Paula F Gonzalez v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, No. 5:2011cv01639 - Document 15 (C.D. Cal. 2012)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Marc L. Goldman. For the reasons stated above, the decision of the Social Security Commissioner is AFFIRMED and the action is DISMISSED with prejudice. (twdb)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 EASTERN DIVISION 8 9 PAULA F. GONZALEZ, 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. 12 13 MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, 14 Defendant. 15 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. EDCV 11-1639-MLG MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 16 17 Plaintiff Paula Gonzalez seeks judicial review of the Social 18 Security Commissioner s denial of her application for disability 19 insurance benefits ( DIB ) and Social Security Disability Insurance 20 ( SSDI ) benefits. For the reasons set forth below, the decision of 21 the Commissioner is affirmed and the action is dismissed with 22 prejudice. 23 24 I. Facts and Procedural Background 25 Plaintiff was born on June 7, 1958. (Administrative Record 26 ( AR ) at 65.) She earned a GED and has work experience as a care 27 giver and real estate agent. (AR at 171, 173.) Plaintiff filed her 28 applications for benefits on January 23, 2009, alleging disability 1 1 beginning January 31, 2008, due to hepatitis and affective mood 2 disorder. (AR at 65, 66.) Her application was denied initially on 3 May 14, 2009 and upon reconsideration on September 9, 2009. (AR at 4 79-82, 86-91.) An administrative hearing was held on October 19, 5 2010, before Administrative Law Judge ( ALJ ) Sharilyn Hopson. 6 Plaintiff, represented by a non-attorney representative, testified 7 as did vocational and medical experts. (AR at 27-64.) 8 ALJ Hopson issued an unfavorable decision on November 22, 9 2010. (AR at 8-17.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from the 10 following severe impairments: degenerative disc disorder in L5-S1 11 of the lumbar spine; early osteoarthritis of the right hip; 12 previous cruciate ligament repair; early osteoarthritis of the 13 right knee; hepatitis C; status-post surgery of the left knee; and 14 depression. (AR at 10.) However, these severe impairments did not 15 meet the requirements of a listed impairment found in 20 C.F.R. 16 Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Id.) 17 The ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the residual functional 18 capacity ( RFC ) to perform medium work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 19 404.1567(c) and 416.967(c) as follows: the claimant can lift 20 and/or carry 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently; she 21 can stand, walk, and/or sit for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, with 22 normal breaks such as every 2 hours with a sit or stand option (she 23 should be allowed to change positions with no anticipated loss of 24 productivity time); she can only occasionally push and/or pull with 25 her left leg, but no limitations with her right leg; the claimant 26 can occasionally bend, kneel, crouch, crawl and stoop; she can 27 climb stairs but she cannot climb ladders, work at heights or 28 balance; the claimant can do simple and repetitive tasks; she could 2 1 have occasional public contact; but she is precluded from tasks 2 that are fast-paced work or requiring hypervigilance. (AR at 11.) 3 The ALJ concluded that although Plaintiff could not perform any 4 past relevant work, there were jobs in the national economy which 5 Plaintiff could perform, such as office helper, hand packager, and 6 a small products assembler II. (AR at 16.) Therefore, she found 7 that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (AR 8 at 17.) 9 The Appeals Council denied review on August 25, 2011 (AR at 1- 10 3), and Plaintiff commenced this action for judicial review. On 11 April 10, 2012, the parties filed a Joint Stipulation ( Joint 12 Stip. ) of disputed facts and issues, including the following 13 claims of error: (1) the ALJ erred in evaluating Plaintiff s 14 credibility and subjective testimony; and (2) the ALJ failed to 15 properly consider the lay testimony. (Joint Stip. at 2.) Plaintiff 16 asks the Court to reverse and order an award of benefits, or in the 17 alternative, remand for further administrative proceedings. (Joint 18 Stip. at 17.) The Commissioner requests that the ALJ s decision be 19 affirmed. (Id.) 20 21 22 II. Standard of Review Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the 23 Commissioner s 24 decision must be upheld unless the ALJ s findings are based on 25 legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the 26 record as a whole. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 27 1999); 28 Substantial evidence means more than a scintilla, but less than a Parra decision v. Astrue, to deny 481 benefits. F.3d 3 742, 746 The Commissioner s (9th Cir. 2007). 1 preponderance; it is evidence that a reasonable person might accept 2 as adequate to support a conclusion. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 3 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007)(citing Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 4 466 5 substantial evidence supports a finding, the reviewing court must 6 review the administrative record as a whole, weighing both the 7 evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the 8 Commissioner s conclusion. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 9 (9th Cir. 1996). If the F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006)). evidence can To determine support either whether affirming 10 or reversing the ALJ s conclusion, the reviewing court may not 11 substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Robbins, 466 F.3d at 12 882. 13 14 III. Discussion 15 A. The ALJ Properly Evaluated Plaintiff s Subjective Symptom 16 Testimony 17 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to provide clear and 18 convincing reasons 19 testimony. (Joint 20 administrative hearing to the following symptoms and functional 21 limitations: she suffers from pain due to problems with the discs 22 in her neck and back; she has hepatitis C, which makes her 23 lethargic; she suffers from depression and has twice attempted 24 suicide; she has nuts and bolts in her knee that have fallen apart 25 and she needs similar surgery in her other knee; and she can sit 26 and/or 27 positions. (AR at 31-33, 49-53.) 28 // stand for for Stip. about discrediting at 20 3.) Plaintiff minutes 4 her before subjective testified having to symptom at the change 1 To determine whether a claimant s testimony about subjective 2 pain or symptoms is credible, an ALJ must engage in a two-step 3 analysis. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009) 4 (citing Lingenfelter 504 F.3d at 1035-36). First, the ALJ must 5 determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical 6 evidence of an underlying impairment which could reasonably be 7 expected 8 Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036. [O]nce the claimant produces 9 objective to produce medical the alleged evidence of an pain or other underlying symptoms. impairment, an 10 adjudicator may not reject a claimant s subjective complaints based 11 solely on a lack of objective medical evidence to fully corroborate 12 the alleged severity of pain. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 13 345 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). To the extent that an individual s 14 claims of functional limitations and restrictions due to alleged 15 pain is reasonably consistent with the objective medical evidence 16 and other evidence in the case, the claimant s allegations will be 17 credited. SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186 at *2 (explaining 20 C.F.R. §§ 18 404.1529(c)(4), 416.929(c)(4)).1 19 Unless there is affirmative evidence showing that the claimant 20 is malingering, the ALJ must provide specific, clear and convincing 21 reasons for discrediting a claimant s complaints. Robbins, 466 F.3d 22 at 883. General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must 23 identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence 24 25 26 27 28 1 The Secretary issues Social Security Rulings to clarify the Secretary s regulations and policy .... Although SSRs are not published in the federal register and do not have the force of law, [the Ninth Circuit] nevertheless give[s] deference to the Secretary s interpretation of its regulations. Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 346 n.3. 5 1 undermines the claimant s complaints. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722 2 (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1996)). The 3 ALJ must consider a claimant s work record, observations of medical 4 providers and third parties with knowledge of the claimant s 5 limitations, aggravating factors, 6 by symptoms, effects of medication, and the claimant s daily 7 activities. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1283-84 & n.8 (9th Cir. 8 1996). The ALJ may also consider an unexplained failure to seek 9 treatment or follow a prescribed course of treatment and employ 10 other ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation. Id. (citations 11 omitted). 12 Here, the ALJ concluded functional restrictions caused that Plaintiff s medically 13 determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the 14 alleged 15 Plaintiff s description of her symptoms to the extent they [were] 16 inconsistent with the ALJ s assessment that Plaintiff retained the 17 RFC to perform medium work with certain limitations. (Id.) Because 18 there was no evidence of malingering, the ALJ was therefore 19 required to provide specific, clear and convincing reasons for 20 rejecting Plaintiff s subjective allegations of pain and functional 21 limitations. symptoms. (AR at 13.) However, the ALJ rejected 22 The ALJ provided three reasons for rejecting Plaintiff s 23 testimony, each of which is substantially supported by the record. 24 First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not fully credible because 25 she admitted that she stopped working as a real estate agent 26 because of the economy, not because she was no longer able to work 27 due to her alleged impairments. Plaintiff also stated that after 28 losing her job as a real estate agent, she subsequently looked for 6 1 employment. (AR at 12, 30-31, 167.) See Bruton v. Massanari, 268 2 F.3d 824, 826 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that ALJ properly considered 3 fact that claimant stopped working because he was laid off, not 4 because of a medical disability). 5 The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff admitted that she had not 6 had any psychiatric treatment nor was she taking any medication. 7 (AR 8 unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or 9 to follow a course of treatment in assessing credibility. See 10 Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008); Fair v. 11 Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that claimant s 12 allegations of persistent, severe pain and discomfort belied by 13 minimal conservative treatment ); see also Flaten v. Secretary, 44 14 F.3d 1456, 1464 (9th Cir. 1995) (ALJ permitted to draw rational 15 inferences from treatment history). at 12, citing AR at 47.) An ALJ may properly rely on 16 Finally, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff s ability to perform 17 various activities of daily living was at odds with her claims of 18 disabling pain. (AR at 13.) The ALJ noted that Plaintiff could run 19 errands, drive, manage her personal care, wash dishes, prepare her 20 own meals, do laundry, vacuum, load the dishwasher, and shop for 21 groceries. (AR at 12-12.) Although a claimant does not need to be 22 utterly incapacitated in order to be disabled, Vertigan v. 23 Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001), the ability to perform 24 certain activities of daily life can support a finding that the 25 claimant s reports of his or her impairment are not fully credible. 26 See Bray v. Comm r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th 27 Cir. 2009); Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1990) 28 (finding that the claimant s ability to take care of her personal 7 1 needs, prepare easy meals, do light housework and shop for some 2 groceries ... may be seen as inconsistent with the presence of a 3 condition which would preclude all work activity ) (citing Fair, 4 885 F.2d at 604). 5 The ALJ made specific findings articulating clear and 6 convincing reasons for his rejection of Plaintiff s subjective 7 testimony. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996). It 8 is the responsibility of the ALJ to determine credibility and 9 resolve conflicts or ambiguities in the evidence. Magallanes v. 10 Brown, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). A reviewing court may not 11 second-guess 12 supported by substantial evidence in the record, as here. See Fair, 13 885 F.2d at 604. It was reasonable for the ALJ to rely on the 14 reasons stated above, each of which is fully supported by the 15 record, in rejecting the credibility of Plaintiff s subjective 16 complaints. In sum, the ALJ reasonably and properly discredited 17 Plaintiff s subjective testimony regarding the severity of her 18 symptoms as not being wholly credible. the ALJ s credibility determination when it is 19 B. 20 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly discounted the 21 statements of lay witness Bill Snyder. (Joint Stip. at 15.) On 22 February 14, 2008, Mr. Snyder, a friend of Plaintiff, completed a 23 Third 24 Plaintiff s abilities and daily activities. (AR at 184-191.) The 25 ALJ found that Mr. Snyder was not fully credible for the following 26 reasons: (1) the report merely mirrors Plaintiff s function 27 report 28 professional and therefore is not competent to make a diagnosis or The ALJ Properly Considered the Lay Witness s Statements Party and Function Report, allegations; (2) detailing Mr. 8 Snyder his is observations not a of medical 1 argue the severity of the claimant s symptoms in her relationship 2 to her ability to work; and (3) as Plaintiff s friend, he has the 3 camaraderie and pecuniary motivation to be helpful to the claimant 4 so she can receive benefits. (AR at 13.) 5 A lay witness can provide testimony about Plaintiff s symptoms 6 and limitations. See Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1467 (9th 7 Cir. 1996). Lay testimony as to a claimant s symptoms is competent 8 evidence that an ALJ must take into account, unless he or she 9 expressly determines to disregard such testimony and gives reasons 10 germane to each witness for doing so. Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 11 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 12 918-19 (9th Cir. 1993). Appropriate reasons include testimony 13 unsupported 14 inconsistent testimony. Lewis, 236 F.3d at 512. 15 by the medical record or other evidence and Although the ALJ has a duty to consider lay witness testimony, 16 the 17 individualized 18 testimony predicated upon reports of a claimant properly found not 19 credible. Molina v. Astrue, F.3d , 2012 WL 1071637 at *7 20 (9th Cir. April 2, 2012) (citing Valentine v. Astrue, 574 F.3d 685, 21 694 (9th Cir. 2009)). An ALJ s omission of lay testimony is 22 harmless when it is inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability 23 determination. Id. at *13 (citing Carmickle v. Comm r, Soc. Sec., 24 533 F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008)). ALJ is not required to address witness-by-witness basis, each and witness may on reject an lay 25 As discussed in detail above, the ALJ properly discredited 26 Plaintiff s testimony. Mr. Snyder s report provides essentially the 27 same 28 limitations as Plaintiff s testimony and does not describe any information regarding Plaintiff s 9 alleged symptoms and 1 limitations beyond those Plaintiff herself described. (See AR at 2 184-191.) Accordingly, the ALJ properly rejected the lay witness 3 report under the standards established in Molina. 2012 WL 1071637, 4 at *7; see also Valentine, 574 F.3d at 694 (holding that because 5 the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for rejecting [the 6 claimant s] 7 witness s] testimony was similar to such complaints, it follows 8 that the ALJ also gave germane reasons for rejecting [the lay 9 witness s] testimony ). Furthermore, to establish reversible error, 10 Plaintiff must specifically show that Mr. Snyder s testimony, if 11 credited, would alter the ultimate nondisability determination. Id. 12 at *9. (citing Robbins v. Barnhart, 466 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 13 2005) (reaffirming that an ALJ s decision will be reversed when 14 omitted lay testimony, if credited, leads to a different disability 15 conclusion)). Plaintiff has not made any such showing. 16 own subjective complaints, and because [the lay In addition, unlike lay testimony, there is no controlling 17 precedent 18 statements, such as the Third Party Function Report in this case. 19 Indeed, it is clear that an ALJ is not required to discuss all 20 evidence in the record in detail. Howard v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 21 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, Plaintiff s claim is 22 without merit. 23 // 24 // 25 // 26 // 27 // 28 // requiring an ALJ to 10 explicitly address written 1 IV. Conclusion 2 For the reasons stated above, the decision of the Social 3 Security Commissioner is AFFIRMED and the action is DISMISSED with 4 prejudice. 5 6 Dated: April 25, 2012 7 ______________________________ Marc L. Goldman United States Magistrate Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
