Kimberly Sumner v. Michael J Astrue, No. 5:2010cv01125 - Document 17 (C.D. Cal. 2011)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Marc L. Goldman: For the reasons stated below, the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed. (See document for details.) (rla)
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Kimberly Sumner v. Michael J Astrue Doc. 17 1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 EASTERN DIVISION 8 9 KIMBERLY SUMNER, 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. 12 13 MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, 14 Defendant. 15 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. EDCV 10-1125-MLG MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 16 17 Plaintiff Kimberly Sumner seeks judicial review of the Social 18 Security Commissioner’s denial of her application for Supplemental 19 Security Income benefits(“SSI”) pursuant to XVI of the Social 20 Security Act. For the reasons stated below, the decision of the 21 Commissioner is affirmed. 22 23 I. 24 Facts and Procedural Background Plaintiff was born on November 5, 1969. She completed tenth 25 grade 26 (Administrative Record (“AR”) at 127, 133, 136.) Plaintiff filed an 27 application for SSI on May 30, 2007, alleging disability as of 28 December 1, 2005, due to “leg syndrome, depression, anxiety and and has worked as a care giver and cashier clerk. 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 stress.” (AR at 132.) Her application was denied initially and upon 2 reconsideration. (AR at 66, 74.) An administrative hearing was held 3 on July 17, 2009, before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Lowell 4 Fortune. (AR at 24-63.) Plaintiff was represented by counsel and 5 testified on her own behalf. A vocational expert (“VE”) also 6 testified at the hearing. 7 ALJ Fortune issued an unfavorable decision on September 23, 8 2009. (AR at 10-23.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged 9 in substantial gainful activity since the date of her application 10 and suffered from 11 psoriasis, right knee disorder, osteoporosis, migraine headaches, 12 pain in the hands and fingers, and dysthymia. (AR at 12.) These 13 severe impairments, alone or in combination, did not meet the 14 requirements of a listed impairment found in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 15 Subpart P, Appendix 1. (AR at 12-13.) The ALJ determined that 16 Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to 17 perform less than a full range of light activity, specifically, 18 that she could: lift and/or carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 19 pounds frequently, stand and/or walk for two hours in an eight hour 20 workday, occasionally climb ramps and stairs, and perform frequent 21 postural activities. The ALJ further found that Plaintiff cannot 22 climb ladders, ropes and scaffolds, and is precluded from work 23 requiring a “high-quota production rate pace.” (AR at 14-20.) Based 24 on this RFC and testimony from the VE, the ALJ concluded that 25 Plaintiff 26 generally performed in the national economy, but not as she 27 performed it. (AR at 20-21.) Based on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ 28 concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled because there were a could the perform following past severe relevant 2 impairments: work as a vulvar cashier as 1 significant 2 perform in the national and local economy. In the alternative, the 3 ALJ asked the VE whether there were jobs that Plaintiff could 4 perform 5 Plaintiff’s RFC permitted her to work as an information clerk, 6 general office clerk, and order clerk. Based on this testimony and 7 using 8 Subpart P, App. 2, Rule 201 ("the grids"), as a framework for 9 decision, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled because 10 there were a significant number of jobs in the national and local 11 economy that Plaintiff could perform. (AR at 21-22.) 12 number in the of addition cashier to positions cashier, Medical-Vocational and that the Guidelines, Plaintiff VE 20 could testified C.F.R. Part that 404, The Appeals Council denied review on June 22, 2010, and 13 Plaintiff commenced this action on July 29, 2010. Plaintiff 14 contends that the ALJ failed to afford proper consideration to the 15 treating physician’s opinion that Plaintiff could not work. (Joint 16 Stip. at 2-5.) 17 18 19 II. Standard of Review Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the 20 Commissioner’s 21 decision must be upheld unless “the ALJ’s findings are based on 22 legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the 23 record as a whole.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 24 1999); 25 Substantial evidence means more than a scintilla, but less than a 26 preponderance; it is evidence that a reasonable person might accept 27 as adequate to support a conclusion. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 28 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007)(citing Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Parra decision v. Astrue, to deny 481 benefits. F.3d 3 742, 746 The Commissioner’s (9th Cir. 2007). 1 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006)). To determine whether 2 substantial evidence supports a finding, the reviewing court “must 3 review the administrative record as a whole, weighing both the 4 evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the 5 Commissioner’s conclusion.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 6 (9th Cir. 1996). “If the evidence can support either affirming 7 or reversing the ALJ’s conclusion,” the reviewing court “may not 8 substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.” Robbins, 466 F.3d at 9 882. 10 11 III. The ALJ Properly Rejected the Treating Physician’s Opinion on 12 an Issue Reserved to the Commissioner 13 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly rejected on opinion 14 by her treating physician, Dr. Vidhya Koka, that she is unable to 15 work due to a chronic condition. (Joint Stip. at 3.) On August 27, 16 2007, Dr. Koka filled out the "Statement of Provider" portion of a 17 one-page county public assistance form. (AR at 206.) He checked a 18 “Yes” box indicating that Plaintiff has a medically verifiable 19 condition that limits performance of certain tasks. He further 20 indicated, again by checking a box, that her condition was chronic 21 and that she was seeking treatment “as needed.” Dr. Koka checked 22 the "No" box when asked if Plaintiff was able to work. (Id.) 23 Although the ALJ adopted several of Dr. Koka’s medical diagnoses 24 expressed in other portions of Plaintiff’s medical records, the ALJ 25 considered and rejected Dr. Koka’s conclusory “check-box” opinion 26 that she could not work because the alleged chronic condition was 27 unspecified, 28 findings to support the conclusory assertion, and the opinion was there were no objective 4 clinical or diagnostic 1 provided on an issue that is reserved to the Commissioner. (AR at 2 18.) Plaintiff claims this was error, and the ALJ should have re- 3 contacted Dr. Koka to obtain clarification or additional evidence. 4 (Joint Stip. at 3-4.) 5 A treating physician's medically supported opinion regarding 6 the nature and severity of a disability claimant's impairments is 7 generally given great weight. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); Orn v. 8 Astrue, 495 F.3d 625 (9th Cir. 2007); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 9 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). Even if a treating doctor's opinion is 10 contradicted, an ALJ may disregard it only by giving specific and 11 legitimate reasons for doing so that are supported by substantial 12 evidence in the record. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1148 13 (9th Cir. 2001); Reddick, 157 at 725. 14 Nonetheless, the ultimate determination of disability (i.e. 15 whether a claimant can perform work in the national economy) rests 16 solely with the Commissioner, and a physician's statement that a 17 claimant is "unable to work" is not entitled to special weight. 20 18 C.F.R. 416.927(e); see Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1148-49 (ALJ not 19 bound by opinion of treating physician with respect to ultimate 20 determination of disability); Martinez v. Astrue, 261 Fed.Appx 33, 21 35 (9th Cir. 2007) ("[T]he opinion that [the claimant] is unable to 22 work is not a medical opinion...[and] is therefore not accorded the 23 weight of a medical opinion."). Moreover, an ALJ need not accept 24 the opinion of any medical source, including a treating medical 25 source, "if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately 26 supported by clinical findings." Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 27 957 (9th Cir. 2002); accord Tonapetyan 242 F.3d at 1149. 28 // 5 1 Here, the ALJ's reasons for rejecting the opinion contained in 2 the August 27, 2007, county public assistance form are both legally 3 sound and supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ correctly 4 noted the conclusory nature of Dr. Koka’s opinion that Plaintiff 5 could not work. (AR at 18.) Indeed, in the same form Dr. Koka 6 opinion that Plaintiff could not work, she indicated that Plaintiff 7 has no limitations that affect her ability to participate in 8 education and training, that Plaintiff’s condition does not prevent 9 her from caring for her children in the home, and that Plaintiff 10 does not need someone to be in the home to care for her. (AR at 11 206.) Thus, despite the brief “opinion” that Plaintiff cannot work, 12 Dr. Koka did not identify any functional limitations cause by 13 Plaintiff’s medical impairments. See Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 14 1428, 1432 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding no error where the ALJ rejected 15 treating physician's opinion that claimant was disabled due to 16 physician's failure to specify functional limitations); Crane v. 17 Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 253 (9th Cir. 1996) (an ALJ need not accord 18 weight to unexplained "check-off reports"). Moreover, nowhere in 19 Dr. Koka’s treatment records is there any indication of functional 20 limitations caused by her medical conditions. (See AR at 215-47.)In 21 addition, an examination of the records reveals that the ALJ’s 22 conclusion that Dr. Koka provided routine, conservative care is 23 supported by the record and belies his “no work” opinion. (See AR 24 at 18, 215-47.) Thus, the ALJ’s conclusion that the “unable to 25 work” opinion is inconsistent with the medical record was sound, 26 and the ALJ’s rejection of it was proper. 27 Finally, Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ should have re- 28 contacted Dr. Koka for clarification or additional evidence is not 6 1 persuasive. Plaintiff points to 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(e), which 2 states, in relevant part: "When the evidence we receive from your 3 treating...medical source is inadequate for us to determine whether 4 you 5 treating...medical source to determine whether the additional 6 information we need is readily available." However, this is not a 7 case where the evidence was inadequate to assess Dr. Koka’s check- 8 box opinion or make a disability determination. As noted above, 9 there were consistent records from Dr. Koka for the time Plaintiff 10 was under her care. (See AR at 215-47.) The fact that the medical 11 records do not support Dr. Koka’s conclusory “no work” opinion does 12 not render the records ambiguous such that the ALJ’s duty to 13 supplement the record was triggered. Instead, Dr. Koka’s opinion on 14 the ultimate issue of disability was simply not supported by the 15 record. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in rejecting Dr. Koka’s 16 check-box opinion without recontacting him for clarification. are disabled," the Commissioner "will recontact your 17 18 19 20 IV. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, the decision of the Commissioner affirmed and this matter is dismissed with prejudice. 21 22 Dated: February 7, 2011 23 24 ______________________________ Marc L. Goldman United States Magistrate Judge 25 26 27 28 7
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