Frank W Valva v. Michael J Astrue, No. 5:2011cv01004 - Document 15 (C.D. Cal. 2012)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OF DECISION by Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Wistrich. See document for details. (yb)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 EASTERN DIVISION 11 12 13 14 15 16 FRANK W. VALVA, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, ) Commissioner of the Social ) Security Administration, ) ) Defendant. ) _____________________________________) Case No. EDCV 11-01004 AJW MEMORANDUM OF DECISION 17 Plaintiff filed this action seeking reversal of the decision of defendant, the Commissioner of the 18 Social Security Administration (the Commissioner ), denying plaintiff s application for supplemental 19 security income ( SSI ) benefits. The parties have filed a Joint Stipulation ( JS ) setting forth their 20 contentions with respect to each disputed issue. 21 Administrative Proceedings 22 Plaintiff filed his application for benefits on March 16, 2007, alleging that he had been disabled 23 since1999 due to paranoia, schizophrenia, hearing voices, and depression. [JS 2; Administrative Record 24 ( AR ) 169]. In a September 15, 2009 hearing decision that constitutes the Commissioner s final decision 25 in this matter, an administrative law judge ( ALJ ) found that plaintiff had a psychotic disorder that was 26 severe. [AR 19]. The ALJ found plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity ( RFC ) to perform work 27 at all exertional levels, and that he had nonexertional mental limitations restricting him to unskilled, 28 1 nondetailed tasks requiring one and two-part instructions in a nonpublic setting. [AR 20]. The ALJ found 2 that plaintiff s RFC did not preclude him from performing work available in significant numbers in the 3 national economy. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff was not disabled. [AR 24-25]. 4 Standard of Review 5 The Commissioner s denial of benefits should be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial 6 evidence or is based on legal error. Stout v. Comm r, Social Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 7 2006); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence means more than 8 a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 9 2005). It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 10 Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005)(internal quotation marks omitted). The court is 11 required to review the record as a whole and to consider evidence detracting from the decision as well as 12 evidence supporting the decision. Robbins v. Social Sec. Admin, 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006); 13 Verduzco v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 1999). Where the evidence is susceptible to more than 14 one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ's decision, the ALJ's conclusion must be upheld. 15 Thomas, 278 F.3d at 954 (citing Morgan v. Comm r of Social Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th 16 Cir.1999)). 17 Discussion 18 Nonexamining physician s opinion 19 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly ignored a limitation to low-stress work found in the 20 opinion of nonexamining state agency physician H. Amado, M.D. 21 Dr. Amado completed a Psychiatric Review Technique ( PRT ) form and a Mental RFC Assessment 22 form. [AR 342-356]. The PRT form includes a section with the heading Consultant s Notes containing 23 a narrative assessment. [AR 352]. In the second paragraph of that section, Dr. Amado wrote that the 24 evidence of record supports the existence of a mental impairment that would not preclude at least unskilled 25 work activity in a low-stress, non-public setting. [AR 352]. In an Addendum dated August 13, 2007, 26 Dr. Amado noted that the first two paragraphs in that section had been written earlier, on July 26, 2007, and 27 that additional treating source medical evidence subsequently had been received and reviewed. Dr. Amado 28 stated that the prior recommendation for SRT/NP [simple repetitive tasks/non-public] work activity is 2 1 unchanged by the additional evidence received. [AR 352 (alteration and footnoted added)]. 2 On reconsideration, a nonexamining state agency psychiatrist, Barbara Smith, M.D., concluded that 3 plaintiff is capable of performing unskilled non[-]detailed tasks requiring one and two part instructions in 4 a non[-]public setting. [AR 399]. Dr. Smith also said that she had reviewed all the evidence in the file 5 and the assessment of 8/13/2007 is affirmed as written. [AR 399]. 6 In his summary of the evidence from the State Agency review psychiatrists, the ALJ, citing Dr. 7 Smith s report, said that plaintiff would be capable of performing unskilled, nondetailed tasks requiring 8 one-and two-part instructions in a nonpublic setting. [AR 23 (citing AR 399)]. The ALJ did not mention 9 a limitation to a low-stress setting or cite specifically to Dr. Amado s opinion containing that limitation. 10 The ALJ concluded that the State Agency opinion [is] more consistent with the record as a whole and 11 gave the greatest weight to the opinion of the State Agency. [AR 23]. 12 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in ignoring the limitation to low-stress work that appears in 13 Dr. Amado s narrative assessment on the PRT. Plaintiff argues that this omission was error because the ALJ 14 had an obligation to explain the weight he gave Dr. Amado s opinion, and because Dr. Smith incorporated 15 and adopted the opinions of Dr. Amado. [JS 6]. 16 An ALJ is not bound by any findings made by State agency medical or psychological consultants 17 but must consider and evaluate their findings using the relevant factors in paragraphs (a) through (e) of [20 18 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.927], such as the consultant's medical specialty and expertise in our rules, the 19 supporting evidence in the case record, supporting explanations the medical or psychological consultant 20 provides, and any other factors relevant to the weighing of the opinions, and must explain in the decision 21 the weight given to the opinions of a State agency medical or psychological consultant . . . . 20 C.F.R. §§ 22 404.1527(f)(2)(i), 416.927(f)(2)(i); see also SSR 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180, at *1-*2; Sawyer v. Astrue, 303 23 Fed. Appx. 453, 455 (9th Cir.2008) ( An ALJ is required to consider as opinion evidence the findings of 24 state agency medical consultants; the ALJ is also required to explain in his decision the weight given to such 25 opinions. ). 26 The ALJ s failure to acknowledge or adopt Dr. Amado s limitation to work in a low-stress setting 27 was not legal error. Dr. Amado s opinion is somewhat ambiguous. On July 26, 2007, Dr. Amado found 28 that plaintiff was restricted to work in a low-stress, nonpublic setting, but on August 13, 2007, Dr. Amado 3 1 said that the prior recommendation for [simple repetitive tasks/nonpublic] work activity is unchanged . . 2 . . [AR 352]. Dr. Amado s use of these two formulations interchangeably to describe plaintiff s RFC 3 suggests that the limitation to work in a low-stress setting was cumulative and not material. 4 That conclusion is bolstered by Dr. Smith s opinion. She opined that plaintiff was capable of work 5 in a nonpublic setting, and she also said that she was affirming Dr. Amado s opinion as written. [AR 299]. 6 Those statements are reconcilable only if Dr. Smith concluded that her assessment adequately captured the 7 limitations Dr. Amado described Given Dr. Amado s use of the simple repetitive tasks/nonpublic 8 formulation, that interpretation of Dr. Amado s opinion was reasonable. Burch, 400 F.3d at 679 ( Where 9 evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ's conclusion that must be 10 upheld. ). 11 Even if Dr. Smith misinterpreted Dr. Amado s opinion, Dr. Smith s opinion constitutes substantial 12 evidence supporting the ALJ s RFC assessment. Dr. Smith said that she reviewed all the evidence in 13 [plaintiff s] file, and she unequivocally found that plaintiff could perform unskilled, nondetailed tasks 14 requiring one or two part instructions in a nonpublic setting. [AR 399]. See Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957 ( The 15 opinions of . . . non-examining physicians may also serve as substantial evidence when the opinions are 16 consistent with independent clinical findings or other evidence in the record. ). Accordingly, plaintiff s 17 contentions lack merit.1 Conclusion 18 The Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence and is free of legal error. 19 20 Accordingly, the Commissioner's decision is affirmed. 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 April 24, 2012 23 _________________________ ANDREW J. WISTRICH United States Magistrate Judge 24 25 26 27 28 1 Additionally, plaintiff does not contend that any of the jobs identified by the ALJ to support his finding of nondisability at step five (bus cleaner, nut sorter, and cleaner [AR 24]) would be precluded even if the ALJ erred in failing to include a limitation to work in a low-stress setting. 4
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