Javier Mancilla Luna v. Michael J Astrue, No. 5:2011cv00758 - Document 21 (C.D. Cal. 2012)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Marc L. Goldman: The decision of the Commissioner is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings. (See document for details.) Accordingly, the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and order. (rla)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 EASTERN DIVISION 9 10 JAVIER MANCILLA LUNA, Plaintiff, 11 12 13 14 v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, 15 Defendant. 16 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. EDCV 11-00758-MLG MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 17 18 Plaintiff Javier 19 Commissioner s 20 Security Disability Insurance ( DIB ) benefits. For the reasons stated 21 below, the decision of the Commissioner is reversed, and the matter is 22 remanded for further proceedings. final Mancilla decision Luna seeks denying his judicial review application for of the Social 23 24 I. Background 25 Plaintiff was born on October 21, 1965. (Administrative Record 26 ( AR ) at 20, 113.) He completed twelve years of education in Mexico and 27 has no other educational or vocational training. (AR at 20.) Plaintiff 28 has work experience performing door and cabinet installation and R.V. 1 assembly. (AR at 19.) 2 Plaintiff filed an application for benefits on March 7, 2008, 3 alleging that he had been disabled since November 30, 2006, due to a 4 spinal injury. (AR at 124.) Plaintiff s application was denied initially 5 on May 2, 2008, and upon reconsideration on September 3, 2008. (AR at 6 40-44, 48-52.) An administrative hearing was held on January 28, 2010, 7 before 8 Plaintiff 9 hearing, as did a vocational expert. (AR 465-484.) Administrative was Law represented Judge by ( ALJ ) counsel. Jesse J. Plaintiff Pease at testified which at the 10 On March 11, 2010, ALJ Pease denied Plaintiff s application for 11 benefits. (AR at 7-21.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in 12 substantial gainful activity during the period at issue. (AR at 15.) The 13 ALJ further found that the medical evidence established that Plaintiff 14 suffered from the severe impairment of status-post posterolateral fusion 15 L4 to the sacrum with pedicle screws bilaterally at L4, L5 and S1 and 16 repeat decompression laminotomy at L4-L5 bilaterally. (Id.) The ALJ 17 concluded that Plaintiff s impairments did not meet, or were not 18 medically equal to, one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R., Part 19 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Id.) The ALJ next found that Plaintiff 20 retained the residual functional capacity to perform light work as 21 defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) with the following exceptions: 22 the claimant can lift and/or carry 20 pounds occasionally and 23 10 pounds frequently; he can stand and/or walk for six hours 24 out of an eight-hour workday with regular breaks; he can sit 25 for six hours out of an eight-hour workday with regular 26 breaks; he must be allowed to change positions every 30 27 minutes for up to 10 minutes; he can perform occasional 28 postural activities; and he understands and speaks very little 2 1 2 English. (Id.) 3 The ALJ determined that Plaintiff was unable to perform his past 4 relevant work. (AR at 19.) However, the ALJ found that there were jobs 5 that 6 Plaintiff could perform, such as garment sorter, hand packager, and 7 bench assembly. (AR at 20-21.) The ALJ concluded, therefore, that 8 Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security 9 Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f). exist in significant numbers in the national economy that 10 On March 25, 2011, the Appeals Council denied review (AR at 1-3) 11 and Plaintiff timely commenced this action for judicial review. On 12 March 5, 2012, the parties filed a Joint Stipulation ( Joint Stip. ) 13 of disputed facts and issues. Plaintiff contends that (1) the ALJ s 14 residual 15 substantial 16 credibility determination. (Joint Stip. at 3.) Plaintiff seeks remand 17 for 18 Commissioner requests that the ALJ s decision be affirmed. (Joint 19 Stip. at 18.) a functional capacity evidence; new and administrative (2) assessment the hearing. ALJ is not failed (Joint to Stip. supported make at a by proper 17.) The 20 21 II. Standard of Review 22 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the 23 Commissioner s decision to deny benefits. The Commissioner s or ALJ s 24 decision must be upheld unless the ALJ s findings are based on legal 25 error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a 26 whole. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1990); Parra 27 v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence 28 means such evidence as a reasonable person might accept as adequate to 3 1 support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); 2 Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006). It is more 3 than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Robbins v. Soc. Sec. 4 Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006). To determine whether 5 substantial evidence supports a finding, the reviewing court must 6 review 7 evidence 8 Commissioner s conclusion. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th 9 Cir. 1996). If the evidence can support either affirming or reversing 10 the ALJ s conclusion, the reviewing court may not substitute its 11 judgment for that of the ALJ. Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882. the administrative that supports record and the as a whole, evidence that weighing both the detracts from the 12 13 14 III. Discussion A. 15 16 The ALJ Improperly Discredited Plaintiff s Subjective Symptom Testimony Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly discredited his 17 subjective symptom testimony. (Joint Stip. at 11.) To determine 18 whether a claimant s testimony about subjective pain or symptoms is 19 credible, an ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis. Vasquez v. 20 Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Lingenfelter v. 21 Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007)). First, the ALJ must 22 determine 23 evidence 24 expected to produce the alleged pain or other symptoms. Lingenfelter, 25 504 F.3d at 1036. [O]nce the claimant produces objective medical 26 evidence of an underlying impairment, an adjudicator may not reject a 27 claimant s subjective complaints based solely on a lack of objective 28 medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity of pain. whether of an the claimant underlying has impairment 4 presented which objective could medical reasonably be 1 Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). To 2 the extent that an individual s claims of functional limitations and 3 restrictions due to alleged pain is reasonably consistent with the 4 objective 5 claimant s allegations will be credited. SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186 at 6 *2 (explaining 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(4), 416.929(c)(4)).1 medical evidence and other evidence in the case, the 7 Unless there is affirmative evidence showing that the claimant is 8 malingering, the ALJ must provide specific, clear and convincing 9 reasons for discrediting a claimant s complaints. Robbins, 466 F.3d at 10 883. General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify 11 what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the 12 claimant s complaints. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722 (quoting Lester v. 13 Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1996)). The ALJ must consider a 14 claimant s work record, observations of medical providers and third 15 parties with knowledge of claimant s limitations, aggravating factors, 16 functional restrictions caused by symptoms, effects of medication, and 17 the claimant s daily activities. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1283- 18 84 & n.8 (9th Cir. 1996). The ALJ may also consider an unexplained 19 failure to seek treatment or follow a prescribed course of treatment 20 and employ other ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation. Id. 21 (citations omitted). 22 Plaintiff testified to the following at the administrative 23 hearing: He has pain in his low back and both legs. He can stand for 24 only 10 to 15 minutes before he has to sit; he can walk for only 25 to 25 26 27 28 1 The Secretary issues Social Security Rulings to clarify the Secretary s regulations and policy .... Although SSRs are not published in the federal register and do not have the force of law, [the Ninth Circuit] nevertheless give[s] deference to the Secretary s interpretation of its regulations. Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 346 n.3. 5 1 30 minutes before he has to rest; and he can sit for only 20 to 25 2 minutes before he has to change positions for 5 or 10 minutes. He can 3 lift at most 15 to 20 pounds. He has to lie down four or five times 4 every day for 15 to 20 minutes at a time because of the pain and 5 because his pain medication makes him sleepy. (AR at 471-475.) Here, 6 the ALJ found that Plaintiff s medical impairments could reasonably be 7 expected to produce the alleged symptoms. (AR at 16.) He was therefore 8 required 9 rejecting Plaintiff s subjective allegations of pain and functional 10 11 to provide specific, clear and convincing reasons for limitations. However, the ALJ did not provide any specific reasons for 12 rejecting Plaintiff s testimony, but rather merely stated that the 13 objective medical evidence did not support the alleged severity of 14 Plaintiff s symptoms and limitations, without specifying what medical 15 evidence in the record contradicts Plaintiff s subjective complaints. 16 (AR at 16-17.) This was error. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 17 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that lack of medical evidence cannot form 18 the sole basis for discounting pain testimony ). Although the medical 19 evidence is a relevant factor in determining the severity of the 20 claimant s pain and its disabling effects, once a claimant produces 21 objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment, an ALJ may 22 not reject a claimant s subjective complaints based solely on lack of 23 objective medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity 24 of pain. Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 856-57 (9th Cir. 2001). 25 Here, the ALJ provided no other reason for discrediting 26 Plaintiff s testimony other than that it was not supported by the 27 objective medical evidence. Because the sole reason given by the ALJ 28 for failing to credit Plaintiff s testimony regarding his symptoms and 6 1 related 2 Plaintiff is entitled to relief on this claim. 3 B. limitations was not supported by substantial evidence, The ALJ Failed to Properly Assess Plaintiff s RFC 4 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to properly consider the 5 medical evidence in assessing his RFC. (Joint Stip. at 4.) Plaintiff 6 argues that the ALJ s assessment that he is capable of standing and/or 7 walking and sitting for up to six hours out of an eight-hour work day 8 is not supported by the medical evidence or by Plaintiff s testimony. 9 (Id. at 5.) 10 A claimant s RFC is what he is capable of doing despite his 11 physical and mental limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1); Cooper v. 12 Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989). RFC is an 13 assessment of an individual s ability to do sustained work-related 14 physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and 15 continuing basis. SSR 9608p, 1996 WL 374184, at *1 (S.S.A. July 2, 16 1996). An RFC assessment is ultimately an administrative finding 17 reserved to the Commissioner, based on all of the relevant evidence, 18 including the diagnoses, treatment, observations, and opinions of 19 medical sources, such as treating and examining physicians. 20 C.F.R. 20 § 404.1527(e)(2). 21 In support of the RFC assessment, the ALJ cited opinions from two 22 of Plaintiff s treating physicians, Drs. Christopher H. Fleming, M.D. 23 and Dr. Neil J. Halbridge, M.D. (AR at 18-19.) Both Dr. Fleming and 24 Dr. Halbridge, who treated Plaintiff in the context of his worker s 25 compensation claim, determined that Plaintiff was precluded from 26 prolonged sitting, standing or walking. (Id. citing AR at 249, 268, 27 346.) In concluding that Plaintiff was able to sit, stand and/or walk 28 for six hours out of an eight-hour workday, the ALJ stated that 7 1 Plaintiff must be allowed to change positions every 30 minutes for up 2 to 10 minutes. (AR at 16.) 3 There is insufficient medical evidence in the record to support 4 the ALJ s RFC assessment, which found that Plaintiff could sit, stand 5 and/or walk for six hours out of an eight-hour work day if he were 6 allowed to change positions for up to 10 minutes every 30 minutes. 7 Each of the physicians who treated Plaintiff, Drs. Halbridge, Fleming 8 and Dr. David Siambanes, D.O., concluded that Plaintiff was precluded 9 from prolonged sitting, standing and walking. None of these medical 10 opinions cited by the ALJ ever noted that Plaintiff would be able to 11 walk, sit and/or stand for six hours out of an eight-hour workday if 12 he were allowed to change positions for 10 minutes every thirty 13 minutes. 14 Although Dr. Fleming did state in a June 5, 2007 report that 15 Plaintiff should avoid prolonged sitting or prolonged standing and 16 walking for more than one hour at a time or 4 hours, in an 8-hour day 17 without the ability to change positions (AR at 268), he never opined 18 that changing positions for 10 minutes every thirty minutes would 19 enable Plaintiff to sit, stand and/or walk for six out of eight hours. 20 In fact, Dr. Fleming specifically limited Plaintiff to sitting, 21 standing and/or walking for no more than four hours out of an eight- 22 hour day. (Id.) 23 Furthermore, six months later, on December 3, 2007, Dr. Fleming 24 stated that he agree[d] with Dr. Siambanes that preclusion against 25 heavy work as well as prolonged sitting and prolonged standing and 26 walking is appropriate. (AR at 249, citing AR at 232.) In addition, 27 two years later, on November 17, 2009, Dr. Halbridge, in agreement 28 with Dr. Fleming s December 3, 2007 report, concluded that Plaintiff 8 1 could not perform any prolonged sitting or prolonged standing or 2 prolonged walking. (AR at 346.) None of the more recent medical 3 opinions concluded that Plaintiff would be able to sustain prolonged 4 sitting, standing and walking if he were allowed to change positions 5 for 10 minutes every 30 minutes. 6 Accordingly, the Court agrees with Plaintiff s contention that 7 the ALJ improperly determined Plaintiff s RFC because the medical 8 evidence cited by the ALJ does not support the RFC assessment. 9 10 IV. Conclusion 11 The decision whether to remand for further proceedings is within 12 this Court s discretion. Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1175-78 (9th 13 Cir. 2000). Where no useful purpose would be served by further 14 administrative 15 developed, it is appropriate to exercise this discretion to direct an 16 immediate award of benefits. Id. at 1179 ( [T]he decision of whether 17 to remand for further proceedings turns upon the likely utility of 18 such proceedings. ); Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 19 2004). However, where there are outstanding issues that must be 20 resolved before a determination of disability can be made, and it is 21 not clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find the 22 claimant disabled if all the evidence were properly evaluated, remand 23 is appropriate. Bunnell v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 1112, 1115-16 (9th Cir. 24 2003); see also Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2003) 25 (remanding case for reconsideration of credibility determination). 26 // 27 // 28 // proceedings, or where 9 the record has been fully 1 Here, the ALJ failed to explain with sufficient specificity the 2 basis for his determination that Plaintiff was not fully credible and 3 failed to properly assess Plaintiff s RFC. Accordingly, the case is 4 remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and 5 order. 6 7 DATED: March 13, 2012 8 9 10 11 ______________________________ Marc L. Goldman United States Magistrate Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
