Chutima Uthes Sutton v. Michael J. Astrue, No. 5:2011cv00424 - Document 20 (C.D. Cal. 2012)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Patrick J. Walsh: For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is reversed and the case is remanded to the Agency for the limited purpose of: (1) calculating Plaintiff's benefits for t he closed period and awarding those benefits; and (2) allowing the ALJ to explain how he determined in 2007 that Plaintiffs disability prevented her from working during the closed period but not thereafter despite the fact that her residual functional capacity remain unchanged. IT IS SO ORDERED. **PLEASE REVIEW DOCUMENT FOR FULL AND COMPLETE DETAILS** (ca)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 CHUTIMA UTHES SUTTON, Plaintiff, 11 12 13 14 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Defendant. 15 Case No. ED CV 11-424-PJW MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 16 17 I. 18 INTRODUCTION 19 This case is before the Court a second time, following an order 20 of remand with directions to the Agency for further proceedings 21 consistent with the Court s order. 22 40.) 23 Administrative Law Judge ( ALJ ) failed to follow the Court s remand 24 order. 25 decision is reversed and the Agency is ordered to calculate an award 26 of benefits for the closed period from October 30, 2003 to November 27 16, 2005. 28 for his previous finding that Plaintiff was unable to work during the (Administrative Record ( AR ) 327- Plaintiff complains that, after the Court remanded the case, the For the following reasons, the Court agrees. The ALJ s In addition, the ALJ is again ordered to explain the basis 1 closed period but was able to work thereafter despite the fact that 2 the ALJ found that Plaintiff s residual functional capacity remained 3 the same throughout the entire period. 4 II. 5 ANALYSIS 6 Because the Court has already issued a detailed decision 7 explaining the facts and law in this case, see Sutton v. Astrue, ED CV 8 08-1659-PJW, (AR 327-40), it need not repeat them here. 9 say that, after the ALJ issued a decision granting Plaintiff s Suffice it to 10 application for disability insurance benefits for a closed period and 11 denying benefits for the period that followed, Plaintiff appealed to 12 this court alleging that the ALJ erred when he: 1) found that her 13 medical condition had improved after November 16, 2005; 2) failed to 14 properly consider her and her husband s testimony; and 3) used the 15 Grids at step five. 16 remanded the case to the Agency to allow the ALJ to: (1) explain how 17 he determined that Plaintiff was unable to work during the closed 18 period but could work thereafter despite the fact that the ALJ had 19 determined that her residual functional capacity was the same before 20 and after; and (2) reconsider Plaintiff s testimony and consider for 21 the first time her husband s testimony. 22 chose not to appeal and, therefore, the Court s remand order was 23 binding on the Agency. The Court agreed with Plaintiff in part and (AR 327-40.) The Agency 24 On remand, the ALJ inexplicably reconsidered his decision that 25 Plaintiff was disabled during the closed period and this time found 26 that she was not. 27 in toto. 28 constitutes error. As a result, he denied her application for benefits This was inconsistent with the order of remand and See Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 885-886 2 1 (1989); see Ischay v. Barnhart, 383 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1213-1217, 1224 2 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (holding under the law of the case doctrine and the 3 broader rule of mandate the ALJ abused his discretion by going 4 beyond the issue identified in the district court s remand order, 5 taking evidence on additional issues, produc[ing] a third decision 6 out of whole cloth, and denying benefits on remand at step four when 7 the remand order did not authorize the ALJ to disturb or revisit his 8 step-four determination); see also Ruiz v. Apfel, 24 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 9 1050 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (remanding for further administrative proceed- 10 ings where the remand order makes it very plain that the remand was 11 for a limited purpose, and there was no basis for the ALJ to review 12 issues that had been determined in plaintiff s favor and not 13 appealed). As the Supreme Court explained in Sullivan: 14 Where a court finds that the Secretary has committed a legal 15 or factual error in evaluating a particular claim, the 16 district court s remand order will often include detailed 17 instructions concerning the scope of the remand, the 18 evidence to be adduced, and the legal or factual issues to 19 be addressed. 20 order in the subsequent administrative proceedings is itself 21 legal error, subject to reversal on further judicial review. 22 23 . . . Deviation from the court s remand Sullivan, 490 U.S. at 885-86 (citations omitted). The ALJ s decision is hereby reversed and the case is remanded to 24 the Agency for a calculation of benefits for the closed period. 25 addition, the ALJ is again ordered to explain the basis for his 26 conclusion in 2007 that, based on Plaintiff s residual functional 27 capacity, she was unable to work from October 2003 to November 2005, 28 3 In 1 but that, with the same residual functional capacity, she was able to 2 work thereafter. 3 As a result of the Court s ruling above, Plaintiff s second 4 issue--that the ALJ failed to properly consider the medical expert s 5 and the vocational expert s testimony at the second hearing--is moot. 6 The remaining issue raised by Plaintiff has to do with the ALJ s 7 credibility findings. 8 because: she was not taking pain medication to deal with her alleged 9 severe pain; the record disclosed that she had exaggerated her claims 10 of pain; she was able to play golf despite claims of intolerable pain; 11 and the medical records did not support her claimed level of pain and 12 incapacity. 13 He found that Plaintiff was not credible (AR 320.) The Court assesses this finding in light of the ALJ s obvious 14 effort to countermand the order of this Court. 15 factual basis for each of his findings and the law supports the ALJ s 16 discounting of her testimony on these grounds. 17 Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (claimant s testimony 18 about her activities undermined her claims of disabling pain); Meanel 19 v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 1999) (claimant s failure to 20 seek treatment for supposedly excruciating pain was proper basis for 21 rejecting her testimony); and Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 22 (9th Cir. 2005) (ALJ can consider lack of medical evidence as a factor 23 in determining credibility). 24 Plaintiff was not credible is affirmed. 25 Even so, there is a See Rollins v. As such, the ALJ s finding that Plaintiff argues that the ALJ also erred when he rejected parts 26 of her husband s testimony. Again, the Court disagrees. 27 witness, the ALJ was only required to set forth reasons that were 28 germane to the husband for discounting his testimony. 4 As a lay Dodrill v. 1 Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 1993). The ALJ noted that the 2 husband s statement that his wife regularly played golf and performed 3 numerous household chores was inconsistent with his other statements 4 that she suffered from disabling pain. 5 supported by the record and are germane to the husband s testimony. 6 Therefore, the ALJ s finding that parts of the husband s testimony 7 were not believable will not be disturbed. (AR 320.) 8 III. 9 These reasons are CONCLUSION 10 For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ s decision is reversed 11 and the case is remanded to the Agency for the limited purpose of: 12 (1) calculating Plaintiff s benefits for the closed period and 13 awarding those benefits; and (2) allowing the ALJ to explain how he 14 determined in 2007 that Plaintiff s disability prevented her from 15 working during the closed period but not thereafter despite the fact 16 that her residual functional capacity remain unchanged. 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 DATED: January 12, 2012. 19 20 21 22 _______________________________ PATRICK J. WALSH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 23 24 25 26 27 28 S:\PJW\Cases-Soc Sec\SUTTON, 424\memo and order.wpd 5
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