch as needed, estimated to require one 2 1 Plaintiff commenced this action for judicial review on 2 November 23, 2011. On June 22, 2012, the parties filed a joint 3 statement of disputed issues ( Joint Stip. ). Plaintiff contends 4 that the ALJ: (1) failed to properly develop and evaluate the 5 vocational evidence, and (2) improperly assessed her credibility in 6 considering 7 Plaintiff 8 alternatively, 9 (Joint Stip. at 24-45.) Defendant requests that the ALJ s decision her subjective seeks reversal remand for complaints.2 and an further (Joint award Stip. of administrative at 4.) benefits, or proceedings. 10 be 11 reversible error, that the Court remand for further administrative 12 proceedings. (Joint Stip. at 25-27.) 13 // 14 // 15 // 16 // affirmed, or, if the Court finds that the ALJ committed 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 to three minutes an[] hour; she can climb stairs, but cannot climb ladders, work at heights or balance; she can do occasional neck motion but should avoid extremes of motion, and her head should be held in a comfortable position the remainder of the time; she can maintain a fixed head position for 15 to 30 minutes at a time, occasionally, she cannot perform above shoulder work on the left and has no limitation on the right side; she is limited to performing simple repetitive tasks. 2 In Plaintiff s discussion of the second issue, she argues in passing that the ALJ improperly gave great weight to the testimony of Samuel Landau, M.D. who testified at the hearing, over the opinions of other treating or consulting physicians. (Join Stip. at 11.) However, this issue is underdeveloped and lacks any legal analysis, and therefore the Court need not consider it. See Indep. Towers of Washington v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003)(refusing to address issues not accompanied by legal argument). 3 1 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 2 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the 3 Commissioner s decision to deny benefits. The Commissioner or ALJ s 4 decision must be upheld unless the ALJ s findings are based on 5 legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the 6 record as a whole. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 7 1990); 8 Substantial evidence means such evidence as a reasonable person 9 might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. 10 Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 11 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006). It is more than a scintilla, but less 12 than a preponderance. Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 13 882 (9th Cir. 2006). To determine whether substantial evidence 14 supports 15 administrative record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that 16 supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner s 17 conclusion. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1996). 18 If the evidence can support either affirming or reversing the 19 ALJ s conclusion, the reviewing court may not substitute its 20 judgment for that of the ALJ. Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882. Parra a v. Astrue, finding, 481 the F.3d 742, reviewing 746 court (9th must Cir. 2007). review the 21 22 III. Analysis 23 A. The Vocational Evidence 24 At the hearing, the VE testified that someone with Plaintiff s 25 limitations would be able to 26 occupations: (1) electronics worker, which carries the number 27 726.687-010 in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles ( DOT ); (2) 28 Receptionist, with a DOT number of 237.367-046; and (3) Parking Lot 4 perform the following three 1 Booth Attendant, with a DOT number of 915.473-010. (AR at 653, 688- 2 89.) Based on this testimony, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff 3 retained the ability to perform jobs existing in significant 4 numbers in the national economy. (AR at 653.) 5 Plaintiff contends that the VE did not properly identify any 6 occupation that Plaintiff would be able to perform. She argues that 7 the occupation of Electronics Worker requires numerous duties that 8 are incompatible with the standing and head position limitations 9 identified in her RFC. (Joint Stip. at 7.) She also argues that the 10 DOT number provided by the VE for Receptionist actually identifies 11 a Telephone Quotation Clerk, and that Plaintiff is not able to 12 perform either the duties of a Telephone Quotation Clerk, DOT 13 237.367-046, or those of a Receptionist, DOT 237.367-038. (Joint 14 Stip. 5-6.) Similarly, the DOT number provided by the VE for 15 Parking Lot Booth Attendant actually identifies a Parking-Lot 16 Attendant, an occupation that Plaintiff would be unable to perform. 17 (Join Stip. at 6.) Plaintiff also maintains that it was error for 18 the ALJ to fail to address the VE s testimony that Plaintiff would 19 be unable to sustain work activity if she were taking unscheduled 20 breaks or missing days from of work. (Join Stip. at 8.) 21 Despite Plaintiff s arguments to the contrary, the VE s 22 testimony that someone with Plaintiff s RFC would be able to 23 perform the occupation of Electronics Worker does not conflict with 24 the DOT. The DOT s description of Electronics Worker includes 25 multiple tasks. (Joint Stip at Ex. D.) While it appears that at 26 least two of the tasks, those involving moving and unloading parts, 27 require standing up and moving, there is no indication that many of 28 the other tasks, such as preparing components and printing, cannot 5 1 be performed sitting down. As Plaintiff s RFC allows for some 2 mobility, there is nothing inconsistent on its face between the DOT 3 description and Plaintiff s RFC. Similarly, it is not clear from 4 the DOT description that the tasks would be incompatible with 5 Plaintiff s head and neck limitations. There is no indication that 6 the tasks cannot be performed while maintaining a comfortable head 7 position, or that Plaintiff would be unable to switch positions 8 every 15 to 30 minutes. It was reasonable for the ALJ to rely on 9 the VE s testimony that someone with Plaintiff s standing and head 10 and neck limitations could perform the occupation of Electronics 11 Worker, particularly in light of the absence of any obvious 12 contradiction with the DOT description. See Johnson v. Shalala, 60 13 F.3d 1428, 1435 -366 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding it proper for the ALJ 14 to rely on a VE s testimony regarding which available jobs the 15 claimant 16 Plaintiff could perform the occupation of Electronics Worker was 17 supported by substantial evidence. 18 could perform). Accordingly, the ALJ s finding that As Plaintiff points out in the Joint Stipulation, the DOT 19 number 20 occupation of Telephone Quotation Clerk. (Joint Stip. at 5, Ex. A.) 21 The occupation of Receptionist, which carries a DOT number of 22 237.367-038, 23 incompatible with Plaintiff s RFC limitation of simple, repetitive 24 tasks. (Joint Stip. at B.) The DOT describes the occupation of 25 Telephone 26 customers regarding stock quotations. (Joint Stip. at Ex. A.) 27 Defendant states in the Joint Stipulation that a Receptionist may 28 also be known as a Telephone Quotation Clerk. (Joint Stip. at 9.) the VE gave is a Quotation for Receptionist semi-skilled Clerk as actually occupation, involving 6 identifies and telephone the therefore calls with 1 However, the DOT description for 237.367-046 provides alternative 2 names for Telephone Quotation Clerk, and none of them are similar 3 to Receptionist. (Joint Stip. at Ex. A.) Furthermore, the VE 4 repeatedly referred to the occupation as that of Receptionist 5 throughout his testimony and made no reference to the specific 6 duties of a Telephone Quotation Clerk. Therefore, there is nothing 7 to suggest that the VE 8 Telephone Quotation Clerk when referring to DOT 237.367-046. (AR at 9 688, 692.) Similarly, it appears that the ALJ did not actually 10 consider whether Plaintiff could perform the duties of a Telephone 11 Quotation Clerk, but rather simply adopted the VE s conclusion. (AR 12 at 653.) While Defendant argues that nothing in Plaintiff s RFC 13 conflicts with the description of a Telephone Quotation Clerk, 14 there is simply no indication that the ALJ actually considered 15 whether 16 appears that she made her decision based on the mistaken assumption 17 that DOT 237.367-046 denoted a Receptionist, even going so far as 18 to explicitly state that the [VE s] testimony is consistent with 19 the information contained in the [DOT]. (AR at 653.) Moreover, 20 even 21 Telephone Quotation Clerk, it is unclear whether the VE s testimony 22 on the availability of this occupation in the national and regional 23 economies 24 occupation he was referencing. Accordingly, it was error for the 25 ALJ based her finding that Plaintiff could perform working existing 26 in the national economy on the assumption that she could perform a 27 job called Receptionist with a DOT number of 237.367-046. 28 Plaintiff assuming is was actually contemplating the position of could that perform Plaintiff accurate, given this could the occupation. perform ambiguity the Instead, duties regarding of it a which The VE made a similar error in providing the DOT number for 7 1 the occupation of Parking Lot Booth Attendant. The number he gave, 2 815.473-010, refers to a Parking-Lot Attendant. (Join Stip. at C.) 3 There does not appear to be any occupation listed in the DOT called 4 a Parking Lot Booth Attendant. As for Parking-Lot Attendant, the 5 DOT describes this occupation as involving walking around and 6 patrolling parking lot areas. (Joint Stip. at Ex C.) These duties 7 appear incompatible with the standing and walking limitations 8 contained in Plaintiff s RFC.3 As with the Telephone Quotation 9 Clerk, it does not appear that either the VE or the ALJ 10 specifically contemplated whether Plaintiff could perform the 11 duties of a Parking-Lot Attendant. (AR at 653, 688.) In the absence 12 of 13 inconsistencies, it was error for the ALJ to base a finding that 14 Plaintiff was not disabled on the assumption that she could perform 15 the duties of a Parking-Lot Attendant. any indication that the ALJ attempted to resolve these 16 Accordingly, it was erroneous for the ALJ to rely on a finding 17 that Plaintiff could perform the jobs of Receptionist or Parking 18 Lot Booth Attendant. Nevertheless, the error is harmless. See 19 Ludwig v. Astrue, 681 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2012) (harmless 20 error rule applies to review of administrative decisions regarding 21 disability); Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 22 2008) (same). As discussed above, the ALJ properly found that 23 Plaintiff is able to perform the occupation of Electronics Worker, 24 a position which exists in significant numbers in the national 25 26 27 28 3 In the Joint Stip., Defendant does not even attempt to argue that Plaintiff would be able to perform this occupation. (Joint Stip. at 10.) 8 1 economy.4 This finding satisfies the final step of the disability 2 evaluation process, which requires the ALJ to determine whether a 3 claimant unable to perform her past work is able to do any other 4 work. See Gray v. Comm r, 365 Fed. App x 60, 63 (9th Cir. 2010) 5 (affirming ALJ s finding that Plaintiff could find work because, 6 [e]ven assuming, arguendo, that two of the three jobs named by the 7 [VE] . . . were inconsistent with [plaintiff s RFC], third job was 8 not and was enough to support ALJ s conclusion). Therefore, the 9 ALJ s errors in finding that Plaintiff could perform the 10 occupations of Receptionist and Parking Lot Booth Attendant were 11 harmless and relief is not warranted. See Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 12 1042-43; see also Stout v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 13 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006) (defining harmless error as such error 14 that is irrelevant to the ALJ's ultimate disability conclusion ). 15 Finally, it was not error for the ALJ to fail to address the 16 VE s testimony that if Plaintiff were taking unscheduled breaks or 17 missing work days, she would be unable to perform the identified 18 occupations. Plaintiff s RFC, as determined by the ALJ, did not 19 include the limitation that Plaintiff would be required to take 20 breaks and miss days. (AR at 640.) It was appropriate for the ALJ 21 to present the VE with a hypothetical taking into account only the 22 limitations she identified in her RFC, and to rely on the VE s 23 answers to that hypothetical. See Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 24 747, 756-57 (9th Cir 1989) (it is proper for the ALJ to rely on 25 26 27 28 4 The VE testified that there were approximately 4,000 Electronics Worker positions within the region of Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, and San Bernardino counties, and 79,000 positions within the national economy. (AR at 653, 688-89.) 9 1 VE s 2 supported by the record). While Plaintiff contends that she would 3 need 4 determined that Plaintiff s subjective complaints were not fully 5 credible, as discussed more fully below. Accordingly, it was 6 appropriate for the ALJ to ignore the VE s testimony regarding the 7 effect of a need for unscheduled breaks and absences on Plaintiff s 8 ability to work. 9 response these to hypothetical additional breaks limited and days to those off, the restrictions ALJ properly B. Plaintiff s Credibility 10 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate her 11 credibility regarding her subjective complaints in determining her 12 RFC. At the hearing, Plaintiff testified that though she works 13 part-time, she would not be able to work more than three hours per 14 day because of pain in her legs, back, and hands. (AR at 680.) She 15 stated 16 approximately once per hour for ten minutes each, and tries to take 17 a 18 experiences 19 medication: dizziness, fatigue, dry mouth, and thirst. (AR at 677- 20 78.) that daily while nap. (AR the she at is working, 680-81.) following side she She needs also effects to take testified from her breaks that she prescribed 21 To determine whether a claimant's testimony about subjective 22 pain or symptoms is credible, an ALJ must engage in a two-step 23 analysis. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009) 24 (citing Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 25 2007)). First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has 26 presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment 27 which could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged pain or 28 other symptoms. Lingenfelter, 504 10 F.3d at 1036. [O]nce the 1 claimant produces objective medical evidence of an underlying 2 impairment, an adjudicator may not reject a claimant's subjective 3 complaints based solely on a lack of objective medical evidence to 4 fully 5 Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). To the 6 extent that an individual's claims of functional limitations and 7 restrictions due to symptoms are reasonably consistent with the 8 objective medical evidence and other evidence in the case, the 9 claimant's allegations will be credited. SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186 10 corroborate the alleged severity of pain. Bunnell v. at *2 (explaining 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(4), 416.929(c)(4)).5 11 Unless there is affirmative evidence showing that the claimant 12 is malingering, the ALJ must provide specific, clear and convincing 13 reasons for discrediting a claimant's complaints. Robbins, 466 F.3d 14 at 883. General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must 15 identify 16 undermines the claimant's complaints. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 17 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 18 834 (9th Cir. 1996)). The ALJ must consider a claimant's work 19 record, observations of medical providers and third parties with 20 knowledge 21 functional restrictions caused by symptoms, effects of medication, 22 and the claimant's daily activities. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 23 1273, 1283-84 & n.8 (9th Cir. 1996). The ALJ may also employ other what of testimony claimant's is not credible limitations, and what aggravating evidence factors, 24 25 26 27 28 5 The Secretary issues Social Security Rulings to clarify the Secretary's regulations and policy .... Although SSRs are not published in the federal register and do not have the force of law, [the Ninth Circuit] nevertheless give[s] deference to the Secretary's interpretation of its regulations. Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 346 n.3. 11 1 ordinary 2 omitted). 3 techniques Here, the of ALJ credibility concluded evaluation. that Id. Plaintiff's (citations medically 4 determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause some 5 of the alleged symptoms. (AR at 643.) However, the ALJ rejected as 6 not credible Plaintiff's statements concerning the intensity, 7 persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms to the extent 8 they are inconsistent with the ALJ's RFC determination. (AR at 9 643.) As there was no evidence of malingering, the ALJ was required 10 to 11 testimony. 12 provide clear and convincing reasons for rejecting this The ALJ provided several clear and convincing reasons for 13 rejecting 14 Petitioner s 15 interaction undermined her allegations that she is unable to 16 maintain employment. (AR at 642.) Plaintiff s testimony at the 17 hearing revealed that she performs the following activities on a 18 daily or regular basis: showering and taking care of her personal 19 hygiene; going to work; picking up her children from school; 20 preparing meals; performing household chores, such as mopping and 21 washing dishes; grocery shopping; watching TV; reading books; and 22 attending church. Although a claimant does not need to be utterly 23 incapacitated in order to be disabled, Vertigan v. Halter, 260 24 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001), the ability to perform certain 25 activities of daily life can support a finding that the claimant s 26 reports of his or her impairment are not fully credible. See Bray 27 v. Comm r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009); 28 Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding Plaintiff s somewhat testimony. normal First, level 12 of the ALJ daily found activity that and 1 that the claimant s ability to take care of her personal needs, 2 prepare easy meals, do light housework and shop for some groceries 3 ... may be seen as inconsistent with the presence of a condition 4 which would preclude all work activity ) (citing Fair v. Bowen, 885 5 F.2d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 1989)). 6 Similarly, the ALJ found that the fact that Plaintiff has 7 worked following the alleged onset date of her disability indicates 8 that her daily activities have been somewhat greater than she has 9 generally reported. (AR at 641.) In weighing a claimant's 10 credibility, an ALJ may properly consider the claimant's work 11 record. See Bray v. Astrue, 554 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009) 12 (claimant's allegation of debilitating illness belied in part by 13 fact that she recently worked as a personal caregiver for two 14 years, and has sought out other employment since then ); Thomas v. 15 Barnhart, 278 F.3d 948, 958 59 (9th Cir. 2002) (inconsistency 16 between the claimant's testimony and conduct supported rejection of 17 claimant's credibility). Here, Plaintiff testified that her part- 18 time job involves three hours of chores that she performs while 19 standing. (AR at 681.) It was appropriate for the ALJ to consider 20 that 21 debilitating pain and other conditions that interfere with her 22 ability to work, she has been able to maintain this type of 23 employment. despite Plaintiff s testimony that she suffers from 24 Third, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had made contradictory 25 statements in the past, which undermined her credibility. (AR at 26 642-43.) At the previous hearing on October 31, 2008, Plaintiff 27 testified that she had not done any kind of work for compensation 28 since she became disabled in 2005. (AR at 46.) However, Plaintiff 13 1 did earn money for work in 2006 and 2007. (AR at 269, 671-72, 823.) 2 In addition, there was evidence that Plaintiff had not been 3 forthright in her earlier worker s compensation case, where she 4 failed to reveal her involvement in an off-duty motor vehicle 5 accident pertinent to her case. (AR at 601-05.) It was appropriate 6 for the ALJ to consider these statements in finding Plaintiff not 7 credible. See, e.g., Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284 (ALJ may use ordinary 8 techniques 9 inconsistent statements and whether claimant has been candid). of credibility evaluation, such as considering 10 Finally, the ALJ found that the Plaintiff has not generally 11 received the type of medical treatment one would expect for a 12 totally disabled individual. (AR at 641.) For example, in 2007 it 13 appears that her only treatment was seeing a chiropractor every 14 couple of months.(AR at 563.) She has never undergone surgery, or 15 even been referred to a specialist for surgery consultation. (AR at 16 625.) The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff s refusal to follow her 17 prescription for Paxil, due to its side effects, demonstrated an 18 unwillingness to improve her condition and could indicate that her 19 symptoms were not as severe as reported. (AR at 676-77.) 20 may properly rely on unexplained or inadequately explained failure 21 to seek treatment or to follow a course of treatment in assessing 22 credibility. See Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039; Fair, 885 at 604 23 (finding that claimant's allegations of persistent, severe pain and 24 discomfort belied by minimal conservative treatment and failure 25 to follow doctor s advice). An ALJ 26 These findings constitute clear and convincing reasons for the 27 ALJ s rejection of Plaintiff s subjective testimony. Smolen, 80 28 F.3d at 1284. It is the responsibility of the ALJ to determine 14 1 credibility and resolve conflicts or ambiguities in the evidence, 2 Magallanes v. Brown, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989), and a 3 reviewing 4 determination when it is supported by substantial evidence in the 5 record, as here. See Fair, 885 F.2d at 604. Accordingly, it was 6 reasonable for the ALJ to rely on the reasons stated above in 7 finding 8 severity of her symptoms was not wholly credible.6 court that may not Plaintiff s second-guess subjective the ALJ s testimony credibility regarding the 9 10 IV. Conclusion 11 For the reasons stated above, the decision of the Social 12 Security Commissioner is AFFIRMED and the action is DISMISSED with 13 prejudice. 14 15 Dated: July 12, 2012 16 ______________________________ Marc L. Goldman United States Magistrate Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 6 26 27 28 To the extent there are other reasons in the ALJ s decision for finding Plaintiff not credible that are not supported by substantial evidence, any error is harmless given that the ALJ provided the above well-supported reasons for not fully crediting Plaintiff s statements. See Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1038. 15
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